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A bstract
In this thesis I address certain key issues in contemporary philosophy 
of mind and psychology via a study of Jerry Fodor's hugely important 
contributions to the discussion of those issues. The issues in question 
are; (i) the nature of scientific psychology; (ii) the individuation of 
psychological states for the purposes of scientific psychological 
explanation; and (iii) the project of naturalising mental content. I 
criticise many of Fodor's most significant and provocative claims but 
from w ithin a framework of shared assumptions. I attem pt to 
motivate and justify many of these shared assumptions.
Chapter 1 constitutes an overview of the key themes in Fodor's 
philosophy of mind. In Chapter 2 an account of scientific psychology 
w ith in  the orthodox com putationalist trad ition  is developed 
according to which that discipline is concerned w ith explaining 
intentionally characterised cognitive capacities. Such explanations 
attribute both semantic and syntactic properties to subpersonal 
representational states and processes.
In Chapters 3 and 5 Fodor's various arguments for the conclusion 
that scientific psychology does (or should) individuate psychological 
states individualistically are criticised. I argue that there are 
pragm atic reasons why scientific psychology should sometimes 
attribute contents that are not locally supervenient. In Chapter 4 I 
consider Marr's theory of vision and conclude that the contents that 
M arr attributes to the states of the visual m odule are locally 
supervenient. Inconsistency is avoided by stressing the continuity of 
scientific psychological content with folk psychological content.
In Chapter 6 I develop an account of the project of naturalising 
mental content that vindicates that project. In Chapter 7 I address the 
question of w hether Fodor's theory of content constitutes a 
successful engagement in that project. I argue for a negative answer 
before drawing some morals as to how we should proceed in the 
light of the failure of Fodor's theory.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Overview
1.1 Introduction
Jerry Fodor is one of the m ost im portant and influential 
philosophers of mind of the last thirty years or so. Since the m id­
sixties he has been developing what might be described as a view, 
that is, a collection of distinct yet mutually reinforcing positions on a 
range of related issues. In this thesis my aim is to evaluate certain 
prom inent elements of Fodor's view. These elements are: his 
account of the nature of scientific psychology and its relationship to 
folk psychology; his reflections on the question of whether scientific 
psychology is, or should be, individualistic; and his attem pt to 
construct a naturalistic theory of content. In this introductory chapter 
I set myself the task of presenting an overview of Fodor's philosophy 
of mind along with an outline of the content of the chapters to come.
1.2 An overview of Fodor's philosophy of mind^
Throughout his career, Fodor's central aim has been to vindicate folk 
psychology within a broadly physicalist framework. This involves 
show ing how the fundam ental assum ptions and theoretical 
commitments of folk psychology could be true given the physicalist 
theses that all real phenomena are identical to, or constituted by, 
physical phenomena, and that all properties that are instantiated in 
our world supervene upon the physical.
 ^ In addition to his philosophical work, Fodor has made some important 
contributions to empirical psychology; in particular, to psycholinguistics and the 
study of mental architecture. See, for example. The Psychology of Language (co­
written with Bever and Garret), and The M odularity of Mind. In this thesis 1 will 
largely ignore Fodor's psychological output, referring to it only when it bears 
directly on philosophical issues.
The details of Fodor's attem pted vindication bear a profound 
imprint of certain key developments in the philosophy of mind and 
scientific psychology that took place during the early stages of his 
career. The developm ents in question are the overthrow  of 
behaviourism and the cognitive revolution in scientific psychology, 
and the rise of functionalism - at the expense of both logical 
behaviourism and the type-identity theory - in the philosophy of 
mind.^ These twin developments resulted in the establishment of a 
new orthodoxy in philosophy and scientific psychology according to 
which intentional mental states are physically realised internal states 
that cause behaviour and other intentional mental states, and whose 
essence (rather like states of a computer) resides at a level more 
abstract than the physical.^
As Fodor sees it, folk psychology is a descriptive, explanatory, and 
predictive practice that is bound up with a conception of the nature 
and workings of the hum an individual. According to this 
conception, human individuals stand apart from most of the other 
inhabitants of their world in being minded; that is, we are capable of 
thought and feeling and we behave or act rather than merely make 
movements. In this context, "thought" is a broad term that covers a 
wide range of distinct categories of mental states, including beliefs, 
desires, intentions, hopes, fears, expectations, and so on. In other 
w ords, thoughts are prepositional attitudes (PA's for short), or 
intentional states. PA's are particularly im portant from the folk 
psychological perspective, for they play a prom inent role in our 
mental life and in determining how we act or behave. This fact is 
reflected in the practice of folk psychology: m uch of folk 
psychological description, explanation, and prediction involves the
2 Chomsky's critique of Skinner's behaviouristic account of language learning is a 
classic paper that both helped initiate the cognitive revolution in scientific 
psychology (and in the scientific study of the mind in general) and exerted a profound 
influence on Fodor. (See Chomsky (1959)). With respect to the rise of functionalism in 
the philosophy of mind, Hilary Putnam's work of the early 1960s stands out as being 
both hugely important and as having a particular influence on the development of 
Fodor's views. (See the papers collected in Putnam (1975a), in particular 'The Nature 
of Mental States' and 'The Mental Life of Some Machines'.
 ^ In fact, Fodor played an important role in the establishment of this new orthodoxy. 
See his early book Psychological Explanation.
attribution of PA's to hum an individual's and the employment of 
causal generalisations relating PA's to one another and to behaviour.
Given the centrality of PA's to the theory and practice of folk 
psychology, Fodor's task of vindicating folk psychology reduces to 
that of showing how we could have PA's; or rather, how we could 
have states that have the properties that folk psychology takes PA's to 
have.4 The following are the key properties of, or the facts about, PA's 
that must be accounted for.
(i) PA's have semantic and intentional properties. For example, they 
have m eaning or content, they are about things, they have 
satisfaction conditions, and so on. In general, having a PA involves 
standing in a relation to a propositional content. The that clauses of 
the sentences that we employ to attribute PA's to ourselves and our 
fellows serve to specify such propositional contents. For example, 
when I say that Edgar believes that Fang is ferocious I am saying that 
Edgar stands in the belief relation to the propositional content Fang is 
ferocious. (See 'Propositional Attitudes').
(ii) PA's are not causally inert; rather they are very much part of the 
causal fray. There are three main types of mental causation. First, 
PA's are often caused by environmental factors impinging on the 
subject, as when a display of Fang's ferocious behaviour causes me to 
believe that he is ferocious. Second, PA's often cause other PA's, as 
when my belief that Fang is ferocious causes a desire to avoid all 
contact with Fang. Third, PA's often cause behaviour, as when my 
belief that Fang is prowling nearby causes me to crouch behind the 
nearest bush. Consequently, folk psychological explanations that 
attempt to explain a behavioural episode, or the tokening of a PA, are 
causal explanations. The manner in which PA's causally interact 
w ith environmental impingements, other PA's, and behaviour is 
not random; rather it is regular or law governed. Consequently, there
4 Fodor concentrates his attention on thought to the extent that he completely ignores 
feeling. In so doing, he accepts the idea that there is a fundamental distinction 
between cognition and consciousness, a distinction such that questions to do with the 
former can be addressed independently of questions to do with the latter. This idea is 
orthodox both within the cognitive science and the philosophical community. For a 
critique of such orthodoxy see Searle (1992). As a matter of fact, Fodor thinks that we 
have no hope of making any progress on the problem of consciousness at this point in 
our intellectual history.
are a w hole ba ttery  of coun terfac tua l-supporting  causal 
generalisations relating PA's to one another, to environm ental 
im pingem ents, and to behaviour. The em ploym ent of such 
generalisations is fundam ental to folk psychological description, 
explanation, and prediction. (See Psychosemantics, Ch. 1).
(iii) There is a systematic relationship between the causal powers of 
PA's and their semantic and intentional properties; PA's tend to 
cause PA's and behaviour to which they are semantically related. The 
most graphic case of this kind is constituted by demonstrative 
reasoning, a mental process where the contents of the thoughts that 
form the links of the process are related in a way that mirrors the 
relationship between the propositions of a logically valid argument. 
As Fodor puts it in Psychosemantics: 'one of the most striking facts 
about the cognitive mind as commonsense belief/desire psychology 
conceives it . . . [is] . . . the frequent similarity between trains of 
thought and arguments' (p. 13). This feature of mental processes is 
reflected in the nature of the generalisations employed by folk 
psychologists, m any of which quantify over PA's and behaviour 
which are semantically or logically related. The classic example of 
such a generalisation is this: 'If X wants P, and X believes that not-P 
unless Q, and X believes that X can bring it about that Q, then, ceteris 
paribus, X tries to bring it about that Q' {Psychosemantics, p .13).
(iv) Thought is both productive and systematic. Each of us has the 
capacity to token any one of infinitely many content-distinct PA's. 
Moreover, anyone capable of having the thought that aRb (for any 
relation R, and subjects a and b) is also capable of thinking that bRa. 
For example, I believe that Fang is more ferocious than Edgar, and I 
am capable of believing that Edgar is more ferocious than Fang. (See 
'Propositional Attitudes' and Psychosemantics, Appendix).
(v) Thought has the property of intensionality or opacity. In other 
words, PA contexts are not transparent to the substitution of co- 
referential expressions. For example, it can be true that Edgar believes 
that Mark Twain was born in Missouri, whilst false that he believes 
that Sam Clemens was born in Missouri, despite the fact that Mark 
Twain and Sam Clemens are one and the same. (See 'Propositional 
Attitudes' and 'Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research 
Strategy in Cognitive Psychology').
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Fodor notes that folk psychology is central to human life; we engage 
in folk psychology in all our dealings with our fellow humans. 
Consequently, if it turned out that folk psychology was false (in the 
sense that its basic categories had no reality, that it was based on a 
collection of false assumptions, and that it employed a body of 
generalisations that did not hold) we would suffer one of the greatest 
intellectual disasters imaginable. In fact, Fodor never seriously 
doubts folk psychology; for him, its everyday success is testament to 
its basic truth.^ (See 'Three Cheers for Propositional Attitudes' and 
Psychosemantics, Ch. 1). Thus he attempts to construct a physicalist 
theory of mind that explains how folk psychology could be true; in 
other words, that explains how we could have mental states and 
processes that have the properties that are described in (i) - (v). His 
theory is a version of the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM for 
short) and can be described in the following terms.
PA's are relations to representations. That is, believing that Fang is 
ferocious involves standing in the belief relation to a representation 
that has the content Fang is ferocious. R ep resen ta tio n s  are 
neurophysiologically realised, hence precisely the kind of items that 
can have causal powers. The belief relation (along with the desire 
relation, the hope relation, and so on) is to be understood in 
functional terms; whether or not a representation in my brain 
expresses the content of a belief depends upon how the mental 
processes that have access to that representation would manipulate 
it. Hence, PA's are like computational states in that they are relations 
to representations whose tokens are identical to, or constituted by, 
internal physical states, and yet are multiply realisable at the physical 
level.^
The representations that are the vehicles of PA contents belong to a 
language, namely the Language of Thought (LOT for short), or
5 Thus he will have no truck with the eliminativism of Quine (1962), Feyerabend 
(1963), Rorty (1965), P.M. Churchland (1979,1981), and P.S. Churchland (1986).
 ^ Hence, Fodor rejects both the type-identity theory (see, for example. Place (1956), 
Feigl (1958), and Smart (1962)) and logical behaviourism (see, for example, Ryle 
(1949) and Hempel (1980)). For his explicit criticisms of the former see 'Special 
Sciences', and of the latter see 'Operationalism and Ordinary Language', (co­
authored with Charles Chihara) Psychological Explanation, and The Language of 
Thought, Introduction.
Mentalese. LOT is not a natural language^ but it is like a natural 
language in the respect that it comprises finitely m any simple 
symbols and finitely many syntactic or grammatical rules for 
combining those simple symbols to create more complex symbol 
structures. Moreover, LOT has a combinatorial semantics in that the 
meaning of any complex symbol is determined by the meaning of its 
simple components and its syntactic structure. These similarities 
between LOT and a natural language such as English account for the 
productivity and systematicity of thought. Given that symbols of LOT 
can be combined to form longer strings of symbols, that in turn can 
be combined with other symbols to form yet longer strings, (and so 
on ad infinitum) there are infinitely many syntactically distinct 
sentences of LOT. Given that the meaning of a symbol string is 
determ ined by the m eaning of its simple components and its 
syntactic structure, LOT will be capable of expressing infinitely many 
distinct meanings. And given that having a PA involves tokening a 
symbol of LOT, we will (at least in principle) be capable of tokening 
any of infinitely many content-distinct PA's. As for the systematicity 
of thought, if LOT is capable of expressing the proposition that a 
stands in relation R to b, then it will thereby be capable of expressing 
the proposition that b stands in relation R to a.
Fodor supplements RTM with a thesis about mental processes. 
Com puters are systems which generate symbolic output from 
symbolic input by means of the application of symbol-manipulating 
rules. Com puters are sensitive only to the formal or syntactic 
properties of the symbols that they manipulate, being blind to their 
semantic properties. However, they can be programmed in such a 
way as to respect semantic relations so that the symbols that they 
produce as output stand in appropriate semantic or logical relations 
to the symbols that they take as input. Fodor’s idea is that the brain 
engages in computational activity, generating symbols of LOT from 
symbols of LOT by means of computation in such a way as to respect 
semantic and logical relations between the symbols so manipulated. 
Using Schiffer's metaphor of belief boxes, the idea is that what goes 
on when a belief that P interacts with a belief that if P then Q to cause
 ^ There are philosophers committed to the existence of a language of thought who 
identify that language with the natural language of the thinker. See, for example, 
Harman (1972) and Carruthers (1996).
a belief that Q is as follows: a computational process in the subject’s 
brain takes two symbols of LOT from the belief box (one of these 
being a symbol that has the content P, and the other being a symbol 
that has the content if P then Q), and generates as output a symbol of 
LOT that has the content Q , a symbol which it then places in the 
belief box. Hence, the idea that the brain engages in computational 
activity explains the fact that thought processes are generally logically 
and semantically coherent.
Fodor's version of RTM explains the intensionality of thought in 
the following manner. Whether or not a belief-ascribing sentence is 
true depends upon which sentences of LOT the subject has in his 
belief box. For example, for it to be true that Edgar believes that Mark 
Twain was born in Missouri, he has to have the LOT analogue of the 
English sentence "Mark Twain was born in Missouri" in his belief 
box. Clearly he can have that sentence in his belief box without 
having the LOT analogue of "Sam Clemens was born in Missouri" in 
his belief box. Hence it can be true that Edgar believes that Mark 
Twain was born in Missouri and false that he believes that Sam 
Clemens was born in Missouri, despite the fact that Twain and 
Clemens are one and the same. In general, it is due to the fact that 
having a PA involves tokening a sentence of LOT that a subject can 
think that a is F without thinking that b is F despite the fact that a=b.
At this point, it is worthwhile emphasising the fact that LOT is 
nothing like a private language in Wittgenstein's sense of the term.^ 
There are three salient differences between LOT and a private 
language. First, the symbols of LOT do not refer to sensations. 
Second, the symbols of a private language are understood by the 
subject that employs them but cannot, even in principle, be 
understood by anyone else. W ith respect to LOT, m atters are 
somewhat different. I do not grasp or understand the symbols of LOT 
that are manipulated in my brain. Neither do the computational 
processes that m anipulate them, as they are blind to semantic 
properties. But cognitive scientists could, at least in principle, "crack 
the neural code" and so come to understand the sentences of LOT 
that are m anipulated in my brain. Third, symbols of a private
 ^ This is despite the fact that in The Language of Thought Fodor described LOT as a 
private language and attempted to defeat Wittgenstein's arguments for the 
conclusion that there could be no such language.
language get their meaning as a result of a conscious and deliberate 
act of ostensive definition. LOT, on the other hand, is innate, and the 
meanings of its symbols are not the product of any explicit naming 
ceremony.
What does Fodor offer by way of argument for his version of RTM? 
First, he thinks that it is the only theory that can account for the facts 
about PA's; it is "the only game in town". For example, he criticises 
traditional empiricism for being wedded to a theory of mental 
processes (namely, associationism) that cannot account for the 
semantic and logical coherence of thinking; he criticises logical 
behaviourism  for having no account of thinking at all; and he 
criticises connectionism  for its inability to account for the 
systematicity of thought.^ Second, he argues that his theory has 
independent support from science; judged by purely scientific criteria, 
his theory is the best empirical hypothesis we have as to the nature 
and workings of the cognitive mind. This line of thought is pushed 
particularly hard in The Language of Thought where he argues that 
all currently plausible scientific psychological theories of decision 
making, concept learning, and perception, are committed to RTM. 
This reflects his official view that there is no fundamental divide 
between philosophy of mind and the scientific study of cognition: 
empirical investigation is relevant to philosophers of mind, as the 
questions that interest them cannot be answered by means of 
conceptual analysis or a priori reflection alone.
One problem with Fodor's theory as described thus far is that it 
doesn't account for the semantic and intentional properties of PA's. 
In virtue of what do the symbols of LOT have the semantic and 
intentional properties that Fodor attributes to them? Given his 
commitment to physicalism, Fodor is committed to the thesis that 
such properties are fixed or determined by non-intentional and non- 
semantic properties. But, ever since Brentano, it has been widely 
thought that intentional and semantic properties just couldn't be so 
fixed or determined and thus resist incorporation into the natural 
world. Hence there is a real challenge to physicalist friends of folk 
psychology (and intentional psychology in general). Fodor rises to 
this challenge by attempting to construct a naturalistic theory of
 ^ See Psychosemantics, Appendix, and 'Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: a 
Critical Analysis' (co-authored with Zenon Pylyshyn).
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content, a theory that specifies the nonsemantic and nonintentional 
determ inants of the semantic and intentional properties of the 
symbols of LOT. The bulk of this theory consists of a sufficient 
condition for a simple, nonlogical symbol of LOT to express a 
particular property.
Fodor's theory of content is essentially a version of informational 
semantics and is therefore atomistic. Fodor is vigorously opposed to 
holistic theories of content (theories according to which the meaning 
of a symbol depends on its relationships to other symbols) and 
devotes much energy to undermining the arguments for them. (See, 
in particu lar, 'Tom Swift and his Procedural G randm other', 
Psychosemantics, Ch. 3, and Holism: A  Shopper's Guide (co-authored 
with Ernest LePore)). His rabid opposition to holism is explained by 
the fact that he sees that doctrine as a threat to the viability of 
intentional psychology. His reasoning runs thus. There is no 
analytic-synthetic distinction. Consequently, if some of a symbol's 
relations to other symbols determine its meaning, then all of its 
relations to other symbols do. Given that distinct symbol-tokens 
rarely bear identical relations to other symbols, they rarely have the 
same meaning. In connection with LOT, barring a cosmic accident, 
no symbol of LOT in a subject's head is ever going to have the same 
content as that in the head of any of her fellows. The upshot of this is 
that distinct individuals rarely ever share the same PA's, and that 
in tentional generalisations at m ost only ever subsum e one 
individual. But if intentional generalisations only ever subsume one 
individual, then there are effectively no intentional generalisations; 
and if there are no such generalisations then intentional psychology 
is explanatorally and predictively toothless.
It is because of this threat that holism provides to the very viability 
of intentional psychology (and thus folk psychology) that Fodor will 
have no truck w ith functionalist theories of content (theories 
according to which the content of mental representations are 
determined by their causal roles). Hence, although Fodor was an 
early champion of functionalism and holds a functionalist account of 
PA relations, there are severe lim its to the extent of his 
functionalism.
What, in Fodor's eyes, is the relationship between folk psychology 
and scientific psychology? Fodor's attempted vindication of folk
psychology implies that it comes close to being a bona fide special 
science as its states are physically constituted, its properties are 
physically determined, and its generalisations are hedged, true, 
counterfactual-supporting , and im plem ented by lower level 
mechanisms. Moreover, much of Fodor's reflections form part of a 
wider project of vindicating scientific intentional psychology. All this 
would tend to suggest that Fodor would hold that scientific 
psychology is little more than a rigorous, research-driven extension 
of folk psychology. In fact, he explicitly commits himself to such a 
view (see Psychosemantics, Ch. 1). However, for several years he held 
that there is a fundamental difference between folk and scientific 
psychology, as the latter individuates psychological states in such a 
way as to respect the local supervenience of the psychological on the 
physical, and thus employs a notion of narrow content. In other 
words, due to the fact that folk psychological content is broad (as is 
indicated by the familiar Putnam and Burge thought experiments), 
there is a mismatch between the respective taxonomies of the two 
psychologies. This placed on Fodor the additional burden of giving a 
plausible account of narrow content. He did not shirk from this task, 
describing narrow content as a function from contexts to broad 
contents.
More recently, Fodor has abandoned narrow content as he has 
become reconciled to the idea that an intentional psychology would 
not need to go narrow in order to satisfy the rigorous demands of 
scientific methodology.
That completes my description of Fodor's philosophy of mind. In 
short: Fodor engages in the project of vindicating folk psychology 
within a physicalist framework, and doing so in such a way as to 
establish that it constitutes a firm basis for the development of a 
respectable scientific intentional psychology. Central to that 
vindication is (i) a version of the Representational Theory of Mind, 
according to which PA's are computational relations to symbols of a 
Language of Thought, and thought processes are computational 
processes involving the manipulation of such symbols; and (ii) an 
informational theory of content that specifies the nonsemantic and 
nonintentional determinants of the contents of the symbols of LOT 
and, thereby, of our PA's.
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1.3 An overview of the chapters to come
This thesis does not constitute a comprehensive account and study of 
Fodor's philosophy of m ind, as several key elements of his 
philosophical output are, in effect, i g n o r e d d o  Rather, what I attempt 
to do is address certain key issues in contemporary philosophy of 
m ind and psychology via a study of Fodor's contributions to the 
discussion of those issues. The issues in question are as follows, (i) 
The nature of scientific psychology. How does scientific psychology 
relate to folk psychology? What are its explanatory ambitions and 
basic theoretical assum ptions and commitments? W hat are the 
respective roles of sem antic and syntactic properties in its 
explanations? (ii) The individuation of scientific psychological states. 
Does (or should) scientific psychology individuate the states that 
figure in its explanations individualistically (for example, in terms of 
their narrow content)? Do the basic commitments, assumptions, and 
explanatory aims of scientific psychology tell either for or against 
individualism? Are there any relevant metaphysical considerations?
(iii) The project of naturalising content. What is the naturalisation 
project? Is it a misguided project or does the scientific status of 
psychology depend upon the possibility of naturalising content? Does 
Fodor succeed in naturalising content? If not, what morals are to be 
drawn from the failure of his theory?
As will become apparent, there is much that I admire in Fodor's 
approach to these issues. Moreover, I endorse, or at least sympathise 
with, many of his basic assumptions. I accept Fodor's account of folk 
psychology; it is a proto scientific theory of the nature and workings 
of the hum an individual that permeates our dealings with our 
fellows. I also share Fodor's intentional realism; we really have 
beliefs, desires, and the like and the generalisations of folk 
psychology are largely true. Further, folk psychology is closely related 
to scientific psychology and does constitute a sound basis for the 
construction of such a psychology. I accept Fodor's physicalism; the 
sum totality of facts is ultimately determined by the sum totality of 
physical facts and science is, by its very nature, committed to such a 
doctrine. Finally, I agree with Fodor that empirical research and
For example, his attempts to undermine the arguments for holism, and his attack 
on connectionism.
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findings are relevant to what have traditionally been seen of as 
philosophical questions that can only be answered by means of a 
priori reflection or conceptual analysis. As a result of all this, I view 
Fodor's project of vindicating intentional psychology (both in its folk 
and scientific varieties) within a broadly physicalist framework as 
being a viable and important project. However, I wish to dispute 
many of Fodor's specific pronouncements on the issues that are my 
concern. Thus I should be seen not as a disciple of Fodor but as a 
sympathetic and admiring detractor and critic.
The structure of my thesis can be described in the following terms. 
In Chapter 2 I develop an account of the nature of scientific 
psychology. According to this account, the aim of scientific 
psychology is to account for our intentionally characterised cognitive 
capacities. It does this by descending to the sub-personal level and so 
posits a whole range of representational states and processes that are 
unfam iliar from the folk psychological perspective. Scientific 
psychological explanations of cognitive capacities do, and must, 
appeal to both semantic and syntactic properties of representations 
and representation-manipulating processes.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 address the question of whether scientific 
psychology is (or should be) individualistic, or should employ a 
notion of narrow content. Here my reflections rely heavily on the 
claims made in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 I consider those of Fodor's 
p ro -ind iv idualistic  argum ents that appeal to psychological 
assumptions and practice. These arguments fail as they rely on a 
misrepresentation of those assumptions and that practice. There are 
good practical reasons why scientific psychology should avoid "going 
narrow" if at all possible, especially if narrow content is to be 
understood as Fodor describes it. I argue that these practical 
considerations may well carry the day given the contingent fact that 
we have yet to discover any other worldly twins and cousins. Thus, I 
make a tentative externalist conclusion: some of the intentional 
properties that scientific psychology attributes to our representational 
states in the course of explaining our cognitive capacities are not 
locally supervenient. And that this is so is all to the good.
In Chapter 4 I turn away from Fodor to consider Marr's theory of 
vision; is that theory individualistic? I argue against a negative 
conclusion; the contents that Marr attributes to the states of the
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visual module are locally supervenient. I then attempt to reconcile 
this conclusion with that of Chapter 3 by arguing that the contents 
that Marr attributes find echo in those that folk psychology attributes 
to our personal level visual states and experiences as those contents 
are locally supervenient. Thus the general conclusion of Chapters 3 
and 4 is that some (but not all) of the contents that scientific 
psychology does (and should) attribute to our psychological states are 
not locally supervenient. In Chapter 5 I attempt to defend this 
conclusion  against Fodor's m etaphysica l a rgum en ts for 
individualism . These arguments rest upon the idea that science 
individuates in terms of causal powers and that the causal powers of 
psychological states are locally supervenient. I argue that the causal 
powers of psychological states are not locally supervenient by 
developing an interest-relative account of causal powers.
Chapters 6 and 7 are concerned with the naturalisation project. In 
Chapter 6 I develop an account of that project that reveals it to be 
both sensible and important. Making progress in the project of 
naturalising content is a central component of the program  of 
vindicating scientific psychology in such a way as to discredit its ever- 
vocal Brentano-inspired detractors. Naturalising content does not 
involve reducing content to something non-semantic and non­
intentional; rather, it involves generating naturalistic sufficient 
conditions that specify the non-sem antic and non-intentional 
determ inants of the semantic and intentional properties that 
scientific psychology attributes to our states.
In Chapter 7 I address the question of whether Fodor's theory is a 
successful engagement in the naturalisation project as I have 
described it. I argue for a negative conclusion. Once again I rely upon 
the account of scientific psychology developed in Chapter 2 by 
appealing to representational states that figure in its explanations 
that are quite other than the familiar everyday beliefs that populate 
Fodor's imagination. A consideration of such states raises doubts as 
to the generality of Fodor's theory, and generates counterexamples to 
it.
Before closing this chapter I will outline some of the prominent 
themes that emerge in the course of my reflections. First, when 
addressing the issues of individuation and naturalisation it is of 
crucial importance to bear in mind the explanatory ambitions of
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scientific psychology and its basic theoretical assum ptions and 
commitments. Second, it is important not to focus on too narrow a 
range of examples. Fodor makes just this mistake. For example, 
when he engages in the naturalisation project he has a tendency to 
focus his attention on a small number of cases that seem familiar and 
salient from the folk psychological perspective. As a result of this, 
certain of his claims have an air of plausibility that they would lose if 
only we cast our eye more widely. And when he argues for 
individualism he focuses almost exclusively on the case of twins 
with beliefs featuring natural kind concepts. This tends to obscure the 
fact that narrow psychology (at least as Fodor conceives it) is not a 
practical option if our aim is that such a psychology should apply to 
our cousins as well as our twins. Third, it is im portant not to 
overlook practical considerations and contingencies. There is a 
danger of making demands of scientific psychology that are so great 
that its practitioners have no real hope of satisfying them. However, 
a less than pure psychology that we have a chance of making some 
progress in is much to be preferred to a pure psychology that we don't 
have the ability to engage in. In particular, I have in mind the issue 
of individuation. Suppose that an ideal scientific psychology would 
be narrow  in virtue of the generality of such a psychology. It 
w ouldn't follow from that fact alone that a respectable scientific 
psychology should be narrow. For it may well be that the practical 
difficulties of engaging in narrow  psychology outw eigh the 
advantages of greater generality. This will especially be the case if, as a 
matter of fact, we have no twins or cousins who are similar to us in 
their narrow psychological states.
It is now time to get down to some work.
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Chapter 2 
Psychological Explanation
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter my central aim is to develop an account of the nature 
of scientific psychology and the explanations that it endeavours to 
produce. This account will underlie my discussion of individualism 
and the naturalisation project in subsequent chapters and will 
motivate many of my criticisms of Fodor's most interesting and 
provocative claims.
I make no claims to present an account that applies to everything 
that can justifiably be labelled "scientific psychology". The science of 
psychology, like most sciences, is a broad discipline consisting of sub­
divisions that vary widely in terms of their explanatory aims, 
research m ethods and theoretical assum ptions. Like m any 
contemporary philosophers of mind, when I talk about scientific 
psychology what I really mean is cognitive psychology, that branch of 
psychology that seeks to explain our cognitive capacities. However, 
my account doesn't even apply to everything that can justifiably be 
described as cognitive psychology. For example, connectionist 
th eo ries^  and J.J. Gibson's theory of vision^^, though both arguably 
cognitive psychological theories, certainly do not fit my picture. 
What I intend my account to apply to is most mainstream cognitive 
psychology of the last three decades or so. Such psychology has been 
variously described as orthodox computationalism (Cummins, 1989), 
as being committed to the Computational Theory of Mind (Fodor, 
1980), and as viewing the mind as a physical symbol system (Newell 
and Simon, 1976; Newell, 1980). As these characterisations suggest, 
the idea that in some important respect the mind is a computer is a 
defining assumption of this brand of psychology. Another central 
characteristic of it is that it is an intentional psychology; that is.
See, for example, Rumelhart and McClelland (1986). 
See, for example, Gibson (1979).
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in ten tional states figure prom inently  in its theories and 
explanations.
A satisfactory account of mainstream cognitive psychology!^ should 
specify the following:
(i) The explanatory ambitions of scientific psychology.
(ii) Its basic ontological com m itm ents and theoretical 
assumptions; in particular it should spell out the nature of the 
Computational Theory of Mind that underlies it.
(iii) Its relationship to folk psychology, that is, the descriptive, 
explanatory and predictive practice that everyday folk engage in in 
their dealings with their fellows.
(iv) Its relationship to lower level sciences such as neuroscience 
and physics.
(v) The role of semantic and intentional properties in its 
explanations.
Hopefully my account will satisfy all these requirements.
2.2 The relationship to folk psychology
In order to describe the relationship that scientific psychology bears 
to folk psychology I shall begin with a brief account of some salient 
features of the latter. Folk psychology is bound up with a conception 
of the human individual that can be described in the following 
terms. We stand apart from most of the entities that exist in our 
world by being minded. Related to our being minded is the fact that 
we don't just make movements or have things happen to us; rather, 
we behave or act. Part of what it is to be minded is to have or 
experience mental states of which there are many distinct types. One 
broad category of mental state types contains states that have 
intentional or semantic properties, properties in terms of which they 
are identified and individuated. These are the propositional 
attitudes, the most familiar being beliefs, desires and intentions. 
Propositional attitudes (PA's for short) are not causally inert. In 
addition to being caused by environmental impingements on the
From here on in I will use the term "scientific psychology" in place of the more 
cumbersome "mainstream cognitive psychology".
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sensory apparatus, they cause, and interact with one another to 
cause, other PA's, non-intentional mental states and behaviour. 
These causal episodes are not random; on the contrary, there are 
countless counterfactual-supporting causal generalisations in which 
PA's figure. The causal powers of PA's are such that, as a general 
rule, they cause PA's and behaviour to which they are logically or 
semantically related, as when a desire for a bottle of beer and a belief 
that there is one in the fridge interact to cause an intention to get that 
bottle, an intention that subsequently causes the subject to go to the 
fridge and retrieve the bottle. Consequently, the causal chains in 
which PA's figure are typically rationally coherent, and this fact is 
reflected in the nature of the generalisations in which they figure. 
Finally, in v irtue  of the m anner in which environm ental 
impingements, PA's, other mental states, and behaviour interact 
w ith one another, we all have a battery of cognitive capacities 
including those of being able to acquire knowledge of the external 
world by means of perception, recognise faces, remember past events, 
categorise objects, solve problems, and so on.
However, folk psychology isn't merely an abstract theory. Rather it 
is a descriptive, explanatory and predictive practice that is central to 
human life. It plays a fundamental role in all our dealings with our 
fellow humans; without folk psychology we would be at sea in the 
social world. In describing, predicting and explaining mental and 
behavioural episodes we employ the above described causal 
generalisations. Given the nature of these generalisations, a typical 
folk psychological explanation of a PA or a behavioural episode will 
represent it as being caused by something to which it is semantically 
or logically related. Hence, such explanations don't just indicate the 
causes of our PA's and behaviour; in addition they make sense of 
them or reveal them to be rational.!^ And because we believe that 
people are by and large rational we only rest satisfied with a candidate
14 To say that I am scattering salt on my lawn because I want to get rid of the 
dandelions growing on it and believe that salt kills dandelions is to specify the 
causes of my behaviour. And it is also to make sense of my behaviour, to reveal it to 
be rational in the light of its causes. To explain my behaviour by an appeal to the 
belief that Kilimanjaro has snow-covered peaks and the desire for Fang to lose his 
teeth is not to so make sense of my behaviour due to the absence of any sensible 
semantic or logical relation between the causes and their effect.
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causal explanation when it makes sense of the effect in question, 
when it reveals it to be rational or sensible in the light of its causes 
and their doxastic surroundings. ^  ^
Now how does scientific psychology relate to folk psychology? Is the 
former merely a sharpened up, more rigorous version of the latter? 
Or is it bound up with a distinct body of theoretical assumptions and 
concerned with a different explanatory project?
It would perhaps be a surprise and out of keeping with the general 
nature of the relationship between folk theories and their scientific 
counterparts were it to be the case that folk and scientific psychology 
attempted to explain the same range of phenomena. What we should 
expect is for them to have somewhat different explanatory agendas. 
The point of folk theories is to enable us to deal and interact 
successfully with our environment on an everyday basis. In order to 
do this we need to be able to describe and categorise phenomena 
accurately and quickly and, on the basis of such descriptions, 
construct explanations and predictions of particular events. We 
behave in the light of such descriptions, explanations and 
predictions, and thus our success depends on their truth value; for 
example, if we were generally way out in our folk physical 
descriptions, explanations and predictions, we could hardly prosper 
in a world of medium-sized physical objects. Given that we utilise 
generalisations in the construction of such descriptions, explanations 
and predictions, folk generalisations must, by and large, approximate 
the truth. An im portant point is that ordinary folk, though they 
utilise such generalisations, are rarely concerned with the question of 
why these generalisations hold. For example, most of us know that 
unsupported objects fall to the ground, and that water expands when 
frozen. It is important for us to know such facts, but for ordinary, 
everyday purposes it just doesn't matter why they hold. For the 
purposes of explaining such events as the cracking of Edgar's pipes 
on a cold winter's night and avoiding such misfortunes myself, I will 
need to know that water expands when frozen, and that water in 
pipes tends to freeze on cold winter nights. But as to why water 
behaves in this way I need know nothing; it is only outside the folk
For an extended account and celebration of folk psychology very much in the spirit 
of my pronouncements see Psychosemantics Ch. 1.
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physical arena that such knowledge will be of any use or interest to 
me.
All this suggests the following. The folk practice of explaining and 
predicting is typically one of explaining and predicting particular 
events. The generalisations that are employed in such activity are 
taken for granted; it is rarely a folk enterprise to explain why they 
hold. In the case of folk psychology, the concern is to explain and 
predict particular behavioural and mental events but not to account 
for the generalisations or facts about the mind the recognition of 
which is central to such explanation and prediction. Science, on the 
other hand, is somewhat different. Scientists don't just accept the 
facts or generalisations recognised by ordinary folk; rather they 
attempt to explain why they hold. And often, in constructing such 
explanations, they postulate a whole range of phenom ena and 
generalisations not recognised by ordinary folk. Thus it is a job for 
physics to explain why w ater expands when frozen, and the 
explanation will involve reference to molecules, molecular bonds, 
the effect of temperature-falls on them, and so on. Similarly, folk 
biology recognises that individuals inherit certain properties of their 
parents but it takes scientific biology to account for such facts, and in 
doing so refers to a whole range of properties and phenomena not 
recognised by its folk counterpart, namely, genes, chromosomes, 
DNA, and the like.l^
Expressed in the terminology of Cummins (1983) this comes pretty close to the 
claim that folk explanations are transition theories whereas science aims at 
property theories. Cummins outlines the distinction in these terms:
The point of what I call a transition theory is to explain changes of state in a 
system as effects of previous causes - typically disturbances in the system. The 
em phasis is on what w ill happen w h en  (i.e. under what conditions). 
Subsumption under causal law is the natural strategy: one tries to fix on a set of 
variables for the system that will enable one to exhibit each change of state as a 
function of a disturbing event and the state of the system at the time of the 
disturbance, (pp. 2-3)
The point of what I call a property theory is to explain the properties of a 
system not in the sense in which this means "Why did S acquire P?" or what 
caused S to acquire F?" but, rather, "What is it for S to instantiate P?", or, "In
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This way of describing matters makes it look as if there is a respect 
in which a science's agenda is set by its folk relative and that sciences 
generally endorse the ontological commitments and accept the 
generalisations of their folk counterparts. But, of course, this is not 
true without qualification. Often scientists attempt to explain facts 
and generalisations not recognised by any folk theory, sometimes 
they question the reality of folk categories, and sometimes they 
conclude that folk seriously misrepresent the facts. But all this 
notwithstanding, there is usually a close relationship between folk 
theories and their scientific counterparts: the latter are born of the 
former and rarely serve to completely underm ine their parent. 
Another feature of folk theories is that they are frequently enriched 
by developments in science; ordinary folk often talk of atoms, 
molecules, gravity, genes, unconscious desires, long term memory, 
and the like. Thus I am idealising somewhat when I say that science 
seeks to account for the generalisations invoked, or facts assumed, in 
the construction of folk explanations, and that in doing so it appeals 
to a whole range of properties (and generalisations quantifying over 
them) that are not recognised by ordinary folk. But it is of the nature 
of idealisations that they approximate rather than fundamentally 
misrepresent the truth.
Hence we should expect scientific psychology to have a different 
explanatory agenda to folk psychology, to appeal to a whole range of 
properties, phenomena and generalisations not recognised by it, and
virtue of what does S have P?" . . . The natural strategy for answering such a 
question is to construct an analysis of S that explains S's possession of P by appeal 
to the properties of S's components and their mode of organisation. The process 
often has as a preliminary stage an analysis of P itself into properties of S or S’s 
components, (p. 15)
I accept that there is a distinction between explaining a particular event and 
explaining a fact about a system (or a generalisation true of it) that the explanation 
of that event presupposes. And I accept that science typically aims at the latter sort 
of explanation, explanations that often satisfy Cummins’ description of a property 
theory. However, as will become apparent later, I am not at all convinced that the 
distinction between transition theories and property theories is as clear-cut as 
Cummins would have us believe. Hence I am reluctant to say that science in general, 
and scientific psychology in particular, aims to construct property theories.
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yet to share many of its most basic commitments and assumptions. 
Even the most cursory examination of folk and scientific psychology 
and the nature of the relationship between the two bears out this 
expectation. The primary concern of folk psychological explanation is 
to explain particular events, namely instances of behaviour and 
tokenings of mental states. It is not a folk psychological concern to 
explain why the generalisations employed in the construction of 
such explanations hold; rather they are just assumed to hold. It is a 
fundamental assumption of folk psychology that we have a whole 
battery of cognitive capacities; having such capacities is part of what it 
is to be minded. Many folk psychological generalisations correspond 
to such capacities; for example, the generalisations that people 
understand sentences of their own language whenever they are 
presented with such a sentence, and that people form true beliefs 
about the nature of the world on the basis of their perceptual 
experiences, correspond, respectively, to the cognitive capacities to 
understand sentences of one's own language and to perceive and 
classify objects in one's immediate environment. Such capacities are 
intentionally characterised, for exercising them typically involves 
tokening an intentional state, a belief, for example.
Folk psychology offers little by way of explanation of our cognitive 
capacities; it doesn't answer such questions as how we perceive 
objects, how we understand spoken and written sentences, how we 
recognise faces, how we recall past events, and so on. This is where 
scientific psychology comes in, for it attempts to answer such "how" 
questions. Thus it shares with folk psychology the assumption that 
we have cognitive capacities (and many of the cognitive capacities 
recognised by folk psychology) and that we have the intentional 
states (beliefs, for example) that are tokened in the exercise of these 
capacities. Yet despite being committed to the reality of beliefs and 
other PA's - and causal generalisations in which they figure - 
scientific psychology is not a belief-desire psychology, for in 
accounting for our cognitive capacities it appeals to a quite different 
range of states and processes. The states in question are subpersonal 
representational states. They are states that play a role in the 
proximal causation of beliefs, perceptual experiences, and so on, 
without belonging to any such category of personal level state; they 
are, in Stich's (1978) terminology, subdoxastic states. And the
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processes in question are subpersonal representation manipulating 
processes.
How are we to understand the distinction between personal level 
intentional states and processes and subpersonal representational 
states and processes?!^ The distinction is difficult to characterise 
precisely, but at an intuitive level it is easy enough to grasp. Personal 
level states, such as beliefs, are states of a whole person not of a 
person’s parts. It is I, a whole person, who believes that Fang is 
ferocious. None of my proper parts has this belief or any other belief. 
Hence belief attributions are attributions of an intentional state to a 
whole person; it would be a confusion to attribute a belief to a system 
and deny that it was a person. Similarly, certain mental processes are 
executed by whole persons and not by any of their proper parts; for 
example, it is me, not any of my parts, who engages in mental 
arithmetic when calculating my bank balance, and who reflects on 
the writings of Jerry Fodor. Subpersonal states, on the other hand, are 
not states of a whole person but, rather, states of a person's proper 
parts. For example, the primal sketch (which represents significant 
changes in light intensity across the retinal image, (see Marr, 1982)) is 
a state of a component of the brain, namely the visual module. 
When a primal sketch is tokened within me I do not represent a 
pattern of changes in light intensity across a retinal image, rather a 
part of my brain does that. Similarly, some mental representational 
processes are executed not by whole persons but by their parts. For 
example, stereopsis, the process of extracting depth information from 
disparities between a pair of retinal images, is executed by the visual 
system (or a component of it). Such processes are subpersonal.
Being constituted by an internal physical state is not enough to 
make a representational state subpersonal. Hence, even if beliefs are 
constituted by brain states, it doesn't follow that they are subpersonal 
states, even though brain states are states of a part of a person. If that 
sounds odd consider the following. Some medical conditions are 
constituted by internal physical states. Edgar’s arthritis is constituted
The personal-subpersonal distinction was originally made by Dennett (1969). 
According to his characterisation, explanation at the personal level is intentional 
and instrum ental, whereas subpersonal explanation is m echanical and 
physiological. In later writings (see his 1981, for example) he describes subpersonal 
states as having informational content.
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by a state of his joints. The constituting state is thus a state of one (or 
several) of his parts, namely his joints. Nevertheless it is Edgar the 
whole person, as opposed to his joints, that has arthritis. Joints don't 
get arthritis; it is people that suffer that misfortune. Here is another 
example, this time involving a process. As I run away from a 
snarling Fang I break into a sweat. My sweating is constituted by a 
physiological process that takes place at the surface of my skin. Yet it 
is I that sweat and not my skin. My claim then is that if beliefs and 
such mental processes as thinking about Jerry Fodor's writings are 
constituted by brain states and processes they will not thereby be 
subpersonal, rather they will be personal level phenom ena 
analogous to arthritis and sweating in the above described respect.
In short, then, we can characterise the relationship between folk and 
scientific psychology in the following terms: scientific psychology 
endorses m any of the basic assum ptions and ontological 
commitments of folk psychology, but whereas the latter attempts to 
causally explain and predict particular behavioural and mental 
events, and in doing so sticks to the personal level, the former 
attempts to explain our cognitive capacities by descending to the 
subpersonal level.
I accept that this characterisation of the personal-subpersonal distinction could do 
with being somewhat more rigorous and precise. However, I think I have succeeded 
in giving the reader a basic feel for what is arguably a very familiar and obvious 
distinction. 1 suspect that to attempt to do anything more than this would be to 
engage in a lengthy and arduous project that would take me far off track.
Perhaps 1 ought to mention that 1 don't think there is much hope of grounding the 
distinction between personal level and subpersonal representational states in either 
that between conscious and unconscious states or that between states with conceptual 
content and states with nonconceptual content. An appeal to conscious awareness 
won't work because of the existence of unconscious personal level states of the sort 
that populate psychoanalytic theories. Moreover, to echo a point made by Davies 
(1989), we could conceive of a subpersonal representational state that surfaced in 
conscious awareness as a distinctive type of sensation. An appeal to the distinction 
between conceptual and nonconceptual content fairs no better as some personal level 
representational states have nonconceptual content (visual experiences, for example) 
and, arguably, some subpersonal states have conceptual content (for example some of 
those involved in language comprehension and production) (Peacocke, 1992).
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2,3 Explaining cognitive capacities
What specific form do scientific psychological explanations of our 
cognitive capacities take? What does the scientific psychologist offer 
by way of answers to such "how" questions as the following: how do 
we acquire knowledge about the nature of the external world by 
means of vision?; how do we understand sentences?; how do we 
recognise faces?; how do we categorise objects?; how do we remember 
past events? So far I have said little more than that the scientific 
psychologist descends to the subpersonal level presen ting  
explanations that appeal to subpersonal representational states and 
processes. In itself this is hardly very illuminating. A first valuable 
step in remedying this situation involves reflecting on the question 
of how capacities in general are explained.
Many capacities - not just cognitive capacities - are complex in the 
sense that to have them a system (or its parts) must have a whole 
series of simpler capacities. The complex capacity is executed by 
executing these simpler capacities in a certain order. A familiar 
example comes from cooking: in order to have the capacity to bake a 
cake one must have such simpler capacities as those of being able to 
break an egg, weigh flour, sugar and the like, mix flour, eggs and 
sugar together in a bowl, and so on. In executing the capacity to bake a 
cake one has to execute these simpler capacities in a certain order. 
One answers the question "how do you bake a cake" by specifying 
an ordering of tasks simpler than that of baking a cake such that the 
execution of those tasks in that order reliably lands one with a baked 
cake. Psychology attempts to account for our cognitive capacities in 
much the same way; that is, by specifying the simpler capacities that 
our cognitive capacities depend upon, and describing the order in 
which they are executed whenever the cognitive capacity in question 
is exercised.
Cognitive capacities are intentionally characterised; their exercise 
involves the tokening of a personal level intentional state and they 
could not be had by a system that did not token, or was not capable of 
tokening, such states. These capacities are close to being miraculous. 
For example, light reflected off objects in my local environment hits 
my retina and within a fraction of a second I have a rich perceptual 
experience in which the world is presented to me as being a certain
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way (a way pretty much how it is) and I form a whole collection of 
true beliefs about the nature of my local environment. How could we 
be capable of such feats?
A fundamental assumption of scientific psychology is that the 
sim pler capacities underly ing  our cognitive capacities are 
information processing capacities of our brain and its parts. Parts of 
the hum an brain have the capacity to do such things as the 
following: generate information from information, and in so doing 
extract, or make explicit, new information; compare separate items of 
information; and store and retrieve information when appropriately 
prom pted . In processing information the brain doesn’t generate, 
store and retrieve any old information but, rather, information that 
is relevant to our cognitive capacities and thus capable of supporting 
them. Thus, whenever we exercise a cognitive capacity our brain 
engages in information processing activity and in so doing generates 
information that is relevant to the task in hand, information that 
somehow breaks through to, or makes its mark on, the personal 
level.
But how is the brain able to process information? Attributing 
information processing capacities to the brain and its parts gives rise 
to two related worries. First, these capacities appear to be so similar to 
the cognitive capacities that they are invoked to explain that to 
appeal to them is to make no real explanatory progress. Second, these 
capacities appear to be the sort of capacities that the brain or its parts 
couldn't have short of being intelligent agents, something that they 
are not. This brings us to the second fundamental assumption of 
scientific psychology, an assumption that goes some way towards 
alleviating these worries. This is the assumption that it is by means 
of computation that the brain and its parts process information, 
computation being a process of mechanical symbol-manipulation. 
So, the idea is that the brain performs computational operations on 
physically realised symbols or representations, and in so doing 
processes information.
The second assumption has bearings on the nature of psychological 
explanation for it entails that the explanation of a cognitive capacity
 ^9 I am using the term "information" in its ordinary, everyday sense and not as a 
technical term. When I say that a symbol or a state carries or encodes information all 
I mean is that it represents something in the world as being a certain way.
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must specify the computational means by which the brain and its 
parts exercise their information processing capacities. But this raises a 
whole series of questions. What exactly is computation? How could 
the brain, or any of its parts, manage to be a computer or have 
computational capacities? Just what role does a specification of the 
computational capacities and activity of the brain, and its parts, have 
in an explanation of a cognitive capacity? These questions need to be 
answered in the course of the construction of a complete account of 
the nature of scientific psychological explanation. But before I 
attempt to address them an important point needs to be made.
A complete explanation of a particular capacity of a system involves 
specifying a range of simpler capacities of the system (and/or its parts) 
such that their execution in the indicated order reliably results in an 
exercise of the target capacity. The explanations of contemporary 
scientific psychology fail to be complete in this respect. The 
information processing and computational capacities and activity 
that scientific psychologists describe resides at the subpersonal level. 
Consequently, what is required for their explanations to be complete 
is an account of precisely how activity at the subpersonal level 
generates personal level intentional states, an account, in other 
words, of the precise relationship between the subpersonal and the 
personal. It is my contention that contemporary scientific psychology 
has no such account, due as much as anything to its not having a 
complete account of the nature of personal level intentional states 
nor an account of how those states are realised in us. Consider Marr's 
theory of vision, for example. Marr's explicit aim is to account for 
our ability to acquire knowledge about the nature of the external 
world by means of vision. Yet he doesn't tell us how we reliably 
acquire true beliefs about the nature of the external world by means 
of vision but only how the visual module reliably generates, from a 
pair of retinal images, accurate, object-centred 3-D representations 
that indicate the shape, size, colour, texture etc. of distal stimuli. His 
assumption is that the generation of such representations plays an 
im portant role in belief-fixation, but he doesn't specify how they 
result in the formation of a belief (or, indeed, how they are connected 
to visual experiences). In other words, there is a gap in Marr's theory, 
a gap between the personal and the subpersonal. This gap is a quite
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general feature of scientific psychological explanations of our 
cognitive capacities.^^
The above point has bearings on one of Fodor's central arguments 
for RTM as a theory about the familiar PA's of folk psychology. As we 
saw in Chapter 1, Fodor argues that RTM underlies virtually all 
contemporary scientific psychology. This, he thinks, gives us good 
reason to endorse the theory. However, the RTM that scientific 
psychology endorses is not a theory about beliefs, desires, and the 
like, but rather a theory about subpersonal representational states. 
The representations that populate scientific psychological theories, 
the primal sketch and the 3-D representation, for example, are not 
the vehicles of belief-contents. Thus Fodor has misrepresented the 
nature of the RTM that scientific psychology is committed to.^^
It m ight be thought unacceptable that there is such a gap in scientific 
psychological explanations; that, contrary to the advertisements, they don't account 
for any of our cognitive capacities. But such a judgement would surely be unacceptably 
harsh. Minds and their capacities are so very complex and scientific psychology is 
such a young science that we should not expect there to be a plethora of complete 
theories and explanations. Progress is all we have a right to demand, and surely a 
characterisation of processing that generates information that intuitively appears to 
be relevant to, or useful in, the formation of beliefs by means of the exercise of a 
cognitive capacity counts as progress.
Of course Fodor's version of RTM does make it intelligible how subpersonal 
representation-manipulating processes could play a role in the fixation of belief or 
"make their mark" at the personal level. However, Fodor's theory is not the only 
model currently on the market. Consider a famous passage from Dennett.
In a recent conversation with the designer of a chess-playing program I heard the 
following criticism of a rival program: "It thinks it should get its queen out 
early." This ascribes a prepositional attitude to the program in a very useful and 
predictive way, for as the designer went on to say, one can usually count on 
chasing that queen around the board. But for all the many levels of explicit 
representation found in that program, nowhere is anything roughly synonymous 
with "I should get my queen out early" explicitly tokened. The level of analysis 
to which the designer's remark belongs describes features of the program that 
are, in an entirely innocent way, emergent properties of the computational 
properties that have "engineering reality". I see no reason to believe that the
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2.4 The nature of computation
In this section I will attempt to develop an account of the nature of 
computation. My account is largely in line with what might be 
described as the received view of computation, a widely held view 
that has been championed by Fodor
First and foremost computers are symbol m anipulators; given 
sym bols as inpu t they produce symbols as ou tpu t. Thus 
co m p u ta tio n a l p rocesses invo lve  the m a n ip u la tio n  or 
transformation of symbols. This symbol manipulation isn't random 
but rather rule governed. More specifically, computers generate 
o u tpu t symbols from inpu t symbols by apply ing  symbol- 
m anipulating rules (what this means will be explained in due 
course).
Computational processes are often complex; that is to say that it is 
frequently the case that computers generate output from input not in 
one single symbol m anipulating move but rather by executing a 
whole series of substeps each of which involve applying a rule to a 
symbol. However, to express the point in these terms fails to
relation between belief-talk and psychological process-talk will be any more 
direct. (1978, p. 107).
Even shorn of the implicit instrumentalism, such a view goes some way towards 
indicating how the manipulation of internal representations at the subpersonal level 
could play a role in belief fixation without beliefs being relations to internal 
representations.
Another alternative to Fodor's RTM identifies beliefs with whole collections of 
internal representational states. Horgan and Woodward (1985) portray Minsky's 
(1981) "Society of Mind" view in such terms. According to Minsky, they write, "the 
role of a belief (say) is typically played by a vast, highly gerrymandered, 
conglomeration of C[ognitive] S[cience]-events' (p. 140). In short then, scientific 
psychologists are not forced to endorse Fodor's RTM and there is no reason to suppose 
that they generally do.
See 'Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive 
Psychology' where Fodor makes his most explicit statement of his understanding of 
the nature of computation.
^  Therefore, pace Cummins (1989), making hollandaise sauce is not computation.
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distinguish between two distinct ways in which a computational 
process can be complex. The first type of complexity is the analogue of 
the complexity of the task of baking a cake when executed by a single 
i n d i v i d u a l . ^ 4  The process of baking a cake generates a baked cake as 
output from a collection of ingredients as input. This process cannot 
be executed by an individual in one single move; rather she has to 
make a whole series of simpler moves in a certain order. Examples 
of such substeps would be those of breaking an egg into a bowl, 
mixing together some eggs with a quantity of flour, butter, and sugar, 
pouring a mixture of eggs, sugar, butter, and flour into a lined cake 
tin, and so on. A cook bakes a cake by performing each of these 
substeps in a certain order. The point to note is that the system that 
performs the complex task, namely the cook, is the very system that 
performs the simpler sub-tasks. A computational process that is 
complex in this first respect is one that is executed by a system by 
means of executing a whole series of sim pler com putational 
processes or operations in a certain order. In such a case the system 
that performs the substeps is the very system that executes the 
complex process and it does the latter by doing the former.
The second type of complexity is the analogue of the process of 
cooking meals as performed by a restaurant kitchen. A restaurant 
kitchen produces from an input of ingredients and representations of 
customer orders an output of meals which correspond to what the 
customers have ordered. In executing this process a whole series of 
simpler processes or operations are executed, but there is a respect in 
which it is misleading to say that the kitchen as a whole performs 
these simpler operations. Rather, it is subsystems of the kitchen that 
perform  them. Restaurant kitchens have a hierarchical structure; 
that is, they can be analysed into subsystems each of which performs 
a distinct task (or series of tasks) the performance of which 
contributes to the higher level performance of the complete kitchen. 
These subsystems doing what they do, and interacting with one 
another in the process, engender the complex behaviour of the 
whole system to which they belong. In other words, the kitchen
Examples from the world of food production are frequently used by philosophers 
and psychologists when explicating the notion of computation. See, for example, 
Cummins (1983) and Haugeland (1985). My love of food-preparation and consumption 
stands in the way of the generation of more original examples.
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executes its complex process by having components that execute 
simpler processes and interact with one another in so doing. These 
subsystems in turn analyse into simpler subsystems - that execute 
simpler tasks and interact with one another in so doing - that analyse 
into simpler subsystems until eventually one comes to the basic 
components of the system. These basic components execute tasks that 
are complex, if complex at all, only in the first respect described 
above. The basic components of restaurant kitchens are typically 
individual hum ans that do such things as chop vegetables, stir 
sauces, carve joints of meat, arrange items of cooked food on plates, 
and so on. At any level in this hierarchy of systems there are 
operations simple relative to that level, simple in the respect that if 
they are perform ed by perform ing sim pler operations those 
operations are perform ed by subsystem s lower dow n in the 
hierarchy.
A computational process is complex in the second respect when it is 
executed by a computer with a hierarchical structure, so that it 
executes the process in question by having components that execute 
simpler tasks, and in so doing interacts with other components in 
that level of the hierarchy. In the case of a computer, the processes at 
all levels will be symbol-manipulating ones.^^
Sometimes computational processes that are complex in the first 
respect occur in a computer with a hierarchical structure. This will be 
the case if at any level in the hierarchy there exists a subsystem that 
performs its task by executing symbol-manipulating substeps.
The concept of a program is intimately bound up with that of 
com putation. What is a com puter program? A program  is a 
description of the means by which a computer executes a particular 
computational process. A program typically takes the form of a list of 
lines or a flowchart each line or box of which corresponds to a sub­
step taken in executing the complex process in question, and thus to a 
sym bol-manipulating capacity. The program as a whole will not
The hierarchical nature of (many) computers is described by Fodor (1968), Demiett 
(1978), Lycan (1982) and Cummins (1983). All these writers em phasise this 
characteristic of computers in order to make a point about the explanation of 
computer capacities, the point being that explaining such capacities involves 
analysing the system  under study into subsystems with simpler capacities the 
execution of which engender the execution of the target capacity.
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merely specify the steps taken but also the order in which they are 
made. Each of the substeps will of course be a com putational 
operation, that is, a symbol-manipulating move made by applying a 
rule to a symbol to generate from it another symbol. Thus each line 
(or box) of a program will correspond to a symbol-manipulating rule 
applied by the computer (or one of its subsystems) in executing a 
complex computational process. A program will rarely tell the whole 
story as to how a computer performs a given complex process, for 
typically each line of the program will correspond to an operation 
that is not absolutely simple but rather complex in at least one of the 
respects described above.
Programs are thus rather like recipes in cookbooks, for such recipes 
specify the operations to be made or the steps to be taken (and the 
order of execution) in executing the process of producing a certain 
dish. Each line of the recipe will specify a culinary operation which is 
not absolutely simple but simple only relative to the language of that 
cookery book; executing that operation may well involve executing a 
whole series of simpler operations in a certain order. Similarly, 
computer programs are typically written in a programming language 
(for example LISP or FORTRAN) and each line of a program  will 
specify a computational operation simple only relative to that 
language. Thus in executing an operation specified by a single line of 
a LISP program a computer (or one of its subsystems) might have to 
execute a whole series of simpler computational operations.
This way of viewing computer programs^^ does not require a 
program to be explicitly represented in a computer that runs it. To 
run a program just is to execute a computational process by executing 
the steps specified by the program in that order. To do this no more 
requires the program to be explicitly represented in the computer 
than baking a cake in the manner described by a recipe requires the 
cook to consult some explicit representation of the recipe. In other 
words programs describe how computers perform computational 
processes, rather than specify the representations that are causally 
implicated whenever the process is executed. To say this is not to 
deny that programs are ever explicitly represented in computers. On 
the contrary, they often are, for program m ing a von Neum an 
machine typically involves bringing about changes in its memory so
26 A way which is heavily influenced by Cummins (1983 ch. 2).
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that it comes to contain representations that correspond to the lines 
of the program, representations that will be causally implicated in the 
m achine's sym bol-m anipulating activity whenever it runs the 
program or executes the process that the program is a program of. But 
even computers that explicitly represent some of the programs they 
run cannot explicitly represent all of the programs that they run on 
pain of infinite regress. This is because a computer can only run an 
explicitly represented program if it "knows-how" to respond to those 
representations. If how it is to respond to such explicit 
representations has to be explicitly represented, then in turn how it is 
to respond to that explicitly represented program will need to be 
explicitly represented, and so on ad infinitum. To bring an end to the 
regress w hat is needed is w hat D ennett (1983) calls tacit 
representation. Tacit representation is 'know-how' that is 'built into 
the system in some fashion that does not require it to be (explicitly) 
represented in the system' (p. 218). If a computer didn't have such 
know-how then it w ouldn't be able to respond to any explicitly 
represented programs. For a computer to have such know-how is for 
it to have certain computational capacities hard wired into it.
Computers are sensitive only to the formal properties of the 
symbols that they m anipulate, being blind to such semantic 
properties as meaning, content, truth value, reference, and the like. 
Fodor expresses the point in the following terms:
computational processes are both symbolic and formal. They are 
symbolic because they are defined over representations, and they 
are formal because they apply to representations in virtue of 
(roughly) the syn tax  of the representations. . . . What makes 
syntactic operations a species of formal operations is that being 
syntactic is a way of not being semantic. (1980, 227)
Thus the rules that computers apply to representations are formal 
rules. Two computers, or computational processes, will belong to the 
same computational type if and only if they produce the same 
formally individuated symbolic output from the same formally 
individuated symbolic input, and do it by applying the same formal 
rules. Two computers or computational processes might meet this 
requirement despite the fact that the symbols that they manipulate
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are divergent in their semantic properties. But this would not stand 
in the way of their computational equivalence. Alternatively, two 
computers, or computational processes, could produce semantically 
identical yet formally divergent output from semantically identical 
yet formally divergent input. In such a case, despite the semantic 
equivalence, the systems or processes would belong to different 
computational types.
How are we to understand this term "formal"? Syntactic properties 
are a species of formal property, but not all formal properties are 
syntactic. In this context the term "formal" can be replaced with 
"syntactic", a substitution that aids clarity given the familiarity of 
the latter notion. This substitution can be made because most 
scientific psychologists take the brain to be a type of computer that 
(like a von Neuman machine) is sensitive to syntactic properties, and 
they therefore understand the com putational operations that 
underlie cognition to be syntactic operations. Thus for our purposes, 
com putation can be understood as the process of m anipulating 
syntactically individuated symbols by means of the application of 
syntactic rules.
What does it mean to say that computers apply syntactic rules to 
symbols? A syntactic rule, or a representation of a syntactic rule, 
defines or specifies a function the arguments and values of which are 
syntactically individuated symbols. Suppose a syntactic rule R 
defines a function F. A computational system or process C generates 
its output from its input by applying R to its input if and only if its 
input-output behaviour satisfies F: in other words, if and only if it 
takes argum ents of F as input and whenever it takes such an 
argument as input, it produces as output the value of F for that 
argument. This characterisation of what it is to apply a syntactic rule 
indicates that a system or process can manipulate symbols by 
applying such rules w ithout having either to represent them 
explicitly or to understand them.
It is because of the fact that computers manipulate syntactically 
individuated symbols by applying syntactic rules to them that they 
are described as syntactic e n g i n e s . B u t  what about this term 
"syntax"? W hat are syntactic properties? For a symbol to have 
syntactic properties it must belong to a language. In this connection
22 The term "syntactic engine" is due to Dennett (1981).
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the term  "language" is best thought of as referring to formal 
languages rather than natural languages. Formal languages are 
defined w ithout reference to m eaning or any other semantic 
property. A formal language consists of a set of sentences of well 
formed formulae (wff s for short), typically denumerably many such 
sentences. Defining a formal language involves specifying the basic 
or atomic symbols of the language (the words of the language), 
making clear to which syntactic category each such symbol belongs 
(the categories being: predicate symbol, constant, quantifier, logical 
connective, and so on) and a set of formation rules that determine 
which combination of words of the language are w ff s. Symbols can 
be combined in accord with the rules to create complex expressions of 
the language. Such sentences can similarly be combined in accord 
with the rules to create further, more complex, sentences. Given that 
one can continue combining sentences in this manner to create new 
ones, a formal language with only a small number of words and 
formation rules will comprise denumerably many distinct sentences 
or wffs.
Describing the syntactic structure or the syntactic properties of a 
complex wff (that is, one made from combining simpler wffs) is a 
m atter of specifying the simpler w ffs that comprise it and the 
m anner in which they are combined. Similarly, describing the 
syntactic structure of a simple wff (that is, one that cannot be analysed 
into simpler w ffs) involves specifying the words that are its 
constituents and the manner in which they are combined. Thus 
specifying the syntactic properties of a wff involves analysing it into 
sim pler components and describing how those components are 
combined. Ultimately these components will be w ords of the 
language.
Thus the notion of syntax is inextricably bound up with that of a 
language; you don't have syntactic properties where you don't have 
language. Moreover, syntactic properties are inextricably bound up 
with semantic properties despite the frequently highlighted contrast 
between them. This is so for several reasons. Firstly, it is part of the 
essence of symbols that they are meaningful items, so something has 
syntactic properties only if it has semantic properties. Secondly, a 
property of a symbol is a syntactic property only if it has a bearing on 
the symbol's meaning. As Dennett puts it, 'what makes a feature
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syntactic is its capacity to make a semantic difference' (1982, p. 141). 
Thus the colour or size of a printed word is not a syntactic feature of 
it. Thirdly, to assign a symbol to a syntactic category is to imply 
something about its meaning. For example, to say that a particular 
symbol is a two-placed predicate-symbol is to say that it expresses a 
relational property that, when instantiated, holds between two 
individuals. (Bermudez, 1995).
The close relationship between semantic and syntactic properties 
might appear to pu t pressure on the claim that computers are 
sensitive only to syntactic properties by suggesting an argument such 
as the following. For any computer there will be a systematic 
relationship between the semantic properties of the symbols that it 
m anipulates and the syntactic properties of those symbols; for 
example, semantic differences between symbols will be reflected in 
syntactic differences between them. Consequently, corresponding to 
any counterfactual-supporting syntactic generalisation true of a 
com puter there will be a counterfactual supporting semantic 
generalisation. What this entails is that how a computer processes its 
input will depend upon the semantic properties of that input in the 
respect that: (i) ceteris paribus, to have been processed differently the 
input would have to have been semantically different (for only then 
would it have been syntactically different); and (ii) ceteris paribus, 
had the input been semantically different it would have been 
processed differently (as it would have been syntactically different). 
All this makes it difficult to avoid the conclusion that if computers 
are sensitive to syntactic properties then they are just as sensitive to 
semantic properties.^^
One reply to this argument is that it supplies the ammunition for its 
own downfall by implying that computers are sensitive to semantic 
properties in virtue of their sensitivity to syntactic properties (and 
not vice versa). This dependency relationship suggests that, first and 
foremost, computers are syntactic engines. However, replying in this 
manner is to run the risk of winning the battle at the cost of losing 
the war. Many computers (and the symbols that they manipulate) are 
physically realised. The behaviour of such systems is governed by the
28 A similar argument is run by Block (1989) in an attempt to defeat the claim that 
the semantic properties of intentional states are epiphenomenal with respect to the 
intentional states and behaviour that they cause.
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laws of physics. Hence any sensitivity to the syntactic properties of 
the symbols that they m anipulate will be a product of their 
sensitivity to the physical. In other words, the dependency 
relationship between the syntactic and the physical will mirror the 
one that holds between the semantic and the syntactic. So, by parity 
of reasoning, many computers - including those that psychologists 
care about - are physical rather than syntactic engines.
However, the claim that computers are syntactic engines, that they 
are only, or at least primarily, sensitive to the syntactic properties of 
the symbols that they manipulate, can be defended.
Consider the case of neurophysiological systems. Some subsystems 
of the hum an brain take symbolic input and produce symbolic 
output, the symbols so manipulated having semantic properties. 
There will be semantic generalisations true of the input-output 
behaviour of such neurophysiological systems, generalisations of the 
form: if the system receives input with such and such semantic 
properties then it will respond by producing output with such and 
such semantic properties. If this is not the case then scientific 
psychology is a non-starter. Yet it offends intuition to claim that such 
neurophysiological systems are sensitive to semantic properties; 
intuitively it seems plausible to say that neurophysiological systems 
are sensitive only to neurophysiological properties.
The question is: how can we reconcile the view that there are 
semantic generalisations true of (some) neurophysiological systems 
w ith  the view  tha t such system s are sensitive only to 
neurophysiological properties? Here is how. N europhysiology 
individuates events, states, processes and entities in terms of their 
neurophysiological properties. Semantic properties cannot be 
identified with, or reduced to, such properties. A taxonomy of neural 
phenomena in terms of their semantic properties would crosscut a 
taxonomy of neural phenomena in terms of their neural properties. 
This is because neural phenomena belonging to one and the same 
neural type can diverge in their semantic properties and, conversely, 
neural phenomena with the same semantic properties can differ at 
the neural level. Consider a neurophysiological system N located in 
my brain. N will take input and produce output that has both 
semantic and neurophysiological properties. Moreover, there will be 
true of N both semantic and neurophysiological generalisations
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concerning its inpu t-ou tpu t behaviour. Now just the same 
neurophysiological generalisations will be true of the input-output 
behaviour of all neurophysiological systems of the same type as N. 
But there is no guarantee that the same semantic generalisations 
will be true of them all. Thus there may be a respect in which N is 
sensitive to the semantic properties of its input. But given that there 
will not be any (or need not be any) semantic generalisations that 
apply to all neurophysiological systems of the same type as N we can 
conclude that, qua neurophysiological system, N (and all other 
neurophysiological systems) is not sensitive to semantic or syntactic 
properties.
A parallel argument establishes the conclusion that computers are 
not sensitive to semantic properties. Computational phenomena are 
individuated in terms of syntactic properties. Semantic properties 
neither reduce to, nor can be identified with, syntactic properties. It is 
possible for the symbols manipulated by one computer to have quite 
different semantic properties than the corresponding symbols 
m anipulated by another computer despite the fact that the two 
computers are computationally identical. Thus all systems of a 
particular com putational type will have the same syntactic 
generalisations true of them  but not the same sem antic 
generalisations. Therefore, we can conclude that computational 
systems, qua computers, are not sensitive to semantic properties but 
rather are sensitive to syntactic properties.^^
That completes my account of the nature of computation. By way of 
recapitulation: computers are symbol manipulators, they produce 
symbolic output from symbolic input. The symbols that they so 
manipulate have syntactic properties (and thus belong to a formal 
language) and they are manipulated by means of the application of
29 This argument does not presuppose an externalist theory of content in endorsing the 
possibility that syntactically identical symbols manipulated by computationally 
identical systems can diverge in content. This is because computational systems can be 
embedded in larger computational systems. Consider two computationally identical 
system s S' and S" embedded in computationally divergent systems. The causal 
relations between the symbols manipulated by S' might diverge from those between 
the same symbols manipulated by S" (in virtue of the differences between the 
respective systems in which S' and S" are housed) in such a way that, on a 
functionalist theory of content, their meanings diverged.
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syntactic rules. Despite the fact that symbols have semantic properties 
(and often physical properties) computers are sensitive only to the 
syntactic properties of the symbols they manipulate.
2.5 How could a physical system be a computer?
Some physical systems are computers. According to scientific 
psychology the brain, or some of its parts, is a computer. Thus the 
question arises of how a physical system could be a computer or 
engage in computational activity. What conditions must a system 
satisfy in order to be a computer? I will attempt to answer this 
question in this section.
Suppose we are presented with a physical system (call it S) which is 
described as a computer. For this description to be legitimate - given 
the above account of the nature of computation - there must be some 
language that S employs, a language the symbols of which S 
manipulates. Suppose that a description of that language (call it L) is 
given by specifying its atomic symbols, or words, and the formation 
rules for constructing sentences, or wffs, out of these words. For S to 
employ L there would have to be a mapping of potential internal 
physical states of S onto symbols of L, a mapping that satisfies two 
conditions. The first condition is this. The mapping maps onto each 
word and expression of L a distinct type of internal state that S is 
capable of tokening. The physical states mapped onto the complex 
symbols must be more complex than the physical states mapped 
onto the atomic symbols and the complexity of these complex 
physical states m ust mirror the complexity of the symbols onto 
which they are mapped. Let me try to explain. Complex expressions 
of a language are made up of simpler items, ultimately words, that 
are combined in a certain way. Tokens of such complex symbols 
have components each of which is a token of a word type present in 
the complex symbol-type in question. For example, w hen I say 
"Giraffes have long necks" what I do is emit a sound that is a token 
of the sentence type Giraffes have long necks. This sound can be 
decomposed into parts each such part being a token of a word that 
belongs to the sentence. If, for example, the noise I made did not 
have a component which was a token of the word Giraffes then 
whatever sentence I uttered it was not Giraffes have long necks.
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In the case of the mapping of physical states of S onto symbols of L, 
the physical states that are mapped onto complex symbols must 
have as components physical states that map onto the simple 
symbols that are the constituents of the complex symbols. Thus, for 
example, if L is English, then the physical state of S mapped onto the 
sentence Giraffes have long necks must be a complex state which has 
as components the physical state that is mapped onto Giraffes, the 
physical state that is mapped onto long and so on. This condition 
would be violated if, for example, the state mapped onto Giraffes 
have long necks had no component that mapped onto Giraffes but 
had one which mapped onto tree.
What makes a sentence the sentence that it is is not just the words 
that it comprises but, in addition, the way in which those words are 
combined to make the sentence, in other words the syntactic 
structure of the sentence. This fact generates a second condition that 
the m apping m ust satisfy if S is to employ L. The physical 
relationships between the components of complex states must mirror 
the syntactic relationships between the words of the sentences onto 
which they are mapped. Consider an example. The state mapped 
onto Aardvarks eat termites m ust have the same simple states as 
components as that m apped onto Termites eat aardvarks, but the 
physical relationships between these simple components must differ. 
They must differ in the respect that the component of the first state 
that corresponds to aardvark had better not stand in the same 
relationship to the other components of that state as the component 
corresponding to aardvark in the second state stands to the other 
components of that state. However, there is a respect in which the 
physical relationships between the parts of these physical states must 
agree. Syntactic relationships m ust correspond to physical 
relationships so that all sentences that have the same abstract 
syntactic structure will be m apped onto complex states whose 
components stand in the same physical relationships to one another. 
For example, all sentences of the form A eats B must have mapped 
onto them complex states such that the component that corresponds 
to A stands in just the same physical relation to the components 
that correspond to the other words in the sentence. In meeting this 
second condition, a mapping of physical states of S onto symbols of L 
effectively maps physical relations between component physical
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States of complex physical states onto syntactic relationships between 
symbolic components of complex symbols.
For S to employ L there must be a mapping from internal physical 
states of S onto symbols of L that satisfies the above described 
conditions. But how is a theorist supposed to specify a proposed 
mapping? Given that languages standardly comprise denumerably 
many distinct sentences, one clearly cannot just write down for each 
and every distinct sentence of L the state that maps onto it, for to 
attempt to do this would be to engage in a task that could never be 
completed. But there is a device that can be employed that is 
analogous to that employed in defining a formal language. Formal 
languages are defined by specifying the atomic symbols - the words - 
of the language, and the formation rules which determine which 
combinations of words are sentences of the language. Similarly, in 
specifying a mapping from physical states to symbols one explicitly 
states for each word of the language the physical state that maps onto 
it, and for each distinct syntactic relation that can hold between 
components of a sentence the corresponding physical relation. Once 
this has been done the theorist has effected a mapping of physical 
states of S (that is, states S can potentially token) onto symbolic 
expressions of L that satisfies the above described conditions.
A first step in justifying the assertion that a particular physical 
system is a computer is to indicate which language it employs and 
specify a mapping of internal physical states of the system onto 
symbolic expressions of the language in question. Once this is done 
one has indicated how the symbolic expressions of the language are 
realised or instantiated in the system in question. Given this fact I 
will, following Pylyshyn (1984), name such a mapping of physical 
states onto symbolic expressions an "instantiation function".
It is possible for physically distinct systems to employ the same 
language. In such a case the instantiation function that describes how 
the symbols of the language are realised in one system will differ 
from that that describes how the symbols of the language are realised 
in the second system. Thus the symbolic expressions of a language 
are multiply realisable in the respect that if a physical system employs 
a particular language then there will be some other (possible) 
physical system that employs the same language yet realises the 
symbols of that language differently at the physical level. Indeed, the
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instantiation function true of a system can change over time with 
symbols being realised in one way at t l  and quite another at t2.
I do not wish to argue that if there is an instantiation function that 
maps the states of a physical system S onto the symbols of a language 
L then S will thereby be a computer, or more specifically, a computer 
that employs L or m anipulates the symbols of L. Satisfying this 
condition is not enough to attain computerhood. In other words the 
existence of such a m apping is not a sufficient condition for 
computerhood. But it certainly is a necessary condition. So what 
other conditions are there?
A first further condition has to do with meaning. Earlier we saw 
that there is an intimate connection between semantic and syntactic 
properties. Items that do not have semantic properties are not 
symbols, and a property of an item is a syntactic property only if it has 
a bearing on the meaning of the item. Consequently, for a physical 
system to be a computer, some of its internal states (namely, those 
m apped onto the symbolic expressions of a formal language by 
whatever instantiation function the system satisfies) m ust have 
semantic p r o p e r t i e s . ^ 0  One could imagine there being a physical 
system such that it was possible to map its internal states onto the 
symbols of a formal language despite the fact that those internal 
states had no semantic properties. Such a system would not be a 
computer.
However, it is not enough that the putative symbols manipulated 
by a physical system have semantic properties. In addition, there 
m ust be a systematic relationship between their semantic and 
syntactic properties; a relationship like that that holds between the 
semantic and syntactic properties of natural language symbols. A 
relationship such that, for example, the meaning of any complex 
symbol is determined by its syntactic structure and the meaning of its 
parts.
Another condition is that to be a computer a system’s putative 
symbol-manipulating activity must be semantically coherent. This 
condition would not be satisfied if the system generally produced 
output which bore no sensible or cogent logical or semantic relation
80 These semantic properties could be the products of acts of interpretation of 
intelligent agents or, alternatively, the products of the satisfaction of some 
naturalistic sufficient condition for the tokening of such properties.
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to its input. In such a case the system would, as it were, "talk 
gibberish" and would not be doing anything that would count as 
information processing, solving information processing problems, 
or extracting information.
In making these points I am not turning my back on the syntactic 
account of com putation that I advanced earlier. For though 
com putation, by its very nature, involves the m anipulation of 
meaningful items and the generation of output that is semantically 
related to the input from which it is generated, computers and 
computational processes are individuated syntactically rather than 
semantically.
I feel tempted to claim that the notion of a computer is partly a 
teleological one; that nothing is a computer unless it is its function to 
process or extract information, solve problems, work things out, and 
such like. Computers don't just do these things; in addition they are 
used to do these things and in so being used are of a benefit to their 
user. W ith respect to the brain this suggests the following. A 
subsystem of the brain might satisfy all of the above described 
conditions but if it doesn't benefit the system in which it is housed in 
virtue of generating the information that it generates (if it isn't, so to 
speak, used to generate that information or if that information 
doesn't play a significant role in the life of the embedding system) 
then it isn't a computer.
This attempt to specify the conditions that a physical system must 
satisfy in order to be a computer could do with much in the way of 
elaboration. However, I think that I have done enough to indicate 
the outlines of an adequate answer to the question of how a physical 
system could be a computer, an answer which tells us in virtue of 
what those physical systems that are computers attain that status. 
What should be clear is that it is very hard to be a computer, contrary 
to what some philosophers would have us believe.
Suppose that physical system S is a computer that manipulates 
symbols of L. What computational capacities will S have, what 
symbolic /  syntactic functions will it be able to compute? The answer 
is that it all depends upon w hat counterfactual-supporting 
generalisations concerning its internal state transitions are true of S 
(or its parts). Given the instantiation function, corresponding to each 
such generalisation will be a syntactic generalisation. Thus if it is true
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of s  that w henever it tokens an internal state of type I' it 
subsequently tokens an internal state of type I", then it will also be 
the case that whenever it tokens the symbol F' it will generate from it 
a token of the symbol F" (where F' and F" are the symbols that have, 
respectively, F and I" mapped onto them). Given the huge network 
of generalisations relating its internal physical states to one another, 
there will be a huge network of syntactic or symbol-manipulating 
generalisations true of S. Which such generalisations are true of S 
will determine which symbol-manipulating capacities it has, or 
which symbolic functions it is capable of computing. Suppose that it 
is claimed of S that it can compute the symbolic function SF, a 
function defined by the rule R. This claim will be true if and only if 
the syntactic generalisations that are true of S are such that whenever 
S tokens a symbol that is an argument of SF, that token causes S to 
token the symbol that is the value of SF for that argum ent (or, 
alternatively, S responds to the token by producing a token of the 
symbol that is the value of SF for that argument). If this condition is 
satisfied, some of S's (potential) symbol manipulating activity can be 
described as generating symbols of L from symbols of L by applying 
rule R.
We have seen that syntactic properties or syntactic types are 
multiply realisable. But is it true to say, as does Block (1989), that 
'syntax is . . .  a functional notion', and that 'it is having a certain 
functional role that makes a state satisfy a syntactic description' (p. 
142)? For syntactic properties to be functional properties it would 
have to be the case that a state of a system's having a given syntactic 
property was a matter of its bearing certain counterfactual-supporting 
causal relations to other states of the system. A consideration of 
symbols containing logical connectives would seem to support 
Block's view. Most powerful formal languages contain logical 
connectives, and such connectives are a primary way by means of 
which simple sentences are combined to build more complex 
sentences. Consider the connective &. For a state of a system to have 
the syntactic property of being a sentence of the form A  & B certain 
causal generalisations would have to be true of the system. Suppose 
that the state in question is state T of system S. For I' to have the 
syntactic property of being a symbol of the form A  & B it would have 
to be the case that the following causal generalisations held. First, I'
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causes the state that maps onto A , (or realises A  in S), and the state 
that maps onto B (or realises B in S). In other words, whenever S 
tokens I', that token causes a token of the state that maps onto A, and 
a token of the state that maps onto B. Second, I’ is jointly caused by 
the state that maps onto A  and the state that maps onto B. In other 
words, whenever S tokens the state that maps onto A  and tokens the 
state that maps onto B , those two tokens jointly cause a tokening of 
These generalisations correspond, respectively, to the familiar 
rules of &-elimination and «^-introduction. The same will hold, 
m utatis mutandis, for all other connectives; that is, for any 
connective C, for a state of a system to have the syntactic property of 
being a symbol containing C as its main connective, generalisations 
corresponding to the introduction and elimination rules for C must 
be true of the system.
Indeed something like the above would also appear to apply to 
quantifiers. For a state of a system to have the syntactic property of 
containing a particular quantifier Q, that state must figure in causal 
generalisations that correspond to the introduction and elimination 
rules for Q.
However, we have to be careful, for it is certainly possible for two 
distinct computational systems, or the same system at different 
points in time, to employ the same language, yet to manipulate the 
symbols of that language differently. In such a case the causal 
relations between the symbolic states of one of the systems will 
diverge from the causal relations between the symbolic states of the 
other. Many of the syntactic generalisations that are true of a 
com putational system are contingent in the sense that those 
generalisations don’t have to be true of the system given the formal 
language that it employs; it is consistent w ith a com puter's 
employing a particular language that it manipulates the symbols of 
that language in many different ways. Indeed, what happens when 
one programs a computer is that one brings about changes in the way 
it manipulates the symbols of the language that it employs; in other
31 Strictly speaking this is a little too strong as S need only tend, or have a tendency 
to, generate a token of the state that maps onto A  and a token of the state that maps 
onto B from tokens of I', and a tendency to generate tokens of I' from tokens of the 
state that maps onto A  and the state that maps onto B.
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words one alters the syntactic generalisations that are true of the 
computer.
2.6 The role of meaning in psychological explanation
As we have seen, computation and meaning are closely linked in 
virtue of the fact that computation involves symbol manipulation. 
The concept of symbol and that of meaning are inextricably bound 
together. It's not just that symbols are sometimes, or often, 
meaningful. Rather, to be a symbol you have to have meaning, or 
belong to a system of meaningful items (that is, a language), or have 
been designed or invented w ith a view to having m eaning 
attributed, or something along those lines. Thus no computation 
w ithout meaning. However, this fact alone does not entail that 
psychological explanation m ust appeal to meaning or semantic 
properties. That computation, by its very nature, involves the 
manipulation of meaningful items doesn't entail that computational 
processes are to be individuated in terms of the meanings of the 
sym bols they m anipulate, or that one's descrip tion  of a 
computational process qua computational process is incomplete until 
one has specified some meanings. Indeed, I have argued that 
computational phenomena are syntactically individuated. Thus one 
can describe a computer's computational capacities and activities qua 
computational without concerning oneself with the meaning of the 
symbols the system manipulates, even if those symbols must have 
some meaning to be symbols.
This might suggest the following line of thought. Scientific 
psychology is committed to the idea that the mind-brain - or its 
subsystems - is a computer, and thus that the processes and capacities 
that underlie cognition are computational. In accounting for a 
cognitive capacity, psychologists attempt to specify the program that 
is run  whenever that capacity is exercised. Doing this involves 
describing a series of symbol-manipulating steps each of which 
corresponds to a symbol-manipulating capacity of the system under 
study (or one of its subsystems). As meaning has no place in the 
description of a computer's computational operations and capacities, 
meaning, and semantic properties in general, have no place in the 
explanation of cognitive capacities.
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However, I shall argue, meaning has a fundamental role to play in 
psychological explanation. A description of a computer program or a 
series of computational capacities that made no attributions of 
semantic properties to the representations it alluded to could not 
constitute a satisfactory explanation of a cognitive capacity.
The nature of computation would be such as to imply that there is 
no role for meaning in psychological explanation only if it were the 
case that cognitive capacities were computational or syntactic 
capacities. But the crucial fact is that scientific psychology is 
concerned with explaining intentionally-characterised cognitive 
capacities. Scientific psychology characterises and individuates 
cognitive capacities (partly) in terms of the intentional states that 
their exercise gives rise to. A capacity the exercise of which did not 
standardly result in the formation of a belief about the nature of the 
world by means of vision would not be the capacity Marr was 
interested in; a capacity the exercise of which did not standardly 
result in the formation of a belief about the meaning of a sentence 
just heard would not be the capacity to understand spoken sentences; 
a capacity the exercise of which did not standardly result in the 
having of a recollection of a past event would not be the capacity to 
remember past events; and so on. A consequence of this fact is that 
even if com putation is involved in cognition, explaining or 
describing a system's computational capacities would not be enough 
to explain its cognitive capacities. At the very least the meaning or 
semantic properties of the symbols manipulated would have to be 
specified.
It is a fundamental assumption of scientific psychology that the 
symbols manipulated by the subpersonal systems of the mind-brain 
have semantic as well as syntactic properties and that the semantic 
properties of these symbols are crucial to our having the cognitive 
capacities we have. The idea is that it is by means of computation that 
the m ind-brain processes inform ation or solves inform ation 
processing problems. Thus, for a computational process or capacity to 
be involved in the exercise of a particular cognitive capacity, the 
symbols manipulated would have to have appropriate meanings; not 
any old meaning will do. Hence, alongside the instantiation function 
w hich will map neurophysiological states onto syntactically- 
individuated symbols of a formal language, there will be a semantic
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function which maps such syntactically-individuated symbols onto 
meanings. This semantic^^ function will be such that the meaning of 
complex symbols will depend upon the meaning of their parts and 
their syntactic structure. In other words, the semantic function will 
reveal the language(s) manipulated by the mind-brain (and /or its 
sub-systems) to have a combinatorial semantics. It is important to 
stress that, as far as the scientific psychologist is concerned, the 
semantic function maps mental symbols onto meanings that they 
really have. Thus the content of mental symbols is not "as if" content 
or the product of interpretation. If the semantic properties of mental 
symbols and states were not as real and objective as, say, their 
physical properties, then whatever goes on within the mind-brain at 
the subpersonal level would not be information p r o c e s s i n g . 3 3
Given the existence of a semantic function, w henever a 
computational capacity is exercised by a sub-personal system, a 
symbol with a certain meaning will be generated from a symbol with 
some other meaning. The generation of such a symbol will constitute 
an important step in a process that will eventuate in the formation of 
a personal level intentional state that manifests some cognitive 
capacity or other. But how and why will making such steps, steps 
which involve the generation of a symbol with a certain meaning 
from a symbol with some other meaning by means of computation, 
play such an important role in the exercise of cognitive capacities? To 
answer this question consider the example of my capacity to work out 
how much money I have in my bank account.
Most of the time I don't know how much money I have in my bank 
account but I have the capacity to work it out. How do I do this? First 
of all I consult my chequebook which has in it a symbol that 
represents the state of my bank balance at some previous point in 
time and a whole load of other symbols each of which represent 
individual deposits and w ithdraw als from my account in the
32 In naming this function "the semantic function" I am following Pylyshyn's (1984) 
terminology. Block (1990) uses the same term to label functions from meanings to 
meanings.
33 Therefore, McDowell's (1994) account of scientific psychology as being a syntactic 
psychology whose attributions of content to subpersonal states are not literal is not 
one that the practitioners of scientific psychology would recognise as an accurate 
description of their discipline.
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intervening period, and which collectively represent all such 
deposits and withdrawals. These symbols provide me with a whole 
body of information from which I can work out how much money I 
have in my account now. Hence, what I do is generate information 
concerning the current state of my bank account from information 
about certain events in its history. I make this transition by working 
out, or extracting, information that I want from information that I 
already have by means of computation. In other words, I execute a 
whole series of symbol m anipulating moves, and in so doing 
generate the information that I require from information that I 
already have. These symbol-manipulating moves are the following:
(i) On symbols which represent all the deposits I have made I 
perform  a sym bol-manipulating operation which generates a 
symbol that represents their sum.
(ii) On symbols that represent all the withdrawals I have made I 
perform a symbol-manipulating operation that generates a 
symbol that represents their sum.
(iii) On the output symbol of (i) and that of (ii) I perform an 
operation that generates a symbol that represents the net deposit.
(iv) Finally, on the symbol that represents the previous state of 
my bank account and the output of (iii) I perform an operation 
that generates a symbol that represents the current state of my 
bank balance.
In executing each of these steps I perform, quite mechanically, a 
computational operation which generates symbolic output from 
symbolic input. The symbols that I manipulate belong to the Arabic 
numerical system and so in addition to their syntactic properties they 
have semantic properties, in particular they represent numbers. In 
v irtue  of their rep resen ting  num bers in perform ing  the 
computational operations that I perform, I compute the value of a 
mathematical function for given arguments in performing each of (i) 
to (iv). At stages (i), (ii) and (iv) the mathematical function is that of 
addition whereas at (iii) it is that of subtraction. But, as indicated in 
the description of the stages, the symbols don't just represent 
numbers but also facts about my bank account or events in its history. 
The great thing is that given the meanings of the symbols that I
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manipulate I can, by performing mechanical symbol-manipulating 
operations on them, work out the value of mathematical functions 
for given arguments and in so doing discover facts about my bank 
b a l a n c e . ^ 4  At each stage I discover a new fact about my bank account 
and its history, a fact from which, by making the appropriate moves - 
ultimately quite mechanical moves - I can work out either the fact I 
am after or a fact that it is helpful to be acquainted with if one is 
eventually to become acquainted with the target fact. For my symbol 
manipulating moves to generate information, it is not necessary that 
I be aware that they generate information or be aware of what 
information they generate. For example, the output of stage (i) 
represents the total value of deposits whether I realise it or not. One 
can be in the position of Searle in the Chinese room and still be 
generating information or uncovering facts.
In working out my current bank balance I manipulate symbols by 
applying syntactic rules to them. However an attempt to describe 
how I perform  this task which only appealed to the syntactic 
properties of the symbols I manipulate and the syntactic operations 
that I apply to them will at best only describe how I compute a certain 
syntactic function. It would, to put it mildly, be incomplete as an 
account of how I work out my bank balance. It would leave it a 
complete mystery as to why performing those syntactic operations 
was relevant to the task at hand and why their execution reliably 
leads to success. For it is in virtue of their generating relevant 
information that these syntactic operations enable me to work out 
my bank balance.
A complete account m ust attribute meaning to the symbols 
manipulated, and specify the facts that the symbols at different stages 
of the process represent, for, ceteris paribus, had those symbols had
34 It is quite common for a computer to compute a mathematical function and thus for 
its behaviour to be mathematically characterisable. To so characterise a computer's 
behaviour is to commit oneself to the claim that the symbols manipulated by the 
computer in question represent mathematical objects (for example, numbers). As in the 
bank account case, symbols that represent numbers w ill often do double 
representational duty representing the numerical magnitude of some feature of the 
non-mathematical world. The behaviour of two computers might, from the 
mathematical point of view, be identical despite the fact that they generate quite 
different information.
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different meanings or represented different facts they would not 
have been relevant to, or helpful in, the execution of the task at 
hand. A crucial feature of the steps that I execute is that each of them 
constitutes the discovery of certain information or a certain fact, 
information or a fact that it is helpful to uncover as one can work out 
from it, by mechanical means, some other fact relevant to the task at 
hand. I work out the sum of the deposits and the sum of the 
withdrawals. Why do I do that? What is the point of doing that? If I 
discover such information, which I can do from the information that 
I started with, I can subsequently work out the net deposit. And from 
this, along w ith the information I started with, I can, by quite 
mechanical means, work out my current balance, which is my 
ultimate aim.
That I can acquire relevant information by applying syntactic 
operations to symbols that encode some other information depends 
to a large extent on the world's being a certain way, a way that it need 
not have been. For example, I can work out the value of the total 
w ithdraw als from my account by carrying out that symbol- 
manipulating operation by means of which I compute the sum of 
their individual values, because of a fact about the way the banking 
world works; namely, that the total value of withdrawals from one's 
account equals the sum of the values of the individual withdrawals. 
One could imagine a world, not so far removed from ours, where 
this fact did not hold; where, for example, banks subtracted from ones 
account an extra ten per cent of the sum of the individual 
withdrawals if your middle name began with the letter "J". Given 
the importance of these facts about the world, they must be appealed 
to in a complete account of how I work out my bank balance for if 
they are not specified it will be unclear as to why doing what I do is 
relevant to the task at hand and a means of generating useful 
inform ation.
In short, then, an account of my capacity to work out my bank 
balance or, in other words, a description of how I do it, must appeal 
to more than the syntactic properties of the symbols I manipulate 
and the syntactic operations I apply to them in exercising this 
capacity. In addition it must specify the semantic properties of those 
symbols and describe relevant features of the world. But why, it 
might be asked, must syntax figure in this account? The answer is
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that an account minus the syntax would be incomplete for such an 
account would leave it a mystery as to how I get from one stage to the 
next, for example, how I work out the value of my total withdrawals 
from knowledge of, or information concerning, the value of each of 
the individual withdrawals.
W hat is the relevance of all this to the issue of the nature of 
psychological explanations of cognitive capacities? The explanations 
that psychologists seek are a lot like the above explanation of my 
capacity to work out my bank balance. It is a fundam ental 
assum ption  of scientific psychology that our having  the 
intentionally-characterised cognitive capacities that we have depends 
to a large extent on our having subpersonal systems that are capable 
of working out or generating relevant information. Consider the 
visual capacity. I have the capacity to see, that is, the capacity to form 
true beliefs about the nature of my immediate environment (or, 
alternatively, to have experiences in which the world is presented as 
being a certain way, a way that it in fact is) by means of vision. 
Exercises of this capacity are processes that begin with light hitting the 
retina forming a retinal image, and end with the formation of a belief 
or the having of an experience. The question is: how am I able to get 
from a pair of retinal images to true beliefs about the nature of the 
world? Put this way, we have w hat looks like a m iraculous 
achievement. The key insight of scientific psychology is that the pairs 
of retinal images that are the inputs to the visual process contain 
inform ation from which it is possible, to work out or extract 
information about the nature of the external world just as the input 
to the process of working out my bank balance contains information 
from which it is possible to work out my current bank balance. This 
information about the external world is worked out or extracted by a 
subpersonal system, namely the visual module, and is precisely the 
kind of information that it is necessary to work out if the visual 
process is to eventuate in true beliefs about the external world.
The subpersonal visual module doesn't produce true beliefs about 
the nature of the world as output, but what it does do is perform a 
task that is fundamental to the generation of such beliefs, namely 
that of extracting relevant information, information that is such that 
were it not extracted, ceteris paribus, we wouldn't be able to form any 
true beliefs about the nature of our immediate environm ent by
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means of vision. In general then, the scientific psychologist holds 
that our brain houses a battery of subpersonal systems that perform 
information-extracting tasks that must be performed if we are to 
have the cognitive capacities that we have. Thus an essential 
component of the task of accounting for a given cognitive capacity is 
to discover how the relevant subpersonal system generates useful 
information from whatever information it receives as input. In the 
case of vision this will involve describing how the visual system 
generates from retinal images - which contain information about the 
intensity of light falling on the retina - information concerning the 
nature of the subject's immediate environment. In the case of the 
capacity to understand spoken sentences it will involve describing 
how information concerning the semantic and syntactic properties of 
a heard sentence is generated from information concerning the 
nature of a sound that impinges on the auditory system.
Thus the subpersonal processing that underlies cognition is like 
working out one's bank balance in that it involves working out or 
generating information from information. Indeed there are further 
points of similarity. First, the information is symbolically encoded so 
that subpersonal systems generate information from information by 
generating symbols from symbols. Second, typically the output 
information will be generated from the input information in a series 
of moves each of which involves working out information from 
inform ation that the system  in question already has. This 
information will be relevant to the task at hand in that it will be the 
kind of information from which one can extract the information one 
desires or information that gets one nearer to that final goal. Third, 
these inform ation-extracting moves are m ade by m eans of 
computation, that is, by applying syntactic rules to symbols. Thus 
subpersonal systems work out what they work out by applying 
syntactic rules to information-bearing symbols so as to generate 
further information-bearing symbols.
Given this sim ilarity betw een the subpersonal activity that 
underlies cognition and the process of working out one's bank 
balance, semantic properties of symbols must be appealed to in 
describing the former for just the same reasons as they must be 
appealed to in describing the latter.
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Suppose that in attempting to specify how a subpersonal system 
perform s a given inform ation-generating task a psychologist 
produces an account which appeals only to the syntactic properties of 
the symbols the system in question manipulates, and the syntactic 
rules that it applies to them. This account will be inadequate as it will 
leave it a complete m ystery as to the relevance of all this 
computational activity. What is the point of making all those symbol 
m anipulating moves? Why are they helpful in generating the 
information that the system generates? Why don't they support 
some other cognitive capacity? In order to answer these questions it 
is necessary to specify the semantic properties of the symbols 
m anipulated, and thus to reveal the intermediary steps taken as 
being those of working out information that is relevant to the 
achievement of the overall goal of the system. There is only some 
value or point in executing a particular sym bol-manipulating 
operation if by making it one can generate information which it is 
worthwhile for, or relevant given, the task at hand. To ignore the 
semantic properties of the symbols manipulated is thus to ignore 
what is most im portant about them and the operations that are 
applied to them.
Another good reason for the scientific psychologist not to ignore 
semantics is that it enables her to capture generalisations and 
recognise similarities that do not exist at the syntactic level. For 
example, from the syntactic point of view there are different ways of 
computing such arithmetical functions as addition and subtraction. 
One way involves the application of syntactic rules to Arabic 
numerals whereas another involves the application of quite different 
syntactic rules to binary strings. Consider two calculating devices, one 
that calculated in the first way and the other in the second way. From 
the syntactic point of view their respective capacities are completely 
different and their input-output behaviour is not subsumed by the 
same generalisations. It is only when the semantic properties of the 
symbols manipulated by these devices is considered that the salient 
similarities between them can be recognised; in particular, the fact 
that they both compute the same arithmetical functions. This gives 
rise to the worry that a purely syntactic psychology (of the sort 
championed by Stich (1983)) would employ a taxonomy that is far too 
fine-grained for its own good.
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Syntactic capacities and operations do not appear from nowhere. 
When a system has a particular syntactic capacity or engages in a 
particular syntactic operation there is usually a good reason for its 
having that capacity or engaging in that operation. That good reason 
has to do with semantics. Consider the class of human artefacts that 
are computers. Their syntactic capacities and behaviour is a product 
of the way in which we have designed and programmed them. We 
have designed and programmed them in the way that we have 
precisely because computers so designed and programmed generate 
information - or have the capacity to generate information - that we 
particularly care about and want generated. In short, it is our desires 
and needs at the semantic level that dictate how we design and 
program  computers at the syntactic level. A computer that didn't 
generate information that we needed or wanted would be of no 
interest or use to us and thus would not have come into being (save 
by accident).
Something similar is true of biological systems that are computers 
or have com putational components. Syntactic capacities and 
processes get selected for in virtue of their generating information 
which is of use to, or beneficial for, the system that has the capacity or 
executes the process in question. Evolutionary forces tend not to 
produce creatures with syntactic capacities the exercise of which 
generally  does no t issue in significant sem antic benefits. 
Consequently, a scientific psychologist who was interested only in the 
syntactic would be ignoring what was, from the evolutionary point of 
view, most important about the syntactic capacities and processes she 
sought to d e s c r i b e . 3 5  This point further emphasises the close 
relationship between syntax and semantics, and reinforces the claim 
that scientific psychology cannot fruitfully view the m ind (or its 
parts) as a computer without taking an interest in the semantic 
properties of the symbols that it manipulates.
There are also powerful pragmatic reasons for the scientific 
psychologist to concern herself with the semantic properties of
35 This suggests that teleological theories of content have got matters the wrong 
way round. Mental representations do not have the content that they have because of 
what they (or the processes that generate them) have been selected for; rather, it is 
because of the content that they have that they (or the processes that generate 
them) are selected for.
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mental representations. Even if she set herself the task of uncovering 
the syntactic workings of, say, the visual module (rather than that of 
explaining an intentionally-characterised cognitive capacity) she 
could not afford to ignore the semantic properties of the symbols 
manipulated by that module. This is because one needs to have a 
pretty good idea of what information the visual module is processing 
before one has a realistic chance of working out any of the syntactic 
details. In general, in order to uncover the syntactic workings of a 
cognitive module psychologists proceed by first addressing such 
questions as: what information would it be useful for the module to 
generate for it to support the cognitive capacity that it underlies? 
What information could it possibly generate given the nature of the 
external environment? And so on. It is only when such questions 
have been answered (when some light has been shed on the 
semantic activity of the module in question) that the syntactic details 
can be uncovered. In the absence of a semantic story, the psychologist 
will not know what she is looking for and will have no clues as to 
how to formulate and test plausible hypotheses. Of course, it doesn't 
follow from this that semantic properties have a role to play in the 
description of the syntactic workings of a cognitive module or in an 
explanation of such a m odule's syntactic capacities. For such 
purposes the semantic properties hitherto identified should be, as it 
were, rubbed out. But they cannot be rubbed out from an explanation 
of an intentionally-characterised cognitive capacity for the reasons 
that I have outlined above.
In short, then, the semantic properties of the symbols manipulated 
by subpersonal systems cannot be ignored by the psychologist given 
her explanatory ambitions. But why must any appeal to syntax and 
syntactic operations be made? What would be wrong with an account 
w hich m erely analyses a subpersonal system 's inform ation- 
generating activity into a series of information gathering substeps 
along these lines: the system starts off w ith such and such 
information from which it extracts some other information, from 
which it extracts some more information, and so on? The answer is 
that without the syntactic details it is a mystery as to how the system 
works out the information that it works out. As it generates 
information by means of computation, to give a complete account of 
how a system generates the information that it generates, it is
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necessary to tell the syntactic story. In the case of the subpersonal 
systems that support and underlie cognition there is always the 
worry that if the syntactic story is missing one will have attributed to 
the brain miraculous powers, that is, powers to generate information 
from information that just couldn't be had by an unintelligent, 
mechanical system.
It is worthwhile emphasising the beauty of computation from the 
perspective of the scientific psychologist. In connection with the 
mind, what is most exciting about computers is not the possibility of 
build ing  intelligent com puters, bu t rather the actuality that 
computers are completely stupid. Computers generate meaningful 
symbols from meaningful symbols and in so doing work things out, 
solve problems, discover facts, and the like, by entirely mechanical 
means that involve no exercise of intelligence. This fact about 
computers raises the possibility that subsystems of the brain engage 
in computational activity and thus generate information from 
information by entirely mechanical and unintelligent means. To 
attribute to such subsystems powers to generate information from 
information by means of computation in the course of accounting 
for cognitive capacities is thus not to posit intelligent agents in the 
brain in any way that threatens circularity or infinite regress.^^ It is 
this fact about computers and computation that leads scientific 
psychologists to think of the subpersonal systems that underlie and 
support cognition as engaging in computational activity. And once 
they see subpersonal systems as engaging in computational activity, 
in perform ing their information-generating tasks, psychologists 
commit themselves to the task of telling the syntactic story in the 
course of accounting for cognitive capacities.
In the course of accounting for my capacity to work out my bank 
balance we saw that it was important to appeal to facts about the 
world. These facts are such that if they didn't hold certain symbol- 
m anipulating moves would be incapable of generating relevant 
information. The same point holds of the psychological case. For 
example, the visual module would not be able to detect such features 
of surfaces as changes in texture and colour were it not for the fact 
that there is a systematic relationship between the texture and 
colour of a surface and the intensity and wavelength of the light that
36 See Dennett (1978).
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it reflects. Hence, the psychologist must specify these facts, for a 
failure to do so would leave it a mystery as to the relevance and 
success of the computational operations described by her explanation. 
Indeed, such facts about the world will, in a certain sense, lead the 
way in the construction of psychological explanations. For facts about 
the world will provide the psychologist with clues as to how 
subpersonal systems generate relevant information.
What we have arrived at now is a more or less complete account of 
the nature of scientific psychological explanation. In summary, here 
is how that account goes. Scientific psychology aims to account for 
intentionally-characterised cognitive capacities; in other words to 
describe how we exercise such capacities. A fundamental assumption 
is th a t u n d erly in g  and su p p o rtin g  such capacities are 
neurophysiologically-realised subpersonal systems that are capable of 
generating symbols from symbols by means of computation. These 
subpersonal systems facilitate cognition because the symbols they 
m anipulate have semantic properties, so that in exercising their 
sym bol-m anipulating capacities they generate information from 
information. In other words, given information as input they 
generate further information as output. The information generated 
in this way is precisely the kind that enables the cognitive system as a 
whole to form the personal-level intentional states that manifest the 
cognitive capacity in question. Consequently, central to explaining a 
cognitive capacity is the construction of an account of how the 
subpersonal system underlying the cognitive capacity in question 
performs its information-generating task; that is, how it generates the 
information that it produces as output from the information that it 
takes as input. As it performs this task by generating information- 
bearing symbols from information-bearing symbols by means of 
com putation, such an account m ust include reference to both 
semantic and syntactic properties. It m ust describe the formal 
language employed, the syntactic rules that are applied to the 
symbols of that language, and the semantic properties of these 
symbols. A failure to tell the syntactic story will constitute a failure to 
specify fully how the subpersonal system generates the information 
that it generates. And a failure to tell the semantic story will leave it a 
m ystery as to the point and relevance of the system's symbol- 
manipulating activity, for that activity only has a point and relevance
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if the symbols manipulated have appropriate semantic properties. 
Furthermore, those facts about the external world that enable the 
system to work out the information that it needs from information 
that it already has by means of the computational operations that it 
performs must also be specified. Thus the semantic and the syntactic 
are, as it were, intertwined in scientific psychological explanations. 
That they are so intertw ined is a product of the explanatory 
ambitions of scientific psychology and the fundamental assumptions 
of that discipline.
This account of the nature of scientific psychology would appear to 
imply that scientific psychological explanations are what Cummins 
calls "property theories" (see fn. 16). In explaining cognitive capacities 
by appeal to simpler underlying capacities, psychological explanations 
are not causal explanations of particular events that fit the deductive- 
nomological model of explanation. However, they can be seen as 
being causal explanations that effectively appeal to causal laws (or at 
least to counterfactual-supporting causal generalisations) and for this 
reason I am hesitant to call them property theories. As we have seen, 
cognitive capacities (along with the information processing and 
computational capacities that underlie them) correspond to causal 
generalisations. Consequently, a system's having such a capacity is 
just a matter of a certain causal generalisations being true of its input- 
output behaviour. Moreover, whenever an individual exercises a 
cognitive capacity, a causal process takes place that is subsumed by the 
causal generalisation that corresponds to that capacity. And that 
causal process will be made up of constituent causal processes each of 
which are exercises of underlying capacities and are thus subsumed 
by the causal generalisations corresponding to those capacities. (That 
is why references to underlying information processing and 
computational capacities can be freely interchanged with references 
to what goes on causally whenever such capacities are exercised). 
Effectively then, psychological explanations explain causal 
generalisations by appealing to the underlying causal generalisations 
in virtue of which they hold. And they can also be seen as describing 
what goes on causally whenever the cognitive capacity in question is 
exercised. For these reasons, scientific psychological explanation is a 
form of causal explanation.
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2.7 Fodor's account of psychological explanation
How does Fodor's understanding  of the nature of scientific 
psychology compare with my account? Does my account place any 
pressure on any of Fodor's views? One difference that we have seen 
concerns the nature of the RTM that scientific psychology is 
commited to. According to Fodor, scientific psychology is committed 
to RTM as a theory of such personal level PAs as beliefs, an assertion 
that I have rejected. In actual fact, the RTM that underlies scientific 
psycholog ical theo rising  is a theory  about subpersonal 
representational states, and not beliefs, desires, and the like.
A consideration of some of Fodor's most explicit pronouncements 
on the explanatory ambitions of scientific psychology and the nature 
of the explanations that it endeavours to produce would appear to 
generate a second point of conflict. Fodor has a tendency to represent 
scientific psychology as being a sharpened up version of folk 
psychology which, like the latter, seeks to produce singular causal 
explanations of PA tokenings and behavioural events that appeal to 
PAs, and which fit the deductive-nomological model of explanation. 
The primary difference between the two psychologies is that the 
scientific version is more thorough, rigorous and research oriented, 
and so constantly seeks to add to its stock of causal generalisations so 
as to expand its explanatory p o w e r s . 3 7  Such a view of the nature of 
scientific psychology and the explanations that it produces would 
appear to conflict with the account that I have developed in this 
chapter.
However, the above points notwithstanding, I am hesitant to accuse 
Fodor of holding a mistaken account of the nature of scientific 
psychology for there is much that he writes that sits happily with my 
account. First, he has represented scientific psychology as seeking to 
explain cognitive capacities by appealing to the simpler underlying 
capacities and operations of cognitive subsystems.38
37 This theme of Fodor's work is m ost evident in the first chapter of 
Psychosem antics.
38 In 'The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanation' he describes 
what he labels as '"intellectualist" accounts of mental competencies' as answering 
"how" questions by means of the specification of computer programs. He writes:
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Second, Fodor has frequently argued that non-basic laws (and for 
him all special science laws are non-basic) have implementing 
mechanisms, and that it is a scientific concern to describe such 
mechanisms. Here is how he puts the point in The Elm and the 
Expert::
There m ust be an implementing mechanism for any law of a 
nonbasic science, and the putative generalizations of psychology 
are not exceptions. An implementing mechanism is one in virtue 
of whose operation the satisfaction of a law's antecedent reliably 
brings about the satisfaction of its consequent. . . . Typically,
[A] psychological model in the form of a machine program for simulating the 
behaviour of an organism ipso facto provides, for each type of behaviour in the 
repertoire of that organism, a putative answer to the question "how does one 
produce behaviours of that type?", the form of the answer being a set of specific 
instructions for producing the behaviour by performing a set of machine 
operations. Hence to be interested in simulating behaviour is to be interested in a 
range of "how" questions about behaviour that psychological tlieories built on 
the nomological-deductive model are not designed to answer (p. 75).
And as an example of such a psychological explanation he presents the following 
account of how we tie our shoe laces:
There is a little man who lives in one's head. The little man keeps a library. 
When one acts upon the intention to tie one's shoes, the little man fetches down a 
volume entitled Tying One's Shoes. The volume says such things as: "Take the 
left free end of the shoelace in the left hand. Cross the left free end of the 
shoelace over the right free end of the shoelace . . etc.
When the little man reads the instruction 'take the left free end of the shoelace 
in the left hand', he pushes a button on a control panel. The button is marked 
take the left free end of a shoelace in the left hand'. When depressed, it 
activates a series of wheels, cogs, levers, and hydraulic mechanisms. As a causal 
consequence of the functioning of these mechanisms, one's left hand comes to seize 
the appropriate end of the shoelace. Similarly, mutatis mutandis, for the rest of 
the instructions.
Tlie instructions end with the word 'end'. When the little man reads the word 
'end', he returns the book of instructions to his library.
That is the way we tie our shoes, (pp. 63-64).
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though not invariably, the mechanisms that implement the laws 
of a science are specified in the vocabulary of some other, lower 
level science. Thus, it's a law that water freezes if it is suitably 
cooled. The m echanism that implements this law involves 
various changes in the molecular structures of water that suitable 
cooling reliably induces, (p. 8).
In the case of intentional laws the implementing mechanisms are 
syntactic and the task of describing these mechanisms falls to 
scientific psychology. So not all scientific psychological explanation is 
a matter of explaining PA tokenings or behavioural events by appeal 
to the PAs that are their causes. My account of scientific psychology 
can be described as implying that its central task is to describe the 
mechanisms that implement those intentional generalisations that 
correspond to our cognitive capacities. When described in these 
terms a crucial similarity between my account and that of Fodor 
becomes apparent. However, there is an im portant point of 
d issim ilarity . Fodor effectively divorces in ten tiona l from  
computational or syntactic psychology; for him, their respective 
practitioners are involved in distinct explanatory enterprises. I, on 
the other hand, have emphasised that the intentional and the 
syntactic/computational are intertwined in explanations of cognitive 
capacities.
Third, Fodor accepts that scientific psychology recognises the 
existence of subpersonal representational states and processes. 
Indeed, appeals to such states and processes figure prominently in his 
own psychological work. Consider The Modularity of Mind. In that 
book he presents an account of the architecture of the m ind that 
distinguishes between the central cognitive system and various input 
m odules (for example the visual module). Beliefs - and other 
personal level intentional states - reside within the central cognitive 
system. The input modules are information-processing systems that 
present their output to the central cognitive system and thus play a 
role in belief fixation. However, none of the representational states 
generated by their activity are beliefs; rather, they are subpersonal 
states of a subpersonal inform ation-processing system . The 
processing activity of the input modules is largely unaffected by the 
subject's beliefs and is therefore cognitively impenetrable. The input
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modules are, in Fodor's terminology, informationally encapsulated. 
Similarly, the information that the input modules have access to in 
the course of executing their information-processing tasks is limited 
and domain-specific. For our purposes the important point is that 
Fodor would accept that scientific psychology is committed to the 
reality  of subpersonal representational states and processes. 
Moreover, he would see it as a psychological project to determine the 
workings of the input modules, a project that is part and parcel of 
that of explaining our cognitive capacities.
Therefore, there are good reasons for not charging Fodor with 
holding a m istaken or impoverished account of the nature of 
scientific psychology and psychological explanation despite the fact 
that he sometimes writes as if that discipline were little more than an 
extension of folk psychology. However, my account of scientific 
psychology will play an important role in my evaluation of Fodor's 
philosophy of mind; many of my criticisms of his most important 
and provocative claims - along with my contribution to the issues 
that those claims address - will be motivated by it in one way or 
another. For, despite all the above, Fodor has a tendency to become 
fixated on folk psychology and folk psychological explanation when 
engaged in his philosophical projects, a fact that often has less than 
happy consequences.
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Chapter 3
In d iv id u a lism  and the Explanation of  
Cognitive Capacities
3.1 Introduction
How does scientific psychology individuate the representational 
states that figure in its theories and explanations? Does (or should) it 
individuate such states individualistically? In this and the following 
two chapters I will attempt to answer this question.
Arguments within this area (both for and against an individualistic 
conclusion) tend to fall into one of two categories. On the one hand, 
there are those of a metaphysical or a priori nature. Such arguments 
rely heavily on considerations concerning the nature of causation, 
laws, and scientific explanation in general. On the other hand, there 
are arguments that rely heavily on quite specific claims about the 
theoretical commitments, practices, or explanatory ambitions of 
contemporary scientific p sy c h o lo g y F o d o r  has produced a series of 
highly significant arguments for individualism, some of which fall 
into the first category, and some of which fall into the second. I will 
discuss these argum ents in the course of my reflections. The 
conclusion that I will attempt to establish in this chapter will be a 
tentative anti-individualist or externalist one: some of the contents 
that scientific psychology does, or should, appeal to in the course of 
explaining our cognitive capacities are not locally supervenient. In 
arguing for this conclusion I will draw heavily on the account of 
scientific psychology developed in Chapter 2, and will appeal to a 
series of pragmatic considerations. However, as I argue in Chapter 4 
in connection with David Marr's theory of vision, it is also the case
39 The distinction I have in mind parallels that described by van Gulick (1989) when 
he writes: 'Some internalist arguments are based on empirical facts about the actual 
practices and needs of working cognitive psychologists, while others appeal in a 
more a priori way to very general metaphysical conclusions to support their 
internalist conclusions' (p. 151).
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that some of the contents that figure in the theories and 
explanations of scientific psychology are locally supervenient. In 
chapter 5 I will attem pt to underm ine Fodor's m etaphysical 
argum ents for the conclusion that the contents that figure in 
scientific psychological explanation must be narrow; the nature of 
causation and scientific explanation are not such as to tell against 
externalism.
3.2 Individualism and folk psychology
Before we can address our target question it is necessary to get clear 
on just w hat indiv idualism  is. According to Tyler Burge, 
individualism is the doctrine that:
the mental natures of all a person's or animal's mental states (and 
events) are such that there is no necessary or deep individuative 
relation between the individual's being in states of those kinds 
and the na tu re  of the ind iv idua l's  physical or social 
environments. (1986, pp. 3-4).
Individualism comes in both a strong and a weak form. According 
to the strong form an individual’s being in a given mental state 'can 
be explicated by reference to states and events of the individual that 
are specifiable without using intentional vocabulary and w ithout 
presupposing anything about the individual subject’s social or 
physical environment’ (Burge 1986, p. 4). The weaker form is implied 
by the stronger, being the view that the mental supervenes on the 
physical so that an individual's mental states 'could not be different 
from w hat they are, given the individual's physical, chemical, 
neural, or functional histories, where these histories are specified 
non-intentionally and in a way that is independent of physical or 
social conditions outside of the individual's body' (p. 4).40
40 Quite generally A states supervene on B states if an entity's A states could not be 
other than they in fact are without there being a corresponding difference in its B 
states. Thus if A states supervene on B states two distinct entities that have just the 
same B states will have just the same A states. The concept of supervenience is 
closely associated with the work of Jaegwon Kim. See his 1982,1984 and 1990.
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Most discussions of individualism  concentrate on the weaker 
version of the doctrine. In keeping with this orthodoxy I will take 
individualism  as a thesis about scientific psychology to be the 
doctrine that that psychology does (or should) ind iv iduate  
psychological states in such a way that an individual's psychological 
p roperties supervene on her intrinsic physical properties. 
Understanding individualism in this way emphasises its connections 
to two other related claims, these being that psychology is 
methodologically solipsistic (Putnam, 1975, Fodor, 1980), and that 
psychology respects the autonomy principle (Stich, 1978). Whatever 
their differences advocates of these three doctrines all agree that 
scientific psychology does (or should) individuate psychological states 
in such a way that the psychological supervenes on the physical.
Before considering scientific psychology it will be useful to review a 
couple of very famous and much discussed argum ents that are 
widely taken to show that folk psychology does not individuate 
m en tal sta tes (or, m ore specifically , in ten tiona l states) 
individualistically .41
The first argument is inspired by Putnam's attempt to establish the 
conclusion that "meanings ain't in the head".42 Jn asserting that 
"meanings ain't in the head" Putnam is claiming that the meaning 
of a word on an individual's lips, or his understanding of that word, 
is not solely determined by his narrow psychological state^S; rather, 
it is at least partly determined by the nature of the world external to
4t However, these arguments haven't convinced everyone. A notable exception is 
Brian Loar (1988). He argues that folk psychology individuates in terms of a notion 
of content that cannot be identified by what is specified by oblique or de dicto 
attitude ascription's. One and the same de dicto attitude ascription may be true of 
two individuals but from this it doesn't follow that the states in question have the 
same content from the point of view of folk psychology. And two individuals can 
have states with the same folk psychological content even though the same de dicto 
attitude ascription cannot be correctly made.
42 See Putnam (1975).
43 Putnam defines a narrow psychological state (or a psychological state in the 
narrow sense) as a psychological state that is permitted by a psychology that makes 
the assumption of m ethodological solipsism , that is 'the assum ption that no 
psychological state, properly so called, presupposes the existence of any individual 
other than the subject to whom that state is ascribed' (p. 220).
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the individual. Thus two individuals could be identical in their 
narrow psychological states yet understand a given word differently 
due to differences between their home environments. The argument 
for this conclusion takes the form of a thought experiment which 
utilises the fact that individuals who are physically identical 'in the 
sense in which two neckties can be "identical"' (p. 227) will thereby be 
identical in their narrow  psychological states. Here is how the 
argument goes.
In a distant galaxy there is a planet called Twin Earth that is very 
much like our own planet. On Twin Earth there is a community of 
individuals who speak a language very much like English, a 
community that has a member, call him Oscar2, who is a physical 
duplicate of Oscar, a guy who lives here on Earth. One significant 
difference between Earth and Twin Earth is that the stuff they call 
"water" on Twin Earth - the stuff that fills their rivers and lakes, falls 
as rain, quenches their thirst, and so on - has a physical 
microstructure that differs from that of the stuff that we call "water"; 
for it is XYZ rather than H2O. In virtue of this difference the English 
word "water" has a different extension from that of the Twin English 
word "water"; H 2O, and only H2O, (and therefore not XYZ) falls 
within the extension of the former whereas XYZ, and only XYZ (and 
therefore not H 2O) falls w ithin the extension of the latter. A 
consequence of this difference in extension is that the English word 
"water" differs in meaning from its Twin English counterpart. And 
an upshot of this is that the twins, being fully fledged members of 
their respective linguistic communities, mean different things by 
"water" (or understand that word differently) despite their physical 
(and thus narrow psychological) identity.44
Putnam  was concerned with linguistic meaning but many have 
thought that his argum ent can be extended to generate the 
conclusion that folk psychology individuates intentional states non- 
individualistically. Here is one way in which the argument can be 
extended. Understanding the meaning of a word is an intentional 
state recognised by folk psychology. The twins, as Putnam  has 
established, understand the word "water" differently. Thus as far as
44 For there to be such a difference in meaning it isn’t necessary either that Oscarl 
knows or believes that the stuff he calls "water" is H2O or that OscarZ knows or 
believes that the stuff he calls "water" is XYZ.
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folk psychology is concerned they are in different intentional states 
despite  their physical identity . Therefore folk psychology 
individuates non-individualistically. (Pettit and McDowell, 1986. 
Intro.).
A second way of extending the argum ent runs thus. We use 
language to express our thoughts. For example, Oscar uses the 
sentence "water is wet" to express one of his beliefs, and the sentence 
"I would like a glass of water" to express one of his desires. Like the 
sentences that express them, these intentional states have semantic 
and intentional properties: they are about things in the external 
world, they have satisfaction conditions, and so on. And just as the 
semantic properties of the sentences that they express are partly 
determined by features of the world external to the individual, the 
semantic properties of these intentional states are partly determined 
by features of the world external to the individual. For example, 
because of the nature of his home environment, just as the sentence 
"water is wet" on Oscar's lips is about water (i.e. H2O) and is true if 
and only if water (i.e. H2O) is wet the thought that Oscar expresses 
with this sentence is about water (i.e. H2O) and is true if and only if 
water (i.e. H2O) is wet. Similarly the thought that Oscar2 expresses 
with the sentence "water is wet" is about XYZ, and is true if and only 
if XYZ is wet. In short, the thought that Oscar expresses with the 
sentence "water is wet" has a different content from that that his 
twin expresses with the same sentence and thus their respective 
thoughts would be assigned to different intentional state types by folk 
psychology. This conclusion generalises to all intentional states that 
the twins express with sentences containing the word "water"; the 
thoughts that Oscar so expresses are water thoughts whereas the 
thoughts that Oscar2 so expresses are twin water (twater) thoughts. 
Thus, as far as folk psychology is concerned, the twins diverge in 
their intentional states.45
45 This extension of Putnam's argument does not conflict with what Putnam says 
despite the fact that a key premise of his argument is the claim that the twins are 
psychologically identical in virtue of their being physically identical. This is 
because Putnam means "psychologically identical" to be understood as meaning 
"psychologically identical in the narrow sense" and in no way commits himself to 
the idea that folk psychology individuates narrowly or is com m itted to
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The second argument for the claim that folk psychology is non- 
individualistic was developed by Tyler Burge (1979) and has the 
advantage of being nowhere near as outlandish as the Putnam- 
inspired argument. It is also more general in applying not just to 
thoughts involving natural kind concepts. Burge proceeds by 
describing an individual who has beliefs involving a concept which 
he only partially understands. He then describes a counterfactual 
situation in which the individual is individualistically just as he is 
in the real world but in which his social environment is significantly 
different. He then argues that the actual thoughts involving the 
concept that the individual doesn't fully understand diverge in 
content from the corresponding counterfactual thoughts and thus 
that, from the point of view of folk psychology, the actual individual 
has thoughts that differ in content from those of his counterfactual 
self.
More specifically, here is one of the cases that Burge presents and 
takes to be conclusive. An individual has a collection of arthritis 
beliefs; that is, beliefs 'attributed with content clauses containing 
"arthritis" in oblique occurrence' (p. 77). Many of these beliefs are 
true, for example, that he has had arthritis for years, that stiffening 
joints is a symptom of arthritis, that certain sorts of aches are 
characteristic of arthritis, and so on. He also has the false belief that 
he has arthritis in his thigh as he doesn't know that arthritis is, by 
definition, an inflammation of the joints and that you can't develop 
it in one’s thigh.
Burge next describes a counterfactual situation in which the 
individual is physically just as he is in the actual situation. In this 
counterfactual situation linguistic practises are such that the word 
"arthritis" is typically applied, and defined to apply, to rheumatoid 
conditions both of the joints and outside the joints. In other words, 
in the counterfactual situation the word "arthritis" does not mean 
arthritis. Burge argues that due to this fact about linguistic practises 
in his home environm ent, the individual in the counterfactual 
situation 'lacks some - probably all - of the attitudes commonly 
attributed with content clauses containing "arthritis" in oblique
methodological solipsism. Indeed, as Fodor (1980) points out, some of Putnam's 
comments indicate a hostility to methodological solipsism.
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occurrence' (p. 78). 'So the patient's counterfactual contents differ 
from his actual ones' (p. 79). Burge concludes that:
The upshot of these reflections is that the patient's mental 
contents differ while his entire physical and non-intentional 
mental histories, considered in isolation from their social context, 
rem ain the same. . . . The differences seem to stem from 
differences "outside" the patient considered as an isolated physical 
organism, causal m echanism or seat of consciousness. The 
difference in his mental contents is attributable to differences in 
his social environment. . . . such differences are ordinarily taken 
to spell differences in mental states and events.
In short then, we have a case of physical identity, yet, from the point 
of view of folk psychology, mental divergence. Hence folk psychology 
individuates non-individualistically.^^
However, from the fact that folk psychology is non-individualistic, 
it doesn't follow that scientific psychology is as well. There might be a 
mismatch between their respective taxonomies due to a divergence 
in their theoretical assumptions or their explanatory ambitions. But 
if scientific psychology individuates in terms of intentional content 
then for there to be such a mismatch it must attribute a different 
kind of content to our intentional states. In other words, scientific 
psychological content must be narrow. Hence the individualist is 
faced with a dilemma: either she establishes that scientific psychology 
is not intentional, or she establishes that there is a radical break 
between folk psychological content on the one hand, and scientific 
psychological content, on the other. At different points in his career 
Fodor has seized both horns of this dilemma.
3.3 Individualism and computation
In this section I will consider several arguments for individualism 
that might be labelled "arguments from the Computational Theory 
of Mind(CTM)". According to such arguments, given the nature of
To show that tliis is not an isolated case Burge presents a whole battery of 
parallel cases. These cases feature the following terms "sofa", "contract", "brisket", 
"clavichord" and "red".
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computation, scientific psychology's commitment to CTM entails 
that it is individualistic.
The first of these arguments is due to Fodor and is presented in his 
classic paper 'Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research 
Strategy in Cognitive Psychology'. Methodological solipsism is an 
approach in psychology that considers the individual in isolation 
from her environment, attempting to describe her internal mental 
life in such a way that makes no assumptions about the nature of the 
external world. In ignoring the individual's environm ent and 
making no assumptions about its nature, such a psychology must 
describe and individuate psychological states in terms of properties 
that supervene on the individual's internal constitution. Assuming 
the truth of physicalism, a psychology that endorsed methodological 
solipsism would therefore individuate psychological states in terms 
of properties that supervene upon the intrinsic physical properties of 
the subjects that fell within its domain of inquiry.
Fodor argues that contem porary scientific psychology is 
methodologically solipsistic and thus, in virtue of its physicalist 
predilections, individuates in such a way as to respect the local 
supervenience of the psychological on the physical. His reasoning 
runs thus. Cognitive psychology is committed to CTM. Now 
computers only have access to the formal or syntactic properties of 
the symbols that they m anipulate, being blind to their semantic 
properties (which are determined by features of the world external to 
the computer). Consequently, cognitive psychology is commited to 
the idea that mental processes only have access to the formal or 
syntactic properties of the symbols or representations that they 
manipulate; in other words it endorses the formality condition. This 
endorsement of the formality condition entails that the concern of 
cognitive psychology is to 'study mental processes qua formal 
operations on symbols' (p. 232), and thus that it will ignore the 
sem antic p roperties of m ental rep resen ta tions and states 
individuating such representations and states in terms of their 
formal or syntactic properties. In the case of physically realised 
computers, such properties supervene on their intrinsic physical 
constitution so that two physically identical computational systems 
will be formally or syntactically identical. In short, cognitive 
psychology, in studying and attem pting to characterise the
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computational processes executed by and in the mind-brain, will 
consider the individual in isolation from the environment and will 
ind iv iduate  m ental states and representations form ally or 
syntactically and thus individualistically.
This picture of the nature of cognitive psychology clearly conflicts 
with that developed in Chapter 2, and so should be rejected. The aim 
of cognitive psychology is to account for our in tentionally  
characterised cognitive capacities. The subpersonal computational 
processing that underlies and supports such capacities is able to 
underlie and support them precisely because of the information 
processing problems that it solves or the inform ation that it 
generates. Were it not for the information that the computational 
processes in my brain generated, I would not have the cognitive 
capacities that I in fact have. Consequently, a putative explanation of 
a cognitive capacity that merely characterised the computational 
processing qua formal symbol m anipulation that underlay that 
capacity would not constitute a full explanation. A complete 
explanation m ust characterise the information generated by the 
computational processing (and thus attribute intentional content to 
the representations so manipulated) plus those facts about the world 
that enable the information to be generated in the way that it is. 
Therefore, cognitive psychology can hardly be methodologically 
solipsistic in the manner described by Fodor. First, it must attribute 
intentional content to our mental representations. And second, it 
must consider and appeal to facts about the environment external to 
the subject.
A second argument for the conclusion that the commitment of 
scientific psychology to CTM im plies that it ind iv iduates 
individualistically rests on the idea that the intentional properties of 
mental representations are causally inert or epiphenomenal with 
respect to the phenomena that scientific psychology seeks to explain. 
Here is how the argument goes. Suppose an event el causes another 
event e2. Then e l will have some property (or properties) in virtue 
of which it causes e2; such properties are causally responsible for el's  
causing e2. However, not all of e l's  properties will be causally 
relevant in this way; many will be causally inert or epiphenomenal 
with respect to e2. Consider an example. Edgar's diet causes him to 
develop a heart condition. His diet has many properties one of which
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is the property of consisting of items purchased from Tesco's. It is not 
in virtue of its having this property that Edgar's diet causes him to 
develop a heart condition; with respect to that effect this property is 
causally inert or epiphenomenal. Rather, it is because it has the 
property of containing high levels of saturated fat that his diet causes 
him to develop a heart condition. An adequate causal explanation of 
Edgar's developing a heart condition must specify not just its cause 
(that is, his diet) but also the causally efficacious property of this cause 
(that is, its property of containing high levels of saturated fat). This 
point can be generalised: causal explanations, to be adequate, must 
specify not just the cause of the effect in question, but also the 
causally relevant property of that cause.
A consequence of CTM, with its endorsement of the formality 
condition, so the argum ent continues, is that the intentional 
properties of mental states and representations are causally inert with 
respect to the mental and behavioural effects that such states and 
representations cause. This is because computers only have access to 
the syntactic or formal properties of the symbols they manipulate, 
being blind to whatever intentional properties they have. Therefore, 
in tentional p roperties should not appear in psychological 
explanations of behavioural and mental events. Such explanations 
should specify only the syntactic or formal properties of mental states 
and representations for it is they that are the causally efficacious 
properties. This result has bearings on the individuation question. 
For as intentional properties have no legitimate role in scientific 
psychological explanations, scientific psychology cannot legitimately 
individuate mental states in terms of such properties. It has no 
option other than to individuate mental states in terms of their 
syntactic properties, properties that are locally supervenient. 
Therefore scientific psychology, in virtue of its commitment to CTM 
and subsequent endorsem ent of the form ality condition, is 
individualistic.
Recently there has been much discussion of the question of the 
causal efficacy of content.^^ One popular way of responding to the
Much of ihis discussion concerns itself not so much with the consequences of CTM but 
rather with those of Davidson's anomalous monism. According to Davidson (1970): 
(i) causation is a relation between particular events; (ii) every token mental event is 
identical with some token physical event; and (iii) if an event e l  causes another
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threat of epiphenomenalism is to attempt to argue that, contrary to 
the epiphenomenalist's claim, intentional properties are not causally 
i n e r t . 48 Por the friend of CTM this would involve arguing (as do 
Block (1990a) and Peacocke (1994)) that computers are sensitive to the 
semantic properties of the symbols they manipulate. In Chapter 2 I 
argued that computers are sensitive only to syntactic properties so I 
do not wish to follow this route. However, I think that all is not lost, 
for intentional properties are not required to be causally efficacious to 
have a legitimate role to play in scientific psychological explanation. 
This is another consequence of the nature of scientific psychology as I 
have described it. The causal inertness of content might well entail 
that intentional properties had no legitimate role to play in scientific 
psychological explanation if the aim of scientific psychology was to 
produce singular causal explanations of neurophysiologically realised 
m ental events and behaviour that was realised by bodily  
movements. But the fact that it aims to account for intentionally 
characterised cognitive capacities makes matters somewhat different. 
What is crucial about the causal processes that underlie and facilitate 
perception and cognition is that they generate relevant information. 
Ceteris paribus, if my visual system didn't generate the information
event e2, then e l must have some property F, and e2 some property G such that it is a 
strict law that F-events cause G-events. As Davidson holds that the only strict laws 
are physical laws, this doctrine would seem to imply that the intentional properties 
of mental events are causally inert for whenever a mental event causes an effect it 
will have some physical property that is sufficient to determine that it produces 
that effect. For a discussion of this issue see Davidson (1993), Antony (1989) and Heil 
and Mele (1993).
In 'Making Mind Matter More' Fodor responds to the epiphenomenalist in this 
way. The version of the epiphenomenalist argument that he considers is the quite 
general one that all special science properties that are not identical to physical 
properties, being multiply realisable at the physical level, are epiphenomenal. He 
argues that a special science property F of an event e l  is causally efficacious with 
respect to an effect event e2 that has special science property G if that causal chain 
is subsumed by the law that F's cause G's (this law need not be strict). He then argues 
that given the existence of intentional causal laws, intentional properties meet this 
condition and thus are not epiphenomenal. For a response see Segal and Sober (1990). 
For some other important contributions to the debate see: Jackson and Pettit (1988), 
Dretske (1988,1990), and Yablo (1992).
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that it generates from the retinal images that it takes as input, then it 
would not enable me to perceive the world as I perceive it to be (or to 
find out about the world by means of vision). Hence an explanation 
of that capacity cannot ignore the information generated by the 
visual system's computational activity (and thus the content of the 
representations it manipulates). A purely syntactic account would 
leave it a complete mystery as to how the syntactic operations it 
described were able to support the target capacity and facilitate its 
exercise; it would leave out what, from the point of view of scientific 
psychology, was all important about those syntactic operations. All 
this will be the case even if the visual system is blind to the 
information carried by the representations that it manipulates; even 
if content is causally inert. So, in conclusion, the causal inertness of 
intentional properties does not entail individualism by debarring 
such properties from having any legitimate role to play in scientific 
psychological explanation.
A third argument for the conclusion that scientific psychology's 
commitment to CTM implies that it individuates individualistically 
has to do with implementation. The argument runs as follows. 
Higher level laws are implemented by lower level mechanisms. For 
a higher level law of the form "Fs cause Gs" to be implemented by 
the lower level mechanism that MFs cause MGs, it must be the case 
that the instantiation of the property F is sufficient for instantiation 
of the property Mf and that the instantiation of the property MG is 
sufficient for the instantiation of the property G. Now a scientific 
psychology committed to CTM holds that intentional laws are 
im plem ented by com putational mechanisms. Given the general 
nature of the implementation relation, this implies both that there 
are computationally sufficient conditions for the instantiation of 
intentional properties, and that there are intentionally sufficient 
conditions for the instantiation of computational properties. A 
consequence of this is that com putational mechanisms cannot 
implement broad intentional laws for it isn't generally the case that 
there are computationally sufficient conditions for the instantiation 
of broad intentional properties. (I believe that water is wet, yet being 
in the computational state that I am in isn't sufficient for having this 
belief, as my twin is computationally identical to me yet believes that 
twater is wet). As Fodor puts it, the assumption that intentional
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properties are broad 'makes it very hard to see how there could be 
computationally sufficient conditions for their instantiation. How 
could a process which, like computation, merely transforms one 
symbol into another guarantee the causal relations between symbols 
and the world upon which . . . the [broad] meanings of symbols 
depend?' {The Elm and the Expert, p .12). In short, com putational 
mechanisms can implement intentional laws only if those laws are 
narrow so that a scientific psychology that was both intentional and 
com m itted to CTM w ould have to be narrow  on pain of
inconsistency.49
My objection to the above argum ent is essentially that it 
misrepresents the nature of the implementation relation; there don't 
have to be lower level sufficient conditions for the instantiation of 
higher level properties in order for lower level mechanisms to 
im plem ent higher level laws. It is certainly true  that for 
computational mechanisms to implement intentional laws there 
w ould have to be a close and systematic relationship between 
com putational properties on the one hand, and intentional 
properties on the other. But that relationship need not be one of 
coinstantiation (which is effectively how Fodor describes it). In fact, 
with respect to the case that concerns us, all that the implementation 
relation requires is the following:
49 In The Elm and the Expert Fodor represents ttiis argument as the fundamental 
m otivation for the claim that scientific psychology m ust be narrow or 
individualistic. For example, he writes:
The continuing flirtation that a number of philosophers, myself included, have 
been having with the notion of 'narrow' content over the last decade or so is, 
perhaps, best understood in this context. It is obscure how externalist intentional 
laws could be computationally implemented. Very well, then, let there be 
another kind of intentionality - let there be, as one says, 'narrow' content as well 
as 'broad' content - such that narrow content is ipso facto not externalist. And let 
it be assumed that the content that figures in psychological laws is, in fact, 
content of this narrow kind, then there could be computationally sufficient 
conditions for being in the kind of intentional states that psychological laws 
apply to - viz, for being in narrow intentional states - and everything is fine.
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(i) That intentional state tokens are identical to, or constituted by, 
computational states.
(ii) That any subject subsumed by intentional laws is such that 
intentional differences between its psychological states are 
reflected in differences at the computational/syntactic level.
(iii) That any subject subsumed by intentional laws is such that 
the computational properties that it has are sufficient for the 
tokening of the intentional properties that it has in the context in 
which it is embedded. (So that, given its computational states, a 
subject's intentional states could have been different only if it had 
inhabited an appropriately different context or environment).
Suppose that an intentional law that Fs cause Gs, and a 
computational law that MFs cause MGs subsume a subject S. The 
intentional law will be implemented in S by the computational law 
if the relationship between the Fs and Gs in S, on the one hand, and 
the MFs and MGs in S, on the other, satisfies the above three 
conditions. If this is the case, then whenever S tokens F, that token 
will be constituted by a token of MF, a token that causes a tokening of 
M g , something which, in S's circumstances, is sufficient for a 
tokening of intentional state G.
In effect, what I am arguing is that the implementation relation is 
such that intentional laws can be implemented by computational 
m echanism s even if there are no com putationally sufficient 
conditions for the instantiation  of the relevant in tentional 
properties; all that is required is that there are context or 
environm ent-relative computationally sufficient conditions, This 
allows the possibility of a computational mechanism implementing 
an intentional law in me that it doesn't implement in some other 
subject because that other subject is embedded in an environment 
suitably different from that in which I am embedded.
Given that a subject typically inhabits the same context or 
environm ent for the whole of its life, the intentional laws that 
subsume it will typically be implemented at the computational level 
in one and the same way throughout that life. And given that 
subjects subsumed by one and the same intentional law often share 
an environment, there is nothing to stop that law from being 
computationally implemented in them all in just the same way. The
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upshot of all this is that computational mechanisms are capable of 
implementing broad intentional laws but when they do so what 
enables them to perform this task has a lot to do with the context in 
which they are embedded.
It might be objected that if matters are as I have described, it is 
som ew hat m isleading to talk of com putational m echanism s 
implementing broad intentional laws. For, so the thought goes, it is 
the computational along with the environmental (rather than the 
computational alone) that does the implementing. In response, the 
crucial point is that the broad intentional states are constituted by 
com putational states and not at all by environm ental facts. 
Consequently, the most accurate description of the situation is that 
intentional laws are implemented by computational mechanisms, 
but what enables the latter to implement the former are certain facts 
about the embedding environment. In this connection it is worth 
pointing out that higher level states, events, and objects can be 
constituted by lower level states, events, and objects without higher 
level properties being locally supervenient upon lower level 
properties. Consider my heart, for example. My heart is firmly located 
in my chest as it is constituted by a physical object that is located 
within my chest. Yet my heart is a heart in virtue of facts that lie 
beyond its outer boundaries, for example, facts about our 
evolutionary history. Consequently, something could be intrinsically 
identical to my heart without being a heart and the property of being 
a heart does not locally supervene upon the intrinsic physical 
properties of hearts (or of the bodies that contain them, come to that). 
In other words, my heart is firmly located within my body, despite 
the fact that it is a heart in virtue of properties that spread out (both 
in time and space) beyond the outer limits of my body. Similarly, our 
broad intentional states are quite literally located in our heads in 
virtue of the spatial location of the lower level states that constitute 
them, and in spite of the fact that broad intentional properties are not 
locally supervenient. Hence, the ind iv idualist slogan that 
"psychological states are in the head" is potentially very misleading 
for in a quite familiar and literal sense most externalists believe that 
"psychological states are in the head". (Stalnaker, 1989, Davidson, 
1987).
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In this section I have examined three of the most important and 
influential arguments for the claim that scientific psychology must be 
individualistic in virtue of its commitment to CTM. All have been 
found wanting. I thus conclude that it is consistent with scientific 
psychology's endorsement of CTM that it is not individualistic.
3.4 Practical reasons for avoiding narrow content
The foregoing considerations emphasise the point that scientific 
psychology, given its explanatory ambitions and theoretical 
com m itm ents, m ust a ttribu te  in ten tional contents to our 
representational states. But it is consistent with this point that such 
content is narrow; that scientific psychology attributes locally 
supervenient contents to our states. In this section I will attempt to 
outline some serious practical obstacles that face any scientific 
psychologist who attempts to engage in narrow psychology. The 
moral I will attempt to draw is that these obstacles are such that the 
scientific psychologist would be well advised to refrain from going 
narrow if at all possible. I will also suggest that it is indeed possible to 
avoid going narrow; that the circumstances in which we find 
ourselves are such that the advantages of a narrow psychology over a 
broad one are not so significant as to justify all the additional bother 
that would be entailed in going narrow.
The first practical problem has to do with the need to construct an 
adequate notion of narrow content. What exactly is narrow content? 
W hat has to be the case for two thought tokens to have the same 
narrow content? To say that narrow content is locally supervenient 
and leave it at that is hardly to answer these questions in an 
illuminating way. A narrow scientific psychology would have to 
answer such questions and do so by way of the provision of an 
adequate explication or elucidation of the concept of narrow content 
that it employed. A failure to do this would have the result that it 
would be unclear (both to practitioners of scientific psychology and to 
on-looking outsiders alike) what the aim of scientific psychology was 
and w hat claims were being made by a scientific psychologist 
whenever she presented a narrow  explanation or attributed a 
narrow state to a subject. All this could result in unhealthy confusion 
w ithin the discipline as psychologists fail to understand  the
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pronouncements of their fellows and systematically talk at cross 
purposes. However, developing and explicating a suitable notion of 
narrow content in such a way as to find favour across the discipline 
is hardly going to be an easy task. Such a burden would be avoided if 
scientific psychology were not to deviate from folk psychology in 
terms of the kinds of intentional properties that it attributed to our 
psychological states or the concept of content that it employed. 
G rasping the m eaning of the pronouncem ents of scientific 
psychologists would be no more problematic a business (both for the 
practitioners of that discipline and for outside onlookers) than that of 
understand ing  everyday folk psychological descriptions and 
explanations; we could rely quite successfully on our mastery of folk 
psychological concepts and our facility as folk psychologists. The task 
of elucidating or explicating the concept of content employed by 
scientific psychologists would thus become a philosophical one (just 
as is that of elucidating and explicating the concept of causation). As 
a general rule, technical concepts that don't have a life and a track 
record outside of the particular scientific discipline that is their home 
need to be explicated or elucidated by and for the practitioners of that 
discipline. The concept of narrow content is such a technical concept, 
and hence a narrow scientific psychology would be saddled with this 
burden.
A second practical problem follows on from the first. If scientific 
psychology is faced with the task of developing and subsequently 
explicating a concept of narrow content fit to serve its explanatory 
purposes, then there will always be the possibility of internal conflict 
within the discipline. Of course conflict and disagreement is part and 
parcel of any serious scientific activity. But the kind of conflict that I 
have in mind runs much deeper and is more fundamental than any 
everyday scientific disagreement. For who is to say that scientific 
psychologists will agree as to what concept of narrow content is 
required or as to how the concept of narrow content is to be 
understood? But if there is no such agreement there will be little 
possibility of the communication and shared understanding within 
the discipline that is necessary for its long term health. In short, if 
scientific psychology attempts to go narrow, then there will be the 
possibility that its practitioners will come to operate with different 
concepts of narrow content or divergent understandings of what
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narrow  content is. And that this would be a likely upshot of 
scientific psychology's attem pting to go narrow (rather than an 
outside possibility) is suggested by the level of disagreement amongst 
individualistic philosophers of mind as to how narrow content is to 
be characterised.
A third problem has to do with the determination and specification 
of the narrow  contents of our thoughts. It is far from easy to 
determine and specify the narrow content of a subject's thoughts, or 
establish whether two subjects share a narrow thought. Or at least it 
is very difficult if we understand narrow content as Fodor does. 
According to Fodor, narrow content is a function from contexts to 
broad contents (or truth conditions), so that two thoughts have the 
same narrow content if and only if they instantiate the same function 
from contexts to broad contents. Thoughts with the same narrow 
content that are had by subjects that are embedded in the same 
context will thereby have the same broad content and hence the same 
extension. Fodor accepts that, strictly speaking, narrow contents are 
inexpressible. Any attempt to use a sentence to express the narrow 
content of a thought will fail, as that sentence will be anchored to a 
specific context, and thus will have some particular broad content. 
However, thinks Fodor, this doesn't rule out the possibility of 
specifying the narrow content of a subject's thought or indicating 
which narrow thought she tokens. This is because the psychologist 
can "sneak up" on the narrow content of a thought by mentioning 
the sentence that has the broad content that the thought in question 
w ould have (or its narrow  content would determine) if it were 
embedded in the psychologist's context. For example, I can specify the 
narrow thought that Oscar! expresses with the words "water is wet" 
by mentioning the sentence "water is wet" for, as used by me, that 
sentence has the same broad content that Oscar2's thought would 
have if he were embedded in my context. I can do this by saying that 
Oscar! has the narrow thought that determines the content water is 
wet in my context. What this implies is that determining the narrow 
thought of a subject involves determining the broad content that 
that thought would have were the subject embedded in our context 
and, consequently, that specifying a subject's narrow  thought 
involves specifying the broad content that it would have were the 
subject embedded in our context.
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This account of narrow content and the means by which the narrow 
thoughts of subjects are to be determined and specified implies that 
anyone who attempts to engage in narrow psychology faces some 
very serious practical obstacles. These are as follows: (i) Fodor seems 
to overlook the possibility that distinct narrow  contents could 
overlap in their mapping of contexts onto broad contents. Despite 
being distinct functions the addition function and the multiplication 
function both map the arguments {2,2} onto the value {4|. Couldn't 
distinct narrow contents do something similar by mapping one and 
the same context onto one and the same broad content for one or 
more (but not all) possible contexts? If this is a possibility then in 
order to determine the narrow  content of a thought, it will be 
necessary to do more than determine what broad content it would 
have were it embedded in one's own context. And Fodor's way of 
sneaking up on the narrow content of a thought isn't going to work, 
for it will not pick out one particular narrow content. To see this 
consider the following. Suppose a machine computes a mathematical 
function. In order to determine which function it computes it 
w ouldn't be enough to determine that for the arguments (2,2} it 
produces the value {4}, for knowing that wouldn't tell you whether it 
computed the addition function, the multiplication function or any 
of the other functions that have the value {4} for the arguments {2,2}. 
Similarly, to say that the machine computes the value {4} for the 
arguments {2,2} isn't to specify any one particular function. For just 
the same reasons, to determine that Oscar! has a thought that would 
have the same broad content that the sentence "water is wet" has on 
my lips were he embedded in my context is not thereby to determine 
which function that thought instantiates. What I have determined is 
consistent with his thought's having any of many distinct narrow 
contents. And the description of Oscar2's thought embedded in the 
previous sentence does not specify any particular narrow content. 
Consequently, a narrow psychology would have to do a lot more 
than Fodor would have us believe in order to determine and specify 
the narrow thoughts of the subjects under its study. So the question 
arises: how much more?
(ii) In fact, Fodor's account of narrow content implies that nothing 
short of determining the various broad contents that a thought 
would have over a wide range of possible contexts would be enough
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to determine the narrow content of that thought. But if that were the 
case, w hat hope w ould a scientific psychology have of ever 
determining the narrow content of a thought? How, for example, are 
contexts to be individuated and described? And how, for each such 
context, is the resultant broad content to be determ ined and 
specified? The task looks close to being hopeless.
(iii) I suppose that it is not out of the question that distinct narrow 
contents just couldn't overlap in the way that m athem atical 
functions do. If it could be established that this were the case, then 
the argum ents presented in (i) and (ii) would be som ewhat 
underm ined. However, there would still be major difficulties in 
determining the narrow contents of the thoughts of individuals who 
lived in contexts other than our own, difficulties that are obscured by 
the concentration on twins in the literature. If I know that an 
individual is my twin, then I can thereby conclude that he has just 
the same narrow  thoughts as I do. And if Fodor's m ethod of 
determ ining and specifying the narrow  content of a subject's 
thoughts works, then I can read off the narrow content of my twin's 
thoughts from the broad contents of my own. But how am I to 
proceed with respect to an individual who isn't my twin? I can 
hardly determine the narrow content of its thoughts by determining 
the broad content of my own. So what am I to do? Determining that 
individual's broad thoughts wouldn't be enough for that wouldn't 
tell me whether those thoughts had the same narrow content as 
mine. And it is far from obvious how I am to work out just what 
broad content his thoughts would have were he embedded in my 
context. In short, a narrow psychology is going to have problems in 
dealing with individuals who inhabit alien contexts and who are not 
(or who are not known to be) twins of known earthly subjects. And 
surely the inhabitants of alien contexts who share our narrow  
psychology are unlikely to be our twins. Perhaps these problems can 
be overcome, but I reserve the right to be sceptical.
(iv) Of course there is no Twin Earth, and all the real subjects of 
scientific psychological research inhabit my context or a context 
closely related to it. This might appear to suggest that in the real 
world narrow psychology is a practical option; that it is no more 
difficult to engage in than broad psychology. For all we would need to 
do to determine the narrow content of a subject's thought would be
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to sneak up on it via a determination of its broad content. And we 
could just as easily translate a broad explanation into a narrow 
explanation. But if that is all that narrow psychology is, then it is 
surely something of a scam. Suppose that Edgar, who believes that 
ferocious dogs savage runners, acquires the new belief that ferocious 
Fang frequents Brockwell Park. These beliefs causally interact to 
produce the belief that Brockwell Park is a dangerous place for 
runners. Fodor's comments would seem to suggest that constructing 
a narrow description and explanation of Edgar's thought processes 
would involve determining their broad description and explanation 
and then effortlessly translating it into something like this: Edgar has 
the narrow belief that in h is /o u r context has the broad content 
ferocious dogs savage runners and the narrow belief that has the 
broad content ferocious Fang frequents Brockwell Park. These two 
beliefs interact to cause him to have the narrow belief that has the 
broad content Brockwell Park is a dangerous place for runners. To me 
that explanation is nothing more than a thinly disguised broad 
explanation constructed by means of an exercise in broad psychology. 
A genuine narrow psychology would have to do much more than 
generate explanations like this; alluding to the narrow contents of 
broad states is just not enough.
But if a genuine narrow psychology would have to do much more 
than allude to the narrow contents of broad states, then it isn’t going 
to be so easy to engage in after all, even if, as a matter of empirical 
fact, all its subjects are locals. Consequently, engaging in genuine 
narrow  psychology, constructing  narrow  descrip tions and 
explanations of episodes of our mental lives, is going to be a difficult 
and messy business.
In short, then, narrow psychology faces some significant practical 
problems. It m ust develop and explicate an adequate concept of 
narrow  content that finds w idespread acceptance w ithin  the 
discipline. Yet in attempting to deal with this burden it runs the very 
real risk of generating internal dispute and conflict. Even if these 
problems can be overcome, say by the universal endorsement of 
Fodor's account of narrow  content, it is questionable whether 
psychologists are ever going to be able to produce any genuine 
narrow descriptions and explanations. The difficulties presented to 
narrow psychologists by subjects that share our narrow psychology
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but who do not inhabit our local environment and are not our twins 
will be particularly hard to overcome. And even the narrow  
psychologist who restricts her attention to her neighbours is hardly 
going to have an easy time of it.
Of course the existence of such practical obstacles does not in itself 
entail that scientific psychology does not, nor should not, attempt to 
go narrow. However, they do suggest that scientific psychology would 
be well advised to avoid going narrow if at all possible; after all, an 
impure psychology that we have a chance of making some progress 
in is to be preferred to a pure one which we have no realistic hope of 
engaging in successfully. I suppose that the main problem with broad 
psychology is that it is hopelessly parochial; the broad psychology that 
we engage in is a psychology of creatures like us living in 
environm ents like ours. It is blind to salient psychological 
similarities between us and our other worldly twins and cousins, and 
cannot capture the generalisations that subsume us all. But why 
should we worry about this parochialism when we have yet to 
discover any other-w orldly tw ins and cousins? If scientific 
psychologists restrict their attention to us, then broad psychology 
will work just as well as narrow psychology. After all, if narrow 
content is related to broad content in the way that Fodor describes, 
then a broad psychology of subjects who all inhabit the same context 
will, to all intents and purposes, be nothing other than a locally 
specific version of narrow psychology. What this suggests is that 
scientific psychology can, and should, reject the call to go narrow 
given the problems that it would take on board in going narrow. 
Given that we have yet to come across any other-worldly twins and 
cousins, the limitations of a broad psychology would be academic; as 
a matter of empirical fact, scientific psychology can get away with 
being broad.
3.5 Capturing generalisations
In the previous section I referred to a putative weakness of broad 
psychology, namely its parochialism. A broad psychology - folk 
psychology, for instance - is incapable both of recognising and 
representing some of the significant psychological sim ilarities 
between us, on the one hand, and our twins and cousins, on the
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other, and of capturing some of the intentional generalisations that 
subsum e us all.^O This would be a major weakness of such a 
psychology if we had any twins or cousins. But, it might be argued, 
even if we don't have any twins or cousins, broad psychology is still 
in trouble. A respectable scientific psychology should be capable of 
recognising and representing what is psychologically significant 
about us, and should aim to capture whatever psychological 
generalisations subsume us. Reflection on our counterfactual fellows 
indicates that what is psychologically significant about us are our 
narrow  states, and that we are subsumed first and foremost by 
narrow generalisations. In this section I will attempt to respond to 
this charge; broad psychology, particularly folk psychology, is not as 
blind to what binds us together with our twins and cousins as is often 
thought. Hence we may not, after all, be forced to choose between 
expediency and generality.
A first point worth noting is that some of the generalisations 
employed by folk psychology quantify over content. An example is 
the familiar generalisation that if a person wants it to be the case that 
P, and believes that the best way to bring it about that P is by doing Q, 
then, ceteris paribus, she will do Q. When an individual satisfies the 
antecedent or the consequent of such a generalisation it will be in 
virtue of the content of her states. However, individuals whose 
states have quite different contents can be subsumed by such a 
generalisation. Hence folk psychology can capture some of the 
generalisations that subsume both us and our twins and cousins, and 
can recognise some psychologically significant similarities between 
us that are not a matter of sharing broad contents.
Yet not all generalisations and similarities can be captured in this 
way. Any serious psychology needs to recognise and employ 
generalisations that are less abstract, that appeal to specific 
psychological states. This is because some states will have quite 
distinctive causal powers. For example, we would expect Edgar's 
belief that he was abused as a child, or that he is systematically hated 
by his fellows, to have causal ramifications that find no parallel in 
those of his beliefs that giraffes have long necks or that his mother 
was born in Nova Scotia. Hence we will need to appeal to content-
An expression of the complaint that broad psychology is unable to capture 
important generalisations can be found in Block (1991).
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specific generalisations to describe and account for some elements of 
our psychology. This gives rise to the worry that a broad psychology, 
in attempting to capture such content-specific generalisations, will 
inevitably go too far and miss some of the generalisations that 
subsume both us and our twins and cousins.
But perhaps all is not lost for folk psychology, for there would 
appear to be a way of capturing similarities between intentional states 
that diverge in their broad content that folk psychologists frequently 
and routinely employ. Edgar has an indexical belief that he might 
express with the words "once when I was out running I was savaged 
by a ferocious dog". Waldo suffered a similar experience and holds a 
corresponding belief. These two beliefs differ in broad content, as 
Edgar's is about Edgar and a past episode in his own life, whereas 
Waldo's is about Waldo and a past episode in his life. Yet any folk 
psychologist will tell you that there is a significant similarity between 
the respective beliefs of these two individuals: they both believe that 
they have been savaged by a ferocious dog. So here we have a 
similarity between broad-content-divergent beliefs that is not a 
m atter of their having the same narrow content. Moreover, this 
sim ilarity may well show up in the subsequent m ental and 
behavioural lives of Edgar and Waldo. Both might become nervous 
when they see a dog whilst out running, or harbour a long-standing 
dislike of dogs, or something else along those lines. Hence there may 
well be a generalisation such as this: anyone who believes that they 
have been savaged by a dog in the past becomes nervous whenever 
they are confronted with an unfamiliar dog, ceteris paribus. As Edgar 
and Waldo run through the park together they see Fang in the 
distance. Thus they both satisfy the antecedent of this generalisation 
in virtue of their respective broad states, and they subsequently 
become nervous. Here one and the same highly specific intentional 
generalisation governs the mental life of two individuals with 
distinct broad states, and explains why they both become nervous. 
But the generalisation in question is not narrow.
However, it might be objected, an ability to capture generalisations 
where thoughts with an indexical component are involved gives us 
no indication as to how folk psychology could deal w ith those 
problem cases where the thoughts involved are not indexical. But 
another line of defence is suggested by the fact that the embedded that
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clauses of belief - and other attitude - ascribing sentences often do not 
serve to specify the content of a belief of the subject in question but, 
rather, some fact about her that holds in virtue of the content of the 
beliefs that she has. To see this, first of all consider the practice of 
using sentences with embedded that clauses to describe the claims or 
assertions made by an individual.
In the course of our everyday life we frequently use language to 
make claims or assertions about the world. We also use language to 
describe and report the claims and assertions made by ourselves and 
our fellows, as when I say "Edgar claimed (/asserted/stated/said) that 
Fang is dead". What is the function of the embedded that clause in 
such sentences? Typically such clauses do not serve to indicate the 
specific sentence used to make the assertion in question or the 
content of that sentence. Rather, they serve to indicate some aspect of 
the commitment as to how the world is that the subject makes in 
using the sentence that she utters to make an assertion. When an 
individual uses a sentence to make a claim or assertion she thereby 
makes a whole body of commitments as to how the world is; in other 
words, she commits herself to the truth of a whole collection of 
distinct propositions. Just what she commits herself to will depend 
an awful lot on the content of the sentence that she utters, but other 
factors sometimes play a role. I have in mind three distinct kinds of 
case.
(i) Waldo sincerely says "Fang has been assassinated". He thereby 
commits himself to Fang's having been assassinated or, if you prefer, 
to the truth of the proposition that Fang has been assassinated. Thus 
he can correctly and legitimately be described as having claimed 
( /  asserted / said /  stated) that Fang has been assassinated. But he also 
commits himself to the truth of a whole load of other propositions, 
the proposition that Fang is dead, for example. Thus Waldo can just 
as legitimately be described as having claimed that Fang is dead and 
that is how we would describe him in certain contexts when certain 
interests were operative. Notice that when I say "Waldo claimed that 
Fang is dead" I do not seek to specify the sentence by means of which 
he made his assertion or the content of that sentence; the sentence 
embedded in the that clause of my description is not the sentence 
that Waldo uttered, nor does it have the same content as that 
sentence. Nor do I seek to specify a sentence that Waldo is disposed to
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utter, or the content of such a sentence. When I utter the sentence 
"Waldo claimed that Fang is dead", I seek to highlight some aspect of 
the commitment that he makes (or one of the propositions the truth 
of which he commits himself to) in using the sentence "Fang has 
been assassinated" to make an assertion; I do not seek to announce 
my beliefs as to what he is disposed to say. That Waldo commits 
himself to the truth of the proposition that Fang is dead clearly has 
to do with the content of the sentence that he utters; the content of 
that sentence logically implies that Fang is dead and that is why he 
can be described as having claimed "that Fang is dead".
Which aspect of the commitment made by an individual in making 
an assertion that we seek to highlight will be a context-dependent 
and interest-relative matter. If someone comes up to me and says 
"I've heard that Fang is dead. Have you heard any such news?" I may 
well answer by saying "Yes, Waldo told me that Fang is dead". But if I 
am asked "Do you know anything about the cause of Fang's death?" I 
may well reply "Yes, Waldo told me that Fang has been assassinated" 
(in this context replying "Waldo told me that Fang is dead" is clearly 
a useless and inappropriate answer). Similarly, whether I describe 
Waldo and Edgar as having made the same claim in uttering their 
respective sentences will be a context-dependent and interest-relative 
matter. In certain circumstances I will want to highlight their shared 
commitments, and will describe them both as having asserted that 
Fang is dead. In other circumstances I will want to highlight the fact 
that Waldo goes beyond Edgar in committing himself to the truth of 
the proposition that Fang has been assassinated, a proposition the 
truth of which Waldo does not commit himself to.
(ii) Sometimes the nature of the commitment made by an individual 
in using a sentence to make an assertion will be affected by the 
doxastic surroundings of that speech act. Suppose that Edgar believes 
that Fang is a ferocious dog. Whilst running through the park he sees 
Fang and utters the sentence "Fang is in the park". In virtue of the 
content of that sentence and what he believes about Fang, Edgar 
commits himself to the tru th  of the proposition that there is a 
ferocious dog in the park in making his assertion. Consequently, he 
can legitimately be described as having made the claim that there is a 
ferocious dog in the park. Had Edgar not had any beliefs concerning 
the ferocity of Fang, then his assertion couldn't be so described. In
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general, the nature of the commitment that an individual makes in 
using a sentence to make an assertion can be affected by what she 
believes and this fact is often reflected in how we describe the 
assertions of our fellows, for we often take into account what we 
know about what they believe.
(iii) In another kind of case the embedded sentence in the that clause 
of a sentence of the form "she claimed (asserted/stated/said) th a t . . . "  
serves to summarise or capture the essence of a whole collection of 
distinct assertion-making utterances. An example of such a case is 
that where we describe a weather forecaster's detailed comments 
about tomorrow's weather in various parts of the country by means 
of the sentence "she said it will be lousy right throughout the country 
all day tomorrow". Here, neither is the content of a particular 
sentence used by the weather forecaster to make an assertion about 
the weather conditions somewhere, nor the commitment made in 
so using such a sentence, being specified. Rather, a global 
commitment made in making a whole series of distinct and less 
general commitments is specified; a global commitment that is 
logically implied by the body of less general commitments.
In short, then, what these three distinct kinds of cases indicate is 
that when we describe the nature of an assertion made by an 
individual in uttering a sentence (or a collection of sentences), what 
we seek to specify is typically not the sentence uttered or its content 
but, rather, some aspect of the commitment about the world that the 
individual makes in uttering the sentence(s) in question. The 
content of the sentence(s) will play an important role in determining 
the precise nature of that commitment, but other factors, such as the 
individual's related beliefs, will also play an important role. And 
which aspect of the commitment we choose to focus on will depend 
upon the context and our operative interests.
My contention is that parallel points hold of belief-attributing 
sentences. Our aim in using sentences of the form "she believes that . 
. . " is typically not to express or indicate the content of a particular 
belief. Rather, it is to indicate some aspect of the commitment that an 
individual makes in holding a particular belief or collection of 
beliefs. The three distinct cases described above all have analogues. 
Suppose that Waldo has a belief the content of which is Fang has 
been assassinated. In having that belief he commits himself to the
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tru th of the proposition that Fang has been assassinated, and, in 
virtue of the logical implications of that proposition, to the truth of 
the p roposition  that Fang his dead. C onsequently , he can 
legitimately be described as believing that Fang has been assassinated 
and as believing that Fang is dead. Which way we will describe him 
in practice will be a context-dependent and interest-relative matter. 
In situations where we want to stress the similarity between Waldo 
and Edgar (who has a belief the content of which is Fang is dead), the 
latter description will be employed.
The analogue of (ii) is the case where Edgar, who has a long­
standing belief with the content Fang is a ferocious dog, forms a belief 
with the content Fang is in the park. In forming this latter belief, in 
virtue of its doxastic surroundings, he commits himself to the truth 
of the proposition that there is a ferocious dog in the park. He so 
commits himself regardless of whether he forms a belief with the 
content there is a ferocious dog in the park. Consequently, the very 
belief that Edgar forms when he sees Fang can be described as a belief 
that Fang is in the park or, alternatively, as a belief that there is a 
ferocious dog in the park. That his belief can be legitimately described 
in the latter way is a product of the fact that the commitments an 
individual makes in coming to hold a particular belief can be affected 
by that belief's doxastic surroundings.
The analogue of (iii) is the kind of case where in saying "she 
believes that . . ." we are concerned not with a particular or specific 
belief state of the subject in question but rather with a more global 
state. In this kind of case we attempt to summarise or capture the 
essence of a whole series of distinct beliefs by specifying a general 
commitment that the subject makes in virtue of holding that 
collection of beliefs. An example is the case where I describe the 
weather forecaster as believing that the weather will be lousy all over 
the country all day tomorrow on the basis of learning that she 
believes that it will rain in the North, believes that it will hail in the 
Midlands, believes that it will snow in the South, and so on.
It might be objected that I have misrepresented what is going on in 
these kinds of cases, that in actual fact what we are doing is ascribing 
to the subject a dispositional belief with a specific content. My reply is 
that there are no more grounds for the claim that these belief- 
ascribing sentences ascribe dispositional beliefs than there is for the
90
claim that the sentences that we use to describe what our fellows 
have asserted primarily serve to attribute to them a disposition to 
utter the sentence embedded in the that clause. When, in response to 
hearing Waldo say "Fang has been assassinated" I say "Waldo 
claimed that Fang is dead", I am talking about what he claimed in 
uttering the sentence that he uttered; I am specifying an important 
aspect of what he commited himself to in executing that speech act. I 
see no reason to believe that matters are appreciably different in the 
case where I say "Waldo believes that Fang is dead" in response to 
hearing his utterance; I am describing some aspect of the very belief 
that underlies his speech act (a belief that presumably has the content 
Fang has been assassinated).
None of this is to deny that beliefs have specific and determinate 
contents, that they are individuated in terms of their content, or that 
we are sometimes concerned with determining and specifying that 
content. It's just that a lot of the time our primary concern is not so 
much with the content of the beliefs of our fellows but with the 
commitments as to how the world is that they make in having the 
beliefs that they have. There are very good reasons for this. First, 
what an individual is commited to can be relied on to make some 
difference to her subsequent mental and behavioural life, and so a 
knowledge of such commitments can be of significant explanatory 
and predictive use. Second, it is much more common for people to 
share commitments about how the world is than it is for them to 
share beliefs with just the same content. Hence if we want to capture 
psychological similarities between people it is useful to focus our 
attention on their commitments as to how the world is, rather than 
on the contents of their beliefs. And thirdly, it is often very difficult 
to determine the precise content of the beliefs of our fellows, not least 
because we can be so inarticulate when it comes to describing our 
mental life. The salient aspects of our commitments as to how the 
world is are typically much more easily discernible.
All of this suggests a defence of folk psychology against the charge 
that it is hopelessly parochial, that it is blind to significant 
similarities between ourselves on the one hand, and our twins and 
cousins on the other and that it is incapable of capturing 
generalisations that subsume us all. Perhaps my beliefs diverge in 
content from those of my twins and my cousins, but that doesn't
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debar a coincidence in some of the commitments that we make in 
believing w hat we believe. And although we m ight not be 
subsumed by the same broad content generalisations, we might be 
subsumed by generalisations that (primarily) invoke commitments 
as to how the world is. For example, Oscar has a belief the content of 
which is that water quenches thirst. Oscar2 has no such belief, but he 
does have a belief the content of which is that twater quenches 
thirst. In virtue of the doxastic surroundings of their respective 
beliefs, they are both commited to the truth of the proposition that 
the colourless liquid that comes out of taps is thirst-quenching.51 
Consequently, they might both be subsumed by the generalisation 
that anyone who is thirsty and believes that the stuff that comes out 
of taps is thirst-quenching will take a drink form the nearest tap, 
ceteris paribus.
For reasons such as the above I am far from convinced that a broad 
psychology (such as folk psychology, for example) is hopelessly 
parochial. Broad psychology may well have devices at its disposal to 
enable it to recognise and represent similarities between individuals 
whose states are divergent in their broad content. So perhaps a 
scientific psychology need not describe and individuate psychological 
states in terms of their narrow content, or appeal to narrow content 
generalisations in order to be a psychology sufficiently general to 
cover both us and our other-worldly twins and cousins.
3.6 Explaining cognitive capacities
In earlier sections I appealed to the account of scientific psychology 
developed in Chapter 2 to underm ine several argum ents for
It might be objected that the twins are not commited to the truth of one and the 
same proposition due to the fact that they are related to different taps. (The idea is 
that Oscar is committed to the truth of the proposition that the colourless liquid 
that comes out of Earthly taps is thirst-quenching whilst OscarZ is commited to the 
truth of the proposition that the colourless liquid that comes out of Twearthly taps 
is thirst-quenching). However, this point can be conceded without any damage being 
done. For the twins can be bound together by a combination of an appeal to their 
commitments and an application of the technique employed to lump together broad- 
content-distinct indexical beliefs: they are both commited to its being the case that 
the colourless liquid that comes out of their local taps is thirst-quenching.
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individualism . In this section I will attempt to bring that account to 
bear to establish a more positive conclusion, namely that some of the 
intentional properties that scientific psychology appeals to in 
explaining our cognitive capacities are not locally supervenient.
Scientific psychology is not sharply cut off from folk psychology, for 
it attempts to account for facts about us that are very familiar from 
the folk psychological perspective; facts that we frequently rely upon 
in going about our folk psychological business. Such facts are that we 
are able to recognise our friends, classify objects, understand 
sentences of natural language, recall past events, and so on. These 
cognitive capacities are broad in the respect that their exercise 
manifests itself in the tokening of a broad intentional state. For 
example, it is central to the identity of my capacity to recognise my 
friends that its exercise manifests itself in the tokening of a belief that 
represents the identity of the friend before me. Such properties as 
that of representing the individual before one as being Edgar are 
clearly not locally supervenient; I could believe that the individual 
before me was Edgar without my twin (who has had no contact with 
Edgar and has never even heard of him) believing that the 
individual before him was Edgar.
In order to explain such broad capacities, or describe how we 
exercise them, the scientific psychologist m ust attribute broad 
intentional properties to some of our subpersonal representational 
states, or make it explicit that those states have such properties. 
Suppose that I come across Fang when out running and, exercising 
my capacity to recognise familiar individuals when confronted by 
them, I form the belief that Fang is before me. How did I do this? 
How did I exercise that capacity? The cardboard cut-out version of the 
answer runs thus. My visual system generates a representation of 
Fang's observable properties (his shape, size, colour, etc.) which is fed 
to the recognition module. The recognition module has access to a 
whole battery of representations stored in long-term memory that 
represent various properties (including the visual appearance) of the 
m any in d iv id u a ls  of my acquain tance. A m ongst these 
representations is one that represents Fang's appearance, that carries 
information about his shape, size, colour, and so on. The recognition 
module compares its input representation with those stored in long­
term memory until it finds a match; that is, until it comes across a
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representation in long-term  memory that represents a certain 
individual as having just those observable properties that the visual 
system represents the distal cause as having. In this case the match is 
made with the representation that carries information about Fang. 
This results in the generation of a representation reporting this 
match which is fed to the central cognitive system eventuating in the 
formation of a belief that Fang is present.
Let us focus our attention on the representation stored in long-term 
memory, a representation that plays the fundamental role in the 
recognition process. It carries information about Fang, in particular 
about his visual appearance or observable properties. Its being about 
Fang, its having the content that Fang has such and such an 
appearance, is fundamental in enabling it to play any role in the 
process of recognising Fang. If it carried information about the 
appearance of some other dog, then I would end up believing that 
that dog was before me; it would be of no use in enabling me to 
recognise Fang. Consequently, an explanation of how I recognise 
Fang must emphasise the point that this representation represents 
Fang's appearance or carries information about Fang. A putative 
explanation that ignored the reference of this representation would 
leave it a complete mystery as to how it facilitated my recognition of 
F a n g . B u t  the property of carrying information about Fang's 
observable properties (or that of representing his visual appearance 
as being a certain way) is not locally supervenient. The corresponding 
representation in my twin carries information not about Fang but 
about some other dog (how could it carry information about Fang 
given that he has never come across that dog or even heard about 
him). If my twin came across Fang he would end up forming a false
An analogous point can be made about my capacity to work out my current bank 
balance. I do this by manipulating symbols that carry information about previous 
states of my bank account and episodes in my banking history. It is of fundamental 
importance that these symbols are about my banking history for it is because of their 
reference that I am able reliably to generate from them information about my current 
balance. Were they about previous states of Edgar's bank account and episodes in his 
banking history then I would not be able to work out my current bank balance from 
them. Consequently, an explanation of my capacity must specify such facts about the 
representations that I manipulate, otherwise it will leave it a complete mystery as 
to why the processes tliat I execute work.
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belief as to the identity of the beast before him. What would explain 
his mistake would be the fact that Fang has just the same appearance 
as his representation of this other dog represents that dog as having. 
Therefore, a scientific psychology that attempts to explain my capacity 
to recognise Fang must attribute to the subpersonal representational 
states that it appeals to intentional properties that are not locally 
supervenient.
My capacity to recognise Fang is not peculiar in this respect. 
Underlying and explaining many of our cognitive capacities are 
subpersonal representational states that have significant intentional 
properties that are not locally supervenient. What enables me to 
recognise and classify objects (as well as individuals) are 
representations that carry information about the specific kinds of 
objects that populate my environment. What enables me to recall 
past events in my life are representations that carry information 
about those events. And so on.
It m ight be objected that my argum ent doesn't tell against 
individualism, as I have not established that the reference of the 
states that I have described plays any role in determining their 
psychological nature. In greater detail, here is the argument that I 
have in mind. Consider the capacity to perceive the world by means 
of vision. Whenever I exercise this capacity I token a visual state that 
represents such properties as the shape, size, colour, motion, etc. of 
whatever object is currently impinging on my visual apparatus. Such 
visual states are about the objects impinging upon me; they represent 
those objects as being a certain way, something that they would have 
to do to count as manifestations of the capacity to perceive the world 
by means of vision. Yet the fact that such states need to have a quite 
specific reference to count as a manifestation of the capacity in 
question doesn't entail that reference plays any role in the 
individuation of such states. Suppose that I am confronted by a 
square-shaped object in response to which I token a visual state that 
represents that object as being square-shaped. The identity of the 
object in question doesn't enter into the content of my visual state; 
my state would have just the same content (and would thus belong 
to the same psychological type) no matter which particular square­
shaped object it represented. And the corresponding state of my twin 
would have just the same content as my state even though he was
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being stimulated by a different square-shaped object (or if his state did 
have a different content than mine this would not be due to our 
respective states diverging in their reference). What this raises is the 
possibility that though the representations implicated in object- 
recognition have quite specific references (as they would have to 
have in order to support the capacity of object recognition) those 
references do not enter into their content. It is one thing for a 
representation in me to represent Fang's characteristics (or carry 
information about Fang) whilst the corresponding representation in 
my twin represents the characteristics of some other dog (or carries 
information about some other dog), but it is quite another for our 
respective representations to diverge in their content in virtue of this 
difference.
My response to this argument runs thus. In order for me to have 
the capacity to recognise Fang it has to be the case that (typically) 
whenever I am confronted by Fang a causal process is set off that 
eventuates in my forming a belief to the effect that Fang is before me. 
This belief isn't just about Fang in the way in which a Fang-caused 
visual state is about Fang. Rather it represents my distal stimulus as 
being Fang; it has a content something along the lines of Fang is 
before me. Now the corresponding belief of my twin clearly does not 
have this content. It is not true of my twin that if he were confronted 
by Fang he would come to believe that Fang was before him. In other 
words, he does not have the capacity to recognise Fang. Similarly, the 
content of the representation underlying my capacity to recognise 
Fang doesn't just carry information about Fang or have Fang as its 
reference. Rather it represents Fang as having certain characteristics; 
it has the content Fang is such and such. It is this fact about that 
representation that enables it to support my capacity to recognise 
Fang as Fang. If my recognitional module didn't "know" what Fang 
looked like (if it only believed that there existed a dog of unknown 
identity that had certain visible characteristics) then it would not be 
able to help me recognise Fang when confronted by that dog. My 
twin's recognitional module doesn't "know" what Fang looks like. If 
it did, he too would be able to recognise Fang. But it does know what 
some other dog (a dog with whom I am unacquainted) looks like. 
The point generalises: reference enters into the content of all of the 
representations stored in long term memory that carry information
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about particular objects, individuals, events, types of substance, and 
the like. If this were not the case we w ould not have the 
recognitional and classificatory capacities that we in fact have. And at 
least some of these contents are not locally supervenient; for example 
the content of those representations that represent the appearance of 
individuals of our acquaintance, and that that (in inhabitants of a 
watery world) represents the appearance of water.^^ Consequently, in 
order to account for our familiar, everyday, recognitional and 
classificatory capacities, scientific psychology must attribute to some 
of our representational states contents that are not locally 
supervenient.
Given that some of the cognitive capacities that scientific psychology 
attempts to explain are broad, going narrow is not an option for the 
scientific psychologist. A narrow  psychology could, at best, only 
explain narrow capacities. But, it might be objected, such narrow 
accounts of narrow capacities could be supplemented with the details 
of the subject's environm ental em bedding so as to genera te an 
explanation of the corresponding broad capacity. The objections to 
this tactic should by now be familiar. First, won't such an explanation 
in effect be a thinly-disguised broad explanation, and not a genuine 
exercise in narrow psychology? If (as Fodor thinks) narrow content 
determines broad content relative to context, then it is difficult to 
avoid the conclusion that to attribute a narrow state to an individual 
and then specify the details of her environmental embedding is in 
effect to attribute to her a particular broad state (and to do so in a 
particularly messy and disingenuous way). Second, it will be far from 
easy to determine and specify the details of our environmental 
embedding. A far more realistic and practical option is to, so to speak, 
build  the details of the environm ental em bedding into the 
intentional-property attributions. After all, in doing this we will not 
be making any claims that are false (broad properties are just as real
One of my capacities is that of being able to distinguish between water and other 
liquids, and being able to recognise water as such whenever I come across a sample of 
that substance. When I exercise this capacity I form a belief that the stuff before me 
is water. And what underlies and explains this capacity is a subpersonal 
representation that represents the observable properties of water, a representation 
that has the content zvater looks thus and so.
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as narrow  ones), nor will we be any less able to satisfy our 
explanatory ambitions.
But why, it might be asked, must scientific psychology attempt to 
explain the broad capacities that I have described? Why can it not 
pursue a different explanatory agenda, namely that of explaining the 
corresponding narrow capacities, capacities whose exercise manifests 
itself in the tokening of a narrow state? My reply is to say that even if 
scientific psychology could (in principle) set itself the task of 
explaining such narrow  capacities, what motivation is there for 
adopting this goal? We really have the capacities that scientific 
psychology seeks to explain, and those capacities are inevitably going 
to be of particular interest to us given our immersion in folk 
psychology. In general, science has to speak to our desires and 
interests (that is, answer the questions that strike us as important and 
interesting), otherwise there is little point in our engaging in it (not 
least because of the cost to the tax-payer of scientific research).
Our twins and cousins will have many of the broad capacities that 
we do.^4 por example, they will be able to recognise their friends, 
categorise objects, recall past events in their lives, and so on. And in 
an important respect they will exercise these capacities in just the way 
that we exercise ours. Consequently, the explanation of their 
capacities will be just the same as that of ours. This doesn’t contradict 
anything that I have said for the following reason. Suppose that you 
work out your bank balance in just the same way that I work out 
mine. For this to be the case, it is crucial that the symbols that you 
manipulate represent facts about episodes in your banking history 
and not facts about episodes in my banking history. In other words, 
for one and the same explanation to account for both your and my 
capacity to work out our respective bank balances, it is necessary that 
the symbols that we manipulate differ in their intentional properties. 
The same point applies to the explanation of cognitive capacities. 
Such explanations are pitched at a level of generality that enables 
them to account for the capacities of individuals whose states diverge
Of course my twin will not have the capacity to recognise Fang or the capacity to 
recognise water, as he doesn't have the concepts of Fang or zvater. But those 
capacities are instances of more general capacities that my twin certainly will 
have, namely those of being able to recognise familiar individuals, and classify 
familiar types of stuff.
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in their intentional properties. Yet these explanations will make it 
clear that the representations manipulated by the processes that they 
describe have (and need to have) intentional properties that 
represent the characteristics of quite specific individuals, types of 
objects, historical events, and the like. And these are just the sort of 
properties that are not locally supervenient. Therefore, scientific 
psychology doesn't produce parochial explanations; its explanations 
account for the cognitive capacities of our twins just as much as they 
account for our cognitive capacities. This is so notwithstanding the 
fact that scientific psychology attributes to the representational states 
underlying our capacities intentional properties that are not locally 
supervenient. Thus it would be misguided to go narrow in response 
to a desire for generality.
3.7 Fodor’s account of narrow content
In section 3.4 I outlined some problems with Fodor's account of 
narrow  content. I argued that his m anner of determ ining and 
describing the narrow content of our psychological states won't work, 
and that narrow psychology as he characterises it is a thinly-disguised 
broad psychology. In this penultimate section I will add to my 
objections.
The first objection runs thus. Fodor’s account is very vague and 
unclear. He says that narrow content is a function from contexts to 
broad contents, and that narrow content determines broad content 
relative to context, so that, for example, our water thoughts must be 
about water, given their narrow content and the fact that they are 
anchored to water. Yet he doesn't tell us anything about how contexts 
are to be individuated and described. Neither does he tell us what is 
involved in a thought or a subject's being embedded in a particular 
context, or how we are to understand the anchoring relationship. For 
example, if I were transported to Twin Earth my water thoughts 
would not become twater thoughts, so I cannot be embedded in my 
Twin's context; in this case physical presence is not enough. So what 
would be the difference between me and my twin in virtue of which 
he was embedded in his context but I was not? In the absence of 
answers to such questions Fodor's account is hopelessly vague and 
incomplete.
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This criticism is not as petty and as pedantic as first might appear. 
Fodor presents his account of narrow  content in the context of 
defending intentional psychology against the charge that it is 
unscientific. He accepts that folk psychology won't do as legitimate 
science (in virtue of its not employing an individualistic taxonomy), 
but argues that this doesn't rule out the prospects of a scientifically- 
respectable intentional psychology. For such a psychology can 
employ a notion of narrow content. But given the w idespread 
suspicion that the whole notion of narrow content is incoherent he 
will not have succeeded in vindicating intentional psychology's 
claim to be a legitimate science until he has developed a clear and 
complete account of narrow content; in the circumstances we have a 
right to remain sceptical if all he does is make some gestures towards 
such an account.
A second objection is that a psychology that employed Fodor's 
notion of narrow content would be, in certain respects, too course- 
grained. It would imply that certain intuitively quite distinct 
thoughts belong to the same intentional type. I believe that Fang is 
ferocious. I also believe that Gnasher is ferocious. These beliefs have 
different broad contents. But it would appear that they have just the 
same narrow content as they instantiate the same function from 
contexts to broad content. Fang might have been called "Gnasher"; 
there is a possible world or context where Fang has that name. 
Similarly, there is a possible w orld or context w here I am 
individualistically just as I am but where my "Gnasher" thoughts are 
about Fang, where they are anchored to that dog. In other words, in 
the context where they are anchored to Gnasher, my "Gnasher" 
thoughts are about Gnasher, and in the context where they are 
anchored to Fang they are about Fang. But exactly the same is true of 
my "Fang" thoughts; were they anchored to Gnasher (as they could 
have been with me being individualistically just as I am now) they 
would be about that dog. In other words, these thoughts instantiate 
just the same function from contexts to broad context and thus have 
identical narrow contents. The fact that they differ in broad content, 
is a product of their being embedded in different contexts rather than 
their having divergent narrow contents. But is it acceptable for a 
scientific psychology to assign my belief that Fang is ferocious to the 
same intentional type as my belief that Gnasher is ferocious? Surely
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scientific psychology should distinguish between these beliefs; after 
all, they do have quite different causal powers.^^
My final objection is related to the second, as it again accuses Fodor 
of lum ping together states that a scientific psychology should 
distinguish. The belief that I express with the words "water is wet" 
has the same broad content as that that I express with the words "H2O 
is wet". Intuitively, though, there is an im portant semantic 
difference between these beliefs; they differ in sense, or something 
like that. However, they do not differ in narrow content. Were my 
"water" thoughts anchored to XYZ (as my twin's "water" thoughts 
are) they would be about XYZ. In other words, their narrow content is 
such as to entail that they are about water in a watery context, twater 
in a twatery context, and so on. But exactly the same is true of my 
"H2O" thoughts for were I embedded in my twins context they would 
be about XYZ. (If that sounds implausible ask yourself what my 
twin's "H2O" thoughts are about. It's difficult to see how they could 
be about anything but XYZ). Consequently, any thought that I express 
with the words "water is F" will have just the same narrow content 
as the thought that I express with the words "H2O is F", and hence, 
according to Fodor, belong to the same scientific psychological type. 
But surely a scientific psychology should distinguish between these 
th o u g h ts .O n c e  again, these thoughts have quite distinctive causal 
powers.
I therefore conclude that there are serious problems with Fodor's 
account of narrow content.
For example, my belief that Fang is ferocious causes me to hide when I see Fang 
whilst out running, but not when I see Gnasher. And my belief that Gnasher is 
ferocious causes me to hide when I see Gnasher whilst out running, but not when I see 
Fang.
In his recent writings Fodor has argued that scientific psychology individuates 
partly in terms of syntax. This implies that it would assign my "water" thoughts to 
different types than their corresponding "H2O" thoughts because of differences 
between their respective syntactic properties. In Chapter 7 I attempt to undermine 
this claim.
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3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter my reflections have taken a decidedly anti­
individualist line. By way of summary, my key points can be 
described in the following manner. The endorsement by scientific 
psychology of the computational theory of mind does not commit it 
to individuating psychological states individualistically, several key 
argum ents to the contrary notwithstanding. There are practical 
problem s associated w ith any attem pt to engage in a narrow  
psychology, problems that may well outweigh any benefits that such 
a psychology could bring us; whether the possible benefits are 
outweighed by the drawbacks may well be contingent upon such 
factors as whether we have any other-worldly twins or cousins. 
Moreover, the advantages of narrow over broad psychology have 
often been exaggerated; for example, it is far from clear that scientific 
psychology has to go narrow in order to recognise the similarities 
betw een us and our tw ins and cousins and capture the 
generalisations that subsume us all. When addressing the question of 
how scientific psychology individuates psychological states it is of 
param ount importance to bear in m ind the actual explanatory 
ambitions of its practitioners. As a matter of fact, or so I contend, in 
keeping with the continuity of scientific psychology w ith folk 
psychology, they are often concerned with accounting for broad 
cognitive capacities and, as a result, sometimes appeal to intentional 
p roperties that are not locally supervenient. That scientific 
psychologist's should seek to account for capacities that are salient 
from the folk psychological perspective, and particularly interesting 
to those who adopt that perspective, should come as no surprise; at 
the end of the day what we all want is for science to answer those 
questions and account for those facts about the world that seem 
particularly interesting and important to us.
I recognise that none of this conclusively vindicates the thesis that 
scientific psychology is externalist. This is because individualism is a 
thesis about how psychological states are (or should be) individuated. 
The fact that scientific psychology is (or could get away with being) 
broad implies only that some of the intentional properties that it 
recognises and appeals to are not locally supervenient; it doesn't
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imply that those broad intentional properties are the properties that 
are individuative in scientific psychology. I have little by way of 
argum ent for the claim that broad intentional properties are 
individuative. However, it is far from obvious to me that there is 
any determinate fact of the matter as to which of the many properties 
that scientific psychologists appeal to in their theories and 
explanations are individuative and which are not. It is often taken 
for granted that scientific psychology operates with a clear-cut, hard 
and fast taxonomy, so that there is always a determinate once and for 
all answer to the question of whether two psychological state tokens 
belong to the same psychological type. I w ant to resist this 
assumption. Suppose two psychological state tokens share certain 
properties recognised by scientific psychology. It may well be the case 
that there is a range of legitimate scientific psychological interests, 
concerns and purposes that are such that when some of them are 
operative the similarities between the state tokens will be particularly 
salient and relevant, whereas when others are operative these 
similarities will be overshadowed by other similarities or differences. 
If this is right, then in establishing that scientific psychology does (or 
at least might be able to get away with) recognising, and sometimes 
appealing to intentional properties that are not locally supervenient, 
I have established what might be described as a tentative externalist 
conclusion.
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Chapter 4
In d iv id u a lism  and Mart's Theory o f  
V ision
4.1 Introduction
It is not much of an exaggeration to describe David Marr's theory of 
v ision  as con tem porary  ph ilosophy  of m ind 's favourite  
psychological theory. Since the publication of his book Vision, rarely 
has a philosopher made a significant claim concerning the nature of 
scientific psychology or psychological explanation without appealing 
to Marr's theory to justify her views. In keeping with this fact, much 
recent discussion of the question of whether or not scientific 
psychology is individualistic centres on Marr's theory of vision. As 
might be expected, consideration of Marr's theory has failed to 
produce any universal agreement. On the one hand there are those 
writers who believe that Marr individuated the psychological states 
that figure in his theory non-individualistically, and on the basis of 
this conclude that scientific psychology - or at least significant parts of 
it - is, and is legitimately, externalist.^^ On the other hand there are 
those writers who find no convincing evidence for such a view; for 
them  M arr's theory doesn 't p resen t a counterexam ple to 
individualism .^^
Given my concern w ith the question of w hether scientific 
psychology is individualistic I cannot ignore the discussion of 
Marr's theory. In this chapter I will reflect on some of the key 
episodes in this ongoing debate, and will attempt to establish the 
pro-individualist conclusion that the contents that Marr attributes to 
the states of the human visual module are locally supervenient. At 
first sight, this conclusion appears to be at odds with the line of 
thought that I developed in Chapter 2. However, I believe that a
Burge (1986) and Davies (1991), (1992) belong to this category.
Segal (1989), (1991), Egan (1991), (1992), (1994) and Patterson (1996) advance such 
a view.
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reconciliation can be effected. The best way to begin the proceedings is 
to provide a description of the key features of Marr's theory
4.2 Marr’s theory of vision
We have the capacity to discover facts about the world by means of 
vision; facts such as the shape, size, colour, surface markings and 
motion of objects in our immediate environment. How do we do 
this? How is this capacity to be explained? Marr held that underlying 
this visual capacity is a subpersonal information-processing system 
housed w ithin the brain. The system in question is the visual 
module and Marr's theory is an attempt to describe its workings, and 
in so doing go some way towards explaining our visual capacities. He 
argues that a complete account of the workings of the visual module 
will comprise three distinct levels: these being the computational 
theory, the theory of representation and algorithm and the theory of 
hardw are implementation.
The computational theory concentrates on the semantic and 
intentional details of the visual m odule’s activity. Its task is to 
specify the information processing problem solved by the visual 
module, and the semantic and intentional details as to how it solves 
this problem. In order to construct an adequate computational 
theory one m ust do the following, (i) The information that the 
visual module takes as input and the information that it generates as 
output must be indicated, (ii) The visual module doesn't generate 
output from input in one fell swoop. Rather it makes a series of 
inform ation processing steps. Consequently, these inform ation 
processing substeps and the intermediary information that they 
generate m ust be described, (iii) The visual m odule generates 
information from information by applying mathematical operations 
or computing mathematical functions, just as I work out the current 
balance of my bank account from information about its previous 
state and intervening banking transactions by means of such
The most complete expression of Marr's theory can be found in his book Vision. 
Also relevant is his paper 'Artificial Intelligence - a Personal View'. Excellent 
overviews of subsequent vision research within the broad framework of Marr's 
approach can be found in Johnson-Laird (1988), Stillings et al. (1987) and Yuille and 
Ullman (1990).
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mathematical operations as addition and subtraction. Consequently, 
the mathematical operations executed by the visual module (in other 
words, the mathematical functions that it computes) m ust be 
described in precise mathematical terms, (iv) The appropriateness of 
the inform ation that the visual m odule generates and the 
mathematical operations that it employs must be indicated. Such 
questions as "why is that information and those operations relevant 
to the task at hand?" and "how do they facilitate the solution of the 
inform ation processing problem  that it is the visual m odule's 
function to solve?" must be answered. The appropriateness of the 
interm ediary information generated on the one hand, and the 
mathematical operations by means of which it is generated on the 
other, is closely interlinked. What makes a piece of intermediary 
information relevant is that it is information from which further 
relevant information can be generated by the mathematical means 
available to the visual module. And what makes a particular 
m athematical operation relevant is that it can be employed to 
generate relevant information from information that the module 
already has at its disposal. The appropriateness of such information 
and operations depends crucially on general facts about the world, 
facts that Marr calls physical constraints. An example of such a 
physical constraint is that changes in the intensity of light falling on 
the retina are caused by, and correspond to, such objective features of 
the external world as boundaries between objects, edges of objects, 
changes in colour, changes in surface texture, surface contours, and 
such like. Another example is that physical objects are rigid, not 
changing their shape and size from one moment to the next. The 
v isual m odule takes advantage of these constrain ts w ith  
assumptions corresponding to them being hard wired into it. Were 
these constraints not to hold, the visual module would not be able to 
generate the information that it in fact generates by means of the 
mathematical operations that it employs, or what information it did 
succeed in generating would be of little use or relevance. For 
example, were it not the case that such features as object edges, 
boundaries between objects, and the like, caused and corresponded to 
sudden changes in light intensity falling on the retina, then there 
w ould be little point in the visual m odule's constructing a 
representation of the location of sudden intensity changes on the
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retinal image; such a representation would not contain information 
from which the shape of the objects impinging on the subjects visual 
apparatus could be derived. Consequently, the physical constraints 
that the visual system takes advantage of must be described.
The computational theory tells us nothing about the syntactic 
details of the visual module's activity. It does not tell us which 
formal language it employs, or what syntactic rules it applies to the 
symbols of that language. One and the same computational theory 
could be implemented in several different ways at the syntactic level, 
just as the mathematical function of addition could be computed by 
applying one body of syntactic rules to Arabic numerals, or another 
body of syntactic rules to b inary symbols. The theory of 
representation and algorithm spells out the syntactic details of the 
visual module's activity.
Both the very information processing and the very syntactic activity 
that the visual module engages in could be implemented in many 
different ways at the physical level. The details as to how that activity 
is im plem ented in the brain  is not specified by either the 
computational theory or the theory of representation and algorithm. 
Rather, the theory of hardware implementation does that.
So we know what the goal of Marr's research is, but what are the 
details of the theory that he offers? How does he describe the 
workings of the visual module? Marr's theory is far from complete; 
in particular, the neural and syntactic details are somewhat limited 
and sketchy. However, he has m uch to offer by way of a 
computational theory. The outlines of that computational theory can 
be described in the following manner. When we open our eyes to the 
w orld , light waves reflected off objects in the im m ediate 
environment are focused onto the retina. The intensity of the light 
falling on the retina will vary from point to point as a result of such 
factors as differences in the source and strength of illumination 
across the viewed scene, differences in colour, texture, orientation, 
and other properties of the various surfaces off which light is 
reflected, and so on. The retina is a transducer. In response to the 
light falling upon it the retina generates a two-dimensional array, 
each value of which represents the intensity of light falling on the 
corresponding point of the retina. This two-dimensional array is 
known as the grey coding. The visual module takes as input pairs of
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grey codings. As output, the module produces object centred 3-D 
representations that indicate the shape, size, colour, and motion of 
w hatever objects are in the subject's field of view. This 
representation can then be employed by other cognitive modules to 
perform such tasks as object recognition and classification. Hence, the 
information-processing problem solved by the visual module is that 
of generating object centred 3-D representations from pairs of grey- 
codings.
This information processing problem is solved in three distinct 
stages. In the first stage the primal sketch is constructed. In the second 
stage the 2i/2-D representation is constructed. And in the third the 
object centred 3-D representation is constructed. In greater detail, 
these stages can be described as follows.
1. The construction of the primal sketch. As noted above, changes in 
light-intensity values across the retinal image tend to be caused by, 
and correspond to, such objective features of the viewed scene as 
boundaries between objects, object edges, changes in surface texture, 
changes in colour, surface contours, and the like. Consequently, such 
changes in intensity-value are potentially a very rich source of the 
kind of information that the visual module seeks to extract. Hence, it 
makes sense to represent explicitly the presence and location of 
significant changes in intensity on the retinal image. This is what the 
primal sketch does. But how is the primal sketch constructed? To 
detect intensity changes at a particular scale, a mathematical operator 
is applied to groups of neighbouring values of the grey codings to 
generate another two-dim ensional array, each value of which 
represents the gradient of the gradient of intensity  at the 
corresponding point of the retina at the scale in question. Where a 
positive value in such an array lies next to a negative value, the 
point between them is known as a zero crossing. Zero crossings 
correspond to intensity changes. Different sized operators are applied 
to the grey codings in this manner to detect intensity changes at 
different scales; small operators will detect small scale local changes, 
whereas larger ones will reveal the presence of more gradual, larger 
scale changes. The results of applying these different-sized operators 
are combined to produce a representation that represents the 
presence and location of zero crossings that show up at more than 
one scale. This is the raw primal sketch in which groups of adjacent
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zero crossings are represented as edge segm ents and blobs. 
Com putations are then perform ed on the raw prim al sketch to 
produce the full primal sketch which represents the global pattern of 
intensity changes. (For example, locally similar items are clustered to 
form higher-level units, and boundaries between different regions 
are detected and explicitly represented).
2. The construction of the 21/2-D sketch. The second stage of the 
visual process involves the construction of the 2i/2-D sketch, a 
representation that represents the relative distance from the subject 
of each point on the viewed surfaces together with their orientation 
relative to the subject. This representation is generated from the 
prim al sketch by means of the execution of several m odular 
processes. These processes include stereopsis and the extraction of 
depth information from motion information. Both stereopsis and 
the generation of motion information involve the comparison of 
distinct representations (primal sketches) and the computation of the 
displacement of corresponding elements of the representations so 
compared (where elements of distinct representations correspond 
with one another if and only if they are caused by and represent the 
same feature of the objective world). In order for such a comparison 
process to be perform ed, a m atching process that pairs off 
corresponding elements of the respective representations must first 
be executed. This matching process relies upon the three following 
assumptions. First, that an element of a representation has at most 
one element of any distinct representation corresponding to it. 
Second, that elements of distinct representations correspond to one 
another only if they are similar. And third, that displacements are 
small and vary smoothly. As a result of making these three 
assum ptions, the m atching process pairs an elem ent of a 
rep resen ta tion  w ith  at m ost one elem ent of any d istinct 
representation, pairs elements of distinct representations only if they 
are similar, and pairs elements only if they occupy similar positions 
in their respective representations. That such a matching process is 
successful, and thus facilitates the subsequent extraction of depth and 
motion information, is a product of the fact that the assumptions 
that it relies upon are true, or correspond to real facts about the 
world.
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3. The construction of the 3-D representation. In the final stage of the 
visual process, computational operations are applied to the primal 
sketch and the 2i/2-D sketch in order to generate an object-centred 3-D 
representation of the objects in the viewed scene, a representation 
that is such as to facilitate object recognition and classification. The 3- 
D representation represents objects as generalised cones or ensembles 
of generalised cones, and thus relies on the assumption that our 
world is populated by objects that have such shapes. The details as to 
how this final representation is constructed are complicated, but once 
again the utilisation of motion information plays an important role. 
Generally speaking, if the motion of two neighbouring features of a 
primal sketch that are separated by a zero crossing differ over time, 
then they will lie on different surfaces, for if they lay on the same 
surface their respective motions would be equivalent. This constraint 
enables the visual m odule to determ ine which zero crossings 
correspond to object edges (as opposed to, say, changes in colour or 
surface texture) and thus helps in the construction of the 3-D 
representation.
That completes my initial account of M arr’s theory. Other 
important aspects of the theory and Marr's general approach will 
become apparent in due course.
4.3 Burge's argument
We now come to the question of w hether M arr's theory is 
individualistic. Working on the assumption that Marr individuates 
visual states in terms of their c o n t e n t , ^ ^  this question boils down to 
that of whether the contents that Marr attributes to the states of the 
visual module supervene on the subject's intrinsic properties. The 
central - and agenda setting - argument for a negative answer to this 
question is due to Burge (1986a).
Burge begins by making the following two claims about M arr’s 
theory:
(i) 'the theory makes essential reference to the subject's distal
stimuli and makes essential assumptions about contingent facts
regarding the subject's physical environment' (p. 29).
This assumption is widely held. For a dissenting voice see Egan (1991), (1992).
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(ii) 'the theory is set up to explain the reliability of a great variety 
of processes and sub-processes for acquiring information, at least 
to the extent that they are reliable' (p. 29). In other words Marr's 
theory is not "success neutral".
He takes (ii) to imply a third point, namely that:
(iii) 'the information carried by representations - their intentional 
content - is individuated in terms of the specific distal causal 
antecedents in the physical world that the information is about 
and that the representations normally apply to' (p. 32).
My description of Marr's theory should make it clear that claims (i) 
and (ii) are both true. However, it is less than clear that (ii) implies 
(iii). There are two routes of escape that the individualist might 
a ttem pt to follow. The first involves questioning Burge's 
understanding of the nature of the success-orientation of M arr’s 
theory. The thought is that although Marr takes the hum an visual 
system to be reliable, he is not committed to viewing as reliable the 
visual systems of all our possible t w i n s . T h e  second option is to 
adopt what Davies (1991) calls the revisionary strategy. This involves 
ascribing to visual representations non-workaday contents that 
would be veridical across a wide range of environments, despite the 
fact that their typical causal antecedents would vary from one 
environment to the next. The thought is that the contents of my 
visual representations are such that there are possible environments 
quite unlike our world where, were I placed in them, my visual 
system would be reliable even if its representations had the contents
Patterson (1996) follows ttiis line. She argues that for Marr it would be an open 
empirical question whether the visual systems of our possible twins were reliable. 
She appears to lean towards the view that in those environments where my twin's 
visual representations w ould have to have contents that diverge from their 
counterpart representations in me for his visual system to be veridical, his behaviour 
should (and probably would) lead Marr to conclude that he was systematically 
misrepresenting his world (and thus that his representations had the same content as 
mine).
I l l
they actually have. Hence, one can hold onto the assumption of 
success without going e x t e r n a l i s t .
I will argue that neither claim (i) nor claim (ii) (or the conjunction 
of them) supports an externalist conclusion. As my argument draws 
upon points that emerge most clearly in the context of a discussion of 
some putative counterexamples to the individualist thesis I shall not 
present this argument just yet. Suffice it to say that, as things stand, 
it is far from clear that Burge has a compelling case. However, Burge 
offers much more by way of argument. For example, he presents the 
following chain of reasoning^^:
(1) The theory is intentional. (2) The intentional primitives of the 
theory and the information that they carry are individuated by 
reference to the contingently-existing physical items or conditions 
by which they are normally caused, and to which they normally 
apply. (3) So if these physical conditions and, possibly, attendant 
physical laws, were regularly different, the information conveyed 
to the subject and the intentional content of his or her visual 
representations would be different. (4) It is not incoherent to 
conceive of relevantly different (say, optical) laws regularly 
causing  the sam e non-in ten tiona lly , ind iv id u a lis tica lly  
individuated physical regularities in the subject's eyes and 
nervous system. It is enough if the differences are small; they 
need not be wholesale. (5) In such a case (by (3)) the individual's 
visual representations would carry different information and 
have different representational content, though the person's 
whole non-intentional physical history (at least up to a certain
Segal (1989) adopts this strategy when, in connection with Burge's crack-shadow 
example (see below) he attributes to both the actual and counterfactual P's 
representation O the content crackdow, this being a content that applies equally to 
both cracks and shadows.
In this argument, the controversial claim (iii) appears as premise (2) without any 
additional support. However, this premise does appear in a dialectical context 
where it is easier to appreciate its power and plausibility, what would be involved 
in rejecting it, and just how difficult it is to construct a convincing defence of an 
individualistic reading of Marr. Moreover, the argument presents the individualist 
with something more tangible to grapple with. Hence there is profit to be had from 
focussing one's attention on this argument.
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time) might remain the same. (6) Assuming that some perceptual 
states are identified in the theory in terms of their informational 
or intentional content, it follows that individualism is not true 
for the theory of vision.
What are we to make of this argument? What is needed to make it 
convincing is a plausible example. That is, what the externalist needs 
to do is present us with a sufficiently worked out example of a 
humanoid individual with a visual system that is individualistically 
and non-intentionally just like ours, who lives in, and is well 
adapted to, an environment that is unlike ours to such an extent that 
it would be indefensible to ascribe to her visual representations just 
the same content that Marr would ascribe to the corresponding 
representations in us. The problem is that it is difficult to come up 
with a plausible such example. In the search for such an example the 
externalist is pulled in opposite directions. On the one hand, the 
imagined scenario needs to be plausible. This requirement pulls the 
externalist towards describing a case where the imagined twin's 
environm ent is only subtly different from ours. The more 
outlandish the example the less plausible the claim is that a creature 
with a humanoid form could be well adapted to, and prosper in, the 
imagined e n v i r o n m e n t . ^ ^  Qn the other hand, the closer to our world 
the imagined environment is, the less pressing will be the need to 
ascribe to the visual states of its inhabitant's contents that diverge 
from the contents of the corresponding states in us in order to 
account for their capacity to find out about the nature of their world 
by means of vision. However, all this notwithstanding, there is an 
example worthy of examination. This is a modified version of the 
famous shadow-crack case that is presented by Burge as an 
independent refutation of individualism. I will examine this case 
and argue for the conclusion that it can be successfully 
accommodated by the individualist.
Before examining the shadow-crack case, I will make a brief 
digression. According to the individualist, the contents that Marr
It is important that the creature is w ell adapted to its home environment, 
otherwise there w ill be strong grounds for concluding that its visual states 
systematically misrepresent their distal causes (perhaps by having just the same 
contents as their analogues in us).
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attributes to our visual states supervene on our intrinsic physical 
properties. This rules out the possibility of my having a twin the 
content of whose visual states diverges from that of their 
counterparts in me. Thus, one way of defeating individualism is to 
present a compelling counterexample. However, the externalist is 
not committed to the idea that there are any such counterexamples; it 
is open for her to believe that any environment sufficiently different 
from ours to generate alternative visual contents would be such 
that none of our twins could be well adapted to it. Such an 
externalist will concede that all well adapted twins will share the 
same visual contents. However, (and this is what makes her an 
externalist) she will hold that this content-equivalence is partly the 
product of similarities in the twins' respective home environments 
and their relations to it, and not wholly the product of their internal 
physical similarities. But there is a major problem for the externalist 
who adopts this position and thus abandons, or condemns as 
fruitless, the search for twins with divergent visual contents. For, 
short of producing a twin case analogous to the folk psychological 
examples of Putnam and Burge, it is difficult to see how one could 
vindicate the thesis that Marr individuates non-individualistically. 
To see this consider the following.
As we have seen, Marr was concerned with the workings of the 
human visual system and did not have in mind any creatures living 
in a world other than ours. He portrays the visual system as 
generating representations that represent the extra-cranial world as 
being a certain way; in other words, the visual system sticks its neck 
out as to how the extra-cranial world is. Marr held that the visual 
system is by and large successful in representing the world as it really 
is; for him its representations are largely veridical. Thus he is 
committed to the existence of a good deal of causal covariation 
between properties instantiated in the external world and visual 
representations that represent those properties as being instantiated 
in the external w orld. In other w ords, for M arr, visual 
representations that represent their distal cause as having the 
property F tend to covary with instances of that property. An upshot 
of all this is that Marr describes the contents of visual representations 
in terms that refer to properties instantiated in the extra cranial 
world. But from this alone no externalist conclusion can be derived.
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After all, Descartes, that paradigmatic individualist, described the 
contents of his thoughts in terms that referred to properties that, if 
instantiated at all, are instantiated in the extra mental world. And 
after becoming satisfied that God exists and has a benevolent nature, 
Descartes came to the view that there is a good deal of causal 
covariation between his perceptual states and the external properties 
that they represent as being instantiated in the world. What made 
Descartes an individualist is that he held that the content of his 
thoughts is determined solely by the intrinsic nature of his mind.
W hat would indicate that Marr was committed to externalism 
would be the presence in his work of comments that committed him 
to some externalist theory of content (perhaps a causal covariation 
theory or a teleological theory of the sort advanced by Millikan 
(1984)). But there is no reason to expect Marr, or any other scientific 
psychologist, to make such comments or reflect upon the nature and 
origins of content; it is philosophers, rather than psychologists and 
cognitive scientists, who tend to do that sort of thing. There would be 
a greater likelihood of Marr saying something explicit on these 
questions if he were confronted with twins who inhabited different 
environments and had to reach some decision as to what contents to 
attribute to their visual representations. If Marr had been faced with 
the need to make such decisions, he may well have engaged in some 
general reflections on the nature of content, either to settle the 
question of what contents to attribute to our twins, or to justify a 
decision that he had made. But of course, Marr didn't have to worry 
about hum anoid subjects living in, and being well adapted to, 
environments other than our own. But if Marr, and psychologists in 
general, don't - and don't need to - address themselves to questions 
as to the nature and origins of content, the only way to establish their 
externalism would be to produce an example of twins to which they 
would be unlikely to attribute the same contents because to do so 
w ould be implicitly to commit themselves to some bizarre and 
indefensible theory as to the nature and origins of content. The 
analogy here is w ith folk psychology. Ordinary folk are forever 
attributing contents to the mental states of themselves and their 
fellows in the course of describing, explaining, predicting, and 
making sense of their behaviour and mental life. However, ordinary 
folk do not explicitly commit themselves to any theory as to the
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nature and origins of content, a fortiori they do not explicitly commit 
themselves to any externalist theory of the nature and origins of 
content. This fact doesn't stop folk psychology from being, as it were, 
implicitly externalist. Folk psychology is implicitly externalist in the 
respect that its practitioners attribute to our mental states contents 
that it would be indefensible to attribute to our t w i n s . N o w  Marr's 
theory could be implicitly externalist; that is, it might attribute to our 
visual states contents that it would be indefensible to attribute to all 
of our metaphysically possible twins. In order to establish that Marr's 
theory was externalist in this way, what is needed is a plausible 
example of a humanoid creature living in, and well adapted to, an 
environment different from ours to such an extent that it would be 
indefensible to attribute to his visual representations just the same 
contents that Marr would attribute to the corresponding states in its 
hum an twin. Hence, there is good reason for those with externalist 
leanings to launch themselves into a search for a plausible example 
of twins with divergent visual contents. However, there are risks 
involved for, quite apart from the prospect of returning empty 
handed , a consideration  of pu ta tive  counterexam ples to 
individualism  might only serve to emphasise features of Marr's 
theory and approach that ultimately tell against externalism.
So the question arises: are there any plausible examples? A case 
worthy of consideration is a modified version of Burge’s shadow- 
crack e x a m p l e . T h i s  runs as follows. An individual F lives in an 
environment in which there are both small shadows and similar-
Indefensible for the following kind of reasons: because it would commit one to some 
bizarre theory as to how our twins' states got the content that our states have (how 
could Oscar2's thoughts be water thoughts when he lives in a water-free world?); or 
because it would represent our twins as systematically misrepresenting their world 
when there is no more of a ground for the conclusion that they misrepresent their 
world than that we misrepresent ours; or because it undermines the attributions made 
to us. (If Oscar's thoughts can be water thoughts what is stopping our thoughts from 
being twater thoughts? Surely not that there is no twater around here. For if that is a 
good reason for regarding our thoughts as water thoughts then, by parity of 
reasoning, there are good grounds for attributing twater thoughts to our twins on Twin 
Earth).
This appears both in Burge’s 'Individualism and Psychology' and in his 
'Cartesian Error and the Objectivity of Perception'.
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sized and shaped cracks. Tokenings of a representation of type T in P 
are typically caused by shadows in normal conditions. Marr would 
say of tokenings of T that they represent their distal cause as a 
shadow; in other w ords T has the content shado iv . T's are 
occasionally caused by cracks and in such cases a crack is 
misrepresented as a shadow. When a crack causes a tokening of T, P 
invariably has no dispositions to distinguish the instance of a crack 
from instances of shadows. In effect, P's visual system cannot 
distinguish between shadows and cracks in normal circumstances. 
However, it can distinguish between shadows and cracks in ideal 
conditions. Next consider P in a counterfactual situation where he is 
individualistically and non-intentionally just as he is in the actual 
situation. P's counterfactual environm ent is somewhat different 
from his actual one, for in it there are no shadows, and tokenings of 
T are standardly caused by cracks. If P were to be confronted with a 
shadow in these circumstances (perhaps counter-nomically) it would 
be either invisible to his visual system or would produce a tokening 
of some representation other than T. Marr would, or should, 
attribute to T in the counterfactual case the content crack. It would be 
absurd to ascribe to it the content shadow given the facts about its 
standard e t i o l o g y . T h u s  we have a case of twins who, from the 
point of view of Marr's theory, are in different visual states due to 
differences between their respective environments.
I shall now attem pt to establish that this is not a convincing 
argument; it does not establish that Marr's theory is externalist. It is
67 To repeat, this is a modified version of the example presented by Burge. His 
concern in presenting this example is to produce a general argument against 
individualism as a theory about visual states. He says of his argument that it 'is 
independent of the theory of vision that we have been discussing [that is, Marr’s 
theory].. It supports and is further supported by that theory' (1986a, p. 43). Thus he 
is not specifically talking about Marr's theory, nor are the representations or states 
that he describes necessarily those (or just like those) that figure in Marr's theory. 
For example, it may well be the case that the states or representations that Burge 
describes are intended to be understood as personal level states rather than sub­
personal states (unlike the states and representations that feature in Marr's theory). 
Moreover, Burge initially presents an abstract version of the case which talks of the 
properties O and C. Cracks and shadows appear when he attempts to provide a 
concrete instantiation of his anti-individualist argument.
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quite plausible to say that Marr would ascribe the same content to T 
in the counterfactual case as he would in the actual one, for the 
contents that he attributes in accounting for our visual capacities 
need not be as specific as the argument supposes. As a first step in 
establishing this conclusion consider the case of Putnam's twins once 
m ore. Both Oscar and Oscar2 som etim es token a visual 
representation of intrinsic type R. In Oscar, tokenings of R are caused 
by water, and in Oscar2 they are caused by twater. Thus the types of 
stuff that R is typically caused by and applied to differs from one twin 
to the next. Yet this fact alone doesn't imply that R's in Oscar mean 
(from the point of view of M arr’s theory) one thing, and R's in 
Oscar2 something else. Clearly the contents that Marr attributes to 
visual representations are not so specific as to distinguish between 
w ater and twater. Thus M arr's theory is such that not every 
difference in typical distal cause counts for a difference in content. 
This should make us alive to the possibility that the difference in 
typical distal cause between the actual P's T's and the counterfactual 
P's T's doesn't count for a difference in content.
It might be argued that the crack-shadow case is fundamentally 
different from the water-twater case for the following kind of 
reasons. Firstly, the range of properties that the visual system is 
sensitive to, and represents as such, is rather limited, and does not 
include such properties as that of being water and that of being 
twater. The properties the visual system is sensitive to and does 
represent as such are shape, size, colour, texture properties, and the 
like. In terms of such observable properties, water and twater are 
alike, thus, from the Marrian perspective, the typical distal cause of R 
in Oscar is just the same as the typical distal cause of R in Oscar2. 
Secondly, cracks and shadows do differ from the point of view of 
M arr’s theory as can be seen by recalling what Marr regards as being 
one of the fundamental tasks of the visual system. Changes in light 
intensity values in the retinal image are caused by a number of 
distinct physical phenomena including object edges, changes in 
surface orientation, changes in texture, shadows and so on. One of 
the major tasks of the visual system is to disentangle these various 
physical causes, determining which features of the retinal image (and 
primal sketch) are caused by object edges, which by shadows, and so 
on. Were the visual system  not capable of successfully
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accomplishing this task, it could not produce the veridical output 
representations that it in fact produces. A consequence of this is that 
the visual system cares about the difference between cracks and 
shadows and must be able generally to see shadows as shadows (and 
cracks as cracks) whenever it comes across them.
The above points generate the thought that contents such as crack 
and shadow  are precisely the kind of contents that Marr would 
attribute to visual representations (unlike water and twater), and that 
for their respective visual systems to be successful the actual P's T's 
would have to represent their distal cause as a shadow whereas the 
counterfactual P's T's would have to represent their distal cause as a 
crack.
The above line of argument is unconvincing. It is consistent with 
the success of both the actual and the counterfactual P's visual system 
and the fact that for Marr the visual system disentangles the effects of 
- and thus distinguishes betw een - such disparate physical 
phenomena as object edges and shadows, that T's have identical 
contents in both the actual and the counterfactual case. What the 
shadows and the cracks that Burge describes have in common is that 
they are both thin, dark, surface marks. It is my contention that Marr 
would attribute to both the actual and the counterfactual P's T's some 
content such as thin, dark, surface mark. That is to say that whenever 
actual or counterfactual P's visual system generates a T i t  represents 
the surface before it as having a thin dark mark on it.^^ Here's why. 
Just because the visual system must generally be able to distinguish 
between shadows and other types of physical phenomena, and thus 
m ust be able to represent shadows as such, it doesn't follow that 
there are not some kinds of shadow that it doesn't represent as 
shadows, or that it is never neutral as to whether the distal cause of a 
surface feature it has detected is a shadow or some other physical 
phenom enon. Sometimes a visual system will detect a surface 
feature - typically small and insignificant - that it is unable to 
determine much of the nature of. In such a case it is useful to have a 
representation that specifies as much as is known about the surface
In attributing such a content to T, I am not adopting what Davies (1991) describes 
as the revisionary individualist line, as I am not attibuting a non-workaday 
disjunctive content to T. In particular, I am not (unlike Segal, 1989) attributing the 
disjunctive content crackdow (i.e. shadozo-or-crack) to T.
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feature in question but is noncommittal or neutral as to such details 
as whether it's a shadow, an object resting on the surface, a crack, or 
whatever. If the visual system "stuck its neck out" in such cases it 
would be liable to error or, at the very least, would be making an 
arbitrary, unjustified decision as to what was before the subject. The 
kind of case I am imagining is the analogue of the familiar personal 
level case where we see a viewed surface as having a small dark 
mark on it but we can't make out what the mark is; that is we can't 
make out whether it is a shadow, a crack, another object resting on 
the surface (e.g. an insect), a change in surface texture, or whatever. 
In such circumstances we just see the surface feature as a small, dark 
mark. To jump to the conclusion that the surface feature was, say, a 
shadow would be premature and unjustified, making one prone to 
error and misrepresentation.
My point is that in the crack-shadow case Marr would - or at least 
could have - regarded the T's as having the content thin, dark surface 
mark . Just because the actual P's T's tend to be caused by shadows, it 
doesn't automatically follow that Marr would regard T as having the 
content shadow. It would be beneficial to a visual system to have the 
resources to register the presence of surface features without making 
any significant conclusions as to their nature (beyond such properties 
as their shape and size). That we have such a case of noncommittal 
representation in the Burge example is suggested by several features 
of that example, namely that the shadows and cracks are small (it is 
difficult for the visual system to determine the nature of small 
surface features, especially from a distance), and that the subject isn't 
very interested in the surface feature (as is indicated by the fact that 
the subject has no dispositions to employ any other sensory modality 
or move closer so as to rule out the possibility of error or find out 
more about the surface feature). In short, in portraying the shadows 
and cracks as minor surface features that the subject isn’t very 
interested in, Burge removes any motivation for regarding the 
actual P's T's as representing its distal cause as a shadow and the 
counterfactual P's T's as representing its distal cause as a crack. 
Moreover, the familiar visual experience of seeing a minor surface 
feature just as a small, dark mark (rather than as a token of a specific 
type of physical phenomenon) suggests that the visual system is
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often fairly neutral as to the nature of the distal stimuli impinging 
upon it.
Another relevant point is that, so to speak, relatively neutral 
representations do figure prominently in Marr's theory. For example, 
the edge segments that are amongst the primitives that make up the 
primal sketch are caused by, and correspond to, a whole range of 
physical phenomena (such as object edges, changes in surface 
orientation, and the like), but whenever such a primitive is tokened 
it is neutral as to the physical nature of its distal cause. In so far as 
edge primitives say anything about their distal cause it is that there is 
a significant physical feature out there the nature of which hasn't yet 
been determined. (Segal, 1989).^^
In conclusion, then, Burge hasn't presented us with a convincing 
anti-individualist example, for he has given us no reason for 
thinking that Marr would attribute the content shadow to the actual 
P's T's in preference to the less specific thin, dark surface marking . 
The latter attribution would appear to be intuitively the most 
appealing given the subject's lack of interest in the specific nature of 
the surface feature and the insignificance of that nature to him, 
along with the familiar fact that we often see surface features just as 
thin dark surface m a r k i n g s . A n d  if the actual P's T's mean thin.
It might be argued that there is a key difference between edge segments and the 
representations Burge imagines, for the latter, unlike the former, tend to covary with 
a single type of physical phenomena. In response, this objection misses the point of 
m y appeal to the example of edge segments. The point of this appeal is only to 
indicate that Marr presents the visual system  as having the capacity to be 
relatively unspecific in how it represents the external world to be when it is not in 
the position to determine all that much about the specific nature of its distal stimuli. 
Moreover, the content that I attribute to the T's doesn't violate any covariation 
requirement.
That the actual P's T's are typically caused by shadows gives no grounds for 
attributing a more specific content than thin dark surface marking. Consider the case 
of personal level visual experience where the surface features that I see as thin dark 
surface markings are sometimes one kind of physical phenomena and sometimes some 
other kind. Had I lived in a world where the distal causes of those visual 
experiences were always one single type of physical phenomena (say small cracks) 
the content of my visual experiences would not thereby be different from what they
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dark surface marking then, by parity of reasoning, so do the 
counterfactual P's T's.
It might be objected that Davies (1991) provides a refutation of my 
conclusion. In his assault on revisionary individualism , Davies 
argues that that brand of individualism  cannot cope w ith a 
significant feature of the Burge example, namely 'that in ideal 
circumstances P is quite able to discriminate a C (a crack) from an O (a 
shadow); it is simply that P rarely sees Cs (cracks), and when he does 
it is in non-ideal circumstances' (p. 475). Davies argues that the only 
way of accounting for this discriminatory capacity is to attribute to T 
the content shadow. How should we respond to this?
A first point is that the content attribution that I am arguing for is to 
be distinguished from the disjunctive content that the revisionary 
individualist argues for. Hence the failure of the latter doesn't imply 
that my position is not tenable. So can the attribution of the content 
thin, dark surface marking make sense of P's discrim inative 
abilities? Presumably what is ideal about the ideal circumstances is 
that in them P can reliably discriminate between shadows and cracks. 
Having this ability does not imply that P sees the shadows as 
shadows and the cracks as cracks, but only that how he sees the latter 
is different from how he sees the former. These circumstances are 
not ideal as such but only ideal relative to the task of discriminating 
shadows from cracks. Thus the normal circumstances in which P 
lives out most of his shadow-and-crack viewing life are not non­
ideal as such, but only non-ideal relative to the task of telling 
shadows apart from cracks. In other words, they are not the analogue 
of pitch blackness for us, that is, a type of circumstance in which our 
visual system cannot, and has not evolved to, work in. There is no 
evidence that Burge conceives the circumstances in which P's visual 
system responds to both shadows and cracks by producing T's as 
being abnormal or as constituting circumstances that that visual 
system has not evolved to cope with. Thus we can say that in normal 
circumstances P cannot discriminate between shadows and cracks, a 
fact that is not without significance, for if P had such a discriminative 
capacity it would be implausible to claim that T has a content (thin, 
dark, surface marking, for example) that applied to both shadows and
in fact are. Why would it be any different in the case of sub-personal visual 
representations?
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cracks. So the question is: is P's capacity to discriminate between 
shadows and cracks in ideal circumstances such as to imply that T 
does not mean thin, dark surface marking? Burge does not tell us 
much about what happens in the ideal circumstances when P is 
confronted with a shadow (or a crack). There are two possibilities 
consistent with what he says. First, it is consistent with what he says 
that in ideal circumstances neither shadows nor cracks cause T's, but 
ra ther that shadow s reliably cause tokenings of a second 
representational type T", and that cracks reliably cause tokenings of a 
third representational type T"'. In such a case the attribution of the 
content thin, dark surface marking to T does not make P's capacity to 
discriminate between shadows and cracks in ideal circumstances 
unintelligible. On the contrary, that capacity can be accounted for by 
attributing a second content to T" and a third content to T'". Indeed, 
if facts are as described it would be counterintuitive to ascribe to T the 
content shadow.
That this first scenario is not at all outlandish is indicated by a 
familiar everyday analogue. In the normal course of things, we view 
surfaces from a distance, and as a consequence we are often not able 
to determine much as to the nature of small surface features. Often, 
when we see small surface features, we cannot make out whether 
they are cracks, shadows, or whatever; typically what we see such 
surface features as is small dark surface markings (or something 
along those lines). If we are disposed to find out more as to the 
nature of such a surface feature we will move closer so as to discover 
more as to its nature. When we move closer we typically come to see 
the surface feature differently; we might come to see it as having a 
different (or perhaps a more specific) shape or colour, as having - or 
not having - depth, as having a specific texture, and so on. In such 
cases, how we come to see the surface feature will depend a lot on its 
intrinsic nature; thus when we move closer to cracks we typically see 
them differently from how we see shadows when we move closer to 
them, despite the fact that how we see the latter from a distance is 
just how we see the former from a distance. In this kind of familiar 
case, what goes on when we are in ideal circumstances - that is, 
circumstances ideal relative to the task of discriminating shadows 
from cracks - in no way tells against the idea that in normal
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circumstances we see both the shadows and cracks in a neutral and 
non-specific way.
The upshot of the above reflections is that the content that I have 
attributed to T is consistent with P's having a capacity to discriminate 
between shadows and cracks in ideal circumstances. However, the 
specifics of the Burge case might take a second form. In such a case, 
shadows reliably cause T's in both the norm al and the ideal 
circumstances, whereas cracks cause T's only in the norm al 
circum stances, causing some other representation  in ideal 
circumstances. It might be thought that this scenario would tell 
against the content attribution that I have been arguing for by 
suggesting that T has the content shadow and the representation 
caused by cracks in ideal circumstances the content crack. But this is 
not obviously the case. In normal circumstances P's visual system 
could represent both shadows and cracks as thin dark surface 
markings, that is, represent both types of phenomena in neutral and 
non-specific terms; yet on P's moving closer it could uncover more 
specific facts about the nature of what was before P when what was 
before P was a crack but not when it was a shadow. For example, on 
P's moving closer his visual system might be able to determine more 
about the specific shape or colouration of cracks - something that it 
can't do with respect to shadows. An important point to note is that 
P's visual system might be uncovering properties of cracks that 
shadows do in fact have, or could have. Thus there is no reason to 
conceive of the representations caused by cracks as having the 
content crack. An upshot of this is that once again we can account for 
P's ability to discriminate between shadows and cracks in ideal 
circumstances without attributing to T the content shadow, a content 
that it might be difficult to justify ascribing to the counterfactual P's 
T's given the fact that they are never caused by shadows.
In short, then. P's capacity to discriminate between shadows and 
cracks in ideal circumstances does not in and of itself tell against the 
attribution of the content thin dark surface marking to T. Therefore 
such an attribution is consistent with the shadow-crack example as 
described by Burge. Of course this doesn't rule out the possibility that 
Burge's scenario could be developed in such a way as to cause 
problems for the individualist, but that development has not been 
executed by Burge. I suspect that any such development would have
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to make the difference between P's actual and counterfactual 
environment much more graphic and wholesale than that implied 
by Burge (recall that Burge presents the case as being one where the 
difference between the respective environments is only minor). 
However, as I stated above, the cost of making such a move is a 
reduction in plausibility. Rather than attempting to develop the 
shadow-crack example I shall turn my attention to a case of twins 
who inhabit environments that differ in a graphic and wholesale 
way.
4.4 Circles and squares: a more graphic putative counter-example
Suppose that SI is a state of the hum an visual m odule that is 
normally caused by square-shaped objects and rarely by objects of any 
other shape. In addition, suppose that whenever a subject tokens SI 
she subsequently has a visual experience as of a square, an experience 
w ith  the content square. W henever a subject takes such an 
experience at face value she subsequently behaves in a way that 
would be appropriate were there a square-shaped object before her, 
and inappropriate if otherwise. W hat is the content of SI? The 
obvious answer is square (or square-shaped object). Now consider S2, 
another state of the visual module. S2 tends to covary with circular­
shaped objects and causes visual experiences with the content circle 
(experiences that, when taken at face value, manifest themselves in 
behaviour appropriate to circular-shaped objects). W hat is the 
content of S2? The obvious answer is circle (or circular-shaped  
object).
In a distant world inhabited by creatures intrinsically very much 
like us, optical laws and other external conditions are such that it is 
circular-shaped objects that typically cause tokenings of SI in the 
locals, and square-shaped objects that typically cause tokenings of S2. 
What is the content of SI and S2 in the inhabitants of this world? 
One (externalist) answer is that SI has the content circle (or circular- 
shaped object) whereas S2 has the content square (or square-shaped 
object). That answer suggests the following counterexample to 
individualism. Edgar is a normal Earthly subject who, confronted 
with a square-shaped object, tokens SI in response. Edgar has a twin 
who is an inhabitant of the above described distant world who is
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currently confronted with a circular shaped object (an object that has 
caused him to token SI). The thought is that Edgar's SI has the 
content square, whereas the corresponding state in his twin has a 
quite different content (namely circle). Thus, the content of the states 
of the visual module is not locally supervenient.^^
Is this a convincing counterexample to the individualist's thesis? I 
will argue for a negative conclusion; Marr w ould (or should) 
attribute the content square to SI in both us and our other worldly 
counterparts, which would thus imply that the latter systematically 
misrepresent the shape of objects in their world. There are two basic 
argum ents for this conclusion, one of which appeals to visual 
experience, and the other of which appeals to behaviour.
Here is how the argument from visual experience goes. The visual 
module plays a prominent role in the etiology of visual experience, 
so that how the world is presented to me in experience (the content 
of my experiences) will depend upon how my visual m odule 
represents the world to be. If I have a visual experience as of a square, 
then that experience will be the product of my visual m odule’s 
representing its distal stimuli as being a square-shaped object. Ceteris 
paribus, had my visual module represented the distal stimuli as 
having some other shape, then I would not have had the visual 
experience that I in fact had. In general, then, there is a systematic 
and coherent relationship between the output of the visual module 
and the content of visual experience. Consequently, part of Marr's 
task is to explain how the visual module manages to detect and 
represent those features of the world that our visual experiences 
represent. Marr will fail in this task if the contents that he attributes 
to the states (particularly the output states) of the visual module 
aren't appropriately related to the contents of visual experience, for 
he will have left it a mystery how the visual module enables us to 
see the world as we see it.
The role that the visual module plays in the etiology of our visual 
experiences (or, alternatively, in enabling us to see the world as we 
see it) implies that if the contents of the respective visual experiences 
of twins are identical then so will be the contents of the states of their
This twin scenario is closely based upon one developed by McGinn (1989) in his 
discussion of the question of whether the content of visual experience is locally 
supervenient.
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respective visual modules, for any divergence in the contents of the 
latter states would show up in visual experience. In connection with 
our specific example, if Twin-Edgar's experience is as of a square, 
then the state SI in him must have the content square despite the 
fact that that state covaries with circularshaped objects. To deny this 
is to make it a mystery how Twin-Edgar came to see the world as he 
saw it; if SI had the content circle then surely he would have had a 
visual experience as of a. circle.
As yet, none of this causes the externalist any problems, for it hasn't 
been established that the visual experiences of twins have identical 
contents. However, the assertion that the content of visual 
experience is locally supervenient has considerable intuitive power. 
V isual experiences are states of consciousness; they have 
phenomenological or qualitative properties. There is something that 
it is like to have an experience as of a square. Now w hat seems 
undeniable is that the qualitative character of an individual's 
psychological states is locally supervenient; the psychological states of 
twins are qualitatively identical no matter how much their home 
environments diverge. In other words, what it is like to be you is 
determined by how things are w ithin your skin. Therefore, the 
qualitative character of Edgar's visual experience when he sees the 
square shaped object will be the same of that of his twin when he is 
confronted by the circular-shaped object. Consequently, if the content 
of a visual experience supervenes upon its qualitative character, 
then, given the transitivity of the supervenience relationship, the 
externalist's case collapses. And it has to be noted that it is intuitively 
highly plausible to claim that if someone has a visual experience 
with the same qualitative character as my experience as of a square, 
then that experience must also be as of a square regardless of the 
nature of the home environment of the subject in question. Quite 
generally, it would take some argument to unseat the intuition that 
the content of an individual's visual experiences supervenes upon 
the qualitative character of those experiences and thus upon her 
intrinsic physical properties. I am not going to get embroiled in the 
question of whether such a supervenience relationship holds^^ but
McGinn (1989) argues for the thesis that the content of visual experience 
supervenes upon qualitative character. Davies (1992) disagrees. For him, the 
supervenience relationship is of the within world-within species variety.
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merely note that visual experience is a potential source of trouble for 
the claim that the square-circle case constitutes a counterexample to 
individualism. To recapitulate: if the content of visual experience is 
locally supervenient then Edgar's visual experience will have just 
the same content as that of his twin. And if their visual experiences 
have just the same content then so will their respective tokenings of 
SI, given the role that the visual module plays in enabling us to see 
the world.
My central argument for the conclusion that the square-circle case 
does no t constitu te  a convincing counterexam ple to the 
individualist's thesis involves an appeal to behaviour. The basic idea 
is that the behaviour of Twin-Edgar towards circular-shaped objects 
(being just the same as that of his Earthly twin towards square shaped 
objects) suggests that he systematically m isrepresents them as 
squares. Hence, SI has the content square in both twins, 
environmental differences notwithstanding. In arguing thus I follow 
in the footsteps of both McGinn (1989) and Segal (1991).
Visual systems are not merely onboard entertainment systems.
They perform a very important function, namely that of providing 
the subject w ith inform ation about the nature of her world, 
information that it is useful for her to have if she is going to satisfy 
her needs and desires and generally prosper in the world. In order to 
perform this function it is important that visual systems are reliable; 
their pronouncements as to the nature of the external world must 
generally be veridical. But it is equally important that the subject is 
able to act on the basis of how she sees the world. In general, how we 
see the world shows up in our behaviour. Moreover, it is typically 
the case that how we behave on the basis of our visual states is 
appropriate given the content of those states. Thus, if I see an object 
before me as having a square shape, I will behave towards it in a 
manner that would be appropriate or sensible were it in fact square­
shaped, but not if it were any other shape. In behaving thus, my 
behaviour is coherently related to the contents of my visual states. i
Consequently we can, and often do, read off facts about the contents |
of the visual states of our fellows from facts about their behaviour. If j
a creature couldn't behave in a manner that was coherently related to I
the contents of its visual states then there would be little point in its 
having a visual system; its visual system would play no role in
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enabling it to prosper in the world. And if a creature could, but 
generally didn't, behave in a way that was coherently related to the 
contents of its visual states, then it might as well not have a visual 
system.^^
Now consider Twin-Edgar once more. He will behave in response to 
circular-shaped objects just as Edgar does in response to squares. For 
example, in describing the shape of the object before him when he is 
confronted with a circular-shaped object, he will do such things as 
trace a square in the air with his hand, or draw a square on a piece of 
paper. And he will attempt to circumnavigate circular shaped objects 
by following a square-wise path (a form of behaviour that will either 
result in him colliding with the object in question or expending 
excessive energy by going further out of his way than he need have 
done). In general, behaviour that state SI is implicated in the etiology 
of will be appropriate to squares (but not to circles), and that 
behaviour will be coherently related to the content of SI if that state 
has the content square (but not if it has the content circle).
The upshot of all this is that if Twin-Edgar's behaviour is coherently 
related to the content of his visual states, then SI will have the 
content square, and he will be systematically misrepresenting the 
shape of circular-shaped objects. Thus the externalist has to argue 
that this is a case where there is a breakdown in the relationship 
between visual content and behaviour. Here, behaviour pulls us in 
one direction, and etiology in the other, so that we m ust chose 
between the two (or, more accurately, determine which way Marr 
would jump).
In the case of Earthly humans, the subjects of Marr's reflections, 
there is no such conflict between etiology and behaviour; Marr did 
not have to make any decisions on cases anything like the one that
Of course we don't always behave in a manner that is coherently related to the 
content of our visual states. Sometimes intervening factors prevent us from behaving 
as we normally would, as when we lose control of our limbs through disease or injury. 
Sometimes we do not take our visual experiences at face value. And sometimes we 
behave in such a way as to conceal how we see the world from our fellows. Yet such 
phenomena are exceptions to a general rule. Indeed, in the latter two kinds of case, 
the subject's behaviour will be coherently related to the content of her visual states 
along with tliat of the beliefs and desires that are implicated in her behaving the 
way she does.
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concerns us now . Thus we will find no precedents in his work. 
However, I think that there are good reasons for thinking that his 
approach is such that he would have sided with behaviour in this 
kind of case, and thus that he would have attributed the content 
square to Twin-Edgar's state SI. Such an attribution has the 
advantage of cohering with commonsense, for I take it that most 
ordinary folk would accept McGinn's claim that "aftermath trumps 
etiology", and would thus view Twin-Edgar as being something of a 
Mr. Magoo.
In determining how the visual module works, Marr relies heavily 
on the behaviour of human subjects; for example, their behaviour in 
norm al perceptual situations, their behaviour in experim ental 
settings, their behaviour in laboratory conditions where normal 
physical constraints have been violated, and so on. In so relying on 
behaviour, he operates on the assumption that behaviour can tell us 
an awful lot about the workings of the visual system, for example, 
w hat information processing problems it solves, w hat physical 
constraints it takes advantage of/w hat assumptions it employs, what 
features of the world it is sensitive to and represents, and so on. This 
implies that he assumes that behaviour can tell us an awful lot about 
the contents of the states of the visual module, for to represent that 
module as solving a particular information-processing problem, or as 
relying on a particular assumption, is to make a claim about the 
contents of the representations that it generates. Thus Marr assumes 
that there is a systematic and coherent relationship between the 
goings on in our visual module and the manner in which we 
behave, and, moreover, that there is such a relationship between the 
contents of our visual states and the behaviour tha t they 
subsequently cause. Indeed, it is difficult to see how Marr could 
proceed in any other way, for if he were to abandon his reliance on 
behaviour he would have no hope of constructing a viable theory of 
vision. It's not as if he can cut open our heads and see what is going 
on inside.
What Marr's reliance on behaviour (and his assumption that there 
exists a coherent relation between the contents of our visual states 
and our behaviour) suggests is the following. Since Twin-Edgar 
behaves in just the same way as his Earth bound twin, Marr would 
attribute just the same contents to his visual states. In particular.
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Marr would take his behaviour vis-a-vis circular-shaped objects as 
evidence that he systematically misrepresented them as square­
shaped; to attribute any other content to state SI would be to ignore 
all the behavioural evidence.
But how does this cohere with the success-orientation of Marr's 
theory? It might be argued that in addition to his assumption about 
behaviour, Marr assumes that the visual module generally produces 
veridical representations. In the case of the Earth bound Edgar, these 
two assumptions can jointly hold true but not in the case of Twin- 
Edgar (and his fellows). So, in connection with Twin-Edgar, Marr has 
to abandon one of his assumptions, and who is to say that it would 
not be the one that there is a systematic and coherent relationship 
between the contents of his visual states and the behaviour that they 
issue in? Quite apart from the point that Marr can't afford to 
abandon his assumption about behaviour if he is to have any hope of 
uncovering the workings of Twin-Edgar's visual system, there is an 
answer to this challenge. Although Marr takes our visual module to 
be largely successful in correctly representing the world (and sets out 
to explain this success), it is no part of his position that visual 
modules must be, or are inevitably, successful in this respect. He is 
free to take it as an open empirical question just how successful a 
creature's visual system is, a question that can only be settled by 
observing the behaviour of the creature in question (Patterson, 1996). 
The behaviour of us Earth bound humans indicates that our visual 
states are largely veridical. But matters are somewhat different when 
it comes to Twin-Edgar and his fellows. With respect to circular­
shaped objects, they will systematically engage in a pattern  of 
behaviour that is wholly inappropriate, resulting in their crashing 
into such objects, their dropping them, and general chaos. Heaven 
knows what calamities will ensue if Twin-Edgar attempts to go 
crown green b o w l i n g . ^ 4  pg Marr all this would surely indicate that
The fact that Twin-Edgar's interactions with circular-shaped objects result in such 
disastrous consequences serves to block a certain line of response that the externalist 
might try to develop. The argument I have in mind runs thus. Because of the nature of 
his home environment, we shouldn't automatically assume that when Twin-Edgar 
traces a square with his hand (or draws a square) his behaviour has the same 
significance as it would have here on Earth. Perhaps Twin-Edgar's square tracing 
behaviour means circle, thus implying that SI could have the content circle without
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Twin-Edgar and his fellows misrepresent the shape of circular- 
shaped objects, and that their visual modules are far less successful 
than ours. Moreover, he would take it as his task to explain where 
their visual modules go wrong, to explain why their visual modules 
get it wrong when they get it wrong. Therefore, I conclude that 
Marr, in line with commonsense, would attribute the content square 
to state SI in both Edgar and his twin.
4.5 An externalist rejoinder
There is an im portant line of response according to which the 
externalist can concede the point that sameness of behaviour 
implies sameness of visual content whilst developing the circle- 
square case in such a way as to generate a genuine counterexample to 
individualism. The argument in question is due to Davies (1992) and 
runs thus. It is a mistake to think that twins that inhabit different 
environments must make just the same bodily movements. If twins 
live in environments that differ in terms of gravity, or in terms of 
the density of the medium through which they move, then identical 
nervous impulses and muscle contractions will issue in subtly 
different bodily  m ovem ents. Suppose that the respective
environments of Edgar and his twin differ in this kind of way. The 
very internal phenomena that cause Edgar to trace the shape of a 
square in the air cause Twin-Edgar to trace the shape of a circle and 
the very internal phenomena that cause Edgar to walk in a square- 
wise fashion cause Twin-Edgar to walk in a circle. Hence it is true of 
both twins that their behaviour constitutes a well adapted response 
to its distal cause. And thus the behavioural facts do not tell against
there being any breakdown in the relationship between visual state and behaviour. 
After all, there is no reason why a community couldn't adopt the convention of 
representing circular-shaped objects by means of squares. Whether or not Twin- 
Edgar's behaviour could plausibly be interpreted in this light, the response breaks 
down when it comes to circle-caused behaviour, the primary purpose of which is not 
to communicate the subject's conception of the shape of whatever object is impinging 
upon him. The way in which Twin-Edgar handles and circumnavigates circular­
shaped objects is so inappropriate that there is no way of avoiding concluding that 
he sees them as squares, save accepting that there is a breakdown in the relationship 
between his visual states and his behaviour.
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the attribution of the content square to SI in Edgar and circle to the 
same state in his twin.
Ingenious though this argument is, I think it fails, as it overlooks an 
im portant fact about the way our bodies work. When I make a 
movement I am usually aware of the nature of the movement that I 
have made. For example, if I trace a square in the air with my hand I 
will be aware that I have so behaved. This awareness is a form of 
conscious experience (I have a sensation of tracing a square with my 
hand), but does not rely on vision; even with my eyes closed I am 
sensitive to the way in which I move my limbs. Having this capacity 
to monitor my movements plays an important role in enabling me 
to interact successfully with the world. Underlying this capacity are 
m echanism s w ithin my body that provide my brain  w ith 
information that enables it to determine the extent, direction and 
velocity of the m ovem ent of my limbs as I behave. These 
mechanisms will be sensitive not to (or not just to) the nature of the 
muscular contractions and nervous impulses that cause behaviour, 
but to such factors as the degree and direction of bone movement 
w ithin sockets at the joints, and phenomena issuing from these 
movements such as the tension of ligaments and tendons. When I 
trace a square with my hand, the activity at my joints is subtly 
different from that that takes place when I trace a circle. This 
difference manifests itself in the feedback that my brain receives, 
which in turn results in my having quite different sensations as to 
the way in which I have moved. All this is true not just of me but of 
all humans and, of course, of Twin-Edgar and his fellows.
I concede that identical internal events (muscle contractions, 
nervous im pulses and the like) could cause different bodily 
m ovements in twins that inhabit divergent environm ents. But 
surely the feedback that these movements generate will differ from 
one twin to the next. Edgar traces a square with his hand, whereas 
Twin-Edgar traces a circle. This difference in their respective bodily 
movements will be reflected in the activity that takes place at their 
joints; for example, there will be subtle differences in the direction 
and extent of the motion of bones within the sockets that link them 
to adjoining bones. If there were no such differences, the tw in’s, 
being twins, would surely make identical bodily movements. Given 
that the feedback mechanisms are sensitive precisely to such
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phenomena, the response of Edgar's mechanism will be intrinsically 
different from that of his tw ins corresponding mechanism . 
Consequently, their subsequent experiences of how they moved will 
diverge; Edgar will have the experience of tracing a square, whereas 
Twin-Edgar will have the sort of experience (qualitatively and 
physically) that Edgar normally has when he traces a circle. The 
important point is that whatever contents we attribute to the internal 
feedback states of the twins, the fact is that they will differ at the 
physical level; that is, they will not be twins. Thus Davies has 
sketched a highly implausible scenario; twins with bodies that work 
anything like the way in which our bodies work cannot make 
different bodily movements. If two individuals move in different 
ways then they cannot be twins.
Another point worth making is that all this implies that Twin- 
Edgar will be woefully ill-adapted to his home environm ent. 
Suppose that I find myself in an environment like Twin-Edgar's. I 
see a circular-shaped object which causes a tokening of state 81 (a 
state which, according to the externalist, has the content square) and a 
visual experience as of a square. I attempt to behave towards this 
object in a square-wise fashion, but end up behaving as if it were a 
circle. With my eyes I will see myself engaging in "square" behaviour 
but from the inside it will feel like I am behaving in a "circular" 
fashion. In other words, the information that my brain receives from 
the visual module will clash with that that it receives from the 
internal feedback mechanism, and this clash will manifest itself in 
my being befuddled, experiencing a sense of disquiet, and coming to 
believe that something has drastically gone wrong. Clearly I would 
have problems leading a life in this environment if I had much 
contact with circular and square-shaped objects. To avoid grinding to 
a halt in a state of utter confusion, I would have to learn to ignore an 
im portant source of information as to the nature of my bodily 
movements. And it is difficult to see how a creature like me could 
have evolved in such an environment.
Twin-Edgar is going to face the same problems in his home 
environment that I do when I visit. When he is confronted with a 
circular-shaped object and acts "naturally", he is going to receive 
mixed messages concerning how he has behaved, mixed messages 
that will drive him into a state of confusion and a general feeling
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that something is going wrong. This will be the case however we 
describe the contents of his internal states. The only way that Twin- 
Edgar will be able to overcome this problem will be by learning to 
ignore either what his eyes tell him in such situations, or what his 
internal feedback mechanism tells him. But if he has to undergo 
such a learning procedure he can hardly be well adapted to his 
environment; it is difficult to see how evolutionary processes could 
have cooked up a creature like him. And if Twin-Edgar isn't well 
adapted to his home environment, then he is of not much use to the 
externalist cause, for what the externalist ideally wants is a case of 
twins who inhabit radically different environments to which they 
are equally well adapted. The less well adapted a creature is, the less 
compelling are the grounds for regarding it as correctly representing 
its distal stimuli, and thus the less compelling are the grounds for 
thinking that the nature of its environment is reflected in the 
contents of its visual states.
I therefore conclude that Davies' attempt to modify the square-circle 
case fails. In this case, just as in the shadow-crack case, Marr would 
attribute just the same contents to the corresponding visual states of 
the twins in question. I think that this result is grounds for 
scepticism  that there are any plausible counterexam ples to 
individualism; it is difficult to see how there could be a plausible case 
of well adapted twins who inhabit environments that diverge to 
such an extent as to tell against the attribution of identical contents.
4.6 Behaviour versus environment
My argument in the preceeeding section relies on the idea that Marr 
places a great reliance on the behaviour of the subjects whose visual 
modules he studies. Such a portrayal of Marr's approach might 
appear to be in tension with the way in which I described his theory 
at the beginning of this section (and, indeed, with my general account 
of scientific psychological explanation); for I stressed both that Marr 
proceeded by reflecting on the nature of the extra-cranial world, and 
that appeals to facts about that world play a significant role in his 
theory. Fortunately, this apparent tension can be resolved, and can be 
resolved in such a way as to undermine Burge's initial externalist 
argument.
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As we have seen, scientific psychologists regard our perceptual and 
cognitive modules as information-processing systems, systems that 
generate information from information. To describe a system as 
generating information from information is to say more than that it 
generates m eaningful symbols from m eaningful symbols. In 
addition, it is to imply that the system generates symbols that 
correctly represent facts about a certain subject matter from symbols 
that correctly represent facts about some other subject matter. In 
other words, it is to imply a good deal of success. Thus scientific 
psychology operates with the idea that our perceptual and cognitive 
modules are largely successful. In saying this, I do not contradict any 
of my earlier assertions, as this assumption of success is based upon 
behavioural evidence and in no way commits the psychologist to the 
view that cognitive and perceptual modules must by definition be 
successful; it's just that, in point of empirical fact, our modules are 
largely reliable.
When a system generates information from information, that it 
does so, or that it is able to do so, by the means that it employs, has a 
lot to do with the nature of the world. In general, what information 
can be generated from what information (and how) is determined by 
the way the world is. For example, had the world been suitably 
different I would not be able to extract information about my current 
bank balance from information about its level at a previous date and 
all my intervening banking transactions. Thus it is important to 
highlight the relevant facts about the world in explaining my success; 
in explaining how I manage to reach true conclusions about how 
much money I have in my bank account. The same applies to 
perceptual and cognitive modules; if they are successful, if they do 
generate information from information, then an explanation of that 
success m ust appeal to the relevant (contingent) facts about the 
world. But none of this implies that the nature of the world external 
to an information-processing system determines the content of the 
representations that it manipulates. Suppose that the content of our 
visual states was individualistic, or was assumed to be so by scientific 
psychology. It would still be necessary to appeal to relevant facts 
about the world in order to explain the success of the visual module 
in generating information or veridical representations, as that 
success would partly be the product of such external facts. Hence the
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fact that scientific psychology (and Marr) appeals to facts about the 
extra cranial-world does not imply that it (or he) individuates 
content non-individualistically.
It is true that Marr reflects on features of the world in order to 
determine how the visual module works, and that there is an 
im portant respect in which the contents that he attributes to our 
visual states is environment driven. But once again this does not tell 
against his being an individualist. Suppose that you were confronted 
by a system whose observable behaviour indicated that it solved a 
certain information-processing problem. What would be the most 
effective way of determining how the system solved that problem, of 
explaining its success? A very sensible strategy would be to reflect on 
the system's environm ent in order to work out w hat potential 
solutions that environment permits, and which it rules out. If a 
certain solution is discovered to be theoretically possible in that 
environment, then a hypothesis worthy of consideration is that the 
system solves the problem in that way.(After all, in any environment 
there will be only a small number of ways to solve any complex 
inform ation-processing problem). This hypothesis can then be 
checked against behavioural evidence. If the behavioural evidence 
supports the hypothesis then it can be tentatively endorsed, an 
endorsem ent which involves attributing certain contents to the 
system 's internal states. If this strategy is pursued, then an 
explanation will be constructed by means of a consideration of the 
world external to the system. And the contents attributed to the 
system's internal states will be environment driven in the sense that 
had the environment been significantly different, then a different 
explanation would have been generated, and thus different contents 
attributed.
To adopt this strategy is not thereby to individuate the contents one 
attributes to the system in question non-individualistically. Someone 
who adopted the strategy and endorsed the resultant explanation 
would be free to regard the internal states of all the system's twins as 
having just the same content no m atter w hat their home 
environment was like. It's just that she would be forced to concede 
that some of those twins would systematically generate false answers 
to the information-processing problem that they attempted to solve.
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The strategy that I have described is a simplified version of that 
employed by Marr. It involves considering both behaviour and the 
extra-cranial environment. Consideration of behaviour helps to 
determine the extent of the visual module's success, and to choose 
between alternative candidate explanations of that success. And 
consideration of the environment helps to generate such candidate 
explanations, and reveal why the visual module's operations work 
to the extent that they do.^^ Thus, by parity of reasoning, Marr's 
approach is consistent w ith his individuating visual content 
individualistically; that he examines the extra-cranial world, and that 
his content attributions are environment driven, merely reflects the 
fact that he (on the basis of an observation of our behaviour) is of the 
opinion that the hum an visual module is largely successful in 
generating veridical representations of the external world from 
retinal images.
This, I take it, resolves the tension between, on the one hand, the 
claim that Marr is sensitive to behaviour in the way that I have 
described and, on the other hand, the claim that a consideration of 
the environment and an appeal to environmental factors plays a 
fundamental role in Marr's approach, and theory. It also serves to 
underm ine Burge's argum ent by indicating how the success- 
orientation of M arr's approach and the fact that his content 
attribu tions are environm ent driven, is consistent w ith his 
individuating visual content individualistically.
In a little more detail: Human behaviour suggests to Marr that we generally 
correctly represent such properties of objects as their shape, size, colour, surface 
markings, motion, and the like: hence that behaviour indicates that the visual 
module succeeds in working out the shape, size, colour, surface markings, motion, and 
the like, of distal stimuli from the retinal images that it takes as input. Given that 
the visual module's ability to do this partly depends on the nature of the extra- 
cranial world, Marr reflects on the nature of that world for cues as to just how it does 
it. Candidate explanations generated in this way can then be checked off against 
behavioural evidence. For example, our performance in the task of categorising 
objects on the basis of stick figure representations of them supports the idea that the 
visual module represents the shape of objects as, or by means of, generalised cones or 
collections of generalised cones.
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4.7 Conclusion
I therefore conclude that the case against M arr’s being an 
individualist is unconvincing. Neither the crack-shadow nor the 
circle-square case can be developed in such a way as to tell against 
indivdualism. Moreover, it is consistent with the success-orientation 
of Marr's theory, and the fact that he appeals to contingent facts about 
our environment, that Marrian contents are locally supervenient. 
However, that is not to say that Marr employs a notion of narrow 
content in the sense of a type of content divergent from that 
employed by ordinary folk (or one that is unfamiliar from the folk 
perspective). Of course some of the representations that figure in 
Marr's theory (the primal sketch and the 2i/2-D sketch, for example) 
are unfamiliar. But many of the properties that these representations 
express, and thus the contents that they have, are familiar enough. 
After all, what is so strange about a representation representing an 
object as being square-shaped or as having a small dark mark on its 
surface? This point hints at a way of reconciling the conclusion of 
this chapter with the line I developed in Chapter 3.
In Chapter 3 I argued that due to the practical problems of "going 
narrow" scientific psychology should not employ a notion of narrow 
content if at all possible, and suggested that it is indeed possible to 
avoid narrow content. I also attempted to undermine various pro­
individualist arguments, and claimed that the contents attributed by 
psychologists in the course of accounting for some of our 
recognitional and classificatory capacities are not locally 
supervenient. It is natural to think that all of this is in tension with 
the conclusion of the present chapter. However, appearances 
notwithstanding, there is a harmony to be found.
A first point by way of reconciliation is this. To say that some of the 
contents that scientific psychology attributes to our psychological 
states are locally supervenient is not to imply that they all are. Our 
cognitive capacities are many and varied, so it should perhaps come 
as no surprise that the contents of the symbols manipulated by some 
of our cognitive modules are locally supervenient, whereas those of 
the symbols manipulated by others are not.
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The second, and most important point, runs thus. In Chapter 3 I 
emphasised the continuity between folk psychology and its scientific 
cousin. In the case of Marr's theory I think that such a continuity also 
holds. The contents that Marr attributes to the states of the visual 
module are very much like the contents that folk psychologists 
routinely attribute to our personal-level visual states. It is not just 
that there is an overlap in the properties that the respective states 
express. In addition, as far as folk psychology is concerned, the 
contents of our visual states are locally supervenient; environmental 
differences and differences in typical distal cause do not make for 
differences in content in the way in which they do with thoughts 
involving natural kind concepts. Therefore, in both this chapter and 
Chapter 3, I have been effectively arguing that there is no 
fundamental break between the intentional properties attributed to 
our psychological states by folk psychology on the one hand, and 
scientific psychology, on the other.
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Chapter 5
C ausal P ow ers and a M eta p h y s ica l  
Argument for Individualism
5.1 Introduction
I have been arguing for a tentative externalism: scientific psychology 
need not employ a notion of narrow  content at odds w ith folk 
psychological content. It can legitimately, and perhaps sometimes 
should, appeal to intentional properties that are not locally 
supervenient. In arguing for this conclusion I have appealed to 
practical considerations and to actual psychological practice. This 
raises the question of whether my position falls foul of Fodor's 
metaphysical arguments for individualism. In this chapter I will 
address this question and attempt to establish a negative answer;
Fodor gives us no compelling reasons for thinking that scientific 
psychology must respect the local supervenience of the psychological 
upon the physical.
5.2 The argument from causal powers
In Chapter 2 of Fsychosemantics Fodor presents what he describes as 
a metaphysical argument for the conclusion that scientific psychology 
must individuate the states and events that figure in its theories and 
explanations in such a way as to respect the supervenience of the 
psychological on the neurophysiological. Given the reasonable 
assumption that physical twins are neurophysiologically identical, 
this implies that physical twins are psychological duplicates; in other 
words, that psychological properties are locally supervenient. For 
reasons that will soon become apparent, I will call this argument the 
argument from causal powers. It rests upon a claim about the nature 
of science and can be described in the following terms.
The aim of science is to construct causal explanations. Constructing 
a causal explanation involves subsuming events under a causal
!
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generalisation. Such generalisations 'subsume the things they apply 
to in virtue of the causal properties of the things they apply to' 
{Psychosemantics p.34). This fact has consequences for the way that 
sciences individuate the states, events, and entities that feature in 
their explanations, for they must individuate them in terms of their 
causal powers. Thus a science will allot distinct states, events, and 
entities to the same type only if they are relevantly similar in their 
causal powers, and will distinguish between those that diverge in 
their causal powers. And a property can figure in a scientific 
taxonomy only if it affects the causal powers of whatever has it.^^ 
Consequently, scientific psychology must individuate in terms of 
causal powers. This entails that it must individuate in a manner that 
respects the local supervenience of the psychological on the physical 
as the psychological states of physical twins are equivalent in their 
causal powers; such properties as distinguish between twins do not 
affect causal powers and therefore have no place in a scientific 
taxonomy.
As it stands, this argument is hardly conclusive. On the one hand, 
one might wish to question the claim that science m ust always 
individuate in terms of causal powers. And on the other, one might 
wish to argue that the causal powers of psychological states are not 
locally supervenient, so that twins could have psychological states
Fodor expresses this putative fact about scientific taxonomy by saying that 
sciences are individualistic. His use of the term "individualism" is potentially 
misleading as it is at odds with the standard usage. In Fodor's terminology, to 
individuate individualistically is not thereby to individuate non-relationally or 
solipsisticaliy, as relational properties sometimes affect the causal powers of 
whatever has them, and thus are fit to figure in a scientific taxonomy. An example of 
a relational property that features in a scientific taxonomy in virtue of suitably 
affecting the causal powers of whatever has it is the property of being a planet. As 
Fodor puts it:
'being a planet' is a relational property par excellance, but it's one that 
individualism permits to operate in astronomical taxonomy. For whether you are 
a planet affects your trajectory, and your trajectory determines what you bump 
into; so whether you're a planet affects your causal powers, which is all that 
individualism asks for. Equivalently, there are causal laws that things satisfy 
in virtue of being planets. {Psychosemantics, p. 43)
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that diverged in their causal powers (and thus belong to different 
psychological types). Fodor invests a good deal of effort into defeating 
the second of these potential lines of objection, and it is here that the 
power and interest of his argument lies. But before examining that 
line of his thought I will make a couple of remarks in the spirit of the 
first potential line of attack.
Fodor accepts that folk psychology does not individuate in terms of 
causal powers; there is a mismatch between the folk and scientific 
psychological taxonomy. But he stresses that the primary business of 
folk psychology is to produce causal explanations, and that in 
constructing such explanations its practitioners utilise causal 
generalisations relating folk psychological states and behaviour. 
Moreover, he thinks that the states that folk psychologists appeal to 
have reality, and that the generalisations they employ and the 
explanations they construct are often true. What this suggests is that 
the demands of causal explanation can be met without the utilisation 
of a taxonomy that individuates in terms of causal powers. Thus, one 
might ask, why need science in general, and scientific psychology in 
particular, employ an individualistic taxonomic scheme? Folk 
psychology gets by without doing so. In short, there is a tension 
betw een Fodor's pronouncem ents on the nature of scientific 
taxonomy and his account of, and enthusiasm for, folk psychology. A 
claim that Fodor makes in an endnote perhaps provides something 
of an answer to this charge. He says that the folk psychological 
ascription of intentional states often serves purposes other than 
causal explanation, and this is reflected in its taxonomy; hence the 
difference between it and the taxonomy of a discipline whose only 
concern is to construct causal explanations.
One reason why you might want to know what Psmith believes is 
in order to predict how he will behave. But another reason is that 
beliefs are often true, so that if you know what Psmith believes, 
you have some basis for inferring how the world is. The relevant 
property of Psmith's belief for this latter purpose, however, is not 
their causal powers but something like what information they 
transm it . . . And, quite generally, what information a thing 
transmits depends on relational properties of the thing which 
may not affect its causal powers. (1987, p. 157).
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A couple of points in response to this. First, Fodor effectively 
concedes that a taxonomy, namely that of folk psychology, can work 
for the purposes of causal explanation even though, strictly speaking, 
it is not a taxonomy in terms of causal powers. So why can't scientific 
psychology employ the same taxonomy? Surely it would work for the 
purposes of scientific psychological explanation. Even if scientific 
psychologists are not interested in reading off facts about how the 
world is from the states of their subjects, there would be an 
advantage in holding onto the folk taxonomy. The advantage is that 
scientific psychology would be somewhat easier to engage in if it 
utilised the familiar notion of content than it would be if it employed 
a notion of narrow content. This is not just because formulating a 
workable notion of narrow content is so difficult, hence making it 
very hard for psychologists to work out just what narrow states their 
subjects are in. It is also because we are so steeped in folk psychology 
that we would have to wrestle with our instincts to see and categorise 
the psychological states of our fellows in a way that conflicted with 
the way we, qua folk psychologists, see and categorise the 
psychological states of our f e l l o w s . P u t  crudely the point is this: 
why go to all the bother (and it would be a lot of bother) of 
constructing and employing a psychological taxonomy at variance 
with that of folk psychology if the latter will do for the purposes of 
the causal explanation of such psychological events as behaviour and 
the tokening of psychological states?^^
Psychologists would have to wrestle with their instincts quite literally if Fodor is 
right in thinking that much of folk psychology is innate. (He advances, and argues 
for, this innateness hypothesis in 'The Present State of the Innateness Controversy').
In Chapter 2 I argued that there are practical reasons for avoiding "going narrow", 
reasons that may w ell outweigh the benefits of abandoning folk psychological 
content if twins are thin on the ground. The present point is very much in the same 
spirit. If the folk psychological taxonomy will work for all practical purposes then 
it would be foolish to abandon it just for the sake of satisfying some ideal of pure 
science. Whether or not the practical drawbacks of abandoning the folk  
psychological taxonomy outweigh the benefits is, I take it, an open empirical 
question that has a lot to do with whether we have any twins who (from the folk 
psychological perspective) psychologically diverge from us.
144
Second, Fodor's point that the information that a state carries 
depends on relational properties that do not affect causal powers 
suggests the idea that if the account of the nature of scientific 
psychology that I developed in Chapter 2 is correct, scientific 
psychology may well have to employ a taxonomy that recognised 
properties that do not affect causal powers. This is because, on my 
account, scientific psychology must appeal to the information that 
psychological states carry and that psychological processes extract or 
work out in order to account for our cognitive capacities. In short, the 
plausibility of Fodor's line on the nature of the taxonomy of scientific 
psychology might be closely bound to the plausibility of his view that 
scientific psychology is primarily in the business of constructing 
singular causal explanations of behaviour and of the tokening of 
psychological states, explanations that fit the deductive nomological 
model.
5.3 A putative counterexample
For now let's assume that Fodor is right in claiming that scientific 
psychology must individuate in terms of causal powers. The problem 
is that it isn't obviously the case that such a psychology will respect 
local supervenience of the psychological on the physical. So the 
question is: can Fodor rule out the possibility of physical twins whose 
psychological states do not agree in their causal powers? It is to this 
question that I now turn.
The Putnamian twins might appear to constitute a problem for 
Fodor for the following reason. Suppose Oscar has a thought which 
causes him to say "fetch me a glass of water". Given that he lives 
here on Earth, this utterance, and thus the thought that caused it, 
results in him being presented w ith a glass of water. The 
corresponding thought of Oscar2 likewise causes him to utter the 
sentence "fetch me a glass of water", but due to his living on Twin 
Earth the effects of this utterance, and the thought that caused it, is 
the presentation, not of a glass of water, but of a glass of twater. 
Therefore, so the argument concludes, the respective thoughts differ 
in their causal powers and thus belong to different psychological 
types.
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In responding  to such putative  counterexam ples to his 
supervenience thesis, Fodor argues that 'identity of causal powers 
has to be assessed across contexts, not within contexts' (p.35). Thus 
determining whether two distinct states have the same causal powers 
involves considering not merely what effects they actually bring 
about but what effects they would bring about were they located in 
different contexts. W hen we take into account the relevant 
counterfactuals we see that the thoughts of the twins have the same 
causal powers; for were Oscar2 located here on Earth (that is in 
Oscar's context) his thought would land him with water and were 
Oscar located on Twin Earth (that is in Oscar2's context) his thought 
would land him with twater.
This reply is decisive, but the Putnamian twins present Fodor with a 
far more substantial problem. Here is one form of the problem. 
Psychological sta tes have behav ioural and psychological 
consequences; that is, they cause both behaviour and the tokening of 
other psychological states. Such effects have intentional properties, 
properties that they inherit from their causes. The effects of Oscar's 
w ater thoughts differ in their intentional properties from the 
corresponding effects of Oscar2's twater thoughts. For example, the 
behaviour that Oscar's desire for water causes is water-seeking 
behaviour, whereas the physically identical behaviour that Oscar2's 
desire for twater causes is twater-seeking behaviour. W hat this 
suggests is that Oscar's water thoughts diverge in their causal powers 
from Oscar2's twater thoughts, as the former have the power to cause 
water behaviour and water thoughts, a power that the latter lack. 
Similarly Oscar2's twater thoughts have a power Oscar's water 
thoughts lack, namely the power to cause twater behaviour and 
twater thoughts.
Application of the cross context test does nothing to unseat this 
conclusion, for if Oscar is transported to Twin Earth his water 
thoughts remain water thoughts and the behaviour that they cause 
maintains the property of being water behaviour. The corresponding 
point can be m ade about a transported Oscar2. As scientific 
psychology is concerned with explaining behaviour and the tokening 
of thoughts, it seems reasonable to conclude that this difference of 
causal powers is one that scientific psychology should care about, and 
thus that scientific psychology should assign Oscar's water thoughts
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to a different psychological type than Oscar2’s corresponding twater 
thoughts.
Fodor will have none of this, and puts a lot of effort into defeating 
this putative counterexample to his supervenience claim. Essentially 
he has two major argum ents for the conclusion that the 
psychological states of the Putnamian twins agree in their causal 
powers. The first appears in Psychosemantics , and is to the effect that 
to regard the thoughts of the twins as having different causal powers 
is to postulate crazy causal mechanisms and impossible causal laws. 
The second appears in "A modal argument for narrow content", and 
is to the effect that the difference between the twins and their 
respective thoughts fails to meet a necessary condition for their 
having different causal powers. This is because the difference 
between the twins respective thoughts is conceptually related to the 
difference betw een their respective behaviours. Both these 
arguments will be examined (and rejected) in due course, but first of 
all I will examine a couple of preliminary (and less significant) 
arguments that Fodor presents, arguments that are supposed to 
discredit the idea that the twins' mental states differ in their causal 
powers.
The first of these two arguments draws a parallel between a pair of 
properties that clearly don't count in any scientific taxonomy and the 
properties that Fodor's externalist opponent thinks should figure in a 
scientific psychological taxonomy. The properties in question are that 
of being an H-particle and that of being a T-particle. A physical 
particle is an H- particle at some point in time if and only if Fodor's 
dime is heads up at that point in time. Similarly, a physical particle is 
a T-particle at a given point in time if and only if Fodor's dime is tails 
up at that time. Clearly, thinks Fodor, the property of being a T- 
particle and that of being an H-particle should not figure in the 
taxonomy of physics, as these properties do not affect the causal 
powers of whatever has them. Consider a particle P at time tl. 
Fodor's dime is heads up at time tl. At time t2 Fodor flips his dime 
so that it becomes tails up. Clearly P's causal powers haven't changed 
from tl  to t2 solely in virtue of the change in the orientation of 
Fodor's dime. Yet despite the absurdity of the claim that these 
properties affect causal powers, one could construct an argument to 
the effect that they do in fact affect causal powers, an argument that
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has just the same form as the above argument for the conclusion that 
the thoughts of the Putnamian twins differ in their causal powers.
If the latter argument works then so does the former, in virtue of 
their similarity in form. But the former argument can't work as it 
has an absurd conclusion. Therefore the latter argument must also be 
spurious.
In reply to this argument, it is unfair to draw a parallel between the 
properties of being an H (or a T) -particle and those properties that 
differentiate the twins. The extent of the differences between these 
pairs of properties will become evident in my discussion of Fodor's 
second main argument below. In the meantime suffice it to say the 
following. For a particle to be an H-particle there need be no causal 
relationship between it and Fodor's dime. But for a thought to be a 
water thought there must be some special and significant causal 
relationship between that thought, or the subject who has it, and 
water, for it is in virtue of not having the right causal relationships 
to water - or not having a history in which certain causal interactions 
with water figure - that Oscar2's thoughts are not water thoughts. 
This kind of difference between the property of being a water thought 
(/tw ater thought) and that of being an H-particle (/T-particle) 
suggests that one could admit the former to a scientific taxonomy 
without thereby admitting the latter.
A second reply involves accepting that the property of being an H- 
particle (and that of being a T-particle) affects causal powers. This 
doesn't automatically have the consequence that these properties 
should figure in the taxonomy of physics (or any other science), as to 
so figure a property must not just affect causal powers but must affect 
them in relevant ways. Perhaps physics should not distinguish 
between particle P at t l  (when it is an H-particle) and P at time t2, not 
because it is identical in its causal powers at these two points in time, 
but because it is not relevantly different in its causal powers.
This brings us to Fodor's second attempt to discredit the idea that the 
thoughts of the twins diverge in their causal powers. According to 
this argument, to endorse this idea lands one with the absurd 
consequence that the twins are neurophysiologically distinct in
The argument in question runs thus: 'Being H rather than being T does affect causal 
powers after all; for H-particles enter into H-particle interactions, and no T-particle 
does' (1987, p. 38).
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virtue of there being differences between the causal powers of their 
respective brain states. For example, Oscar's brain states have the 
power to cause water behaviour, a power that the corresponding 
states of his twin do not.
This is not a very convincing argument. The obvious reply 
involves repeating the point that for science it is not causal powers 
per se that count for individuation, but relevant causal powers. Not 
caring about intentional properties, neurophysiology will not 
distinguish between brain states whose difference in causal powers is 
restricted to the intentional realm. Rather the brain states must 
diverge in their powers to produce effects individuated in terms of 
their neurophysiological properties. In a different context Fodor as 
good as makes the same point when he says:
sciences are forever cross-cutting one another's taxonomies. 
Chemistry doesn't care about the distinction between rivers and 
lakes; but geology does. Physics doesn't care about the distinction 
between bankers and butchers; but sociology does. (For that 
matter, physics doesn't care about the distinction between the Sun 
and Alpha Centauri either; sublime indifference!) None of this is 
surprising; things in Nature overlap in their causal powers to 
various degrees and in various respects; the sciences plat these 
overlaps, each in its own way. (1987, p. 45).
So much for Fodor's minor preliminary arguments against the 
claim that the psychological states of the Putnamian twins diverge in 
their causal powers. In the next section I will address the first of his 
main arguments.
5.4 Crazy causal mechanisms and impossible laws
In Psychosemantics the primary argument against the claim that the 
Putnamian twins constitute a counterexample to the thesis that the 
causal powers of mental states are locally supervenient runs thus. If 
the properties of being an H-particle and being a T-particle affected 
the causal powers of whatever particle had them, then the causal 
powers of a particle would depend on the orientation of Fodor's 
dime. For the causal powers of a particle to depend upon the
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orientation of Fodor's dime, there would have to be a causal 
m echanism  or a fundam ental law of nature to m ediate the 
dependency. But there aren't any such mechanisms or laws, for if 
there were, Fodor's dime would be able to causally influence every 
particle in the universe, something that it clearly cannot do. In short, 
to claim that the property of being an H-particle and that of being a T- 
particle affects causal pow ers is to postulate "crazy causal 
mechanisms" or "impossible laws". To hold that the psychological 
states of the twins differed in their causal powers would similarly be 
to postulate crazy causal mechanisms or impossible causal laws. If the 
psychological states of the twins differed in their causal powers, then 
the causal powers of such states would depend upon the character of 
the environment in which the individual who had them existed. For 
there to be such a dependency relationship there would have to be 
some mediating mechanism, a mechanism that enabled the character 
of an individual's environment to affect the causal powers of his 
psychological states without affecting his physiology.
But there is no such mechanism; you can 't affect the causal 
pow ers of a person's m ental states w ithout affecting his 
physiology. That's not a conceptual claim or a metaphysical claim, 
of course. It's a contingent fact about how God made the world. 
God made the w orld such that the mechanisms by which 
environmental variables affect organic behaviours run via their 
effects on the organism's nervous system, or so, at least, all the 
physiologists I know assure me. (1987, p. 40).
How should we respond to this argument? Fodor's thought (as 
evidenced by the above quoted passage) seems to be that it is a 
mistake to hold that there is a dependency relationship between the 
character of an individual's environment and the causal powers of 
his psychological states, because such a view leads to the absurd 
conclusion that changes in an individual's environment can cause 
changes in the causal powers of his psychological states w ithout 
having any effects on his physiology. A first problem with this is that 
the supposedly absurd upshot is not obviously absurd. Certainly 
there are plenty of examples from outside psychology where the 
causal powers of a thing change due to changes in the environment
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w ithout the entity in question undergoing any internal physical 
changes. For example, I have the power to lift Fang. That I have this 
power depends partly on the character of the world external to me, in 
particular on how heavy Fang is. Had Fang been twice his weight 
then, given how I am internally, I wouldn't have the power to lift 
him. The world could change in such a way that, w ithout causing 
any internal changes in me, I lost my power to lift Fang and thus 
underwent a change in my causal powers. This would happen if Fang 
underwent a spurt of growth that pushed him to twice his present 
weight.GO Perhaps there is a psychological analogue to such a case.
Causal powers are powers to produce effects in the world. These 
effects are often at some distance from the power-bearing individual 
in question. Moreover, they are often described and individuated in 
terms of relational properties that are fixed by distant facts in the 
world. Consequently, it is not at all surprising that a thing's causal 
powers could change w ithout it undergoing any intrinsic physical 
change; for the change in causal powers could be brought about by 
changes in the external world. To say this is not to make such 
changes in causal powers miraculous, mysterious or inexplicable. 
Nor is it to sever the connection between the physical and the causal 
powers of things, for the kinds of distant changes, and changes in 
relational properties, that can affect causal powers will always be the 
products of physical changes in the world. For example, my losing 
the power to lift Fang is a result of a physical change in the world, 
namely, a change in his size and weight, even though it is not the 
result of a change in my intrinsic physical properties.
It might be objected that my causal powers haven't changed at all in this case as 
the maximum weight that I can lift will have remained unchanged. In response, I 
would say that certain of my causal powers have remained unchanged, but my powers 
with respect to lifting Fang are not among them. How we describe and individuate 
effects w ill influence how we describe and individuate causal powers. And how we 
describe and individuate effects is an interest relative matter. Given my interests 
and purposes it makes good practical sense to describe and individuate effects in 
terms of the individual objects involved so that my lifting Fang at tl is an event of 
the same type as my lifting him at t2, despite the fact that his size and weight has 
changed between these two points in time. Thus, when Fang grows too heavy for me, I 
can no longer cause an effect of a type that I could once bring about with ease.
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It is im portant to realise that to hold that there could be a 
psychological analogue of the example of my losing the power to lift 
Fang isn't to contradict what Fodor's physiologist friends assure him. 
Of course an environmental event can't cause a behavioural event 
without affecting the individual in question's physiology. But the 
events the possibility of which the externalist envisages are events of 
a different kind from such behavioural events, for they are 
constituted by a stable, pre-existing state's undergoing a change in 
certain of its dispositional properties. If this sounds unconvincing 
consider my power to lift Fang. Intuitively the event of my lifting 
Fang is a fundamentally different kind of event from that of my 
losing my power to lift Fang. The latter event, unlike the former, 
involves a change in my dispositional properties and can take place 
w ithout my undergoing any internal physical change. The 
physiologist does not mean to rule out the possibility of such events, 
but only the possibility of events of the first sort. In other words, the 
physiologist only means to rule out the possibility of such events as 
that of my lifting Fang in response to an event in the environment 
without my undergoing any internal physiological change.
A second objection to Fodor's argum ent is that to view the 
psychological states of the twins as diverging in their causal powers is 
not thereby to commit oneself to the allegedly absurd consequence 
that he describes. Davies expresses the point in the following 
m anner.
Now, a typical consequence of externalism  is that, if a 
neurophysiological twin of an actual subject had been set in a 
different environment then our actual taxonomy would not have 
applied in the counterfactually imagined environment to classify 
the twin in the same way as the actual subject is classified. In that 
sense, he would have been psychologically different from the 
actual subject. But it does not follow from this that a way of 
making the actual subject psychologically different in those ways 
is by changing  his environment now. Still less does it follow 
from the externalist claim about the counterfactual environment, 
that we can make the subject psychologically different now 
without making any physiological difference. (1986, pp. 272-3)
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To see this consider the case of the Putnamian twins. Oscar's water 
thoughts are water thoughts (as opposed to twater thoughts) not just 
because he lives in a watery world, but because he stands in a certain 
complex causal relationship to water, or because he has a history in 
which certain causal interactions with water figure. The standard 
intuition is that these causal relationships are such that they would 
not be overridden were Oscar transported to Twin Earth.^^ His being 
on Twin Earth and interacting with twater wouldn't be enough to 
make any of his thoughts twater thoughts. Similarly, were Oscar2 
transported to Earth, the thoughts resultant of his interactions with 
water, and those underlying his utterance of sentences containing the 
word "water", would not be water thoughts; rather they would be 
twater thoughts.
However, a qualification is needed here. The standard intuition also 
has it that were a transported Oscar to hang around Twin Earth long 
enough, his "water" thoughts w ould eventually become twater 
thoughts for he would eventually become embedded in a twatery 
world and a linguistic community that used the word "water" to 
mean twater . This raises the possibility of a transplanted Oscar being 
neurophysiologically identical to one of his previous selves yet 
having thoughts that diverged in their causal powers from their 
earlier counterparts. But this isn't quite an instance of the "absurd" 
consequence that Fodor accuses the externalist as being commited to. 
For in the period intervening between Oscar's having water thoughts 
and his having twater thoughts there is an awful lot of causal 
interaction between Oscar and the Twin Earth environment (and in 
particular between him and the linguistic community on Twin 
Earth). W ithout such causal interaction he would not have become 
sufficiently embedded in the Twin Earth environment to be capable 
of having any twater thoughts. Thus this case is very different to that 
where a particle changes from being an H-particle to being a T-
This would appear to be accepted by Fodor, as is indicated when he says: 
although  I've heard it su ggested  that m ental states construed  
nonindividualistically are easily bruised and don't 'travel', the contrary 
assumption would in fact seem to be secure. The standard intuition about 'visiting 
’ cases is that if, standing on Twin Earth, I say "That’s water" about a puddle of 
XYZ, then what I say is false . Which it wouldn't be if I were speaking EnglishZ.
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particle (and thus from engaging in H-particle interactions to 
engaging in T-particle interactions) as a result of a change in the 
orientation of Fodor's dime. This is because in this case the change 
isn 't the consequence of a complex history of causal interactions 
between the particle in question and Fodor's dime.
These two objections to Fodor's first major argument against the 
claim that the psychological states of the Putnamian twins diverge in 
their causal powers are hardly conclusive. However, I do think they 
serve to dent his argument somewhat. What is needed is a detailed 
examination of the nature of causal powers that does justice to the 
intuition that a thing's causal powers are determined by its intrinsic 
physical nature, yet explains that and how there can be differences 
between the causal powers of distinct things (and changes in a 
particular thing's causal powers) in the absence of intrinsic physical 
differences (and changes). This is a task that I will pu t off until 
section 5.6. In the meantime I will turn my attention to Fodor's 
second argument, an argument that appears in 'A Modal Argument 
for Narrow Content'.
5.5 A modal argument
It will be helpful to recall the putative counterexample presented by 
the case of the Putnamian twins to Fodor's supervenience claim. It 
runs thus. Oscar has thoughts which have the property of being 
water thoughts in virtue of his causal relations to water (or his 
having a history in which certain significant causal interactions with 
water figure). The corresponding thoughts of Oscar2 are not water 
thoughts, for Oscar2 does not bear the appropriate causal relations to 
water; rather they are twater thoughts. In virtue of its etiology, the 
behaviour caused by Oscar's water thoughts is water behaviour, 
whereas that caused by Oscar2's twater thoughts is not water 
behaviour but, rather, twater behaviour. A consequence of this 
difference between their respective behavioural effects is that Oscar's 
water thoughts have the power to cause water behaviour, a power 
that his twins twater thoughts do not have; and Oscar2's twater 
thoughts have the power to cause twater behaviour, a power that his 
twins corresponding thoughts do not have. Given its concern with 
explaining behaviour under its intentional description, this
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difference in causal powers is one that should be recognised by 
scientific psychology, hence Fodor's supervenience claim is 
mistaken.
It will also be helpful to distinguish a second, related version of the 
putative counterexample/ objection. It runs thus. In virtue of the 
causal connections he bears to water, the thoughts that Oscar 
expresses w ith sentences containing the word "water" are water 
thoughts. Thus Oscar has the power to think water thoughts. This is 
a causal power that Oscar2 does not have, as the thoughts that he 
expresses with sentences containing the word "water" are twater 
thoughts. What he has is the power to think twater thoughts. Thus 
the twins differ in their causal powers, and given that psychology is 
concerned with explaining behaviour by reference to its intentional 
causes, this is a difference in causal powers that should be recognised 
by scientific psychology.
In 'A Modal Argument for Narrow Content', Fodor responds to 
these putative counterexamples.®^ He begins by describing a schema 
which both cases fit, and naming it "schema S". Schema S is as 
follows. C l and C2 are a pair of causes, and El and E2 are their 
respective effects:
C l differs from C2 in that C l has cause property CPI where C2 has 
cause property CP2.
El differs from E2 in that El has effect property EPl and E2 has 
effect property EP2.
The difference between Cl and C2 is responsible for the difference 
between El and E2 in the sense that, if Cl had had CP2 rather than 
CPI, then El would have had EP2 rather than EPl; and if C2 had 
had CPI rather than CP2, E2 would have had EPl rather than EP2. 
(1991, p. 9).
The first of the putative counterexamples fits schema S in this way: 
C l is a thought of Oscar and C2 is a corresponding thought of his 
twin. CPI is the property of being a water thought and CP2 the
'A Modal Argument for Narrow Content' is a highly technical paper. 
Consequently, my discussion of it is also highly technical, especially by my 
standards. For some different, but equally technical, responses to Fodor's reasoning 
see Peacocke (1994), and Baker (1995).
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property of being a twater thought. El and E2 are instances of 
behaviour of Oscar and his twin respectively. EPl is the property of 
being water behaviour and EP2 is the property of being twater 
behaviour.
And the second putative counterexample fits S in this way: C l is 
Oscar and C2 Oscar2. CPI is the property of being causally connected 
to water and CP2 is the property of being causally connected to twater. 
E l and E2 are Oscar's and his twin's corresponding thoughts 
respectively. EPl is the property of being a water thought and EP2 is 
the property of being a twater thought.
Fodor argues that not every instance of schema S is a bona fide case 
of a divergence in causal powers. That is, not every instance of S is a 
case 'where the difference between having CPI and having CP2 is a 
difference in causal power in virtue of its responsibility for the 
difference between El and E2'. This raises the question of whether 
the putative counterexamples are bona fide cases. He formulates a 
condition that he thinks that any instance of schema S of a certain 
type (a type that the putative counterexamples belong to; see footnote 
6) must satisfy if it is to be bona fide. He then argues that the putative 
counterexamples fail to satisfy this condition, and thus the threat that 
they pose to the supervenience claim evaporates.^^
The necessary condition that Fodor presents (a condition that he 
labels condition C) is essentially this: the difference between having 
CPI and having CP2 is a difference in causal power in virtue of its
It is important to get clear on the following point. In the case where an instance of 
S fails to meet the necessary condition, Fodor is not thereby commited to concluding 
that the causes in question agree in their causal powers. Rather, all he is committed 
to is rejecting the claim that C l has different causal powers than C2 in virtue of 
CPI's responsibility for El's having EPl rather than EP2 (or in virtue of CP2’s 
responsibility for E2's having EP2 rather than EPl). It may well be that CPI (or CP2) 
is responsible for some other property of El (or E2) in virtue of which Cl's causal 
powers diverge from those of C2. Or it might be that Cl (or C2) has some other 
property not shared by its counterpart which affects its causal powers. Indeed, argues 
Fodor, any two causes that differ in some contingent property will thereby diverge in 
their causal powers due to the possibility of constructing a machine for detecting 
that property. The cause that has the contingent property in question will have the 
power to cause a detector of that property to go into the positive state, a power 
which its counterpart (which doesn't have the property) will not have.
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responsibility for the difference between El's having EPl and its 
having EP2 only w hen this difference between the effects is 
nonconceptually related to the difference between the causes. Thus if 
there is a conceptual relationship between having CPI (rather than 
CP2) and having effects that have EPl (rather than EP2) so that to 
have EPl (rather than EP2) just is to be caused by something with 
CPI (rather than CP2) then the necessary condition is not satisfied.^4
Essentially, Fodor's justification for the condition is twofold. First, it 
is consistent with his intuitions in that the instances of S which he 
thinks are bona fide pass the test and those that he thinks are not fail 
the test. Thus we find him saying: 'My evidence for the acceptability 
of this condition will be largely that it sorts examples that I have just 
run through in an intuitively satisfactory way' (p. 12). And second, it 
coheres with Humean considerations about the nature of causation. 
Thus we find him saying: 'This . . . condition is motivated both by 
our intuitions about the examples and by the Humean consideration 
that causal powers are, after all, powers to enter into nonconceptual 
relations' (p.24). Civen this, it would be a severe blow for Fodor if it 
could be shown that there is something wrong with his intuitions, 
and that there is no inconsistency between holding a Humean view 
of causation and regarding water and twater thoughts as diverging in 
their causal powers. I will now attempt to show that there is in fact 
som ething wrong w ith his intuitions. (An attem pt to effect a 
reconciliation between externalism and a Humean view of causation 
will come later).
Fodor gives three examples of what he takes to be non bona fide 
instances of schema S. Firstly, there is the case where CPI is the 
property of being C l, CP2 is the property of being C2, EPl is the 
property of being the effect of C l and EP2 is the property of being the 
effect of C2. Of this case he says 'it seems a priori obvious that this is
An important point to note is ttiat condition C is not supposed to be necessary for all 
instances of S. That is, there are instances of S that are bona fide despite the fact 
that they fail to satisfy C. hr such cases 'the property that distinguishes the causes 
is itself the property of having a certain causal power' (p. 15). Such properties are 
noncontingently causal powers; that is, it is noncontingent that things that have such 
properties have certain causal powers in virtue of having them. An example of such a 
property is that of being soluble : to be soluble just is to have the power to dissolve 
when placed in water.
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not a case where having CPI is a causal power of C's in virtue of its 
responsibility for E's having EPl' (p. 11).
Fodor's mistake here is in thinking that the example is an instance 
of schema S. As I understand it, schema S is such that the cause 
properties are such that they could be had by either cause without 
their losing their identity as the cause that they are. Thus, in genuine 
instances of S, C l could have had CP2 (rather than CPI) whilst 
retaining its identity as C l, or, in other words, without becoming C2.
But this is not the case with the example under consideration for if 
C l had had CP2 rather than CPI (that is had it had the property of 
being C2 rather than that of being Cl), it would not have been Cl.
Therefore, though it may well be the case that the property of being 
C l is not a causal power, this example is not relevant to the issue in 
question; it would have been relevant only if it were an instance of S.
Fodor's second example features our old friends the property of 
being an H-particle and that of being a T-particle. The difference 
between Fodor's dime's being heads up and its being tails up is 
responsible for the difference between every particle in the universe 
being an H-particle and every particle in the universe being a T- 
particle. This, he thinks, is another non-bona fide instance of S, for 
'the difference between being heads up and being tails up does not 
count as a causal power in virtue of its responsibility for this 1
difference in the particles' (p. 11). j
Again I doubt that this case is a genuine instance of S, and so j
question its relevance to the issue in question. For it to be a genuine j
instance of S there would have to exist a causal connection between j
Fodor's dime and every physical particle in the universe, for C l and j
C2 in this case are Fodor's coin (or the event of its being flipped), and 
El and E2 are changes in each and every particle in the universe. In 
Psychosemantics Fodor seemed to rule out the possibility of such a |
causal relationship when he said:
how on earth could the causal powers of particles on Alpha 1
Centauri depend on the orientation of my dime? Either there j
would have to be a mechanism to mediate this dependency, or it 
would have to be mediated by a fundamental law of nature; and 
there aren't any such mechanisms and there aren't any such laws.
(p. 39). I
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If there are no causal mechanisms mediating the connection 
between Fodor's dime and the causal powers of distant particles, then 
presum ably there are no causal mechanisms m ediating causal 
connections between Fodor's dime and such distant particles.
Here is the third example. Fodor has siblings but his twin does not. 
In virtue of his having siblings Fodor is able to produce sons who are 
nephews, something that his twin cannot do. But, argues Fodor, it is 
not the case that the difference between having siblings and not 
having them is a difference in causal powers in virtue of its 
responsibility for the difference between having children who are 
nephews and having children who are not nephews.
I do not dispute that this example fits schema S, but I do not share 
Fodor's intuition that it is not a bona fide instance of schema S. As 
far as I can see, in being able to father nephews, Fodor has a power 
that his twin does not have. Of course that is not to say that this is a 
power that science should care about. No-one wants to argue that for 
every causal power there is some science that cares about it. Edgar has 
the power to pacify Fang, a power that no-one else has, but I take it 
that there is no science that assigns Edgar, and Edgar only, to a 
particular type in virtue of his having this power.
Perhaps there is not much profit to be had from merely refusing to 
endorse Fodor's intuitions concerning which instances of S are bona 
fide and which are not, for the danger is that the debate reduces into a 
squabble over intuitions. What is needed is a more substantial 
objection to his argument, an objection the construction of which 
necessitates the adoption of a different line of approach.
Condition C is such that '[ojnly when it is not a conceptual truth 
that causes that which differ in that one has CPI where the other has 
CP2 have effects that differ in that one has EPl where the other has 
EP2' (p. 19) is an instance of S a bona fide case of a difference in causal 
powers. The siblings example fails this test 'because having siblings is 
conceptually connected to having sons who are nephews: to be a 
nephew  just is to be a son whose parents have siblings' (p. 19). 
Similarly, the H-particle case fails the test 'because the connection 
between all the world's particle becoming H-particles at time t and 
my coin's being heads up at T is conceptual. To be an H-particle at t 
just is to be a particle at a time when my coin is heads up' (p. 19).
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An example of a case that satisfies C is the following. The difference 
between being a planet and not being one is a difference in causal 
powers in virtue of its responsibility for the difference between 
having a Keplerian orbit and not having such an orbit. That is so 
'because it is true and contingent that, if you have molecularly 
identical chunks of rock, one which is a planet and the other which is 
not, then, ceteris paribus, the one which is a planet will have a 
Keplerian orbit, and ceteris paribus, the one which is not a planet will 
not' (p. 19).
Is condition C really necessary? In actual fact it does not comply with 
all of Fodor's intuitions as we shall now see. Fodor believes that for 
any contingent property it is nomologically possible to build a 
machine that reliably detects that property. An example of such a 
contingent property is that of having had a Bulgarian Grandmother. 
It is possible to construct a Bulgarian Grandmother detector, 'a 
machine which exhaustively examines the piece of space-time that 
starts with the birth of your Grandmother and ends with your birth 
and which goes into one state if it detects somebody who was your 
Grandmother and was Bulgarian . . . but which goes into another 
state in case it detects no such property' (p. 13).
Fodor asserts that 'having a Bulgarian Grandmother is having a 
causal power in virtue of the (actual or possible) effects that 
instantiations of this property have on Bulgarian G . . . detectors' (p. 
14). Call the state the Bulgarian Grandmother detector goes into if it 
detects a Bulgarian Grandmother the positive state, and the state it 
goes into if it detects no such person the negative state. Then we can 
generate the following instance of schema S. Cl is Edgar and CPI the 
property of having had a Bulgarian Grandmother. C2 is twin Edgar 
and CP2 the property of not having had a Bulgarian Grandmother. El 
and E2 are effects (actual or possible) that Edgar and his twin, 
respectively, have on Bulgarian Grandmother detectors. EPl is the 
property of going into the positive state and EP2 is the property of 
going into the negative state. In this case the difference between 
having CPI and having CP2 is a difference in causal powers in virtue 
of its being responsible for the difference between El and E2, i.e. the 
difference between having EPl and having EP2. But this case does not 
satisfy condition C, for there is a conceptual relationship between the 
difference between having CPI and having CP2, and the difference
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between El and E2, that it is responsible for. Why? It is a conceptual 
tru th  that individuals who differ in that one had a Bulgarian 
Grandmother whilst the other did not, have effects on Bulgarian 
Grandmother detectors that differ in that one has the property of 
going into the positive state whilst the other has the property of 
going into the negative state. If you have the property of having had 
a Bulgarian Grandm other and you cause a putative Bulgarian 
Grandmother detector to go into a negative state, then the machine 
isn't really a Bulgarian Grandmother detector.85 And if you cause a 
genuine, working, Bulgarian Grandmother detector to go into the 
negative state then you can't have had a Bulgarian Grandmother.
Fodor argued that the sibling case failed to satisfy condition C 
'because having siblings is conceptually connected to having sons 
who are nephews; to be a nephew [EP] just is to be a son [E] whose 
parents [C] have siblings [CP]' (p. 19). If that is right then surely 
having had a Bulgarian Grandmother is conceptually connected to 
causing Bulgarian Grandmother machines to go into the positive 
state. This is so because to be a change in the state of a Bulgarian 
Grandmother detector into the positive [EP] just is to be a change in 
the state of a Bulgarian Grandmother detector [E] that is caused by 
exposure to individuals [C] who have the property of having had a 
Bulgarian Grandmother [CP]. Therefore the case fails to satisfy 
condition C, and so that condition doesn't sit happily with Fodor's 
intuitions after all. Moreover, given that Fodor would appear to be 
right in thinking of this case as a bona fide instance of schema S, it 
would appear that we have a reason for rejecting condition C.
What about the case of the Putnamian twins and the two putative 
counterexamples to Fodor's supervenience claim that they generate? 
Fodor believes that they fail to satisfy condition C. Consider the 
second case, that where a difference in the twins' causal connections 
to water is responsible for a difference in the intentional properties of 
their thoughts. He thinks that there is a conceptual connection 
between the difference between Oscar and Oscar2, and the difference 
between the broad intentional properties of their thoughts. He says 'it 
is conceptually necessary that if you are connected to water in the 
right way then you have w ater thoughts (rather than tw ater
Or a ceteris paribus clause as been violated as would be the case if the machine 
was malfunctioning.
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thoughts) (p.20), and that 'to have a water thought just is to have a 
thought that is connected to water in the right way' (p.21). No doubt 
this is right, but that is because "right way" is elliptical for "in the way 
that makes your thoughts water thoughts". In other words, it is no 
doubt true that "it is conceptually necessary that if you are connected 
to water in the way that makes your thoughts water thoughts then 
you have water thoughts (rather than twater thoughts)". But this fact 
need not worry the externalist, for it doesn't follow from it that there 
isn't some property that Oscar has (and that his twin doesn't have) 
that is responsible for his thoughts being water thoughts and that 
isn't conceptually connected to that effect property.
There are many different causal connections that an individual 
might bear to water. Not all of them are capable of supporting water 
thoughts. Call the specific connection that Oscar bears to water, a 
connection in virtue of which his water thoughts are water thoughts, 
CRl.^^ The question is: is the connection between bearing CRl to 
water and having water thoughts conceptual? In other words is it 
conceptually necessary that if you stand in CRl to water then you 
have water thoughts, or that to have a water thought just is to have 
a thought that is connected to water in relation CRl? My intuition is 
that we should supply a negative answer to this question, that causal 
relationships other than CRl are capable of supporting water 
thoughts, or that if one m ust bear CRl to water to have water 
thoughts the notion of necessity involved is more nomological than 
conceptual. I'm not going to attempt to vindicate this intuition but 
rather argue that if Fodor rejects it he runs the risk of contradicting 
other central aspects of his thought. Before I do this I will consider 
Fodor's response to the first Putnam ian case which, naturally 
enough, is very similar to the one we have just considered and is 
open to the same kind of objections.
In this case the difference between the twin's thoughts (one has 
water thoughts whilst the other has twater thoughts) is responsible 
for a difference in the broad intentional properties of their behaviour 
(namely between Oscar's behaviour's being water behaviour and
CRl is to be distinguished from, inter alia, CR2, the relationship that Oscar2 
bears to water just after he has been transplanted to Earth. When Oscar2 stands in 
CR2 to water, he bears a causal connection to water, but not a causal connection that is 
such as to make any of his thoughts water thoughts.
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Oscar2's behaviour being twater behaviour). Fodor argues that this 
case fails to satisfy condition C, for the difference between the causes 
is conceptually connected to the difference between the effects. This is 
so as 'it is conceptually necessary that people who have water 
thoughts (rather than twater thoughts) produce water behaviour. . . 
Being water behaviour just is being behaviour that is caused by 
water thoughts (rather than twater thoughts)' (p.21). No doubt this is 
all correct, but so what? Oscar's water thoughts have the property of 
being the thoughts of someone who bears CRl to water, a property 
the having of which is responsible for his water thoughts having, as 
their behavioural effects, water behaviour. If Oscar stood in CR2 to 
water, then none of his behaviour would be water behaviour. Here 
we have an example of schema S that doesn't obviously fail 
condition C, for it is not obvious that there is a conceptual 
connection between the relevant property of Oscar's water thoughts 
(i.e. their being the thoughts of someone who bears CRl to water) 
and their behavioural effects being water behaviour. It is not obvious 
that being water behaviour just is being behaviour that is caused by 
the thoughts of someone who bears CRl to water.
Of course none of this conclusively establishes that the Putnamian 
tw ins satisfy condition C, but it does dent Fodor's argum ent 
somewhat. Moreover, as I said above, to reject my intuition that, for 
example, there is no conceptual connection between bearing CRl to 
water and having water thoughts is perhaps not an option open to 
Fodor for I think it conflicts with other aspects of his overall view.
This conflict has to with the theory of content. Over recent years one 
of Fodor's main preoccupation's has been to construct a theory of 
content, a theory that explains, in naturalistic terms, why our 
thoughts have the semantic properties that they have. The theory he 
has developed is a descendent of the informational semantics of 
Dretske (1981) and Stampe (1977), and takes the form of the 
specification of a sufficient condition for a mental representation's 
expressing the property that it expresses.37 What makes Oscar's 
water thoughts water thoughts is that he (or those thoughts) bear
Interestingly, in the present connection, Fodor doesn't think he has a necessary 
condition for a mental representation's expressing the property that it expresses, but 
only a sufficient condition, a sufficient condition that our mental representations 
satisfy.
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relation CRI to water. Suppose there exists a conceptual connection 
between bearing this causal relation to water and being a water 
thought. Then the story of why Oscar's water thoughts are water 
thoughts will be conceptually true just as the story concerning why I 
am a nephew is conceptually true (because I have a parent who has a 
sibling). Moreover, the question of why his water thoughts are water 
thoughts will be answerable on the basis of an a priori reflection on 
the concepts involved (just as the question of why I am a nephew can 
be answered on the basis of a priori reflection). And, of course, the 
same will be true of everyone else's water thoughts so that a general 
answer to the question "what makes a water thought about what it is 
about?" can be answered solely on the basis of a priori reflection and 
that answer will be conceptually true.
Now, presumably, there is nothing special about water thoughts. 
Dog thoughts, for example, will be about dogs in virtue of the causal 
relationship that they bear to dogs, and similarly for any thought 
about any object or property instantiated in the external world that 
any individual is capable of having. Therefore, for any type of 
thought there will be a general answer to the question "what makes 
thoughts of that type about what they are about?", an answer that can 
be arrived at solely on the basis of a priori reflection, and an answer 
that will be conceptually true.
Presumably the causal relationship that one's water thoughts must 
bear to water to be water thoughts will mirror the causal relationship 
that ones dog thoughts must bear to dogs to be dog thoughts. And, 
quite generally, for any X, the causal relationship that one's X 
thoughts must bear to X to be X thoughts will mirror the causal 
relationship that Oscar's water thoughts bear to water in virtue of 
which they are water thoughts. In short, the story about Oscar's water 
thoughts will be a particular instance of a general story about why 
thoughts are about what they are about. The upshot of all this is that 
a general theory of content can be arrived at by a priori reflection, a 
theory that will be conceptually true.
I do not believe that Fodor would be happy to endorse this upshot.®® 
The view that there is a conceptually true theory of content to be had.
®® However, having said that, his approach in constructing a naturalistic theory of 
content does have a distinct a priori air to it (see Chapter 7 for the details). But even 
if Fodor would be happy to endorse the consequence that 1 am describing, the point
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a theory obtainable by a priori means, is not the sort of view that one 
expects Fodor to hold. His holding such a view would be in tension 
with his general views on the nature of philosophy and on how the 
philosopher should proceed. Fodor has cham pioned the view 
according to which there is no real, clean-cut distinction between 
philosophy and science. One cannot get very far, he thinks, by a priori 
reflection alone, hence scientific investigations and findings are 
relevant to philosophical concerns. Thus the various theories that 
Fodor has championed during his career^^ were never held by him 
to be conceptually or necessarily true, or provable by a priori means. 
Thus it would be surprising, if not contradictory, were Fodor to 
endorse the upshot of rejecting my intuition that there is no 
conceptual connection between bearing CRl to water (where CRl is 
the relation that Oscar/his water thoughts bear to water in virtue of 
which his water thoughts are water thoughts) and having water 
thoughts. But if he doesn't reject this intuition it would appear that 
he has to accept that the putative Putnamian counterexamples are 
genuine counterexamples to his supervenience thesis.
In the spirit of the point made in the preceding paragraph, it might 
reasonably be thought that there is tension between Fodor's line in 
'A Modal Argument for Narrow Content' and another view that he 
holds dear, and which plays a fundamental role in his overall system 
of thought. Functionalism as a theory of content is the doctrine that 
the content of a mental state is determined by its causal relations to 
other mental states. The idea is that, for example, my thought that 
there is a cat on the mat has the content there is a cat on the mat in 
virtue of what other thoughts it is disposed to cause/ I am disposed 
to infer from it. So that, for example, it wouldn't have that content if 
I wasn't disposed to infer from it a thought with the content there is 
an animal on the mat. On the face of it this idea is quite plausible and 
sits happily with the intuition that in order to have cat thoughts one 
has to believe a whole load of true things about cats, one belief 
amongst these being that cats are animals.
remains that he should not be so happy, for he cannot consistently hold that there is 
a conceptually true theory of content to be had, a theory that is obtainable by a 
priori means.
For example, the Representational Theory of Mind and methodological solipsism.
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Now Fodor believes that there is no analytic/synthetic distinction: T 
take it very seriously that there is no principled distinction between 
matters of meaning and matters of fact, Quine was right; you can't 
have an analytic/synthetic distinction' (1990, p. x). The absence of 
such a distinction has a quite a dram atic consequence if 
functionalism is true, this being 'that you can't have a principled 
distinction between the kinds of causal relations among mental states 
that determine content and the kinds of causal relations among 
mental states that don't' (p. x),90 Barring an accident on a cosmic 
scale, take any thought of mine you like and no-one else will have a 
thought with just the same causal relations to other mental states. 
Therefore no-one else will have a thought w ith just the same 
content and, as thoughts have their contents essentially, no-one else 
will ever share a thought with me. The same will go for all other 
folks, so that, barring an accident on a cosmic scale, no two 
individuals will ever share a thought. Consequently intentional laws 
will subsume one individual at most, which means that there are 
effectively no intentional laws, and thus no scientific intentional 
psychology. This consequence of the functionalist theory of content - 
given an absence of any analytic/synthetic distinction - motivates 
Fodor's attempt to develop an atomist alternative.
Now we are in a position to notice the contradiction which, quite 
sim ply, is this: how can someone who avowedly rejects the 
analytic/synthetic distinction (and whose rejection of which plays 
such an important role in his thought) help himself to a notion of 
conceptual connection? If 'there is no principled distinction between 
m atters of meaning and matters of fact', how can there be any 
principled distinction betw een conceptual and non-conceptual 
connections. And if there is no such distinction how can Fodor 
legitimately appeal to the notion of a conceptual connection to 
defend his supervenience claim?
If there were an analytic/synthetic distinction one could claim that only certain 
privileged causal connections determined the content of a thought. Thus, for example, 
in order for one to have cat thoughts one must believe that cats are animals, but one 
need not believe that ocelots are members of the cat family. Hence I need not be 
disposed to infer from my belief that there is a cat on the mat a belief that there is 
something related to an Ocelot on the mat in order for the former belief to be the 
belief that there is a cat on the mat.
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It m ight be thought that regardless of w hether Fodor can 
legitimately appeal to conceptual connections, he is on to something 
in arguing in the manner in which he does. The idea I have in mind 
is that scientific psychology m ust produce explanations, specify 
connections, and appeal to generalisations that are contingently 
rather than conceptually true. Consequently, the property of being a 
water thought and that of being water behaviour cannot legitimately 
figure in the taxonomy of scientific psychology, as explanations and 
generalisations that appeal to them will be conceptually rather than 
contingently true. I think that there is a way of answering this line of 
thought, and doing so in such a way as to reconcile the Humean 
intuitions that underlie it with the idea that scientific psychology 
should recognise the difference between water thoughts and twater 
thoughts. Here goes. There may well be a conceptual connection 
between water thoughts and water behaviour (in the sense that water 
behaviour just is behaviour that is caused by water thoughts) and it 
may well be conceptually true that my water thoughts cause water 
behaviour rather than twater behaviour. But that notwithstanding, 
the specific causal explanations that an externalist psychology would 
produce are contingent as would be the generalisations subsuming 
specific water thoughts. To see this consider the following. Suppose I 
switch on an empty kettle. Why did I do that? Because I wanted to 
boil some water and believed the kettle was full of water. Surely that 
is a legitimate causal explanation. The connection between my water 
thoughts and my behaviour is contingent as is the explanation of my 
behaviour. If you want to know why I am a nephew you can generate 
from your armchair the following conceptually true explanation: 
because I have a parent with siblings. But the explanation of why I 
switched the empty kettle on is nothing like that. My behaviour 
could have had just about any cause, and which cause it had (and 
thus how it is to be explained) is a matter for empirical investigation. 
Moreover, I could have had just those thoughts without switching 
the kettle on, in the respect that there are conceptually possible 
worlds where those very thoughts have quite different causal 
p o w e r s . I n  those possible worlds the generalisations that subsume
91 To see that there is nothing conceptually necessary about the specific causal 
powers of the various water thoughts that we are capable of having, consider the
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our water thoughts diverge from those that hold in the real world. 
Therefore, one can assert that a scientific psychology can appeal to 
specific water thoughts in order to explain specific m ental and 
behavioural episodes, and can employ generalisations in which 
reference to such water thoughts figures, without abandoning one's 
Hum ean intuitions. Hence an appeal to Humean considerations 
gives no grounds for the conclusion that scientific psychology 
shouldn't distinguish between water thoughts and twater thoughts.
I thus conclude that Fodor's modal argument fails to establish that 
the Putnam case doesn't constitute a genuine counterexample to the 
claim that the causal powers of psychological states are locally 
supervenient. By way of recapitulation, here is how the argument 
went. Fodor argued that the difference between being a water thought 
and being a twater thought is not a difference in causal powers in 
virtue of being responsible for the difference between its behavioural
following example. Suppose that walking through a forest I come across a pool of 
deep water and form the belief that there is a pool of deep water before me. This 
belief will interact with other thoughts of mine to produce certain mental and 
behavioural effects. We can imagine a creature capable of believing that there was a 
pool of deep water before it such that whenever it had that belief it went into a 
state of fear (perhaps it belonged to a species that had evolved in an environment 
where the deep pools of water tended to be full of crocodiles or other forces of 
destruction). Thus, in this creature the belief in question has causal powers that it 
doesn't have in me, for to cause fear in me it has to interact with other beliefs that I 
am not guaranteed to have (in the imaginary creature the belief automatically 
causes the state of fear without having to interact with any other beliefs). In other 
words, which causal powers my belief that there is a pool of deep water before me 
has is a contingent matter, in that it is conceptually possible that a creature could 
have had just the same belief yet that belief had different causal powers. I take it 
that the point generalises to all water thoughts.
If Fodor denies this claim about the contingency of the causal connections, 
explanations, and powers of our specific water thoughts then it is difficult to see how  
he can avoid concluding that the narrow psychology that he envisages doesn't fall 
foul of just the same Humean considerations. For, given the close relationship 
between narrow and broad content, if it is conceptually true that my belief that there 
is water in the kettle and my desire to boil some water causes me to switch on the 
empty kettle, then it will be conceptually true that my narrow belief and my narrow 
desire causes the narrow behaviour that I engage in.
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effects being water behaviour and twater behaviour. This is because 
this case fails to satisfy a necessary condition for being a difference in 
causal powers. In response, I argued that: (i) this putative necessary 
condition does not cohere with Fodor's intuitions and thus is robbed 
of much of its motivation; (ii) that the Putnam case may well pass 
Fodor’s test for being a difference in causal powers; (iii) that were 
Fodor to reject my argum ent for (ii) he would run the risk of 
inconsistency; (iv) that Fodor's argum ent clashes w ith  other 
important aspects of his overall view; and (v) that it is not in conflict 
with reasonable Humean considerations to allot water thoughts to 
different scientific psychological types than their corresponding 
twater thoughts.
5.6 The nature of causal powers
None of the foregoing establishes that a psychology that individuates 
in terms of causal powers will not respect the supervenience of the 
psychological on the physical; rather, all it does is underm ine 
Fodor's attem pt to establish that the Putnam ian case doesn't 
constitute a bona fide counterexample to his individualism. Hence, 
the question of whether scientific psychology m ust respect local 
supervenience is still very much unsettled. Given this, it would 
perhaps be instructive to examine the notion of a causal power in 
somewhat more detail than Fodor does, and then attempt to apply 
any results of this examination to the case of psychology.
For an entity, state, or event to have a given casual power, it must 
be capable of causing an effect that constitutes an exercise of the 
power in question. Such an effect need not, in actual fact, be caused. 
For example, for me to have the power to lift Fang I must be capable 
of causing an event of my lifting Fang but it is not necessary that I 
have ever lifted Fang. It is enough that that effect is produced in 
some relevant (possibly counterfactual) context. Thus, as Fodor tells 
us, causal powers are to be assessed across contexts; when one is 
addressing the question of whether a thing has a given causal power 
one m ust determine not just its actual effects but the effects it 
produces in a range of counterfactual contexts. However, this raises 
the question of which contexts are relevant. There are reasons for 
resisting the conclusion that all contexts are relevant, as can be seen
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from reflecting on the property of being a planet. Fodor holds that 
being a planet does affect causal powers, for being a planet affects your 
trajectory, which in turn affects what you can bum p into. This 
thought seems intuitively right. Now a planet could have a 
molecularly identical twin that was not a planet. For this non-planet 
not to have the same causal powers as its planet twin, contexts in 
which it has the relational property of orbiting a star m ust not be 
relevant to its causal powers. If such contexts are relevant then the 
property of being a planet would not affect the causal powers of 
whatever had it, and thus would not figure in the taxonomy of 
astronomy. So the question arises of which contexts are relevant 
when assessing causal powers, and in virtue of what are the relevant 
contexts relevant? In order to answer these questions, and to shed 
more light on the notion of a causal power in general, it will be 
instructive to examine an example of a legal power.
Edgar and Waldo both rent rooms in a house owned by a Mr. 
Higgins. Edgar finds Waldo a pain to live with due to the latter's 
continually playing loud music, keeping late hours, and poor 
standards of personal hygiene. Edgar wishes he could evict Waldo 
but does not have the legal power to do so. Higgins does have the 
legal power to evict Waldo, but, despite Edgar's exhortations, he 
refuses to exercise this power. ("So long as he pays the rent what do I 
care?" is what he says). So Higgins has a legal power that Edgar does 
not. In virtue of what do they differ in this respect? They clearly do 
not differ because of the effects that they produce, for Higgins does 
no evicting. In line with the thought that legal powers are to be 
assessed across contexts, the obvious answer is that what is crucial is 
that there are counterfactual contexts where Higgins produces the 
effect of evicting Waldo but no counterfactual contexts in which 
Edgar produces such an effect. This answer is on the right lines, but 
there is a problem with it, as there clearly are counterfactual contexts 
where Edgar evicts Waldo (contexts in which, for example the laws of 
the land diverge from those that hold in reality, or where Edgar is 
Waldo's landlord). Thus in order to appeal to differences in effects 
produced in counterfactual contexts when accounting for the 
difference between the legal powers of Edgar and Higgins, we must 
find a way of ruling out such contexts as irrelevant. How are we to do 
this?
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When evaluating the legal powers of an individual, not all possible 
contexts are relevant. When we ask whether an individual has a 
given legal power LP, what we are asking is whether they, largely as 
they are now, in the world, largely as it is now, are capable of 
producing an effect that constitutes an exercise of LP. Hence the 
relevant contexts are those where the individual and the world is as 
it is now in all relevant respects. But what are these relevant 
respects? It is difficult to frame a general answer to this question, but 
in connection with particular cases it is easy enough to appreciate 
what is relevant and what is not. In the present case contexts in 
which the laws of the land differ from those that hold in reality 
(particularly those relating to the rights and obligations of landlords 
and tenants) are not relevant. For example, that Edgar succeeds in 
evicting Waldo in a counterfactual context where it is enshrined in 
law that you can evict a fellow tenant if he goes six months without 
cleaning the bathroom clearly doesn't imply that he has the power to 
evict Waldo. Similarly, contexts in which Edgar stands in relation to 
Waldo and Higgins differently than he does in the real world are not 
relevant. For example, that Edgar evicts Waldo in a context where he 
is Waldo's landlord doesn't imply that he has the legal power in 
question in the actual world. W hat this suggests is that when 
assessing an individual's legal powers we must hold fixed the laws of 
the land and those properties of his (in particular his relations to his 
fellows) which determine how the laws of the land impinge upon 
and apply to him.
Similar considerations apply to the case of causal powers. Thus 
whether or not something has a causal power P depends not just on 
the effects that it actually produces but the effects that it would 
produce in certain counterfactual contexts. But not all counterfactual 
contexts are relevant. When we ask whether Edgar has the power to 
lift Fang, we are asking whether Edgar, as he is now, in the world as it 
is now, has the ability to lift Fang as he is now. Contexts where Edgar 
is stronger as a result of being a weight lifter, where Fang is heavier, 
and where the laws of nature are other than they are in the real 
world, are not relevant contexts. Thus when we are investigating 
whether or not Edgar has the power to lift Fang we must hold fixed 
such properties of Edgar, Fang, and the world in which they live 
considering only what happens in such contexts.
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Can we generalise this point? Intuitively, what we want to say is 
that when assessing causal powers we must hold fixed all those 
properties of the item under consideration and its w orld that 
determine whether or not it has the causal power in question. To put 
the matter in these terms runs the risk of circularity; what we need - 
or so it would appear - is a non-circular characterisation of which 
counterfactual contexts are relevant and thus should be examined 
when evaluating causal powers. It might be thought that we could 
get round this problem by saying that all we need to hold fixed are 
the laws of nature that hold in the actual world. However this won't 
do, for in the case of the question of whether Edgar has the power to 
lift Fang, the contexts where Fang is a different weight than he is in 
real life, or where Edgar's physical strength is different than it 
actually is are both nomologically possible but clearly irrelevant. 
Thus, besides laws of nature, we must hold fixed both properties of 
the item under consideration and its environment when assessing 
causal powers. The properties that we must hold fixed are those 
which, given the laws of nature, determine whether or not the item 
under consideration has the causal power in question.^^
I don't think I can formulate a general, non-circular account of what 
properties of an item one must hold fixed when assessing its causal 
powers. But this is not really a disaster as enough light has been shed 
on the notion of a causal power to enable some progress to be made 
on the discussion of the question of whether a scientific psychology 
that individuates in terms of causal powers m ust respect the 
supervenience of the psychological on the physical.
To bring out the similarity between the case of legal powers and that of causal 
powers, consider the following: The laws of nature in the case of causal powers are 
the analogue of the laws of the land in the legal powers example. To not hold them 
fixed when assessing causal powers would be as absurd as to argue that Edgar has the 
power to evict Waldo on the grounds that he evicts Waldo in a counterfactual 
context where it's a law that you can evict your fellow tenants if they don't clean the 
bathroom. The properties of the entity under consideration that we must hold fixed 
when assessing causal powers are the analogues of such properties as that of Edgar's 
being a tenant, his bearing such and such relations to Waldo and Higgins, and so on. 
To not hold such properties fixed when assessing causal powers would be as absurd as 
to conclude that Edgar has the power to evict Waldo on the grounds that he evicts 
Waldo in a counterfactual context where he is Waldo's landlord.
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I have argued that there is a similarity between causal powers and 
legal powers, but there is a characteristic of the latter that it offends 
intuition to ascribe to the former. Legal powers are not locally 
supervenient; that is, two individuals can be molecule for molecule 
identical without having the same legal powers. However, there is a 
very strong intuition that if two entities are molecule for molecule 
identical then they must agree in their causal powers given that 
causal powers are to be assessed across contexts. For, the thought goes, 
for any context you care to consider, if one of the twins causes an 
effect in that context, its duplicate would produce just the same effect 
were it slipped in its place. Perhaps this is more than just an 
intuition but, rather, an idea that is intimately bound up with the 
physicalist view that our world is at bottom a physical system 
populated by physical entities that are governed by the laws of 
physics. If you are a physicalist then it is very tempting to suppose 
that the events that a system produces in a given context will be 
determined by its physical properties so that a physical duplicate 
would produce just the same effects were it placed in  that very 
context. From this it's a short step to the conclusion that physically 
identical entities will agree in their causal powers. I suspect that this 
kind of intuition is at work in Fodor's reflections.
On the other hand, it does seem possible for physically identical 
entities to diverge in their causal powers. Thus, for example, surely a 
planet would have different causal powers than a molecularly 
identical non-planet that was no more than a stationary chunk of 
rock. Another example would be that of a meteor. Two rocks could be 
physically identical but one be a meteor and the other not, the latter 
being a stationary rock. Surely the meteor, hurtling through space as 
it is, will have the power to cause craters, a power that its stationary 
twin lacks. For how can a rock that just sits there motionless have 
the power to cause any craters?
It would appear that we have a case of conflicting intuitions. 
However, the conflict is only prima facie, for there is a way of 
resolving it that does justice both to the thought that physical twins 
have identical causal powers and to the thought that such properties 
as that of being a planet and that of being a meteor affect the causal 
powers of whatever has them. The way in which the putative 
conflict resolves has bearings on the issue of whether a psychology
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that indiv iduates in term s of causal pow ers m ust respect 
supervenience.
Consider the case of two molecularly identical rocks, one of which is 
a meteor, and the other of which is not. The meteor has the power to 
cause craters; to see this just reflect upon what happens when a 
meteor, hurtling through space as meteors do, crashes into a planet. 
Does the non-meteor have the power to cause craters? Well, in the 
context where it is hurtling through space and crashes into a planet it 
causes a crater. Whether this means that it has the power to cause 
craters all depends on whether this context is one that is relevant to 
assessing the non-meteor's causal powers. Notice that in this context 
the non-meteor will be a meteor and so the question of whether the 
context is relevant turns into the question of whether the non­
meteor's property of being a non-meteor is one of those properties 
that is to be held fixed when assessing its causal powers. Now for the 
crucial point: whether this property is to be held constant depends 
upon how one sees or considers the non-meteor, and how one so 
sees or considers it is an interest relative m atter. Considered 
astronomically, it is the astronomical properties of the rock that are 
to be held fixed when assessing its causal powers. As far as the 
astronomer is concerned, there is all the difference in the world 
between being a meteor and not being one, hence the context where 
our non-m eteor is hurtling  through space is one w here its 
astronomical properties differ considerably from those that it has in 
the real world. Therefore this context is not relevant when assessing 
the non-m eteor's causal powers so long as that non-m eteor is 
considered astronomically. The matter could be put this way: qua 
astronomical body, meteors have a causal power, namely the power 
to cause craters, that their stationary non-meteor twins do not have. 
In this respect the property of being a meteor affects the causal powers 
of whatever has it.
However, one is not forced to consider the meteor and its non­
meteor twin astronomically, for one can consider them as physical 
bodies. And qua physical bodies they have just the same causal 
powers, or at least they both have the power to cause craters. Here's 
why. The properties of the rocks that the physicist will hold fixed 
when determining their causal powers will be those properties that 
are instances of properties that belong to the set of properties that
174
physics cares about. The property of being a meteor and that of being 
a non-meteor do not belong to this category and so they are not to be 
held fixed. Therefore the context where the non-meteor is hurtling 
through space (and thus is a meteor) is a relevant context when 
determining whether it has the power to cause craters. The properties 
of the rocks that are to be held fixed are their internal physical 
properties; thus the relevant contexts are all those nomologically 
possible contexts where the rocks are, in terms of their internal 
physical constitution, just as they are in the actual world. Given their 
physical identity, the rocks would produce identical physical effects in 
each and every nomologically possible context and so, qua physical 
bodies, they have just the same causal powers. Thus what resolves 
the above prima facie conflict is the fact that qua physical bodies the 
rocks have just the same causal powers (in particular they both have 
the power to cause craters) but qua astronomical bodies they do not 
(for the meteor has the power to cause craters, a power that the non­
meteor does not have).
In short, then, when assessing an entity's causal powers, its effects 
across a range of contexts are to be considered. What all these contexts 
have in common is that they are nomologically possible; the laws 
that hold in them are just the same as those that hold in the actual 
world. Yet it is often the case that not all nomologically possible 
contexts are relevant, for when assessing causal powers one must 
hold fixed certain of the properties of the individual in question (and 
sometimes, also, properties of its environment). But which of these 
properties are to be held fixed is an interest relative matter; it all 
depends upon what science you are doing and how you consequently 
see the entity in question.
W hat bearing does all this have on the question of whether 
psychology indiv iduates in such a way as to respect the 
supervenience of the psychological on the physical? The 
astronomical example suggests that from the point of view of the 
special sciences, causal powers are not always locally supervenient. 
This should make us alive to the possibility of such a violation of 
supervenience in the case of psychology. Perhaps there could be the 
following kind of case. Twinl and Twin2 are a pair of individuals 
who are molecule for molecule identical. Twinl has a psychological 
state, namely PSl, that stands in a relation of identity to (or is
175
constitu ted by) one of his brain  states. The corresponding 
psychological state of Twin2, PS2, stands in a relation of identity to 
(or is constituted by) one of his brain states. Qua physical state, PSl 
and PS2 will have the same causal powers, and it may well be the 
case that qua brain state they have the same causal powers. But it 
doesn't follow from this that qua psychological state they agree in 
their causal powers. It doesn't follow because these states may differ 
in some respect that the psychologist cares about - a respect that 
neither the neurophysiologist or the physicist cares about - that 
makes a crucial difference to which contexts are relevant when 
assessing their causal powers. The kind of psychological difference 
that I have in m ind narrow s down the contexts relevant in 
determining the causal powers of PSl and PS2 (qua psychological 
states) in such a way that they turn out to have different causal 
powers. For example, suppose PSl has a property PI that psychology 
cares about but which PS2 does not have. (Such a property would be 
analogous to the astronomer's property of being a meteor). In 
assessing PSl's causal powers, only those contexts in which it has PI 
are to be considered. In some of those contexts PSl produces a 
psychological effect which counts as an exercise of a psychologically 
significant causal power CP. In virtue of this, PSl has the causal 
power CP. PS2 only produces effects that count as an exercise of CP in 
counterfactual contexts where it has the property PI. But these 
contexts are not relevant given that PS2 in reality doesn't have the 
property PI. Therefore PS2, qua psychological state, doesn't have the 
causal power CP, and as CP is a psychologically relevant causal 
power, PSl and PS2 belong to different psychological types. The 
upshot of this is that the twins, despite their being physically 
identical (and perhaps neurophysiologically identical) are not 
psychologically identical.
Of course this doesn't establish the conclusion that psychology, even 
though it individuates in terms of causal powers, does not respect the 
supervenience of the psychological on the physical. To do that, we 
w ould need to produce some concrete example or engage in an 
examination of the explanatory ambitions and assumptions that are 
specific to psychology.^^ Moreover, it might be objected that there is a
I do not wish to argue that the Putnam case constitutes such an example. The 
externalist is not, solely in virtue of his externalism, commited to the thesis that
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fundamental feature of the planet and meteor case that rules out the 
possibility of a psychological analogue. The meteor has different 
causal powers than its non-m eteor twin, but that is perfectly 
explicable given the fact that the two chunks of matter are subject to 
different proximal stimuli. There are forces acting on the surface of 
the meteor that push and pull it around its local environment in a 
way quite different to those acting on the surface of its twin. (Forces 
such as gravitational pull, air pressure, and the like). Hence, it is not 
surprising that the meteor has the power to cause craters; its having 
that power is a direct product of the proximal stimuli it is subject to. 
Yet, so the objection continues, in the kinds of cases the externalist 
dreams up, the proximal stimuli the imagined twins are subject to 
are intrinsically identical, so making it inexplicable that they could 
have different causal powers. In short, Fodor can quite happily 
concede that causal powers are not always locally supervenient 
whilst holding onto the idea that the causal powers of psychological 
states are locally supervenient.
My first response to this objection involves pointing out that there 
are many cases of differences in causal powers in the absence of 
differences in proximal stimuli. Consider a particular Royal Bank of 
Scotland cash dispenser. It has the causal power to dispense cash and 
to effect changes in the bank accounts of individuals to whom it 
dispenses cash. It is easy to imagine a twin of this machine that 
inhabited an environm ent where the pieces of paper that it 
dispensed were not bank notes but concert tickets This second 
machine does not have the power to dispense cash, despite the fact 
that it might be subject to just the same proximal stimuli as the first 
machine. That there is such a difference in causal powers (and a 
significant one at that) is perfectly explicable: it is due to differences 
between the respective environments of the machines, differences 
that are underpinned by physical differences at some distance from 
the machines. In this case, the context where the cash dispenser is 
transported to the environment of its twin so that it no longer 
dispenses cash is not relevant when assessing its actual causal 
powers.
Oscar and Oscar2 are psychologically divergent. The widespread discussion of the 
Putnam case makes it easy to forget that establishing that the twins are 
psychologically identical does not thereby defeat externalism.
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My second response involves trying to construct a concrete 
psychological example. The example I have in m ind played a 
prominent role in my reflections in Chapter 3. I have the cognitive 
capacity to recognise certain individuals. I exercise this capacity when 
I form the true belief that Fang is before me whenever I am 
confronted by Fang. Underlying and facilitating this capacity are 
subpersonal representational states that carry information about 
specific individuals. That they carry information about specific 
individuals, that they represent those individuals as having certain 
properties, is crucial to their facilitating the exercise of the cognitive 
capacity in question. Consider the representational state in me that 
represents properties of Fang. It has the power to enable me to 
recognise Fang. The corresponding representation in my twin 
represents some other dog, and thus does not have the power to 
enable him to recognise Fang (in fact, were he to see Fang he would 
come to the mistaken belief that some other dog was before him). 
Thus, our respective states have, qua psychological states, divergent 
causal powers, as the context where I am embedded in my twin's 
environment (a context where my state represents some other dog as 
having certain properties) is not relevant to assessing the causal 
powers of my state. And surely the causal power of enabling me to 
recognise a specific individual that I can in fact recognise is one that 
scientific psychology does and should care about. Therefore, my state 
and the corresponding state of my twin, in differing in the specific 
individual that they represent and carry information about, differ in 
a psychologically significant way.^^ So the very case that I earlier 
appealed to in order to justify the claim that scientific psychology 
does and should appeal to properties of psychological states that are 
not locally supervenient would appear to provide us with just the
In Chapters 2, 3, and 4 I emphasised the role of contingent facts about the world in 
facilitating cognition. An upshot of this point is that it is contingent that my state 
(with the information that it carries and the content that it has) enables me to 
recognise Fang and enables me to recognise Fang in the way described by the scientific 
psychologist. Therefore, to describe this state as differing from that of my twin in a 
psychologically significant way is not to violate any Humean considerations. 
Whatever one thinks about the Putnam case, it looks as if we here have an instance 
of schema S that satisfies Fodor’s necessary condition for being a difference in causal 
powers.
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kind of example that we need to fend off Fodor's metaphysical 
argument for individualism.
Once again I accept that my considerations are hardly decisive; the 
individualist may well object that I have not described a plausible 
case of psychological states of twins that differ in their causal powers. 
In short, there is a real danger of a stand off. However, I think that I 
have done enough to blunt the power of Fodor's m etaphysical 
argument by establishing that it is far from clear that it vindicates his 
individualist position. And this, allied with the considerations of 
Chapters 2 and 3, licenses the tentative conclusion that scientific 
psychology both does, and can quite legitim ately, appeal to 
intentional properties that are not locally supervenient, and that it 
does not, nor need not, employ any notion of narrow content.
5.7 Conclusion
Before closing this chapter, here is a brief summary of the course that 
it has taken. Fodor thought that he had a metaphysical argument for 
the claim that scientific psychology does, or should, individuate in 
such a way as to respect the supervenience of the psychological on 
the physical, an argum ent that rests on the idea that sciences 
individuate in terms of causal powers. The case of the Putnamian 
twins poses an immediate problem for such a thesis for they, or some 
of their psychological states, would appear to diverge in their causal 
powers. Fodor provided two counter-arguments neither of which, or 
so I argued, are completely convincing. If we examine the notion of a 
causal power in greater detail than Fodor ever does it becomes clear 
that, from the point of view of special sciences, causal powers need 
not be locally supervenient. This raises the very real possibility that, 
in a m anner akin to astronomy, scientific psychology does not 
individuate in such a way as to respect local supervenience, even if it 
does individuate in terms of causal powers. And that this possibility 
is more than a mere possibility is suggested by a consideration of 
some of the representational states that underlie and facilitate our 
recognitional capacities.
179
J
Chapter 6 
The Naturalisation Project
6.1 Introduction
One of the central preoccupations of contemporary philosophy of 
m ind is that of constructing a naturalistic theory of content and 
evaluating various candidate theories. Reflecting this fact - perhaps 
even explaining it - the development of such a theory has been one 
of Fodor's primary concerns over the last decade or so.^^ Fodor has 
presented a theory inspired by the informational semantics of 
Dretske (1981) and Stampe (1977)% central to which are the notions 
of m ind-world causal laws and the relationship of asymmetric' 
dependency between such laws. In the next chapter I will attempt to 
evaluate this theory. I will argue that, despite its impressive 
ingenuity and prima facie plausibility, it ultimately fails. However, 
before turning to an explicit consideration of Fodor's theory I will 
attempt to get clear on the nature of the problem that it attempts to 
solve; just what are those who seek to construct a naturalistic theory 
of mental content up to? It is especially important to do this given
This marks a distinct change in Fodor's views for prior to the mid-eighties he 
seemed to hold that though mental content can in principle be naturalised (as would 
have to be the case for intentional psychology to be a respectable science) to attempt 
to produce a naturalistic theory of content would be to engage in an inevitably 
fruitless endeavour at this point in our intellectual history. For it is only when the 
rest of science has been completed that we will be in any position to explain in 
naturalistic and non-question-begging terms why our mental states have the 
intentional properties that they have.
Fodor represents the informational theory as identifying the content of a symbol 
with the information that it carries, and as reducing information to causal 
covariation so that, for example, my cow thoughts are about cows because they are 
caused by, and only by, cows. This is, to put it mildly, a gross simplification of 
Dretske’s complex and ingenious theory. However, we need not worry about this point 
in what follows.
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the increasingly large band of philosophers who think that to attempt 
to naturalise mental content is to engage in a misguided project, a 
project that cannot, nor need not, be successfully accomplished and 
w hich is bound up w ith some disreputable scientistic and 
reductionist assumptions. In this chapter I will attempt to present an 
account of the naturalisation project that reveals it to be important, 
sensible, and certainly not misguided. For if a scientific psychology of 
the kind that I have described in earlier chapters is to count as a 
respectable science then there is an important respect in which the 
semantic and intentional properties that figure in its theories and 
explanations must be naturalisable.
6.2 The place of mental content in the natural world
The fundamental worry of the naturalist is that intentional mental 
phenomena have no real place in the natural world and that the 
intentional and semantic properties routinely ascribed to our mental 
states in the course of psychological description and explanation have 
no reality. Alleviating this worry would involve showing that, and 
how:
(i) intentional mental phenomena occur in, and belong to, the 
natural world in broadly the same way in which, for example, 
biological, chemical, and geological phenomena do; and
(ii) the intentional and semantic properties of mental phenomena 
are as real as, and as real in broadly the same kind of way as 
biological, chemical and geological properties.
The purpose of engaging in the naturalisation project is to alleviate 
this worry. This point could do with much in the way of expansion 
and clarification.
By definition scientific intentional psychology is committed to the 
idea that some of our mental states have intentional and semantic 
properties; more specifically that some of our mental sates have 
semantic or intentional content. Moreover, its practitioners seek to 
produce explanations and theories in which appeals to such 
properties figure prom inently. Consequently, if there are any 
requirements or conditions that a property must satisfy in order to be
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scientifically respectable - in order to have a legitimate role to play in 
the theories and explanations of a respectable science - then they 
m ust be satisfied by the semantic and intentional properties that 
figure in psychological theory and explanation.
An assumption that unites those who engage in the naturalisation 
project is that there is just such a condition or requirement in virtue, 
of the truth of the doctrine of physicalism and /o r the commitment of 
science to that doctrine. U nderstood in the relevant sense, 
physicalism is the (perhaps vague) doctrine that our world is at 
bottom physical in nature; that it is at bottom nothing more than a 
very complex collection of physical particles organised hierarchically 
into aggregates that compose or constitute larger scale physical 
entities, states, events and processes, all of which behave in accord 
w ith the laws of physics. Thus physics is the most basic or 
fundamental science. However, according to the physicalist, this is 
not to say that physics is the only science or that physical properties 
are the only real properties. Rather, there are sciences other than 
physics - namely the special sciences - that appeal to properties that 
do not figure in the explanations, descriptions, predictions and. laws 
of physics. According to the physicalist the phenomena that the 
special sciences study and the properties that they appeal to are 
related to physical properties and phenomena in roughly the 
following way. Each and every special science entity, state, event or 
process is possessed by something (be it an entity, state event or 
process) that is physically composed, constituted or realised. And the 
relationship between special science properties, on the one hand, and 
physical properties, on the other, is that the former either reduce to 
or supervene on the latter so that the totality of physical facts fixes or 
determines the totality of special science facts. In other words the 
world couldn't be different at the special science level without being 
different at the physical level.
The upshot of all this is that the physicalist is committed to the idea 
that for any putative special science to be in good repute it must 
satisfy the following condition:
The phenomena that fall within its domain of enquiry must be 
physically composed, constituted or realised; the properties that its 
laws and explanations quantify over m ust be possessed by 
phenomena that are physically composed, constituted or realised;
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and its properties m ust reduce to, or supervene upon, the 
physical.
So the question arises: does intentional psychology satisfy the above 
condition? It might be thought that a positive answer can quickly be 
established by arguing that intentional mental phenom ena are 
physically  com posed, constitu ted  or realised via being 
neurophysiologically composed, constituted or realised and that 
intentional mental properties are possessed by phenomena that are 
at bottom clearly physical (be the bearers of such properties human 
individuals, brains, brain states, or something else along those lines). 
However this is far too swift, for it still remains to be shown that 
intentional properties either reduce to physical properties or 
supervene on the physical. A failure to indicate that (and how) lower 
level physical properties or facts fix, determine, or ground the 
intentional properties of mental states counts as a failure to indicate 
that (and how) intentional psychology manages to be a respectable, 
bona fide special science.^^
In short then, to engage in the naturalisation project is to attempt to 
indicate that (and how) physical properties or facts fix, determine, or 
ground the semantic and intentional properties that are attributed to 
our mental states in the course of psychological theorising and 
explanation. And Fodor's theory of content is an exercise in that 
project.
Of course one might attempt to naturalise any putative special 
science property, for they must all be related to the physical in the 
above described manner if they are to be scientifically respectable. But 
there is a widespread feeling within the philosophical community 
that there is an element of added urgency in the case of the 
intentional properties of mental states; that is why, at the beginning
Constitution/realisation by the physical doesn't entail supervenience on the 
physical as the following example indicates. Suppose that some physical objects 
have the property of being created by God. Such objects are physically constituted 
yet the property of being a physical object created by God does not supervene on the 
physical; rather it supervenes on factors outside the physical reahn. Consequently, 
intentional phenomena could be physically realised without it following that 
intentional properties are supervenient on the physical. Therefore, to establish that 
intentional properties are scientifically respectable one needs to do more than 
determine that intentional phenomena are physically realised or constituted.
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of this section, I described naturalists as having a worry that 
intentional mental phenomena do not belong to the natural world 
and that intentional properties do not have the right sort of reality. 
Who knows how the naturalisation story goes w ith respect to 
geological, biological, and perhaps even chemical properties. But few 
would doubt that there is a story to be told, no matter how complex 
the details. Thus only an eccentric would harbour any doubts about 
the scientific respectability of geology, biology or chemistry. Alas, the 
same cannot be said of intentional psychology, for philosophers who 
doubt that there is a naturalisation story to be told with respect to 
intentional properties are literally queuing up to tell us the bad 
n e w s . T h u s  we find Fodor making comments such as the 
following:
The worry about representation is above all that the semantic 
(and /o r the intentional) will prove permanently recalcitrant to 
in tegration  in the natu ra l order; for exam ple, that the 
sem antic/intentional properties of things will fail to supervene 
upon their physical properties. What is required to relieve the 
worry is therefore, at a minimum, the framing of naturalistic  
conditions for representation. ('Semantics Wisconsin Style' p 32)
If the semantic and the intentional are real properties of things, it 
m ust be in virtue of their identity with (or m aybe their 
supervenience on?) properties that are them selves neither  
intentional nor semantic. If aboutness is real, it must be really 
something else.
Such philosophers make up a motley bunch. At one extreme there are those who, 
following Quine, believe that the semantic and intentional resist naturalisation as 
such properties constitute a closed circle and are happy to conclude: so much the 
worse for such properties and any descriptive and explanatory enterprise that trades 
in intentional talk. At another extreme there are those who, like McDowell and the 
later Putnam, think that the normative nature of meaning stands in the way of 
naturalisation, but that that is not to say that the intentional lacks reality or that 
all explanatory and descriptive enterprises that appeal to intentional properties 
thereby stand in a state of ill repute. Such philosophers object to what they see as 
the scientism of such philosophers as Fodor.
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And, indeed, the deepest motivation for intentional irrealism 
derives from a certain ontological intuition; that there is no place 
for intentional categories in a physicalistic view of the world; that 
the intentional can't be naturalised. {Psychosemantics p 97)
Given these worries there is a very real need to make some progress 
in the task of constructing a naturalistic theory of content. Once we 
have such a theory the mystery as to how our mental states could 
have semantic and intentional properties, and any doubts as to the 
possibility of a scientifically respectable intentional psychology, will 
evaporate.
If one is committed to the existence or the possibility of a scientific 
intentional psychology then one is thereby committed to the idea 
that the intentional properties that such a psychology appeals to in its 
theories and explanations are related to the physical in the very way 
that gives the naturalisation project its sense and importance. One 
cannot be a champion of scientific intentional psychology and deny 
that there is a naturalisation story to be told, a story that specifies just 
which aspects of the physical world fix or determine the intentional 
and semantic properties that that psychology ascribes to us and our 
mental states. Of course one is free to deny that there is, or could be, 
such a psychology. If one did this, one could consistently hold that 
there is neither a need for, nor a possibility of producing, a 
naturalistic theory of content. However, I don't find this position 
very attractive as it requires its advocate to hold either that 
contemporary cognitive psychology is not a legitimate science, or that 
its attributions of intentional properties to our internal states is not 
to be taken literally. Given that I have been arguing for a scientific 
cognitive psychology that, in the course of explaining our 
intentionally characterised cognitive capacities, makes literal and 
ineliminable attributions of intentional properties to some of our 
internal states, I am committed to there being a naturalisation story
I think that there is something distinctive about semantic and intentional 
properties that gives some prima facie or intuitive plausibility to the idea that 
they are not related to the physical in the way that bona fide special science 
properties are. For example, intentional states can be about things that are external 
to them, things with which they have had no causal contact, and, indeed, things 
that do not exist.
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to be told with respect to those properties; a story that needs to be told 
in the course of constructing a complete and successful vindication of 
that psychology.
6.3 Reductionism
What form should a naturalistic theory of content take? What kind 
of theory should the naturalist be seeking? One thought is that the 
theory should attempt to reduce the intentional to the physical in the 
manner in which the property of being water reduces to that of being 
H 2O .101 Much of the opposition to the project of naturalising content 
is based on the idea that to engage in that project is to thereby commit 
oneself to the idea that the intentional reduces to the physical.^02 o f  
course if intentional properties did reduce to physical properties it 
would be clear that (and how) intentional psychology could satisfy 
the requirem ents described in the previous section for being a 
respectable science. But is it really plausible that there is such a 
reductive relationship; that intentional properties have a non- 
intentional essence? Despite the well publicised examples of water, 
lightning, and heat, scientific investigation has uncovered few 
intertheoretic bridge laws and philosophers have proved even less 
successful in specifying convincing necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the application of even our most simple and familiar 
concepts. So we have every right to be sceptical about the prospects 
for naturalising intentional content by means of reduction.
The above quotes suggest that Fodor is seeking a reductionist theory. 
However, they are misleading, for, in keeping with his career-long 
opposition to the idea that the categories of the special sciences can 
(and must) reduce to those of physics, what he really seeks is a
For a helpful account of the nature of the reduction relation see Kim (1996) ch. 9.
See, for example, Stich (1992) and Tye (1992), both of whom represent the 
naturalisation project as being one of specifying reductionist necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the application of intentional concepts. Both are sceptical about the 
possibility of reducing the intentional to the physical, but deny that any disastrous 
consequences follow from this, given the fact that special science properties rarely 
reduce to the physical and need not so reduce to be scientifically respectable. In other 
words, they object to what they see as the reductionist assumptions underlying and 
driving the naturalisation project.
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sufficient condition for meaning (as opposed to a necessary and 
sufficient condition). It is consistent with the existence of such a 
sufficient condition that intentional and semantic properties can 
have many and varied sources; that no such property has a non- 
semantic and non-intentional essence. The idea is that it is possible 
that my cow thoughts are about cows (rather than something else or 
nothing at all) for one reason, that the states of my visual system 
represent what they represent for some other reason, and that Fang's 
thoughts are about food for yet a third reason. In other words, in each 
of these cases some feature of the physical world is responsible for, 
fixes or determines, the intentional properties of the mental state in 
question; but that feature might differ from case to case.
But why, one might wonder, must there be any such non-semantic, 
non-intentional, sufficient conditions? The answer has to do with 
the doctrine of physicalism. Physicalism doesn't require that higher- 
level, special science properties reduce to those of physics, but it does 
require that where there are no relations of reduction or identity 
there are relations of realisation and supervenience. In other words, 
at the very least, higher-level special science properties are physically 
realised and have physical supervenience bases so that whenever 
such a property is tokened in our world the tokening of that property 
is the product of, or is fixed or determined by, some lower level 
physical feature of the world such that the higher level property in 
question couldn't bu t have been tokened given that physical 
f e a t u r e . N o w  the existence of such supervenience or realisation 
relations between higher-level special science properties and lower- 
level physical properties entails that associated with each special 
science property will be a battery of conditional statements each 
specifying a physical condition the satisfaction of which is sufficient 
for the tokening of the higher-level property in question. There may 
be infinitely many such physicalistic sufficient conditions associated 
with each higher-level property, each one specifying a distinctive 
way in which a tokening of that property can be generated. To deny of 
a higher-level non-physical property  that there are any such
133 In this context we need not worry about the specific nature of the supervenience 
relation (e.g. "strong", "global", or whatever) implied by physicalism, or whether 
the notion of necessity im plied by "couldn’t but have" is m etaphysical or 
nomological.
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physicalistic sufficient conditions associated with it is either to deny 
that it is scientifically respectable or to reject the doctrine of 
physicalism.
What these considerations imply about intentional properties is the 
following. If there is to be a scientifically respectable intentional 
psychology then the intentional properties that figure in the 
explanations and theories of that psychology must have physical 
supervenience bases. Thus, associated with each of these properties 
there m ust be physicalistic sufficient conditions such that the 
satisfaction of their antecedents guarantees the tokening of the 
property  in question. To deny that there are such sufficient 
conditions is either to deny the possibility of a scientific intentional 
psychology or to reject physicalism. Anyone who is committed to 
physicalism  (a doctrine that I take to be uncontestable and 
fundam ental to the ideology of science) and to the reality or 
possibility of a scientific intentional psychology m ust accept that 
there are such physicalistic sufficient conditions for the tokening of 
intentional properties.
To attem pt to uncover physicalistic sufficient conditions for 
meaning is to engage in the naturalisation project without thereby 
committing oneself to any implausible reductionist thesis. Seen in 
this light I think that it is clear that the naturalisation project is not a 
misguided project, and that it is an especially important one in which 
to make progress given the widespread scepticism concerning the 
prospects for a respectable scientific intentional psychology. Once we 
have specified some appropriate sufficient conditions we will have 
indicated that intentional properties supervene on physical 
properties and removed the mystery as to how intentional facts could 
be determined or fixed by physical facts.^34
104 Michael Tye (1992) argues that intentional psychology is a respectable science, 
and in the course of doing so constructs an account of the relationship between  
psychology (and higher level sciences in general) and physics that is similar to my 
account. He advances a version of what he calls "naturalism" according to which:
The general relationship which obtains between higher level and lower level 
physical properties is one of realization . . . The realization relation is, at least 
in part, one of determination: the lower level property synchronically fixes the 
higher level one so that the tokening of the former at any time t necessitates the 
token of the latter at t but not conversely. . . The parallel between types and
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But what is the nature of the required physicalistic conditions? In 
Psychosemantics Fodor explicitly states that his theory is intended to 
specify a sufficient condition that is satisfied by our mental states. For 
example, he writes:
I want a naturalized theory of meaning; a theory that articulates, 
in nonsemantic and nonintentional terms, sufficient conditions 
for one bit of the world to he about (to express, represent, be true 
of) another bit. I don't care . . . whether this theory holds for all 
symbols or for all things that represent . . . I'm prepared, that is, 
that only mental states (hence, according to RTM, only mental 
representations) should turn out to have semantic properties in 
the first instance; hence that a naturalized semantics should 
apply, strictu dictu, to mental representations only.
But it had better apply to them, (pp 98-99)
However, by 'A Theory of Content IT it seems that Fodor has 
relaxed his ambitions somewhat so that he would be satisfied with 
any sufficient condition for meaning, even a condition that we, or
tokens on the above conception of naturalism should now be clear: higher level 
types may be realized by more than one type within the actual world; higher 
level tokens may be constituted by different lower level tokens but only in 
different possible worlds.
We are now in a position to summarize what naturalism with respect to mental 
states (token and type) comes to on the above account:
Mental states participate in causal interactions which fall under scientific 
laws, and are either ultimately constituted by or ultimately realized by 
microphysical phenomena, (p 436)
The main difference between Tye's position and mine is that he doesn't think that 
there are any necessary and sufficient, or purely sufficient physicalistic/naturalistic 
conditions for meaning. His point is that naturalism doesn't require that there be any 
such conditions. Hence, Fodor is engaged in a misguided project; intentional 
properties neither are, nor need be, naturalisable. However, if what I have said is 
correct, naturalism /physicalism  does require that there be, at the very least, 
physicalistic sufficient conditions associated with any scientifically respectable 
intentional property. In denying the existence of such conditions Tye, leaves it a 
complete mystery as to how the intentional could be related to the physical in the 
way he describes.
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our internal states, didn't satisfy. For example, he writes, 'It's enough 
if I could make good the claim that "X" would mean such and such if 
so and so were to be the case. It's not also incumbent on me to argue 
that since "X" does mean such and such , so and so is the case' (p 
9 6 ).135 I think that Fodor's initial ambition is the right one for the 
naturalist to have. Certainly to have a mere sufficient condition 
w ould be an achievement, and one relevant to the program  of 
defending the scientific status of intentional psychology. The worry 
that there is no place for meaning in the natural world would be 
soothed were it shown that there would be meaning in the natural 
world if such and such (nomologically possible) nonsemantic and 
nonintentional conditions were satisfied. But the uncovering of a 
sufficient condition isn't going to indicate how our states could have 
semantic and intentional properties, or how there could be a 
scientific intentional psychology which was a psychology of us , if it 
isn't a condition that we (or our intentional states) satisfy.
It strikes me that - besides specifying a sufficient condition that we 
(or our internal states) satisfied - there are two further features that 
an adequate naturalisation story should have. The first feature is 
implied by what I wrote above. It is that the story should explain the 
semantic and intentional properties of our mental states in the sense 
of telling us in virtue of what our mental states have the semantic 
and intentional properties that they have. It should specify the 
supervenience bases of those semantic and intentional properties; 
tell us which features of the physical world fix or determine their 
tokening. To provide the sufficient condition Fodor envisages 
wouldn't automatically be to do this even if our states satisfied that
3^5 And again:
Suppose we had naturalistically sufficient conditions for content. It wouldn't, of 
course, follow that any of our neural states, or any of our public symbols have the 
content that they do because they satisfy the conditions on offer. Indeed it 
wouldn't follow from the mere existence of sufficient conditions that anything in 
the universe has actually got any. . . On the other hand, if there are naturalistic 
sufficient conditions for content, and we don't know these conditions not to be 
satisfied, then we would at least be in a position to claim, for example, that 
"cat" could mean cat for all we know to the contrary. This would be a 
satisfactory situation for the philosophy of mind . . .  to have finally arrived at. 
(p  13 1 ).
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condition. This can be seen by considering the following case. I 
suppose that, in point of nomological fact, w ater is the only 
chemically pure substance that - under norm al atm ospheric 
conditions - has a boiling point of one-hundred degrees Celsius. 
Consequently, it's a sufficient condition for a sample of a chemically 
pure substance to be water that it boils at one-hundred degrees 
Celsius. But the water in my beaker isn't water in virtue of its boiling 
point; rather it is water in virtue of its molecular structure.
One could imagine Fodor uncovering a property analogous to that 
of having a boiling point of one-hundred degrees Celsius, a property 
that our mental states had in virtue of their having the properties 
that fix or determine their meaning in the manner in which one's 
molecular structure determines one's boiling point. A sufficient 
condition that appealed to this property wouldn't explain or tell us in 
virtue of what our mental states have the semantic and intentional 
properties that they have.^36
A second desirable feature of any naturalisation story is that it 
should be able to deal with all of the representational states and 
semantic and intentional properties that feature in psychological 
theory and explanation. Fodor concentrates his attentions on such 
familiar propositional attitudes as beliefs and desires aiming to 
account for the contents of such personal level states. This is because 
of his view of scientific psychology as being an extension of folk 
psychology. Now if beliefs and desires have some role to play in 
scientific psychology, then to construct a theory that naturalised their 
contents would count as a significant achievement. But if that story 
didn't apply to the sub-personal representational states that cognitive 
psychologists routinely attribute to us and our cognitive modules
106 This point indicates how we should respond to an objection to Fodor's project made 
by Stich (1992). Stich argues that Fodor needs more than sufficient conditions to 
naturalise semantic and intentional properties, since 'providing conditions that are 
merely sufficient is just too easy' (p 363). He cites as an example of an easily 
generated sufficient condition the following: 'If x is Fodor's most recent utterance of 
"Maria Callas" (or: if x is the concept that underlies that utterance) then x 
represents Maria Callas' (p 363). The obvious reply is that this condition does not 
tell us in virtue of what x represents Maria Callas or which feature of the physical 
world fixes or determines the meaning of %. A sufficient condition that does that is 
certainly not too easy to generate.
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(and if the advocate of that story had no supplementary theory to 
deal with such states), then the scientific psychology that we actually 
have will hardly have been vindicated. For it will not have been 
shown that, and how, the properties that it appeals to have a firm 
place in the natural order.
This second requirement is not an idle demand, given the (vaguely 
Wittgensteinian) thought that the nature of meaning is such that 
there couldn't be meaning at the sub-personal level. Here's how the 
thought goes. An item is meaningful only if its use is governed by a 
system of rules of a linguistic community, rules which determine not 
just how the item is in fact used but also how it should be used. To be 
used in a m eaningful way - for example to represent or 
communicate a fact about the external world - the item m ust be 
employed to do so by an agent who belongs to the linguistic 
community in question, grasps its rules, and succeeds in following 
them. 137 Now what results do we get if we apply these considerations 
to the sub-personal? Neither my brain nor any subsystem of it, is an 
intelligent agent that belongs to a linguistic community, grasps its 
rules, and employs the symbols of that community's language in a 
manner that constitutes rule following. Consequently, whatever my 
brain or neural subsystems are doing it is not engaging in semantic or 
linguistic activity. Thus a cognitive psychology that seeks to uncover 
and describe our internal workings cannot legitimately talk of 
representation or meaning, nor attribute semantic and intentional 
properties to our sub-personal states in any literal or full blown 
sense. It can only ascribe semantic and intentional properties in a 
non-literal, instrumental, or metaphorical respect, or, as McDowell 
(1994) might say, it can only attribute as if  content. Therefore there 
cannot be a legitimate intentional psychology of our sub-personal
workings. 138
137 "Wliere to follow a rule is to do more than merely act in accord with it. The nature 
of the difference between following a rule and merely actmg in accord with it need  
not concern us here. Suffice it to say that Wittgensteinians feel that in order to follow  
a rule, at a minimum, one has to grasp that rule, something that requires intelligence 
and understanding. One can, on the other hand, act in accord with a rule whilst being 
completely bereft of intelligence and thus without grasping it.
138 A related argument that is generated by these kinds of considerations is that an 
intentional cognitive psychology would be explanatorily useless in virtue of being
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Given such objections the naturalist (or at least the naturalist 
sympathetic to an intentional cognitive psychology of the form that I 
have attempted to describe in earlier chapters) needs to tell us how 
there could be meaning at the sub-personal level; how, for example, 
states of the hum an visual system could have semantic and 
intentional properties in any literal, full blown respect. The upshot of 
all this is that if Fodor's sufficient condition only applies to personal 
level intentional states then he will not have succeeded in 
naturalising all of the intentional and semantic properties that are 
appealed to in contemporary cognitive psychological theory and 
explanation. He will have left it a mystery how, for example, Marr’s 
3-D model representation could represent the shape of an object 
impinging on a human subject's visual system. Indeed, I do suspect 
that the naturalisation story with respect to such states will be 
different from that with respect to beliefs, desires, and the like; that 
there will be no single sufficient condition that is satisfied by all our 
intentional states.
either circular or leading to infinite regress by attributing to our brains the very 
capacities for which an explanation is sought. This point is related to the 
homunculus argument described by Dennett (1978), and can be outlined by reference to 
an example Wittgenstein presents in The Blue Book . Wittgenstein asks how we obey 
the order "fetch a red flower". An answer to this question that W ittgenstein 
considers is that we compare the flower before us with a mental image of red, picking 
the flower if, and only if, it matches the image. One problem with this, he argues, is 
that if it requires to be explained how we are able to perform the task in question 
then it also requires to be explained how w e are able to select the correct mental 
image. The phenomenon that the putative explanation appeals to is just like that 
which it is invoked to explain, so making the explanation circular. And if the 
advocate of the putative explanation attempts to explain the capacity to select the 
correct mental image by appeal to a process of comparing the mental image with a 
prior mental image of red then an infinite regress looms. Thus the invocation of a 
mental image does no real explanatory work and any appearance to the contrary is an 
illusion that is the product of the idea that the mental image resides within that 
mysterious occult medium called the mind.
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6.4 Fodor's method
So we need a naturalistic theory of content, a theory that specifies - 
in nonintentional and nonsemantic terms - a sufficient condition (or 
a battery  of sufficient conditions) for the tokening of those 
intentional and semantic properties attributed to our internal states 
in the course of psychological theory construction and explanation: a 
sufficient condition (/battery of sufficient conditions) that, moreover, 
is (/are) satisfied by our psychological states and which explains why 
they have the semantic and intentional properties that they have. 
But how are we to construct such a theory? Is a priori reflection the 
right method to adopt or is a more empirical approach needed? 
Indeed, is the task philosophical at all? Fodor's approach is decidedly 
a priori and is reminiscent of the traditional technique of conceptual 
analysis. He engages in no examination of psychological or scientific 
research, instead proposing a sufficient condition from his armchair, 
and modifying that condition in the light of any counterexamples he 
can come up with or is presented with.
Stich (1992) claims that many philosophers who engage in the 
naturalisation project employ the method of conceptual analysis. 
W hat they attem pt to do is construct definitions of, or uncover 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of, our 
semantic and intentional concepts from their armchair by proposing 
definitions of the target concepts, searching for counterexamples to 
them , and m odifying the definitions in the light of any 
counterexamples so discovered.
Stich thinks that this employment of the method of conceptual 
analysis is thoroughly misguided as it is based upon the incorrect 
assumption that all of those who possess a mastery of intentional 
and sem antic concepts have, underlying that m astery, tacit 
knowledge of necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct 
application  of those concepts, Stich argues that cognitive 
psychological research, in particular the work of Eleanor Rosch^oe^ 
suggests that this assumption is likely to be mistaken. Rosch's work 
suggests that there is no tacit knowledge of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the application of our concepts underlying our 
classificatory practices. I regularly, and correctly, assign objects that I
See, for example, Rosch 1973,1975 and 1978.
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perceive to the category "bird". But underlying this capacity to 
classify birds correctly is not a representation or mental structure that 
explicitly represents necessary and sufficient conditions for being a 
bird. Rather the representation implicated is a prototype, that is, an 
idealised description of prototypical members of the category "bird". 
Whenever I seek to determine whether an object before me is a bird, 
a similarity metric is employed so that I will judge that the object is a 
bird if it resembles the prototypical bird (as represented in me) to a 
sufficient extent. The prototypical features of birds explicitly 
represented in me might be those of having feathers, of being able to 
fly, and such like. What is important to note is that these features 
constitute neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for being a bird.
Stich induces from such psychological research the conclusion that 
the representations or m ental structures with respect to such 
intentional categories as believing that p and desiring that q do not 
explicitly represent necessary and sufficient conditions for belonging 
to them. He writes: 'Perhaps the safest bet is that, whatever the 
mental mechanism underlying intentional categorization may be, it 
will not utilize "classical" concepts - the sort that can be defined with 
a set of necessary and sufficient conditions’ (p 353). Thus, he 
concludes, it is thoroughly m isguided to engage in arm chair 
conceptual analysis in order to lay bare the essence of the intentional 
and semantic properties that we ascribe to the states of ourselves and 
our fellows.iio
What bearings does the above argument have on Fodor's project 
and the viability of the method he employs? We have seen that 
Fodor is not in the business of defining or laying bare the essence of 
the intentional and semantic concepts we employ (or the properties 
they express). But still, it might be thought, Fodor assumes that there 
are sufficient conditions for the application of our intentional and 
semantic concepts, an assumption that Stich's argument suggests to 
be mistaken.
It strikes me that Stich is m istaken in claiming that the 
psychological evidence suggests that our concepts are not "classical", 
that they cannot be defined by means of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. Stich's mistake is to fail to recognise that there is a
Similar arguments for this conclusion, that again appeal to the work of Rosch, are 
presented by Tye (1992) and Horgan (1994).
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difference between what philosophers (and ordinary folks, come to 
that) are talking about when they use the term "concept" and what 
psychologists mean by the very same term. In the technical 
psychological sense a concept is a mental representation. In the 
philosophical sense a concept is not a mental representation but 
rather an abstract object that we grasp and apply in the course of our 
mental life.i^^ This is, of course, not to deny that there are mental 
representations within us that underlie our grasp of concepts, and 
that are implicated in our employment of them.
Now those who engage in conceptual analysis are invariably 
interested in concepts as opposed to mental representations. What 
Rosch is concerned with, on the other hand, is the nature of the 
representations that underlie categorisation. If she has succeeded in 
establishing that these representations do not explicitly represent 
necessary and sufficient conditions she hasn't thereby shown that 
our concepts can't be defined by means of necessary and sufficient 
conditions or that there are no such conditions for their application. 
Maybe what hooks me, so to speak, onto the concept bird is a 
complex representation that carries information about birds but does 
not carry a definition of what it is to be a bird. But that doesn't entail 
that an elucidation of the concept that I grasp w ould be a 
specification of that information. The representation that hooks 
other people onto that same concept may well be quite different; 
indeed it hardly seems plausible to suggest that the prototypes 
underlying our classificatory activities are invariant across the 
population of individuals who are capable of making the same 
judgements as to what is before them. This further indicates that 
concepts cannot be identified with mental representations. Indeed it 
is hard to see how Rosch's claims could be coherently expressed 
w ithout assuming that the concepts that we apply in categorising 
objects and the mental representations implicated in such activities 
are not one and the same. Thus claims about the nature of the 
concepts that we grasp and apply cannot be automatically read off 
from facts about the nature of the mental representations underlying 
our grasp and employment of those concepts. But that is precisely 
what Stich does.
From this point on I will use tlie term "concept" in the philosopher's sense and the 
term "mental representation" to refer to what psychologists mean by "concept".
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Of course none of the above implies that our concepts can be 
successfully analysed, and it might be argued that the track record of 
conceptual analysis hardly gives grounds for optimism. However, I 
sympathise with Crispin Wright (1989) when he says: 'it seems to me 
that it is an important methodological precept that we do not despair 
of giving answers to constitutive questions too soon; if the 
accomplishments of analysis in philosophy often seem meagre, that 
may be because it is difficult, not impossible' (p 246). So I don't think 
that to search for necessary or sufficient conditions for the 
application of our concepts is necessarily to engage in a hopeless and 
misguided project.
But is a priori reflection the appropriate method for uncovering any 
such necessary and sufficient conditions? Doesn't the work of 
psychologists such as Rosch indicate that even if our concepts are 
definable by means of necessary and sufficient conditions we do not 
have any knowledge of such conditions, thus im plying that 
empirical investigation in the only sensible way of proceeding? 
Perhaps not, for to engage in analysis is not to attem pt to make 
explicit the tacit knowledge that we rely upon in making judgements 
as to the applicability of our concepts (or to make explicit the 
inform ation encoded in the representations that underlie such 
judgements). So those who engage in analysis do not thereby operate 
on the assumption that all of those who grasp a given concept tacitly 
know any necessary and sufficient conditions for its application. 
Thus, once again, Rosch's discoveries do not tell against their 
activities.
It strikes me as not absurd to think that if a concept is such that a 
constitutive account of it could be given, then that account could be 
constructed on the basis of a priori reflection. Suppose that I have a 
grasp and mastery of a concept C. I often apply this concept in the 
course of my daily life, and typically such applications are correct. 
Aren't I then in a good position to use my faculty of reason to work 
out what binds together those cases where C can be applied and what 
marks them apart from those cases where an application of C would 
be incorrect? C ouldn't I, by a process of tentative hypothesis 
formation, a search for counterexamples, and subsequent hypothesis 
modification, tease out a constitutive account of C, or necessary and 
sufficient conditions for its application, utilising my tacit knowledge
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in the process? To do this wouldn't be to search for what one tacitly 
knew at the beginning of the process, but rather to arrive at new 
knowledge, knowledge that most of those with a mastery of C do not 
possess (even tacitly). In short, to suppose that one could generate a 
constitutive account of a concept by means of a process of a priori 
reflection that involved utilising w hat one tacitly knew at the 
beginning of the process is not to commit oneself to the idea that one 
had knowledge of (if only tacit knowledge) that constitutive account 
all along. So, at least with respect to some of our concepts, the search 
for a constitutive account of them (or necessary and sufficient 
conditions for their application) by means of conceptual analysis and 
a priori reflection may not be as misguided as Stich would have us 
believe. But w hat are the concepts of which there m ight be a 
constitu tive  account? W hy, those tha t ph ilosophers have 
traditionally been interested in, such as those of truth, justice, 
knowledge, beauty and, perhaps, such semantic concepts as meaning, 
reference, and so on.
However, none of this should be taken as constituting an 
endorsement of Fodor's a priori approach for two reasons. Firstly, to 
accept the in principle possibility of constructing a constitutive 
account of some of our intentional and semantic concepts by means 
of a priori reflection is not thereby to say that that account would be 
naturalistically acceptable. Maybe the only constitutive account to be 
had in this area is semantic and intentional through and through, 
an account that elucidates our intentional and semantic concepts in 
irreducibly semantic and intentional terms by way of a specification 
of the intricate relationships between these concepts. Thus, my 
recent reflections do not involve an endorsem ent of the 
reductionism that I earlier cast doubt on. Secondly, the naturalist's 
project, as we have seen, is not that of generating a constitutive 
account of our semantic and intentional concepts at all. Rather, it is 
that of discovering naturalistically acceptable sufficient conditions for 
the tokening of the semantic and intentional properties attributed to 
our states in the course of psychological explanation and theory 
construction; conditions that indicate how those properties are 
realised in us, what their supervenience bases are, or what features of 
the physical world fix or determine them when they are tokened. 
Given the nature of the naturalist's goal, whatever one thinks about
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the powers of conceptual analysis and a priori reflection, one may 
well suspect that they are singularly ill-suited as tools for an effective 
completion of the naturalisation project. After all, with respect to 
many of the properties appealed to by scientists, it would be very 
odd to suppose that anything other than a good deal of empirical 
investigation could reveal how they are realised in our world, what 
their supervenience bases are, or what features of the physical world 
fix or determine them when they are tokened.^^
However, on the other hand, all is not lost for a priori reflection for 
there is a significant difference between many intentional and 
semantic properties and some of the more esoteric scientific 
properties. We ascribe intentional and semantic properties to the 
states of ourselves and our fellows all the time and we are very 
effective in making correct ascriptions. Thus we are, perhaps, in a 
good position to reflect upon what underlying facts generally hold 
when a particular intentional property is tokened, and so generate 
tentative hypotheses as to what the required sufficient condition 
comes to. In other words, perhaps we can tease out a satisfactory 
naturalistic theory of content by engaging in a process analogous to 
that described above for constructing a constitutive account of those 
concepts that have traditionally  been of special in terest to 
philosophers.
There is a further reason for thinking that a priori reflection has a 
significant role to play in the achievement of the naturalist's goal. If 
we are going to get clear on what determines the semantic and 
intentional properties of our psychological states it is important that 
we have a good understanding of the nature of those properties. 
Quite generally, we need to know what it is that we are attempting to 
naturalise if we are going to have much chance of naturalising it. If 
we do not have this kind of understanding there will be a real danger 
that we will rest satisfied with sufficient conditions that work with 
respect to our intentional and semantic properties as we take them to 
be, but not as they are in reality. I take it that a priori reflection will
For example, if you want to know the answer to such questions as to how genetic 
properties are realised in us, what their supervenience bases are, and what features 
of the physical world fix or determine them when they are tokened, my advice to 
you is that you go and consult a scientist. As enthusiastic as I am about my subject, I 
don't think a philosopher will be much help.
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play an important role in achieving this understanding by enabling 
us to uncover the relations between our various semantic and 
intentional concepts, by, for example, answering such questions as 
w hether there is more to m eaning than reference, w hether 
normativity is an essential component of meaning, and so on. This 
point suggests the following criticism of Fodor's approach. Fodor 
dives headfirst into the naturalisation project, engaging in little by 
w ay of investigation into the nature of the properties that he 
attempts to naturalise. Consequently, he has to deal with objections 
to his theory according to which it is unable to deal with , or 
ignores, some im portant aspect of meaning (such as sense or 
normativity) in what often looks like an ad hoc manner. Perhaps a 
more cautious and circumspect approach would be wiser and more 
fruitful in the long run.
Yet although a priori reflection no doubt has an important role to 
play in giving us the required understanding of the semantic and 
intentional properties that we seek to naturalise, a priori reflection 
alone will not be enough. We are forever making judgements as to 
the contents of the prepositional attitudes of ourselves and our 
fellows; we are very familiar with the semantic and intentional 
properties that such mental states as beliefs, desires, and the like, 
have. But there is a whole range of intentional states of which most 
ordinary folk are ignorant, namely the sub-personal states that 
cognitive psychologists are so concerned with. There is no guarantee 
that the kinds of semantic and intentional properties that these states 
have will match up with the familiar properties of beliefs and 
desires. Indeed, given the obvious differences between these two 
broad categories of mental states, there is every reason to suspect that 
they diverge quite considerably in their semantic and intentional 
properties. Given that the naturalist has to deal with subpersonal 
intentional states just as much as she has to deal with beliefs and 
desires, a full understanding of the nature of the semantic and 
intentional properties that require to be naturalised cannot be 
acquired without consulting the psychologist. To proceed with blithe 
ignorance of, and indifference to, psychological research is to court 
with disaster.
There are further reasons why a consideration of psychology is 
important. Perhaps we are all in a position to detect from our
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armchair some underlying conditions that are invariably satisfied 
whenever an individual believes that, for example, there is a horse 
before her. By considering such conditions and reflecting on the 
question of whether they could play the role of determining meaning 
we might be able to work out the relevant naturalistic story with 
respect to such states. But most of us are very ignorant of the facts 
surrounding the tokening of subpersonal intentional states. These 
states may well get their contents fixed in a way quite different from 
that in which beliefs and desires get their contents fixed. So if we are 
going to produce a naturalistic theory that applies to such states, we 
are going to have to turn to psychology for help.^^^
Moreover, even a naturalist who seeks an account that applies only 
to beliefs and desires w ould be well advised not to ignore 
psychological research. A putative naturalistic sufficient condition 
might look convincing if we restrict our attention to beliefs and 
desires in virtue of its having an air of intuitive plausibility and our 
not having discovered any counterexamples. However, there might 
be counterexamples aplenty within the subpersonal realm; cases of 
states that satisfy the condition in question yet clearly don't have the 
relevant semantic or intentional property; counterexamples that we 
w ould have soon become aware of if only we had turned our 
attention away from a narrow range of familiar beliefs and desires. 
This point is not merely speculative for in the next chapter I will 
criticise certain aspects of Fodor's theory by appeal to the kinds of 
states that cognitive psychologists have postulated.
What all this suggests is that Fodor's method of proceeding is not 
entirely appropriate given the nature of the task at hand. A priori 
reflection has an important role to play in the uncovering of the 
range of sufficient conditions that will collectively naturalise the 
target intentional and semantic properties. But to engage in a priori 
reflection w hilst rem aining ignorant of, and indifferent to, 
developments in scientific psychology (and perhaps other sciences as 
well) is to adopt a method that does not inspire my confidence. 
Surely what is required is a more inter-disciplinary approach.
Indeed we may well have to turn to sciences other than psychology to get any 
indication as to what the relevant content determining facts might be; neuroscience, 
for example.
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6.5 Normativity
In certain quarters it is thought that the central obstacle that stands in 
the way of a successful completion of the naturalisation project - and, 
indeed entails that that project is ill-conceived - is the normative 
nature of meaning. Given that I have been attempting to vindicate 
the naturalisation project I cannot ignore this im portant and 
influential line of thought. I cannot hope to do anything more than 
scratch the surface of the complex and difficult issues in this area. 
However, I think I have a few points to make that suggest that 
normativity doesn't constitute as big a problem for the naturalist as 
some would have us believe.
W hat is involved in the claim that normativity is central to 
meaning or that meaning is a normative notion? The basic idea is 
that normativity is an essential component of meaning in the respect 
that if a symbol has a meaning then there will be infinitely many 
facts concerning how it ought to be used in various possible 
circumstances over and above any facts concerning how it would be 
used in those circumstances. How a symbol ought to be used is one 
thing, and how it is in fact used (or would be used) is quite another; 
there is no guarantee that the two will coincide. And how a symbol 
ought to be used is partly constitutive of its meaning so that to 
attribute to a symbol a particular meaning is to imply a whole battery 
of normative facts.
This alleged normative element of meaning poses a challenge to the 
naturalist for it entails that, for her theory to be adequate, the 
nonintentional and nonsemantic properties or facts specified by it 
m ust be capable of determ ining or fixing the norm ative facts 
concerning how the symbol or state in question ought to be used. 
Now the worry is that nonsemantic and nonintentional properties or 
facts are just not capable of fixing or determining such normative 
properties and facts. Consequently, there is no true naturalistic theory 
of content and to attempt to construct such a theory is to engage in a 
misguided project. In short, the objection is that the norm ative 
nature of meaning takes it out of the natural, nonsemantic realm.^^^
114 xhis line of thought is closely associated with Kripke's Wittgenstein (Kripke, 
1982) and with the work of John McDowell (see, for example, McDowell, 1986 and 
1994a and McCulloch, 1995). Of course, a fundamental difference between Kripke's
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I do not find this objection convincing; the naturalist can deal with 
normativity, and that she can has a lot to do with the fact that there 
are meaningful items that do not have a constitutive normative 
element. In what follows I will try to substantiate this claim.
A first point worth making is that the naturalist is not required to 
reduce normativity, or normative properties and facts, to physical 
properties and facts. It is quite consistent with naturalism that the 
normative is irreducibly normative/semantic. All that requires to be 
shown is that (and how) such normative facts as there are are 
ultimately determined or fixed by the physical.
It might be thought that there is no problem of normativity over 
and above the problem of misrepresentation; that to say that to use a 
symbol in a particular way is to use it in a way it ought not be used is 
to say no more than that such a use would constitute a case of 
misrepresentation. Now those philosophers who have attempted to 
construct a naturalistic theory of content have focused much of their 
energies on dealing with the problem of misrepresentation; with 
accounting for, in nonsem antic and nonintentional term s, the 
difference between tokenings of symbols that correctly represent their 
cause and tokenings of symbols that misrepresent their cause. It is far 
from obvious that such attem pts to deal with the problem  of 
misrepresentation fail, or that they must inevitably fail. Hence, if the 
problem posed by the normativity of meaning is nothing other than 
the problem posed by the phenomenon of misrepresentation then 
there are no compelling grounds for a blanket scepticism regarding 
the prospects for a viable naturalistic theory of content. However, it 
w ould appear that the problem s of norm ativ ity  and of 
misrepresentation are not one and the same. To say that a system has 
produced a symbol that misrepresents that symbol's cause is not to 
imply that the system has done anything it ought not to have done. 
Once a naturalist has successfully dealt with misrepresentation she
Wittgenstein, on the one hand, and McDowell, on the other, is that the former 
believes that the inability of the nonsemantic and nonintentional to fix the 
normative entails that there is no such thing as meaning something by a term, 
whereas the latter does not. For McDowell the presence of meaning in our world does 
not require that there be a deeper, more basic level of nonsemantic facts that are 
capable of generating, or being responsible for, that presence.
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still owes us an explanation of what makes m isrepresentation 
something that a system ought not do.
It strikes me as false to say that normativity is an essential 
component of meaning, for there are cases of meaningful items with 
respect to the use of which there are no normative facts. Consider the 
visual module as described by Marr. It produces symbols that 
certamly have semantic and intentional properties. For example, the 
primal sketch represents the nature and location of sudden intensity 
changes in the retinal image, the 3-D model representation 
represents the shape of objects impinging on the subject's visual 
apparatus, and so on. Yet governing the generation of these symbols 
are no norms or rules determining what the visual module ought 
(and ought not) do in various possible circumstances. It would be 
very odd indeed to say that my visual system had done something it 
ought not do when it produced a 3-D model representation that 
misrepresented a square shaped object as being rectangular; just as 
odd as to describe a plant that developed buds during a pre-spring 
warm  spell as having violated some norm governing its budding 
behaviour. I think that this point generalises to all symbols tokened 
at the sub-personal level, that is to all representations that express the 
contents of sub-personal intentional states. Moreover, if Fodor's 
language of thought hypothesis is correct (so that symbols of a 
neurophysiologically realised language expressed the contents of our 
beliefs, desires, and the like) there would be no norms associated 
with the use of the symbols of that language, even though they 
expressed the contents of personal level, as opposed to subpersonal,
states.^^5
McGinn (1984) might appear to be making the same point when he writes:
The issue of normativeness . . . has no clear content in application to the language 
of thought: what does it mean to ask whether my current employment of a word 
in my language of thought (i.e. the exercise of a particular concept) is correct in 
the light of my earlier employment of that word? . . . There is just no analogue 
here for the idea of linguistic incorrectness (as opposed to the fa ls ity  of a 
thought): linguistic incorrectness . . .  is using the same word with a different 
meaning from that originally intended (and doing so in ignorance of the change), 
but we cannot in this way make sense of employing a concept with a different
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None of this is to deny that there are meaningful items such that 
there are normative facts closely associated with their meanings. For 
there are certainly norms governing the use of public language 
symbols. When I apply the English word "horse" to a cow, use a word 
contrary to its m eaning in my linguistic comm unity, or am 
inconsistent in what I mean by a word, I do something that I ought 
not do. And as thinking sometimes involves the use of public 
language symbols, as when I say to myself "that dog looks ferocious", 
some of our thinking is norm governed. So there would appear to be 
a crucial difference between public language symbols on the one 
hand, and symbols of the language of thought and those 
m anipulated by our subpersonal processors, on the other. What 
could be responsible for this difference?
Here are some salient facts about public language symbols. Public 
language symbols have a meaning in a linguistic community, a 
meaning that is dependent upon the intentional states of the 
mem bers of that comm unity (their collective beliefs, desires, 
intentions, and so on), but that is independent of the intentional 
states of any particular member. There are rules governing the use of 
these symbols that are similarly dependent on those intentional 
states, rules that the members intend to grasp and follow and that 
they demand that their fellows follow. An individual's use of the 
symbols she uses is mediated by an understanding of their meaning. 
Associated with those symbols and their use is a whole battery of 
intentional states, such as beliefs as to the meaning of the symbols, 
desires and intentions to use them in accord with their meaning in 
the wider community, intentions to use them consistently, and so 
on. Consequently, whenever an individual uses a symbol to mean 
som ething at odds w ith its meaning in the wider community, 
violates a rule governing the use of a symbol, or is inconsistent in 
her use of a symbol, she thereby violates or fails to satisfy her 
intentions with respect to that symbol. Moreover, she runs the risk of
content from that originally intended - it would just be a different concept, (p.
147)
However, I don't want to endorse McGinn's reasoning for his conclusion. As will 
become clear, I think that it is for quite different reasons that the use of the symbols 
of the language of thought is not norm-governed.
205
provoking the censure of the wider linguistic community that makes 
demands of her parallel to those that she makes of herself.
With respect to the symbols of the language of thought, and those 
m anipulated at the subpersonal level, m atters are som ewhat 
different. They are not symbols of a shared public language governed 
by rules determined by the intentional states of their users. Neither 
are their meanings understood or grasped by their users. And their 
users do not have any intentional states with respect to their use.
My thought is that these differences are responsible for, and explain, 
the fact that there are normative facts associated with the use of 
public language symbols, but none with respect to symbols of the 
language of thought and symbols manipulated at the subpersonal 
level. This suggests a way of naturalising norm ativity. Such 
normative facts as there are can be accounted for by appeal to the 
intentional states of individuals; for it is my intentional states, along 
with those of my fellows, that determines the normative facts with 
respect to my use of the words and expressions of English. So long as 
these underlying intentional states do not themselves involve the 
use of symbols whose use is similarly surrounded by intentional 
states (or so long as any such surrounding intentional states can 
ultimately be dealt with by appeal to intentional states underlying 
them that satisfy this condition) then circularity or infinite regress is 
avoided. These underlying intentional states can then be naturalised 
by appeal to properties and facts that are not directly required to 
account for any normative properties or facts.
It might be objected that this appeal to linguistic rules along with 
our intentions to follow them and our practice of criticising our 
fellows when they violate them, can at best only account for 
normative facts connected with the use of public language symbols. 
But, so the objection continues, there are norms of theoretical and 
practical reasoning quite apart from linguistic rules. For example, 
there are rules or standards of inductive reasoning that I violate 
when I make a sweeping claim about the Finnish national character 
on the basis of meeting one or two Finns. In jum ping to my 
conclusion from the premises from which I began, I have done 
something that I ought not have done and that this is the case has 
nothing to do with my having violated a rule of English that I
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intended to follow. How is the naturalist to account for such 
normative facts?
In fact, I think that my treatment of language suggests a way of 
dealing with the present problem. There are many rules of inference 
and it is an open empirical question which of these our thinking 
employs or conforms to. As a matter of empirical fact, we place a very 
high value on truth and knowledge. We desire and seek to know, to 
hold beliefs that are true, to purge our belief system of false beliefs, 
and to make inferential leaps that have a high probability of taking 
us from true beliefs to true beliefs. Moreover, we criticise the 
ignorant and the indifferent, those who hold false beliefs, and those 
who make inferential leaps that have little chance of getting them 
from true beliefs to true beliefs (not to mention those who attempt to 
deceive their fellows). This is all to the good for having knowledge, 
holding true beliefs and minimising false beliefs generally aids our 
survival and helps in the satisfaction of our goals, ends and 
purposes. Consequently, when I reason badly, (as in the above 
example of jumping to a rash conclusion about Finns) I have acted in 
a way that runs counter to much of what I hold dear, in a way that 
violates some of my most fundam ental intentions and desires. 
Moreover, I have done precisely the kind of thing that evokes the 
criticism and condemnation of my fellows as reasoning is judged 
partly by reference to the extent to which it conforms with well 
established and entrenched modes and rules of inference. My point is 
that such facts about our desires, intentions, and what we hold dear, 
along w ith facts about our critical and evaluative practices, are 
collectively responsible for the norm ative facts connected with 
theoretical and practical reasoning. In other words, just as in the 
natural language case, we can account for such normative facts as 
there are in connection with reasoning by appealing to intentional 
states and critical and evaluative practices bound up w ith those 
intentional states.
This line of thought could do with much in the way of extension 
and elaboration. But I think that I have done enough to suggest that - 
in virtue of the fact that normativity isn't an essential component of 
m eaning - the problem  of norm ativity  doesn 't p resen t an 
insurm ountable obstacle to the successful execution of the 
naturalisation project.
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6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have attempted to develop an account of the nature 
of the naturalisation project that reveals it not to be a misguided 
project based upon false or confused assumptions. In particular, it is 
not an inherently or inevitably reductionist project. If there is to be a 
scientifically respectable intentional psychology then the phenomena 
that falls within its domain of enquiry must be physically composed, 
constituted, or realised, and the intentional and semantic properties 
that figure in its theories and explanations must supervene upon 
physical properties, or have their tokenings fixed or determined by 
physical facts. To engage in the naturalisation project, to attempt to 
construct a naturalistic theory of content, is to endeavour to indicate 
that and how the relationship between the psychological and the 
physical satisfies this condition, and thus vindicate scientific 
intentional psychology. A satisfactory naturalistic theory of content 
will consist of a battery of nonintentional and nonsemantic sufficient 
conditions that collectively indicates that and how the semantic and 
intentional properties of all of those intentional states of concern to 
scientific psychology are physically fixed or determined. The method 
most appropriate for constructing such a theory is interdisciplinary in 
nature, having both empirical and a priori components.
In the next chapter my attention will focus on Fodor's naturalistic 
theory of content.
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Chapter 7
Fodor's Theory of Content
7.1 Introduction
In Chapter 6 I argued that we need a naturalistic theory of content, a 
theory  tha t specifies the non in ten tional and nonsem antic 
determinants of the semantic and intentional properties attributed to 
our mental states in the course of psychological explanation and 
theory construction. So the question arises of whether Fodor's theory 
adequately performs this task. In this chapter I will address this 
question arguing in favour of a negative answer. I will also, in the 
light of my earlier reflections, attempt to draw some morals as to 
how we should proceed in the light of the failure of Fodor's theory.
Fodor’s approach to the naturalisation problem is to a large extent 
dictated by his commitment to the Representational Theory of Mind. 
RTM entails that the task of specifying the determ inants of the 
semantic and intentional properties of our intentional states reduces 
to that of specifying the determinants of the semantic and intentional 
properties of sentences of the language of thought or Mentalese. And, 
given that Mentalese has a combinatorial semantics, that reduces to 
the task of specifying the determinants of the meanings of the words 
of that language. Fodor's theory takes the form of a sufficient 
condition for a word of Mentalese to have the meaning that it has. In 
the next section I will turn to the task of describing that sufficient 
condition.
7.2 Fodor's sufficient condition
Fodor recognises that different types of symbols have their meanings 
determined in different ways and thus that one single account will 
not apply to all the symbols of Mentalese. He proposes a 
functional/causal role theory for the logical symbols of Mentalese. 
And, echoing Kripke (1972/1980) and Putnam (1975), he proposes a 
causal chain story for proper names. Neither of these stories are told
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in any deta il,!!^  reflecting his view that the hardest, and most 
important, part of the naturalisation project is that of dealing with 
those words which are neither logical symbols nor proper names; 
words, that is, that express properties, words like the English words 
"red", "horse", "proton", "virtue", and the like. In short his 
sufficient condition is supposed to apply to the simple, nonlogical 
symbols of Mentalese.
The intuition driving Fodor is that the meaning of a simple, 
nonlogical symbol is determ ined by its causal relations to 
phenomena external to it. Thus, for example, the Mentalese symbol 
HORSE means horse - or, in other words, expresses the property of 
being a horse - because horses, and only horses, reliably cause 
tokenings of HORSE.H^ Or because its a law that horses cause 
tokenings of HORSE. The theory that Fodor offers is a modification 
of such a causal covariation theory, thus placing him in a long 
tradition of tying meaning to etiology. (Other members of this 
tradition include Dretske (1981) and Skinner (1957)).
The causal covariation theory is atomistic as, according to it, a 
symbol's meaning is determined not by its relations to other symbols 
but wholly by its causal relations to whatever property it expresses. 
Thus the theory countenances the possibility of a subject's having 
horse thoughts despite being unable to have any other kind of 
thought. This feature of the theory explains a lot of its appeal to 
Fodor for, as we saw in Chapter 5, he thinks that the truth of holism 
would imply the impossibility of intentional psychology. Given that 
the motivation for naturalising content is to vindicate intentional 
psychology, holist theories of content are not an option for him: 
hence his opposition to the functionalist, conceptual role theories of 
Block (1986), Harman (1982) and Loar (1981).
Quite apart from its atomism, there are several reasons for taking 
the causal covariation theory seriously; its widespread and perennial 
appeal is not w ithout explanation. Firstly, by invoking causal 
relations and causal laws the theory appeals to something that is
1  ^^  In fact he more or less tells them in passing.
^1^1 shall refer to representations by means of capitalised words and expressions, 
meanings by means of italicised words and expressions, and natural language symbols 
by means of words and expressions flanked by inverted commas.
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naturalistically kosher. And, one might wonder, what else has the 
naturalist got to play with? Secondly, a cursory look at the predicates 
of natural language would suggest that there is a close relationship 
between the meanings of such symbols and the causal relations they 
bear to the properties they express. For example, most competent, 
adult speakers of English are disposed to respond to horses by 
uttering "horse" and we are reluctant to attribute a grasp of the 
meaning of that word to children or foreigners who indicate that 
they are not so disposed, or who are disposed to utter "horse" in 
response to non-horses. If there is a close relationship between the 
m eaning of the predicates of natural language and the causal 
relations that they bear to the properties that they express then there 
is every reason to expect that the same will be true of their Mentalese 
analogues. For, whenever we respond to an external object by 
uttering "horse" underlying that linguistic act will be a thought 
involving a tokening of HORSE. Thirdly, if a creature is to survive 
and prosper it must correctly represent the world external to it. Being 
able to think and reason will be of limited survival advantage if one 
cannot perceive the world around one. This implies that the 
representations produced by the perceptual systems of successful 
creatures will generally be caused by, and only by, instances of the 
property that they represent. Given the centrality of perception to 
m ental life, it is tem pting  to think that this fact about 
representations could play a meaning-determining role.
However, the causal covariation theory faces a major problem, 
namely that of finding a place for error or misrepresentation. It is one 
thing to say that minded creatures have, and must have if they are to 
survive, very effective perceptual systems and quite another to say 
that they have perceptual systems that never get it wrong, that never 
m isrepresent the nature of their distal stimulus. Indeed we all 
misrepresent the world from time to time as in the case where I see a 
cow on a dark night and mistakenly conclude that it is a horse. In 
such a case a cow causes me to token HORSE. The causal covariation 
theory seems to rule out such a possibility, implying that as cows on a 
dark night, as well as horses, cause tokenings of HORSE that symbol 
must mean something like horse~or-cow~on~a-dark-night. So, on the 
face of it, it looks like the theory doesn't apply to us. In the light of 
such a problem the advocate of the causal covariation theory needs to
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modify the theory in such a way as to avoid being forced to make a 
m istaken attribution of a disjunctive content in such cases. In 
Fodor's terminology, what is needed is a solution to the disjunction 
problem.
To make matters worse, as Fodor emphasises in 'TOCIT, there is 
another familiar kind of case where the cause of a Mentalese symbol 
does not fall within its extension, namely representation in thought. 
For example, thoughts about hay sometimes cause thoughts about 
horses; and thus sometimes cause tokenings of FIORSE. When this 
happens we don't have error or misrepresentation; when a thought 
about hay causes me to token HORSE, I haven't mistaken the hay 
thought for, or misrepresented it as, a horse. Such cases seem to force 
the advocate of the causal covariation theory to attribute to HORSE a 
disjunctive content that not only has as a disjunct cow-on-a-dark- 
night but also thought-about-hay.
If we are to hold onto the idea that mind-world causal relations lie 
at the heart of m ental m eaning, we need uncover some 
nonintentional and nonsemantic property that the causal connection 
between horses and tokenings of HORSE has that that between cows 
on a dark night and tokenings of HORSE (and thoughts about hay 
and tokenings of HORSE) does not; a property that explains why the 
former plays a role in determining the meaning of HORSE whereas 
the latter does not. The discovery of such a property would facilitate 
a modification of the causal theory that would solve the disjunction 
problem.
Fodor considers, and finds wanting, several attempts to solve the 
disjunction problem in the above described way. Firstly, there is 
Dretske's (1981) idea that the fundamental, meaning-determining 
causal connections are those that hold in the period when a symbol is 
being learnt. According to Dretseke, what a symbol means depends 
upon w hat property it covaries w ith, or w hat information its 
tokenings carry, in the learning period. Applied to our example the 
idea would be that HORSE means horse because in the learning 
period horses, and only horses, cause tokenings of HORSE. We get 
misrepresentation when, outside the learning period - i.e. once the 
meaning of the symbol has been fixed - a tokening of the symbol is 
caused by something that doesn't have the property that covaried 
with the symbol in that crucial period.
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Fodor objects^^ that: (i) There is no principled, non-arbitrary way of 
saying w hen the learning period ends and m isrepresentation 
becomes a possibility; (ii) The theory can apply only to symbols that 
are learnt and thus not to the symbols of Mentalese as Mentalese is 
an innate language; (iii) It is not true of learnt symbols that they 
covary with the property they express in the period during which 
they are being learnt. Consider the English word "horse". At best 
utterances of this word by me were caused by, and only by, horses 
when I was learning that term. But had I been confronted by a cow on 
a dark night I w ould have said "horse". The tru th  of this 
counterfactual entails that "horse" doesn't covary with horses in the 
learning period for the relevant notions of causal connection and 
causal covariance are counterfactual-supporting.
A second approach to the disjunction problem involves appealing 
to optimal circumstances. It's true that cows sometimes cause me to 
think HORSE but, usually, when this happens conditions are not 
ideal with respect to determining what type of object is before me. 
This is the case when I am confronted by a cow on a dark night; had 
conditions been ideal, that is had it not been dark, I would not have 
mis-identified the cow as a horse. This leads quite naturally to the 
thought that it is the causal connections that hold in ideal or optimal 
conditions that determine meaning, where these ideal or optimal 
conditions are to be described in psychophysical terms, that is, in 
terms of lighting conditions, spatial relationship to the distal stimuli, 
and such like. Given this, in cases of misrepresentation a symbol is 
caused by something that would not have caused it had conditions 
been ideal. Thus the fact that cows sometimes cause tokenings of 
HORSE doesn't mean that cows fall within the extension of that 
symbol (or that it has a disjunctive content one of the disjuncts being 
cow) because cows do not, and would not, cause tokenings of HORSE 
in optimal conditions.
The main problem with this theory is that it does not apply to belief, 
or thought in general, (and thus, given RTM, not to the symbols of 
Mentalese) due to the role of beliefs in belief fixation. Whenever a 
horse causes me to think that there is a horse present the causal 
connection between the horse and the thought will be mediated by a
118 See Psychosemantics and "Semantics Wisconsin Style"
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whole collection of beliefs including beliefs as to what horses look 
like. A consequence of this is that being in the psychophysically 
described optimal circumstances w ith respect to a horse is no 
guarantee that that horse will cause me to think HORSE. I could be in 
just those circumstances and have a belief which interferes with this 
process.
A third attem pt at solving the disjunction problem involves 
appealing to teleological considerations. The basic idea is that a 
representation expresses the property that it causally covaries with in 
those circumstances where the mechanism that produces it is 
performing its proper function. "Proper function" here is to be 
understood in evolutionary terms so that it is the proper function of 
mechanism M to produce tokens of representation R in response to 
instances of property P if and only if M was selected for in virtue of 
producing R’s in response to instances of P. Expressed in terms of the 
concept of Normalcy, the teleological theory has it that R expresses P 
if R causally covaries with P in Normal c ir c u m s ta n c e s .T h u s  in 
cases of m isrepresentation conditions are not Normal; in other 
words, a mechanism produces a representation in response to a 
property, and in so doing does not perform its biologically proper 
function.
Fodor has two compelling criticisms of this theory!^0. One is that 
representations are produced Normally not only by mechanisms that 
m ediate the causal connections betw een properties and the 
representations that express them. In thought, representations are 
often Normally produced in response to some other representation, 
or a thought there being no instance of the represented property to be 
seen. For example, in chains of thought a tokening of HORSE is often
 ^D  Teleological theories of a biological, evolutionary form have been advanced by 
a number of philosophers in recent years. Some notable examples are: Millikan 
(1984), (1989), Papineau (1987), (1993), Dretske (1986) and Dennett (1987). Indeed, 
Fodor briefly flirted with a version of the teleological theory. See his long  
suppressed paper "Psychosemantics, or; Where Do Truth Conditions Come From". It 
must be emphasised that the teleological theory described above is the theory that 
Fodor considers and does not necessarily coincide with all (or any) of the theories just 
cited. Arguably, however, Fodor's criticisms of the theory he describes cause 
problems for any teleological theory of a biological, evolutionary hue.
 ^20 See his 'A theory of Content, I: The Problem'
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caused quite Normally by thoughts about hay. This fact would seem 
to force the advocate of the teleological theory to conclude that 
HORSE m eans horse-or-thought about hay. In other words the 
theory doesn't solve the disjunction theory.
Fodor's primary objection to the teleological theory is that it is 
afflicted with a problem of indeterminacy, and consequently that, 
once again, it fails to solve the disjunction problem. This can be seen 
by considering the famous case of the Frog and the fly. Frogs have a 
mechanism M which, in response to certain distal stimuli, produces 
a representation R that in turn causes a snap. Flies, when they 
impinge upon a frog's visual system, typically set off such a causal 
chain and as a result end up being swallowed and ingested. This is 
clearly a good thing to happen to a frog, and it is in virtue of such 
effects that M has been selected for. Now what is the function of M? 
One possible answer is that it is to detect flies. If M is a fly detector 
then, according to the teleological theory, R means fly  A n o th e r 
possible answer is that, due to the fact that all the flies in the frog's 
environment are little ambient black things (LABTs for short) and all 
the LABT's are flies, M is an LABT detector; for M was selected for in 
virtue of the effects of producing R in response to LABTs. If that is 
the function of M then, on the teleological theory, R means, not fly  , 
but LABT. Fodor's crucial point is that there is nothing the advocate 
of the teleological theory can appeal to in order to justify the 
preference of one of these stories to any other. In particular 
counterfactuals cannot be appealed to for the basic idea driving the 
theory is that it is the mechanism's actual history that determines its 
function. Thus, the teleological theory entails that R has no 
determinate content. Fodor writes: It bears emphasis that Darwin 
doesn't care which of these ways you tell the teleological story' 
('TOCT p. 72). And again: 'The moral . . .  is that . . . Darwin doesn't 
care how you describe the intentional objects of frog snaps. All that 
matters for selection is how many flies the frog manages to ingest in 
consequence of its snapping, and this number comes out exactly the 
same whether one describes the function of the snap guidance 
mechanism with respect to a world that is populated by flies that are, 
de facto, ambient black things, or with respect to a world that is 
populated with ambient black dots that are, de facto, flies . . .  So its no
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use looking to Darwin to get you out of the disjunction problem', 
(pp. 72-73)
The above described attempts to solve the disjunction problem all 
involve specifying a property that the causal connection between a 
representation and the property that it expresses has that the causal 
connection between the representation and all other properties do 
not have; a property in virtue of which the meaning-determining 
causal connections determine meaning. So, according to Dretske's 
theory, the crucial property is that of being a causal connection that 
holds in the learning period. According to the second theory it is that 
of being the connection that holds in ideal or optimal circumstances. 
And according to the teleological theory it is that of being the 
connection that holds in Normal circumstances.
All these theories take the causal connections in question to be 
counterfactual supporting and hence to be causal laws. This has the 
effect of making them all Type one theories. That is they attempt to 
define, in naturalistic terms , what Fodor describes as a "Type one 
situation", a situation that is such that:
(i) If it's a law that Ps cause S-tokens in type one situations, then S 
means F (and if P is disjunctive then so be it);
and
(ii) not all situations in which S gets tokened qualify as type one, 
so that tokens of S that happen in other sorts of situation s are 
ipso facto free to be false. ('TOCII' p. 64)
These theories have it that, respectively, the Type one situation is the 
learning situation, the ideal or optimal situation and the Normal 
situation.
Fodor's theory points to a property that the causal connection 
between a representation and the property that it expresses has that 
marks it apart from all other causal connections involving that 
representation. But his is not a Type one theory. For he suspects that, 
because of the robustness of meaning, there just are not any 
naturalistically describable circumstances in which a representation is
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caused by, and only by, instances of the property that it represents.!^! 
For Fodor, the key difference between the causal connection between 
a representation and the property that it expresses, on the one hand, 
and all those causal connections between that representation and 
other properties, on the other, is that the latter depend on the former 
but not vice versa. The idea can be brought out by considering the 
now familiar example of the Mentalese symbol HORSE (which, of 
course, means horse.) Horses cause tokenings of HORSE. Cows (on a 
dark night) also cause tokenings of HORSE. Now cows wouldn't 
cause tokenings of HORSE were it not the case that horses did. But 
not vice versa; for horses would still cause tokenings of HORSE even 
if cows didn't. In other words, break the causal cormection between 
horses and HORSE and you thereby break the causal connection 
betw een cows (and all other non-horses, for that matter); but 
breaking the latter connection will not thereby break the former. 
Expressed in Fodor's now famous terminology, the causal connection 
betw een cows (and all non-horses) and HORSE asymmetrically 
depends on that between horses and HORSE. This feature of the 
causal connections involving HORSE, thinks Fodor, lies at the heart 
of its meaning. Thus he presents the following as a sufficient 
condition for a prim itive, nonlogical symbol of mentalese S to 
express a property P:
S expresses the property P if:
(i) Ps cause Ss; and
(ii) For any property P* not equivalent to P, if P^ s^ cause Ss then 
the P'^  -> S connection asymmetrically depends on the P -> S 
connection.
2^1 Fodor says of his theory that it:
Has the desirable property of not assuming that there are such things as Type 
one situations; in particular, it doesn't assume that there are circumstances - 
nom ologically specifiable and naturalistically and otherwise nonquestion  
beggingly specifiable - in which it's semantically necessary that only cows cause 
"cows". Nor does it assume that there are nonquestion-beggingly specifiable 
circumstances in which its semantically necessary that all cows would cause 
"cows". ('TOCIT p.91)
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Actually the above only counts as a first approximation of Fodor's 
theory. This is because he conceives the causal connections in 
question as being counterfactual supporting. He holds that 'if the 
generalisation that Xs cause Ys is counterfactual supporting, then 
there is a "covering" law that relates the property of being X to the 
p roperty  of being a cause of Ys: counterfactual supporting  
generalisations are (either identical to or) backed by causal laws, and 
laws are relations among properties' ('TOCIT p. 93). Therefore a 
better expression of his theory would be:
S expresses the property F if:
(i) It's a law that Ps cause Ss; and
(ii) For any property P* not equivalent to P, if its a law that P*s 
cause Ss then that law asymmetrically depends on the law that 
Ps cause Ss.^^^
Applied to HORSE Fodor's idea is that that symbol expresses the 
property horse, that is, means horse, because it's a law that horses 
cause tokenings of HORSE, a law upon which all causal laws relating 
non-horses to tokenings of HORSE asymmetrically depend. Thus 
HORSE doesn't mean cozv on a dark night, horse-or- cow on a dark 
night or thought about hay despite the etiological heterogeneity of 
HORSE tokens.
To say that a law, or a causal connection, asymmetrically depends 
upon another is to commit oneself to the tru th  of certain 
counterfactuals; specifically, it is to say that if, contrary to fact, the 
latter law did not hold, then neither would the former, but not vice
122 Here I am assuming that the sentence "there is a nomic relation between the 
property of being X and the property of being a cause of Ys" is semantically 
equivalent to (the somewhat less unwieldy) "it's a law that Xs cause Ys".
 ^ Here's how Fodor puts it:
So, what the story about asymmetric dependence comes down to is that "cow" 
means cow if (i) there is a nomic relation between the property of being a cow and 
the property of being a cause of "cow" tokens; and (ii) if there are nomic relations 
between other properties and the property of being a cause of "cow" tokens, then 
the latter nomic relations depend asymmetrically upon the former, (p. 93)
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versa (that is, the latter would hold even if, contrary to fact, the 
former didn’t). If, following Lewis (1973) and Stainaker (1984), we 
understand counterfactuals in possible world terms, then to say that 
law Y asymmetrically depends on law X is to say that in nearby (or, 
perhaps, the nearest) possible worlds where it's not a law that X, 
neither is it a law that Y; and in nearby (or in the nearest) possible 
worlds where it isn't a law that Y, it is nevertheless a law that X. 
Thus, Fodor can be understood as claiming, for example, that HORSE 
means horse if/because in the nearby possible world where it’s not a 
law that horses cause tokenings of HORSE neither is it a law that 
cows, thoughts about hay, etc. cause tokenings HORSE; but not vice 
versa. Fodor expresses some qualms about such a possible-worlds 
understanding of his theory. However, he does talk in possible- 
worlds terms, and often attempts to justify his theory by pointing out 
how things are in nearby possible worlds. Following this convention, 
I will understand the notion of asymmetric dependence in possible 
world terms. I think there is a very good reason for doing this: 
namely, it gives us some tangible grasp on what Fodor's theory 
comes to, thereby putting us in a better position to evaluate it.
7.3 Natural language
My first step in evaluating Fodor's theory will involve addressing 
the question of whether it applies to the prim itive nonlogical 
symbols of natural language. As we shall see, this question is highly 
relevant despite the fact that Fodor's prim ary concern is with 
M entalese. There is a very close relationship betw een natural 
language and thought. For example, it is by means of language that 
we express our thoughts, so that underlying any causal or nomic 
connections between properties and the natural language symbols 
that express them will be causal or nomic connections between those 
very properties and the corresponding symbols of mentalese. 
Consequently, if the theory works for natural language then there is 
good reason to take it seriously as a theory of Mentalese. Indeed 
Fodor seems to be relying on this consideration as he often appeals to 
(putative) facts about natural language in motivating and defending 
his theory. And he often presents natural language examples, 
implying that w hat is true of the natural language symbol in
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question is just as true of its Mentalese analogue; it's just that English 
is "easier to spell".^^4 Therefore it would be bad news for Fodor if his 
theory didn't apply to natural language, or only applied to a narrow 
portion of it. If this were the case serious doubts would arise as to 
whether there were any reasons for believing that the theory applied 
to Mentalese; much of the m otivation for endorsing the theory 
w ould have evaporated. Hence the relevance of addressing the 
question of whether the theory applies to natural language symbols.
So the question is: does Fodor's theory work for the primitive 
nonlogical symbols of natural language? Do the primitive nonlogical 
symbols of English even satisfy Fodor's sufficient condition? If one 
restricts one's attentions to such words as "horse" and "cow" the
124 Fodor introduces and m otivates his asymmetric dependence story in 
Psychosemantics in the following manner. He begins by announcing that he is after 'a 
difference between A-caused "A" tokenings and B-caused "A" tokenings that can be 
expressed in terms of nonintentional and nonsemantic properties of causal relations' 
(p.106). To discover this difference he considers a specific symbol, namely the 
English word "horse", the tokenings of which are sometimes caused by horses and 
sometimes by cows (when seeing a cow I misidentify it as a horse), Fodor is explicit 
that what is true of the English word "horse" will also be true of its mentalese 
counterpart: 'Here we have all the ingredients of the disjunction problem (set up, as 
it happens, for a token of English rather than a token of Mentalese; but none of the 
following turns on that)' (p. 107). A consideration of this case leads him to the 
conclusion that:
misidentifying a cow as a horse wouldn't have led me to say 'horse' except that 
there was independently a semantic relation between 'horse' tokenings and 
horses. But for the fact that the word 'horse' expresses the property of being a 
horse (i.e. but for the fact that one calls horses 'horses') it would not have been 
that word that taking a cow to be a horse would have caused me to utter. 
Whereas, by contrast, since 'horse' does mean horse, the fact that horses cause me 
to say 'horse' does not depend on there being a semantic - or, indeed, any - 
connection between 'horse' tokenings and cows. (pp. 107-108)
In 'TOCir Fodor again appeals to a natural language example to introduce and 
motivate his theory of mental content. Here he says that the linguistic practise of 
using the expression "fetch me a slab" to request a slab (and hence the causal 
connection between a desire for a slab and an utterance of "slab") asymmetrically 
depends on the practice of using "slab" to predicate slabhood (and hence the causal 
connection between slabs and utterances of "slab"). See pp. 96-100.
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answer would seem to be that they do. I often respond to horses by 
saying, either aloud or to myself, "horse". And if there were doubts as 
to w hether an individual (for example, a foreigner or a child) 
understood the word "horse", those doubts would be confirmed if 
she didn't respond to horses by saying "horse"; especially if she 
tended to respond to horses by uttering some other word and tended 
to utter "horse" in response to some other type of object. So it would 
appear that it is true of individuals who mean horse by "horse" that 
there is a reliable causal connection (and perhaps even a nomic 
connection) between horses and their uttering "horse". Moreover, 
this connection would appear to be basic with respect to all the causal 
connections between non-horses and "horse". "Horse" is not a 
symbol of an innate language, rather it has to be learnt. The learning 
process involves a teacher trying to establish in the learner a 
disposition to respond to horses w ith "horse". Until such a 
disposition has been established (and hence a reliable causal 
connection between horses and "horse") the teaching process will not 
be deemed to have been successful; that is, the language learner will 
not be judged to have grasped the m eaning of "horse". In 
establishing this disposition, a whole load of other dispositions to 
respond to non-horses with "horse" will thereby be established; for 
example, the dispositions to produce "horse" in response to cows on 
a dark night, pantomime horses, pictures of horses, thoughts about 
hay, and so on. Thus we have asymmetric dependency of sorts, for: 
had the causal connection between horses and "horse" not been 
established none of the other connections would hold; and these 
latter connections are a contingent by product, or side effect, of the
former. 125
Thus it is arguable that "horse" comes close to satisfying Fodor's 
condition. But a mere satisfaction of the condition does not entail 
that the Fodorian theory applies to such natural language symbols as 
"horse". One possibility is that though Fodor's condition is sufficient 
it is not in virtue of its satisfaction that "horse" means horse. If this
In saying that we have a case of asymmetric dependence here I don’t mean to 
imply that the nature of the relationship between the various causal connections is 
just as Fodor describes. All I mean to say is that there is an intuitively obvious 
respect in which all the connections between non-horses and "horse" depend upon 
that between horses and "horse", but not vice versa.
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were the case his theory would not tell us in virtue of what "horse" 
means horse. Another possibility is that the condition for meaning 
that Fodor presents is not sufficient but, rather, necessary. In the case 
of "horse" I think that at least one of these possibilities is the case.
My intuition is that to say that "horse" (on my lips) means horse 
because of the nature of the causal connections in which "horse" 
figures (and the dependency relationships between them) is to get 
things the wrong way round; it is to put the cart before the horse. 
When, in response to a horse, I say "horse", what I am doing is 
predicating horsehood of the beast before me. That I do this by 
uttering "horse" is a product of my understanding of that word, of its 
meaning for me. If I understood "horse" differently then I would use 
some other word. Similarly, it is because I understand "horse" to 
mean horse that I utter that word when I mistake a cow on a dark 
night for a horse. And again, it is my understanding of "horse" that 
explains why my desire to tell you about Dobbin manifests itself in 
my uttering "horse". In short, it is meaning that determines causal 
cormections rather than the other way round. The upshot of this is 
that even if the causal connections being as they are described by 
Fodor is sufficient for "horse"'s meaning horse (in the respect that 
"horse" couldn't mean anything other than horse given that the 
connections are this way) it is not in virtue of their being this way 
that that word has that meaning.
A further intuition of mine is that the causal connections being as 
Fodor describes is a necessary (rather than a sufficient) condition for 
"horse'"s meaning horse . In order to mean horse by "horse" it is 
necessary that I use that word to predicate horsehood of horses. A 
failure to do this would suggest that I had no idea what a "horse" 
was. Thus it is necessary that horses causes me to utter "horse". After 
all we suspect that foreigners and children who don't generally say 
"horse" in response to horses (who say nothing at all or utter some 
other word) do not understand or grasp the meaning of the English 
word "horse". Why would we do that if Fodor's condition wasn't 
necessary? And so long as he has only a necessary condition, the 
worry will be that the determinants of the meaning of our mental 
states are non-naturalistic facts about us and those states.
Is the condition even satisfied by other primitive nonlogical 
symbols of English? After all such words as "horse" need not be
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typical. The now familiar reflections of Burge and Putnam suggest 
that at least some words are such that their meaning on our lips is 
partly determined by facts about the world external to us, including 
facts about the social and linguistic communities to which we belong. 
What this suggests is that what many of the words in my idiolect 
mean is determined by what they mean in my linguistic community, 
given my intentions and desires to mean by my words just what my 
fellows mean. I am a bona fide member of an English speaking 
linguistic community. The w ords of that com m unity have a 
meaning that I play no role in determining but that meaning can, 
and often does, play a fundamental role in determining what various 
words mean on my lips. For example, the word "protein" has a 
m eaning on my lips despite the facts that I have a lim ited 
understanding of what proteins are and that I would win no prizes in 
a protein-spotting competition. What I mean by this word is what 
everyone else means, namely protein. And I mean this because the 
meaning (on my lips) of many of the words that I use is borrowed or 
inherited from that of the words of my fellows, given the fact that I 
intend and desire to mean just what they mean. Thus, with at least 
some words, it is not a speaker's dispositions to use them that 
determines meaning; and there will be many cases where a speaker 
means such and such by a word despite the fact that she does not 
satisfy Fodor's condition for meaning such and such by that word.
In The Elm and the Expert Fodor develops a line of thought with 
respect to deferential concepts that constitutes a reply to the kind of 
objection presented in the preceding paragraph. Consider the word 
"elm", for example. Most people cannot recognise an elm when they 
see one; they can’t tell elms from beeches, for instance. This fact 
notw ithstanding, argues Fodor, there is still a reliable causal 
connection between elms and "elm", a connection that is mediated 
by experts. I do not normally care to what species the tree before me 
belongs. In those cases where I do care I can utilise an expert so that I 
will respond by uttering "elm" to (and only to) elms. The situation is 
not appreciably different from that where we employ instruments of 
observation or laboratory equipment in order to determine whether 
or not we are being confronted with an instance of a particular 
property. In other words, just as there is a causal correlation between 
acidhood and "acid", there is a causal correlation between elmhood
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and "elm" and between proteinhood and "protein"; in the first case 
the connection is mediated by an instrument of observation (i.e. a 
piece of litmus paper) and in the other two it is mediated by an 
expert.
I have several objections to this line of thought. First, even if it is 
true that there is an expert mediated reliable causal connection 
between proteinhood and my utterances of "protein", it doesn't 
follow that it is in virtue of the existence of this connection that 
"protein" means protein on my lips. Describing the situation tends to 
do nothing other than suggest that "protein" means what it does on 
my lips in virtue of the facts that it means protein on the lips of 
officially recognised experts and that I am willing to defer to these 
experts and intend to mean by "protein" what they mean by that 
word. It is also worth pointing out that there is a key difference 
between expert mediated casual connections, on the one hand, and 
instrum ent of observation m ediated connections, on the other. 
Employing an instrument of observation is an active process that 
involves a subject's utilising a body of knowledge that she has about 
significant properties of the referent of the term in question. For 
example, when I determine that the solution is acid by dipping in a 
piece of litmus paper, I utilise my knowledge that acid turns litmus 
paper red. Because of this, it seems natural to say that I determine the
Here is how Fodor makes the point:
"I can't tell elms from beeches, so I defer to the experts." Compare: "I can't tell 
acids from bases, so I defer to the litmus paper"; or "I can't tell Tuesdays from 
Wednesdays, so I defer to the calendar." These three ways of putting the case 
are, I think, equally loopy, and for much the same reason. As a matter of fact, I 
can tell acids from bases: I wse the litmus test to do so. And I can tell elms from 
beeches too. The way I do it is, I consult a botanist.
What I do with the litmus, and with the botanist, is this: I construct 
environments in which their respective states are reliable indicators of the 
acidity of the sample and the elmicity of the tree; in the one case, I dip the 
litmus into the fluid, in the other case. I point the expert at the tree.. . . From the 
point of view of an informational semantics, the situation is absolutely normal: 
that my elm and my acid thoughts have the content that they do depends on 
their being mechanisms that reliably correlate them with instantiations of 
elmhood and acidhood respectively. (The Elm and the Expert pp. 34-35)
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acidhood (or otherwise) of the solution. Yet when I defer to an expert 
as to the type of tree before me, I do not engage in an active process 
that involves utilising my knowledge as to some of the key 
properties of elms; rather, I passively respond to someone who tells 
me what to think and say. Because of this fact, it seems wrong to say 
that I can detect elms and tell elms from beeches. In other words, 
expert mediated causal connections cannot be lumped together with 
instrument of observation mediated causal connections.
Second, Fodor runs the risk of making it far too easy for a subject to 
grasp the meaning of a word or concept. Suppose that Edgar is 
employed by an ornithologist conducting a survey of the birdlife in a 
particular stretch of woodland. He tramps round the wood with the 
bird expert writing down the name of the species of any bird that the 
expert sees and subsequently calls out. (For example, when the expert 
sees a Jay he says "Jay" and Edgar, as instructed, writes down "Jay" in 
his notebook.) Edgar knows nothing about the creatures whose 
presence he is recording, indeed he doesn't even know that the 
survey is a survey of birds. For all he cares, it could be a survey of 
mushrooms or wild flowers. I take it that Edgar does not grasp the 
meaning of the word "Jay" or the meanings of any of the words that 
he writes down in his notebook. Yet there is as much of a reliable 
expert mediated causal connection between Jayhood and Edgar’s use 
of the word "Jay" as there is between proteinhood(/elmhood) and my 
use of the word "protein"(/"elm"). In short, by appealing to experts 
in order to deal with the charge that his theory does not apply to 
many of the words that belong to my idiolect of English, Fodor runs 
the risk of implying that there is meaning in cases where there 
clearly isn't any, thus providing a reductio of his theory.
Third, suppose that, once more, we accept that there is an expert 
m ediated causal connection between proteinhood and my use of 
"protein". But it is far from clear that this connection is of the type 
that Fodor requires. As will become clear later (see section 7.4), the 
fact that proteins sometimes cause "protein" (i.e. in those cases where 
I have an expert with me) far from implies that it is a law that 
proteins cause "protein". Moreover, given that an instance of 
proteinhood will cause me to utter "protein" in the company of an 
expert only if I believe that expert to be an expert, it would appear 
that the most accurate way to describe the nature of the connection is
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in terms such as these: proteins cause me to utter "protein" when I 
am in the company of someone who I believe to be a protein expert. 
In other words, Fodor's appeal to experts doesn't establish that 
proteins reliably cause "protein" but only that proteins reliably cause 
"protein" when the subject is in the company of experts who are 
believed to be such. But the latter connection is inherently 
intentional and so is of no use to Fodor in his project of producing a 
naturalistic theory of content.
Finally, it is far from clear that proteins cause me to utter "protein" 
even when I have an expert at hand. Fodor would no doubt argue 
along the following lines: in such cases an instance of proteinhood 
causes the expert to have a protein thought, a thought that causes 
him to utter "protein", an utterance that causes the subject to have a 
protein thought and to utter "protein". Given the transitivity of the 
causal relation, all this implies that an instance of proteinhood 
causes the subject to utter "protein". However, it strikes me as 
mistaken to argue in this manner. Surely what causes the subject to 
utter "protein" is not the protein but the expert's pronouncement. In 
other words, we do not have a case where an instance of proteinhood 
causes the subject to utter "protein". If that sounds implausible 
consider this case. One of my housemates hears a noise in the back­
yard and comes to the conclusion that the house is being burgled. She 
bursts into my room shouting "we're being burgled" causing me to 
form the belief that my house is being burgled. What caused that 
belief? Surely not the noise in the back-yard (a noise that I never 
even heard). Rather, the cause of my belief is my housem ate's 
pronouncements. I don't see how the expert case is any different: just 
as the noise in the back yard does not causally impinge upon me, 
neither does the instance of proteinhood causally impinge upon the 
subject. Therefore, proteins don't cause me to utter "protein", experts 
notwithstanding.
Many of the words that we use mean what they mean on our lips 
(partly) because of the knowledge or the beliefs that we hold 
concerning the nature of the property that the word in question 
expresses. I mean chair by "chair" partly because of the fact that I 
believe chairs to be manmade objects with backs and legs that are 
used, and are designed to be used, as seats for one person. If the 
beliefs of mine that were associated with the word "chair" were
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radically different from what they are then, on my lips, that word 
would not mean chair. Reflecting this, when we want to determine 
whether an individual understands a word X, or grasps its meaning, 
we often ask such questions as "what is an XT', "what are X's?". If no 
answer is forthcoming, or if the answer is radically different from the 
one that we would give, we conclude that the individual does not 
mean anything by the w ord in question, or means som ething 
somewhat different from what we mean. So, for example, you can't 
mean chair by "chair" if you don't believe that the items that fall 
within the extension of "chair" are backed, legged, one person seats. 
And if you do mean chair by "chair", it is partly in virtue of your 
having these beliefs.
The preceding comments might raise the suspicion that I run the 
danger of lapsing into some unacceptable version of semantic holism 
or endorsing something like a description theory of reference. Such 
worries, though natural, can easily be allayed. To say that one has to 
hold certain beliefs about the nature of the referent of a word for that 
word to mean such and such on one's lips is not to imply that for any 
two individuals to share a meaning they must have associated with 
their respective words just the same collection of beliefs. To see this 
consider the following. Within a linguistic community at a particular 
point in time there is often a collection of widely held, orthodox 
beliefs concerning the nature of the referents of various of the terms 
of its language. For example, w ith respect to the English word 
"water" the current orthodoxy within our linguistic community is 
that, inter alia, water quenches thirst, can exist in a gaseous, liquid, or 
solid state, is H2O, and so on. Learning the meaning of "water" 
involves learning what water is, which involves learning all, most, 
or at least some of these facts about water. An individual who was 
deemed not to know most, or at least some of these facts, would be 
judged not to understand or have grasped the meaning of "water". 
There are many other examples: if you don't know that what we call 
"snakes" are leg-less reptiles, that what we call "whales" are marine 
mammals, that what we call "ghosts" are restless spirits of the 
departed, or that what we call "futons" are Japanese sofa beds, then 
your do not know, respectively, what the words "snake", "whale", 
"ghost" and "futon" mean. In short, it is true of many words that to 
understand them or grasp their meaning one has to buy into the
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current orthodoxy concerning the nature of their referents. That is 
why the questions "what does 'X' mean?" and "what is an X?" (or 
"what are X’s?") are often interchangeable.
But of course orthodoxy changes; the received wisdom as to the 
nature of water varies from group to group and from time to time. 
Consequently, what one has to know or believe to know what 
"water" means (or for "water" on one's lips to mean water ) depends 
upon which social group you are a member of and the point in time 
at which you exist. So, for example, I have to know that water is H2O 
in order to mean water by "water" but Aristotle didn't have to know 
this fact in order to mean water by the ancient Greek analogue of 
"water". An unacceptable holism that implied that two individuals 
could mean the same thing by a word only if they had identical 
beliefs concerning the nature of the referents of that word is thus 
avoided.
These thoughts could no doubt do with a good deal of elaboration 
and qualification: to which words do they apply?; how much of the 
current orthodoxy does one have to accept?; is it possible to reject 
some, or all, of the current orthodoxy and still mean water by 
"water" - if, say, one is aware of that orthodoxy but finds it wanting in 
some way?; can children get away with knowing less?; and so on. I 
am not going to try to answer any of these questions, for I think I 
have established my point that for natural language it is sometimes 
the case that the meaning of a word on an individual's lips is at least 
partly determined by what she believes about the nature of the 
referent of the word in question. Thus the Fodorian view that 
m eaning is wholly determ ined by the nature of the causal 
connections between, or causal laws relating, (instances of) properties 
and (tokenings of) symbols, and the dependency relationships 
between these connections or laws, would appear not to apply to
natural l a n g u a g e . 127
127 Fodor explicitly says that although beliefs mediate meaning-determining 
causal/nom ic connections, the content of those beliefs plays no role in determining 
meaning. He refers to the Greeks, who had a word with the same meaning as our 
word "star" despite the fact that they believed that stars were holes in the sky. As 
w e have seen, such a case doesn't constitute a counterexample to the claim that 
meaning is partly determined by one’s beliefs (and not w holly by causal 
connections), as what one has to believe to mean such and such by a word is relative
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These reflections suggest that there may well be counterexamples in 
the offing, cases where a word of an individual's idiolect of English 
satisfies the Fodorian sufficient condition for having a certain 
meaning (namely the conventional meaning) but doesn't have that 
meaning due to certain facts about the subject's beliefs concerning the 
nature of the referents of the word in question. Here is one such 
counterexample (one that I take to be highly plausible). Edgar has 
moved to the Scottish Highlands, that last bastion of the pine 
marten. The pine m arten is a small carnivorous, tree climbing 
mammal, a member of the badger-weasel family. Fine martens are 
brown with a creamy yellow chest and have a long, bushy tail. They 
are quick, agile, and wary of humans; but in winter they have a 
tendency to engage in night time raids on domestic refuse bins in 
search of food. Many a highlander has woken to find that his refuse­
laden bin bags have been decapitated by hungry pine martens.
Before he moved to the Highlands, Edgar had never heard of the 
pine marten, but he was familiar with a family of small birds known 
as "martins" (a family that includes the house martin and the sand 
martin) which are closely related to the swallow. One night Edgar is 
woken by sounds of scratching and screeching near his bins. When 
he goes to inspect, he catches a glimpse of a small brown creature as it 
darts away and discovers that his bin bags have been torn open. The 
next day he tells his tale to a neighbour who informs him that the 
intruder was sure to have been a pine marten. Edgar is not told what 
pine martens are but simply jumps to the conclusion that they are a 
kind of small bird related to the house martin. So he believes that 
those creatures known as "pine martens" are birds. Over the
to one’s position in time, and to which social group one belongs. He also refers to the 
case of Berkeley who believed that chairs are mental entities yet still meant chair 
by "chair". This case might appear to be a counterexample to what I've said as, one 
might think, it is part of the received wisdom  about chairs that they are physical 
(an hence not mental) entities. My reply is that Berkeley subscribed to enough of the 
received wisdom to mean chair by "chair". He believed (I presume) that chairs are 
items of furniture, are one-person seats with backs, and so on. And in believing that 
chairs are mental entities he didn't take them to be marked out from anything else 
that w e typically take to be a denizen of the physical world. It's not as if he thought 
that chairs are mental entities but tables not, in which case I might want to argue 
that he couldn’t mean chair by "chair".
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following few weeks he is regularly disturbed by pine martens; 
hearing their shrieks and catching fleeting glimpses of them as they 
scamper away from his bins often causes him to utter "pine marten" 
(as when he says such things as, "there's a pine marten again"). Thus 
a reliable causal connection between pine martens and his uttering 
"pine marten" is established. Sometimes things other than pine 
martens cause him to say "pine marten", for example, torn bin bags 
and small brown birds. These latter causal connections ride on the 
back of that betw een pine m artens and "pine marten", and 
asymmetrically depend on it. In short, Fodor's condition for Edgar's 
meaning pine marten by "pine marten" is satisfied. However, my 
intuition is that "pine marten" on Edgar's lips doesn't mean pine  
m arten  , due to the fact that he thinks that what he calls "pine 
martens" are small birds. You can be mistaken about what we call 
"pine martins" and still have succeeded in grasping the meaning of 
that term (for example you can believe that they feed on insects) but 
you can't be as mistaken as Edgar. Thus, whatever Edgar means by 
"pine marten", it isn't what I mean by that term (i.e. pine marten ), 
and we therefore have a counterexample to Fodor's theory as a 
theory about natural l a n g u a g e .  128
Fodor might respond to this argument by saying that I haven't produced a 
genuine counterexample as it isn't a law that pine martens cause Edgar to say "pine 
marten", as is evidenced by the fact that if Edgar was confronted with a pine marten 
head on in broad daylight he wouldn't say "pine marten". In response one might 
make several points. First, the objection runs the risk of committing its advocate to an 
optimal conditions version of the Type one theory, an option that, as we have seen, 
Fodor rejects. Second, what's so special about what happens when Edgar is confronted 
head on by a pine marten? Why does the fact that in such circumstances a pine 
marten wouldn't cause Edgar to say "pine marten" show that it's not a law that pine 
martens cause him to say "pine marten", any more than the fact that in certain 
circumstances a pine marten's impinging on me wouldn't cause me to say "pine marten" 
doesn't indicate that it's not a law that pine martens cause me to say "pine marten"? 
Third, an advocate of the objection runs the risk of making it so difficult for there to 
be a nomic connection between a property and a symbol as to imply that Fodor's 
condition is never satisfied. I don't want to push such objections as I actually think 
that there are no laws of the sort that Fodor's theory requires; my point here is 
merely that if there are any causal laws linking symbols and utterances, it's far from
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I therefore conclude that Fodor's theory does not apply to the 
primitive nonlogical symbols of English. To recapitulate: (i) In those 
cases where there is a link between meaning and the satisfaction of 
Fodor's condition the condition would appear to be necessary rather 
than sufficient, (ii) Sometimes the meaning of a w ord on an 
individual's lips is determined by the meaning of that word in the 
wider linguistic community so that an individual can mean such 
and such by a word without even satisfying Fodor's condition for 
meaning such and such, (iii) And the condition isn't sufficient as a 
word of an individual's idiolect can satisfy the condition for meaning 
such and such yet not have that meaning because of the individual's 
beliefs concerning the nature of the referents of the word in question.
Of course the failure of Fodor's theory to apply to natural language 
does not thereby destroy that theory given that it is a theory about 
Mentalese. However it doesn't bode well for several reasons.
First, Fodor initially seemed to be presenting his theory as applying 
to natural language as well as to Mentalese, and to be offering its 
applicability to the former as evidence for its applicability to the 
l a t t e r .  129 Xn the face of its failure to work as a theory of natural 
language, it seems reasonable to ask what motivation we have for 
believing that it works as a theory of Mentalese. The worry is that we 
have no motivation.
Second, some of the claims I have made about natural language may 
also apply to Mentalese. Often what is true of natural language is also 
true of thought; after all, on anyone's theory there is a very close 
relationship between language and thought. Consider the fact that
obvious that the relationship between the property of being a pine marten and that 
of being an utterance of "pine marten" by Edgar isn't one of them.
In more recent writings Fodor appears to reject the idea that his theory applies 
to natural language pointing out that there are several salient differences between !
such language and Mentalese, (for example, the former, but not the latter , is a public 
language the use of whose symbols are governed by linguistic conventions and driven 
by communicative intentions) differences that imply that the nature and origins of i
mental meaning will be quite unlike the nature and origins of linguistic meaning. |
This suggests that Fodor's initial appeals to natural language and his use of natural !
language examples to explicate his theory were merely an expository device. See, !
for example, Fodor's response to Brian Loar's paper 'Can We Explain Intentionality?' 
in Loewer and Rey (1991). Î
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the meaning of some words on my lips is determ ined by the 
meaning of those words in my linguistic community and not by the 
causal/nomic connections between my utterances of those words and 
the properties they express. "Protein" would seem to be an example 
of one such word. The word "protein" in my idiolect of English does 
not satisfy Fodor's sufficient condition for meaning protein. So, 
presumably, neither does its Mentalese analogue, that is, that symbol 
that figures in the thoughts which underlie my "protein" utterances. 
W hat this would seem to suggest is that my protein thoughts are 
protein thoughts (or, in other words, that the mentalese symbol 
PROTEIN means protein) partly because of the meaning of the 
English word "protein" within my linguistic community.
Next consider the case of those words the meaning of which on an 
individual's lips would appear to be determined (at least partly) by 
her beliefs concerning the nature of the referents of the word in 
question. Surely the thoughts that express these words have their 
contents partly determined by those associated beliefs. To see this, 
consider Edgar and the expression "pine marten". Underlying his 
utterances of "pine marten" will be thoughts in which the Mentalese 
expression PINE MARTEN figures. It is difficult to see how the 
satisfaction of Fodor's condition could entail that PINE MARTEN 
means pine marten when, as we have seen, its English analogue has 
some other meaning (or no meaning at all). For how could his 
utterances of "pine marten" not mean pine marten, if the underlying 
thoughts that they express had that content? What this case suggests 
to me is that, to put it paradoxically, Edgar's pine marten thoughts 
are not pine marten thoughts because he believes pine martens (or 
what he calls "pine martens") to be birds. Hence the example of Edgar 
constitutes a counterexample to the Fodorian theory as a theory 
about Mentalese as much as it does a theory about natural language.
The other claim I made about natural language meaning was that in 
those cases where Fodor’s condition would appear to be satisfied, and 
where there was some connection between that satisfaction and the 
meaning of the word in question, the condition is necessary rather 
than sufficient. I presented "horse" as an example. Once more it is 
difficult to see how what is true of the English word could not be true 
of its Mentalese counterpart. If it is a necessary, rather than a 
sufficient, condition for "horse"s meaning horse on my lips that . . .
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then surely it is a necessary rather than a sufficient condition for my 
horse thoughts being about horses (for HORSE s meaning horse ) 
that . . . .  Therefore, if Fodor's theory fails to apply to the English 
word "horse" in virtue of providing a necessary rather than a 
sufficient condition, then it will fail to apply to the Mentalese HORSE 
for just the same reason.
To conclude this section, the foregoing exam ination of the 
applicability of Fodor's theory to natural language was not merely an 
academic exercise, for it generated substantial objections to his theory 
of mental content. However, my objections don’t end here. The next 
stage of my argument will focus on Fodor's idea that there are 
causal laws relating symbols of Mentalese and the properties that 
they express.
7.4 Laws and content
My tendency to write in terms of causal connections in discussing 
Fodor's theory might have obscured the important fact that for Fodor 
it is not so much causal relations between individuals but mind- 
world causal laws, that is, nomic relations between properties, that 
determines mental content. Thus it is not merely because individual 
horses cause me to token HORSE that HORSE means horse; rather it 
is because there is a nomic connection between the property of being 
a horse and that of being a cause of horse tokens or, in other words, 
because it is a law that horses cause tokenings of HORSE. Horses 
could cause tokenings of HORSE as reliably and regularly as you like, 
bu t HORSE w ouldn 't mean horse if those causal transactions 
weren't subsumed by the law that horses cause tokenings HORSE.
This aspect of Fodor's theory is only implicit in Psychosemantics, 
but is stated loud and clear in 'TOC IT where it is utilised to deal with 
several objections. On the face of it, it seems awfully strong to
Amongst these objections are the following: (i) The theory doesn't apply to 
UNICORN as, given there are no unicorns, unicorns never cause tokenings of 
UNICORN. Fodor's reply is that the non-existence of unicorns doesn't stop it from 
being the case that there is a nomic relation between the property of being a unicorn 
and that of being a cause of UNICORN (or, in other words, from it being a law that 
unicorns cause UNICORN), (ii) Fodor's theory has the unacceptable consequence of 
implying that HORSE means not horse but all the horses except Old Paint because
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require that there be such laws. So we might reasonably ask: could it 
really be the case that whenever a primitive nonlogical symbol of 
Mentalese expresses a particular property it is a law that instances of 
that property cause tokenings of that symbol? In this section I will 
attem pt to establish a negative answer to this question; HORSE 
means horse and VIRTUOUS means virtuous but that cannot be 
because it is a law that horses cause HORSE or that virtuous acts 
cause VIRTUOUS, for there are no such laws.
Just as we can think about things that do not exist, we can think 
about things that could not, in point of nomological or metaphysical 
necessity, exist. So, assum ing RTM, we can token symbols or 
expressions of Mentalese that express properties whose instantiation 
is nomologically or metaphysically impossible. But such properties 
cannot stand in nomic relations to other properties; thus, if the 
instantiation of a property X is impossible, then it cannot be a law 
that Xs cause Y (for any Y). An upshot of this is that Fodor's theory 
will not apply to any primitive symbol of Mentalese that expressed 
such a property, and this would be particularly bad news if there were 
lots of such symbols. Fodor recognises this point, writing that '[it] 
appears to be quite a strong consequence of the asymmetric 
dependence story [that]: no primitive symbol can express a property 
that is necessarily uninstantiated. (There can't, for example, be a 
prim itive symbol that expresses the property of being a round 
square).' ('TOCII' p. 101).
So the question arises: are there any primitive symbols of Mentalese 
that express properties whose instantiation is necessarily impossible? 
I take it that there are not, and could not be any ghosts, so how about 
GHOST, the Mentalese analogue of the syntactically simple English 
word "ghost"? Fodor would no doubt reply by saying that GHOST, 
though syntactically primitive, isn't primitive in the required sense, 
for it is introduced by definition. One could imagine a mind which 
sometimes associated syntactically primitive symbols with complex 
unwieldy definitions of (necessarily uninstantiated) properties so as 
to facilitate a shorthand expression of such properties. These
of the fact that Old paint wouldn't cause HORSE but that horses except Old Paint 
did, but not vice versa. Fodor's reply is that causal transactions between both Old 
Faint and horses except Old Faint and HORSE are all subsumed by the one law, 
namely that horses cause HORSE.
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syntactically prim itive symbols would not have their meaning 
determined in the m anner that genuinely primitive symbols do; 
rather they would mean what they mean in virtue of the definitions 
that they are associated with in long term memory. So, for example, 
the idea is that GHOST means ghost because there is, in long term 
memory, a sentence of the form "GHOST = . . ." (Where ". . ." is some 
expression of Mentalese the constituent symbols of which mean 
what they mean for the standard reasons). It would be a burden for 
my m ind to lug around the complex sentence ". . ." whenever I 
engaged in thought about ghosts, and so advantageous to employ the 
shorthand GHOST.
How should we respond to this line of thought? It may well work 
for syntactically primitive symbols of Mentalese that express such 
properties as that of being a round square, for such symbols can be 
introduced by definition (as the symbols that they express can be 
defined). But how are we to define GHOST? If that symbol is 
indefinable (as it would appear to be the case) then the suggestion 
under discussion isn't going to work and the question "why does 
GHOST mean ghost?" is left unanswered. It's no good to say that the 
indefinability of GHOST is no problem since something like a 
dictionary definition will do, that is, an entry which doesn't, strictly 
speaking, define the symbol (or the property that it expresses), but 
rather specifies its meaning in an imprecise and roundabout way. 
This would be no help, at least to Fodor, as it would be beset with the 
kind of problems that he attributes to holist theories; namely, that it 
has the consequence that two individuals could mean the same 
thing by GHOST only if their "dictionary definitions" were identical, 
something that is rarely going to be the case.
What if the other horn of the dilemma is seized and it is argued that 
GHOST is the sort of symbol that can be defined? The problem with 
this is that if that symbol can be defined, then so, presumably, can a 
whole load of others, such as HORSE, for example. And then, we 
might ask, why couldn't the definition story work for symbols that 
express properties whose instantiation is possible?; HORSE, for 
example, springs to mind once more. The theory I am envisaging 
here is a two-tier theory that suggests that a basic stock of Mentalese 
terms have their meaning fixed one way (perhaps the way Fodor 
describes) and that these symbols are then used to construct
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definitions of other symbols, definitions that fix the meaning of 
these latter symbols. The question is what grounds has Fodor got, 
apart from sentimental attachment, for preferring his atomistic 
theory - as a theory of the meaning of such symbols as HORSE - to the 
holist alternative I have just sketched? If GHOST can be defined, why 
need holism have the dreadful consequences that Fodor describes it 
as having?
In conclusion, symbols like GHOST would appear to provide Fodor 
with much more of a problem than he realises, for at best his theory 
does not apply to them, and he gives no indication as to how they 
can be dealt with in a manner which does not undermine his theory.
Moreover, GHOST is hardly atypical in this respect; there are plenty 
of properties we are capable of representing in thought whose 
instantiation is (m etaphysically or nomologically) impossible.
Examples include the properties of being a fairy, a witch, phlogiston, 
divine (perhaps), a god (perhaps), and so on: in short, many of the 
properties appealed to by the holders of mythical, astrological, and 
(perhaps) religious beliefs, and many of the properties appealed to by 
the advocates of discredited scientific and quasi scientific theories.
Hence this incom pleteness of his theory is hard ly  a m inor 
shortcoming.
My next objection focuses on the problem which Mentalese symbols 
that express moral and aesthetic properties cause for Fodor. A 
consequence of Fodor's view that nomic connections lie at the heart 
of mental meaning is that for two individuals to mean the same 
thing by a given symbol of Mentalese it must be the case that the basic 
laws that govern their respective tokenings of that symbol must 
coincide. For example, suppose that the symbol X belongs to my 
idiolect of Mentalese and to yours as well. Does my X mean the same 
as your X? Only if the basic law that governs the tokening of X in me 
is the very same law that governs the tokening of X in you. If the 
basic law that governs my tokening of X is "x's cause X" and the basic :
law that governs yours is "y’s cause X", then our respective X's are 
non-synonym ous. W hat I will try to establish is that this i
requirement for meaning-equivalence is not satisfied by many of I
those symbols of Mentalese that express moral and aesthetic j
properties: in other words, that it is a consequence of Fodor's theory |
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that VIRTUOUS, for example, diverges in meaning from one person 
to the next.
Beliefs about horses mediate the causal connection between horses 
and HORSE. For example, it is because of the beliefs that I have about 
what horses look like, how they behave and such like, that horses 
typically cause me to token HORSE when they impinge upon my 
sensory apparatus. Now most people's beliefs concerning what 
horses look like, how they behave, and so on pretty much coincide 
and, consequently, it is no surprise that most of us token HORSE in 
response to horses rather than, say, in response to chairs. In virtue of 
this coincidence of horse beliefs, if you and I confront an object and 
agree on such properties as its shape, size, colour, how it moves, and 
so on, we will agree on the question of whether or not it is a horse. 
And because of the truth of our beliefs, we will usually be correct in 
our judgements. In short, in virtue of sharing a whole bag of true 
beliefs about horses we will both be subsumed by the law "horses 
cause HORSE".
M atters seem to be somewhat different w ith respect to the 
Mentalese symbol VIRTUOUS (which, of course, expresses the 
property of being virtuous). There is w idespread disagreement 
concerning virtue amongst those people who do, or are capable of, 
making judgem ents as to the moral properties of the acts and 
individuals that they confront. Some people think that ambition is a 
virtue, other people don't; some people think that thrift is a virtue, 
other people don't; some people think that chastity is a virtue, other 
people don't; and so on. As a result of such differences it is 
commonplace for two individuals to be confronted with a person or 
an act and disagree on the question of whether or not they have 
before them an instance of the property of being virtuous, despite the 
fact that there is widespread agreement between them as to what 
other properties the act or person in question has. For example, Edgar 
and Waldo both hear about a doctor who knowingly administers a 
lethal injection to a terminally ill patient who has expressed her wish 
to die. Edgar thinks the doctor is virtuous and applauds his actions, 
whilst Waldo condemns him and pronounces that he will rot in 
hell. Such disagreement is unlikely to be isolated, so that Edgar and 
Waldo will often disagree as to whether specific people and their acts 
are virtuous. In short, Edgar will often token VIRTUOUS in response
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to acts and individuals that Waldo won't, and vice versa. The upshot 
of this is that it cannot be the case that both Edgar and Waldo are 
subsumed by the law that virtuous (acts and individuals) cause 
VIRTUOUS. Thus a consequence of Fodor's theory is that at least one 
of them doesn't mean virtuous by VIRTUOUS; at least one of them 
will, so to speak, have their Mentalese symbol VIRTUOUS hooked 
onto the wrong property. And, given that such disagreement is 
widespread throughout our population, it will be true of many of us 
that we are not subsumed by the law that virtuous (people and acts) 
cause VIRTUOUS. Thus, a consequence of Fodor's theory is that 
many of us do not mean virtuous by VIRTUOUS; indeed that many 
of us do not have thoughts about virtue. I take it that this is an 
unacceptable consequence; of course we all mean the same thing by 
VIRTUOUS (otherw ise how  could our d isagreem ents be 
disagreements about virtue?). Therefore, Fodor's theory doesn't 
apply to that symbol.^^^
Parallel arguments will apply to many other symbols of Mentalese 
that express moral properties, for example, EVIL, SAINTLY, and so 
on. Put generally, the point is that given the level of moral 
disagreement in our society, it just isn't the case that all of us are 
such that our moral concepts are nomically related to the properties 
that they express. Thus Fodor's theory does not apply to symbols of 
Mentalese that express moral properties. Neither will it apply, for 
just the same reasons, to what we might call semi-moral concepts 
such as HONEST, GENEROUS, KIND, BOASTFUL, VAIN, RUDE, 
etc.. Moreover, it will not apply to such aesthetic concepts as 
BEAUTIFUL given the disagreements that people notoriously have 
as to what is beautiful and what is not.^^2
Fodor is quite explicit that his theory is supposed to apply to VIRTUOUS just as 
much as it is to HORSE, For example, he writes:
All predicates express properties, and all properties are abstract. The semantics 
of the word "virtuous", for example, is determined by the nomic relation between 
the property of being a cause of tokens of that word and the property of being 
virtuous, it isn't interestingly different from the semantics of "horse".('TOC, If 
p. I l l )
In fact, this argument has still wider application. You and I may well disagree 
as to what's involved in being intelligent so that you think, for example, that being
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It would be no good to respond by arguing that moral and aesthetic 
concepts are subjective; that, for example, virtue and beauty are in 
the eye of the beholder. For one thing, such a claim is in tension with 
Fodor's robustly realist metaphysics. (For the record my intuitions 
are as realist as Fodor's; of course moral and aesthetic properties are 
objective). And for another, even subjective concepts have content so 
we still need an account of where they get their content from. In 
conclusion then, in virtue of his claim that causal laws lie at the 
heart of mental meaning, there is a whole battery of symbols of 
Mentalese that Fodor's theory does not apply to.
None of the above implies that Fodor's theory doesn't apply to such 
symbols as HORSE. This is because we tend to agree in our 
applications of HORSE in the sense that it’s generally true that if I 
respond to a perceptual encounter w ith an object by tokening 
HORSE, then you would have done too had you been in my shoes. 
Thus, it may well be the case that it is a law that horses cause HORSE 
and that we are all subsumed by that law. However, I shall now 
argue, there is no such law; indeed, for hardly any of the symbols of 
Mentalese is it a law that instances of the properties that they express 
cause their tokening.
A first point is that horses could reliably cause tokenings of HORSE 
without it being a law that horses cause tokenings of HORSE; one 
possibility would be that whenever a horse caused a tokening of 
HORSE it was qua having some property other than that of being a
good at crosswords is sufficient for being intelligent, an idea that I reject, whereas I 
think that there is an intimate link between intelligence and verbal articulacy, an 
idea that you reject. As a result of this difference between us you will token 
INTELLIGENT when confronted w ith Waldo the inarticulate crossword ace, 
whereas I will not. Yet w e still both mean intelligent by INTELLIGENT.
Another kind of example is represented by such symbols as WITTY and 
HUMOROUS. Most T.V. comics leave me stony faced yet have a quite different 
effect on many of my fellows. So I do not token HUMOROUS and WITTY in response 
to Clive Anderson, French and Saunders, Frank Skinner, and the like. Yet I still mean 
the same by these symbols as do those folk with very different senses of humour. 
Such symbols are interestingly different from many of the earlier examples m that 
the causal connections between individuals and their utterances, on the one hand, and 
tokenings of HUMOROUS and WITTY, on the other, are not mediated by beliefs or 
theories as to the nature of wit and humour.
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horse. If that were the case, then horse-HORSE causal transactions 
would be subsumed by some other law. In fact my suspicion is that 
the many horse-HORSE causal transactions that occur in our world 
are not all subsumed by the same law; rather, some are subsumed by 
one law, some by another, some by yet another, and so on. To see this 
consider the following range of cases. In the first case Edgar, whilst 
taking a stroll in the country, confronts a horse head on, so to speak. 
His eyes are wide open, the lighting conditions are favourable and 
the horse is right before him, filling his visual field. Borrowing a 
phrase from Psychosemantics we might say that Edgar stands in the 
psychophysically optimal relation with respect to the horse; optimal, 
that is, for determining such observable properties as its shape, size, 
colour, and such like. Edgar's visual system duly constructs a 
representation that explicitly represents these observable properties 
of the horse, and after this representation has been processed by the 
object recognition module Edgar tokens HORSE. The question is: was 
this causal transaction subsumed by the law that horses cause 
tokenings of HORSE? When addressing questions as to what law is 
in operation Fodor often utilises the method of differences to settle 
the i s s u e .A p p l ic a t io n  of the method of differences suggests that 
in this case it was qua object with a horsy appearance that the horse 
caused Edgar to token HORSE. Ceteris paribus, had Edgar been 
confronted by anything, be it a horse or not, that didn't have a horsey 
appearance, then he wouldn't have tokened HORSE. Yet had he been 
confronted by a non-horse with a horsey appearance (for example, a 
pair of clowns in a particularly sophisticated pantom ime horse 
costume) he would have tokened HORSE. Therefore, it would appear 
that the operative law, that is, the law that subsumes this horse- 
HORSE causal transaction, is not that horses cause tokenings of
For example, in 'TOCII' in answering the question of why "horse" doesn't mean 
small horse Fodor writes the following:
As it turns out, routine application of the method of differences suggests that it 
must be the property of being a horse and not the property of being a small horse 
that is connected with the property of being a cause of "horse " tokens since many 
things that have the first property have the third despite their lack of the 
second; large horses and medium horses simply spring to mind. (p. 102)
See also his treatment of the frog case on pp.106-107.
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HORSE but rather that things with a horsey appearance cause 
tokenings of HORSE.
At the other end of the spectrum there are those cases where Edgar 
catches a glimpse of a horse out of the corner of his eye and, largely 
because of the beliefs and expectations he has at that time, this sets off 
a causal chain that eventuates in a tokening of HORSE. In this 
kind of case it is not because the creature impinging on Edgar's visual
 ^ It will do no good to argue that there is a nomic connection between being a horse 
and having a horsey appearance. Even if there is such a connection it is clearly 
nom ologically possible - as the above example indicates - to have a horsey 
appearance without being a horse. The application of the method of differences 
would suggest that it is the property of having a horsey appearance, rather than 
that of being a horse, that is doing the causal work, just as in the frog case it is the 
property of being an LABT, rather than that of being a fly, that is doing the causal 
work, despite the fact that there is a nomic comiection between being a fly and being 
an LABT. (See 'TOCII' pp. 106-107 where Fodor argues that the frog's internal state S 
means LABT (i.e. little ambient black thing ) rather than fly , as the operative law  
is that LABT's cause S, as is indicated by the fact that the frog tokens S in response to 
LABT's that are not flies, namely bee-bees).
135 Fodor appeals to this kind of case to deal with the objection that his theory 
implies that HORSE expresses the property of being a certain pattern of retinal 
stimulation, namely that pattern that typically mediates horse-HORSE causal 
transactions. Fodor responds by saying that there is no such typical pattern of retinal 
stimulation. Sometimes glimpsing a horse out of the corner of one's eye is enough to 
cause HORSE and in such a case the retinal image is going to be very different from 
that produced by a head on confrontation with a horse. Here's how he puts the point 
using the example of COW:
there is no reason at all to suppose . . . that there are specifiable sorts of 
proximal traces that a cow has to leave on pain of the cow -> COW connection 
failing. On the contrary, in the usual case there are a heterogeneity of proximal 
arrays that will eventuate in cow perception, and there's a good reason for this: 
since, -due to the laws of optics, inter alia- cows are mapped many-one onto their 
proximal projections, the mechanisms of perception . . . must map the proximal 
projections many-one onto tokenings of COW. Given the vast number of ways that 
cows may impinge upon sensory mechanisms, a perceptual system which made 
COW tokenings intimately dependent upon specific proximal projections 
wouldn't work as a cow spotter. ('TOCII' p. 109)
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apparatus looks to him like a horse that he concludes that there is a 
horse before him. Rather, such temporary beliefs as that he is in 
horse infested parts and temporary expectations as that he will soon 
cross the path of a horse, prime him in such a way that pretty much 
any object impinging upon him would cause a tokening of HORSE. 
Consequently, had the horse impinging upon him been a non-horse, 
a cow, for example, then, ceteris paribus, it would still have caused a 
tokening of HORSE. Thus it is neither qua object w ith a horsey 
appearance nor qua horse that the horse caused a tokening of 
HORSE; rather it is qua impingement on his visual system, or 
something like that. Hence application of the method of differences 
w ould suggest that the operative law is not that horses cause 
tokenings of HORSE, or that things with a horsey appearance cause 
HORSE, but rather some other law that is such that pretty much any 
(medium sized) object capable of impinging on Edgar's visual system 
satisfies its antecedent.
Between these two extremes will be a whole range of cases of which 
there is no more reason to think that the subsuming law is that 
horses cause tokenings of HORSE. Presumably Edgar is not unique; 
something similar will be true of all of us. Therefore, it would appear 
that, despite the fact that horses frequently cause us to token HORSE, 
it is not a law that horses cause tokenings of HORSE.
Could it really be the case that there are laws relating the nonlogical 
symbols of Mentalese to the properties that they express? Granted, 
instances of properties often cause tokenings of the symbols that 
express them, but, for several reasons, the claim that there are such 
laws has an air of prima facie implausibility. The first reason has to 
do w ith  a fundam ental insigh t of cognitive psychology. 
Behaviourists such as Skinner held that a subject's behaviour at any 
point in her history is determined by her current stimulus and her 
history of reinforcement. The cognitive revolution was partly based 
on the insight that this just isn't true; how we behave (and also what 
we think) has an awful lot to do with our current mental states, so 
m aking it the case that thought and behaviour is stim ulus 
independent. Now to say that it's a law that, for example, horses 
cause tokenings of HORSE w ould seem to imply that when 
confronted by a horse it is nomologically necessary that I token 
HORSE in response to it, or, in other words, that I think that there is
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a horse present. But if it is nomologically necessary that I think that 
there is a horse present whenever a horse impinges on my sensory 
apparatus how could thought be stimulus independent? Stimulus- 
independence would seem to entail that if there are any mind-world 
causal laws they will be of the form: Xs cause subjects who are in this, 
that, and the other intentional state, to token X. Such laws are 
intentional laws and so can only be expressed using intentional 
vocabulary. Therefore they cannot be appealed to by Fodor in the 
course of constructing a naturalistic theory of content. In short, to say 
that there are laws of the form that Fodor requires would, on the face 
of it, be to deny the stimulus independence of thought. And surely 
we don't want to deny that.
A second reason for doubting the plausibility of the claim that there 
are any of the laws in question is the putative fact that it is 
commonplace for an instance of a property to impinge on us without 
our responding by tokening that symbol of Mentalese that expresses 
that property. I often see horses, grass, and clouds without thinking 
that there is a horse, some grass, or a cloud before me. It might be 
objected that I am just not consciously aware of having such 
thoughts and that in reality, as a result of perceptual interaction with 
the world, my cognitive apparatus generates a whole battery of 
representational states (and hence symbols of Mentalese) which 
never break through to the level of consciousness.
In response to this objection we can recall a point made earlier in 
the chapter. Each and every object has many many properties. For 
example. Fang is a dog, is ferocious, is carnivorous, is black, is 
toothed, etc.. Which properties of Fang are explicitly represented in 
me when I perceptually interact with him will depend an awful lot 
on my intentional states, including whatever interests I have and 
purposes that I am engaged in at the time of interaction. Being a 
runner with a history of being savaged by large ferocious dogs, my 
prim ary aim when I first detect Fang's presence is to determine 
whether or not he is a large ferocious dog. I am not interested, for 
example, in the question of whether he's a mongrel or a pedigree. 
This will have an effect on which properties of Fang are explicitly 
represented in me, and thus on which symbols of Mentalese are 
tokened. Given my interests and purposes I token LARGE, 
FEROCIOUS DOG and not MONGREL. Had I been engaged in a
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survey of the number of pedigree dogs in the park then I may well 
have tokened MONGREL and turned a blind eye, so to speak, to his 
snarling and other indications of his ferocious nature. What I am 
saying is that our interests and purposes play a role in determining 
what cognitive processes are brought to bear on our retinal images 
and, consequently, on which information implicit in the retinal 
image comes to be explicitly represented. In other words, when we 
perceptually interact with an object, which of its properties that we 
are in a position to detect and represent we actually come explicitly to 
represent will depend an awful lot on our intentional states. Matters 
have to be this way because each and every object has so many 
properties that to represent them  all explicitly w ould be to 
overburden our cognitive apparatus in every perceptual encounter. 
(It would overburden our cognitive apparatus for at least two 
reasons. First, it would take up a lot of space to list all the properties. 
And second, some properties will require a lot of processing of the 
perceptual trace and subsequent representations, if their possession 
by the object of perception is to be discovered. For example, it will 
take a lot more processing to work out that Fang is a mongrel than it 
will to work out that Fang is a dog. To do the former will be a waste 
of valuable cognitive resources if one doesn't care about such 
questions).
The upshot of these reflections is that it is commonplace for an 
instance of a property to impinge upon our sensory apparatus 
without our tokening the symbol of Mentalese that expresses that 
property. What this suggests, at least on the face of it, is that if is not 
generally true of the primitive, nonlogical symbols of Mentalese that 
it is a law that the properties that they express cause their tokening.
In response, it might be said that the laws that Fodor has in mind 
are ceteris paribus laws. According to Fodor, all special science laws 
are ceteris paribus laws; basic laws are to be found only in the domain 
of fundamental physics. The key point about ceteris paribus laws is 
that they are not exceptionless. Thus it is consistent with its being a 
law that, ceteris paribus, Xs cause Ys, that sometimes Xs occur 
without causing a Y; in such cases the ceteris paribus clause is not 
satisfied, all else is not equal. However, the failure of an X to cause a 
Y when all else is equal would constitute a disconfirmation of the 
claim that it is a law that, ceteris paribus, Xs cause Ys. In other words.
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ceteris paribus laws are such that the satisfaction of their antecedent 
guarantees the subsequent satisfaction of their consequent when 
their ceteris paribus clause is not violated.
However, invoking the notion of a ceteris paribus law will not save 
Fodor's theory. Reflecting on the nature of such laws indicates that it 
just isn't the case that, for example, it is a law that, ceteris paribus, 
horses cause HORSE .
In the course of describing, explaining and predicting phenomena 
within their domain of enquiry, special scientists make a whole load 
of assum ptions or, as Fodor puts it, operative idealisations, 
concerning the nature and behaviour of the inhabitants of that 
domain. Making such assumptions facilitates the discovery and 
expression of manageable generalisations of considerable explanatory 
and predictive power. At this point it will be helpful to consider 
Fodor's favourite example of a ceteris paribus law, a law that comes 
from  the science of geology. The universal, unqualified  
generalisation that a meandering river erodes its outside bank is 
clearly false. If the water in a meandering river freezes, or a concrete 
wall is built along its outside bank, or the tiny abrasive particles in its 
water are removed, or the world comes to an end, then it will not 
erode its outside bank. The occurrence of any such event constitutes 
an unusual, atypical, extra-geological interference with the smooth 
running of the geological world. When such an event occurs, the 
operative assumptions or idealisations of geology fail to hold or be 
satisfied. Geologists do not offer us such false universal 
generalisations; rather their generalisations are hedged, featuring 
ceteris paribus clauses. Thus, for example, it is a generalisation of 
geology that, ceteris paribus, a meandering river erodes its outside 
bank. To say that, as the geologist does, the statement that, ceteris 
paribus, a meandering river erodes its outside bank expresses a law is 
to say 'something like "A meandering river erodes its outside bank 
in any nom ologically possible w orld w here the operative 
idealizations of geology are satisfied'" {Psychosemantics p. 5). In 
effect then, the ceteris paribus clause is shorthand for something like 
this: "so long as this, that, and the other event does not occur" 
(where "this, that and the other event" are events the occurrence of 
which would result in a failure of the operative idealisations of the 
science in question to be satisfied).
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Clearly there are many distinct event-types the tokening of which 
would result in a failure of the operative idealisations of geology to 
be satisfied. Hence it would be difficult, if not impossible, to cash out 
the ceteris paribus clause of the above generalisation. Moreover, the 
ceteris paribus clause could not be cashed out in geological terms 
given that the interfering events are non-geological. Fodor expresses 
the point in these terms:
. . .  it simply isn't true that we can, even in principle, specify the 
conditions under which - say - geological generalizations hold so 
long as we stick to the vocabulary of geology. Or, to put it less in 
the formal mode, the causes of the exceptions to geological 
generalizations are, quite typically, not themselves, geological 
events. . . . All you can say that's any use is: If the generalization 
failed to hold, then the operative idealizations m ust somehow 
have failed to be satisfied. {Psychosemantics p. 6)
Exceptions to the generalizations of a special science are typically 
inexplicable from the point of view of (that is, in the vocabulary 
of) that science. That's one of the things that makes it a special 
science. But, of course, it may nevertheless be perfectly possible to 
explain the exception in the vocabulary of some other science. In 
the most familiar case you go 'down' one or more levels and use 
the vocabulary of a more 'basic' science. (The current failed to run 
through the circuit because the terminals were oxidised; he no 
longer recognizes familiar objects because of a cerebral accident. 
And so forth.) The availability of this strategy is one of the things 
that the hierarchical arrangements of our sciences buys for us. 
{Psychosemantics p. 6)
We are now in a position to see that there is a significant difference 
between the law that, ceteris paribus, a meandering river erodes its 
outside bank, on the one hand, and the putative law that, ceteris 
paribus, horses cause HORSE, on the other; a difference that suggests 
that the latter could not be a law. In the normal course of things the 
operative idealisations of geology hold. If this were not the case the 
generalisations presented to us by the geologist would be of such 
limited explanatory and predictive value that we would have every
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right to question the viability of geology as a serious science. When 
the operative idealisations are not satisfied, when all else isn't equal, 
generally speaking what has happened is that some extra-geological 
event has interfered with the smooth running and normal operation 
of the geological realm. (What has happened is analogous to a 
mischievous child's opening the oven door whilst a cake is baking 
inside the oven.)
As we have seen, it is commonplace for an instance of a property to 
impinge upon an individual w ithout their subsequently tokening 
the symbol of Mentalese that expresses that property. I often see, hear, 
and smell horses without tokening HORSE. Usually when I fail to so 
token HORSE nothing strange, unusual or untoward has happened. 
The case where, because of my interests and purposes, or because of 
my occurrent beliefs, I don't notice, so to speak, that the creature 
before me is a horse, is not one where the operative idealisations of 
psychology have broken down; if it were then the operative 
idealisations of psychology would break down in virtually every 
perceptual encounter - something which would suggest that there 
was something radically wrong with the psychology that made these 
idealisations. Moreover, no extra psychological event that interferes 
with the normal operation of my mind will have occurred, as would 
be the case were I struck down by lightning before I had the chance to 
token HORSE, or were I suffering from some neurological disorder. 
Usually when I fail to token a symbol of Mentalese in response to an 
instance of the property that it expresses my failure is perfectly 
explicable in psychological terms; such an explanation would appeal 
to such intentional phenomena as my beliefs, interests and purposes, 
and the like. Consequently, the differences between such putative 
laws as that, ceteris paribus, horses cause HORSE and the bona fide 
ceteris paribus laws of the special sciences are such as to suggest that 
the former are not laws at all. In other words, the laws that Fodor 
claims lie at the heart of mental meaning are non-existent. This, I 
take it, is bad news for his theory.
Fodor's claims are implausible largely because of the fact that the 
causal process leading from an object (or a perceptual encounter with 
an object) to the formation of a belief or thought as to what is before 
the subject, is a cognitively penetrable process. However, not all 
m ind-w orld causal transactions are cognitively penetrable. For
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example, many of the sub-personal processes that take place in the 
early stages of perception are in no way influenced by our beliefs and 
other such personal level mental s t a t e s . 1 ^ 6  As such processes 
involve the production and manipulation of representations, there 
are, presumably, laws relating external stimuli to the tokening of 
such sub-personal representations. These representations, unlike the 
symbols of Mentalese that Fodor focuses his attention on, are not the 
vehicles of belief content. This raises the possibility that Fodor's 
theory, though not applying to those symbols that express the 
contents of our beliefs, does apply to the representations that figure 
in the sub-personal processing that underlies and facilitates 
perception and cognition. Given this possibility, even if the above 
criticisms are conclusive, Fodor's theory still has considerable 
interest and importance.
7.5 Asymmetric dependence
Arguably the most audacious and brilliant aspect of Fodor's theory of 
content is its invocation of the notion of asymmetric dependence. 
Asymmetric dependence, he thinks, is the key to solving the 
disjunction problem, for it allows the informational theorist both to 
recognise the possib ility  of, and to give an account of, 
m isrepresentation and representation in thought. In this section I 
will focus my attention on this aspect of Fodor's theory. I will raise 
the questions of whether there is as much asymmetric dependence 
around as he requires, and of whether the appeal to asymmetric 
dependence implies that our representations have contents quite 
other than the contents they actually have.
In describing Fodor's theory I argued that with respect to such 
English w ords as "horse" the claim that the various causal 
connections involving those symbols are related as he describes, and
136 Evidence of the fact that some such processes are cognitively penetrable is 
provided by the fact that optical illusions often take us in when w e have knowledge 
that, one m ight think, should prevent such illusions from taking place. In 
Modularity of M ind Fodor points out that the Muller-Lyer illusion still works - that 
is, we cannot but see the parallel lines in the diagram as being of different lengths - 
even when we know that the lines in the diagram have the same length. (Fodor |
introduces examples such as this to support his modularity thesis.) |i
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that their being so related is intimately bound up with meaning, has 
considerable intuitive appeal and plausibility. In teaching me the 
English w ord "horse", my teachers attem pted to establish a 
disposition in me to respond to horses by saying "horse"; in other 
words they attempted to establish a causal connection between horses 
and my uttering of "horse". They succeeded in doing this, a task that 
they would have to have succeeded in for me to have grasped the 
meaning of "horse", but in so doing they inadvertently set up a 
whole load of other causal connections such as that between cows on 
a dark night and my uttering of "horse". In an intuitively obvious 
respect, these latter connections depend on the former in a way in 
which the former does not depend on them. M oreover, the 
relationship between these connections would appear to be such that 
one can break the latter w ithout breaking the former, as Fodor's 
characterisation of asymmetric dependence demands. This is because 
of the fact that we have a capacity to discover our mistakes and alter 
our subsequent behaviour in the light of such discoveries. Suppose 
that on several occasions I confront a cow on a dark night and jump 
to the conclusion that the creature before me is a horse. On hearing 
the cow "moo" I discover my mistake. I then decide not to be so rash 
in future and reserve judgement as to the nature of any creature that 
I meet on a dark night. My making this resolution results in a 
breakdown of the connection between cows (on a dark night) and 
"horse", whilst leaving the horse-"horse" connection very much 
intact. Therefore, in the nearby possible world where it's not a law 
that cows (on a dark night) cause "horse", it is a law that horses cause 
"horse".
However, matters would appear to be different with respect to 
representations that are produced by processes that are cognitively 
impenetrable. I can make decisions and endorse beliefs that influence 
my tokening of such English w ords as "horse" and those 
representations that are the vehicles of my belief contents. Thus the 
causal connections that such symbols bear to external objects and 
properties is not fixed once and for all. That is the reason why the 
cow-"horse" connection can be broken without breaking the horse- 
"horse" connection. But the same is not true of many of the symbols 
that are m anipulated at the sub personal level, for example the 
symbols employed by our perceptual modules. To see this, consider
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the following example. One of the tasks of the visual system is to 
determine the colour of objects impinging on the subject's visual 
system. Typically, implicit in the retinal image is information 
concerning the colour of the object(s) currently impinging on the 
subject's visual system. This information is extracted and made 
explicit by processes in early vision. In order to extract this 
information, the visual system must make all sorts of assumptions 
concerning how various colours affect the visual system or show up 
in the retinal image. These assum ptions are not explicitly 
represented but, rather, hard w ired into the visual system. A 
consequence of the making of these assumptions is that, for example, 
red objects usually cause a tokening of RED (the symbol of the 
language utilised by the visual module that is the analogue of the 
English word "red") when they impinge upon a hum an subject's 
visual system. Thus it is a law that red causes RED. However, these 
assumptions do not always hold true; they only apply within a 
certain range of lighting conditions. Consequently, in certain 
abnormal lighting conditions it is orange objects that cause RED; 
there is nothing that the subject can do to stop such cases of 
m isrepresentation or sensory illusion from occurring in such 
lighting conditions as the processes that generate RED from retinal 
images are cognitively impenetrable. Thus it is a law that orange 
causes RED (in these lighting conditions) just as much as it is a law 
that red causes RED (in normal lighting conditions).
In this case it is difficult to see how the orange-RED connection can 
be broken without breaking the red-RED connection; it would appear 
that these connections stand and fall together. Given the cognitive 
impenetrability of the processes of early vision, the orange-RED 
connection cannot be broken in a manner analogous to that in which 
the cow (on a dark night)-"horse" connection can.1^7 Given the 
nature of the human visual system and the laws of optics that hold 
in our world, orange objects cannot but cause RED (in abnormal 
lighting conditions) if red objects cause RED (in normal lighting
137 Perhaps I can successfully decide not to form beliefs about the colour of what is 
before me unless 1 can be sure that lighting conditions are normal. But orange objects 
are still going to look red to me in abnormal lighting conditions, a fact that indicates 
that RED has been tokened even if I have succeeded in resisting the promptings of my 
visual system.
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conditions). To break the former connection or law without breaking 
the latter would require effecting either substantial changes in the 
workings of the human visual system or substantial changes in the 
laws of optics. This would tend to suggest that the possible world in 
which there is a red-RED connection but no orange-RED connection 
is at some distance from our world. It is far from obvious that this 
world is nearer than that in which the orange-RED connection is 
broken by effecting changes that are such as to bring down the red- 
RED connection as well. Parallel arguments will apply to all symbols 
that are manipulated at the sub-personal level by cognitive modules 
whose processing behaviour is cognitively impenetrable. Thus the 
appeal to asymmetric dependence doesn't solve the disjunction 
problem with respect to such symbols; Fodor's theory would seem to 
imply that RED means red or orange. Earlier I raised the possibility 
that Fodor's theory could apply to such symbols despite its failure to 
apply to those that express the contents of our beliefs. If the preceding 
reflections are anything to go by, this hope would seem to have been 
somewhat premature. This is a significant result, for a failure of 
Fodor's theory to apply to those representations that figure 
prom inently in cognitive psychological theory and explanation 
would constitute an important limitation of that theory. The worry is 
that Fodor's fixation with the familiar prepositional attitudes of folk 
psychology has resulted in him producing a theory which has an air 
of prima facie plausibility if we concentrate our attentions on those 
states, but that looks increasingly unsustainable when we reflect 
upon many of the representational states that are attributed to us by 
cognitive psychologists.
Another objection to the asymmetric dependence aspect of Fodor's 
theory is based upon a general idea concerning the relationships that 
laws bear to one another. Fodor writes as if it makes sense to talk 
about nearby worlds whose laws are just like ours apart from with 
respect to the odd law. But wouldn't a world which was slightly 
different from ours with respect to its laws have to be a world that is 
very different from ours with respect to its laws? The laws that hold 
in our world constitute a complex, interrelated, and finely balanced 
network. Higher level laws are implemented or underpinned by 
lower level laws so that to break a higher level law would require all 
sorts of lower level adjustments, adjustments which would probably
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have significant ramifications with respect to other higher level laws, 
not to mention laws at their own level. Consider the law that water 
boils at one hundred degrees Celsius. Suppose God wanted to break 
this law and make it the case that water boiled at ninety degrees 
Celsius. He couldn't make this prima facie tiny adjustment without 
adjusting a whole load of lower level physico-chemical laws 
governing the behaviour of molecules and, in particular, their 
response to heat. Making these adjustments might involve making 
lots more adjustments at the level of atoms, and in turn, at the level 
of sub-atomic particles and so on. And making these lower level 
adjustments would surely have higher level consequences quite 
apart from that w ith respect to the boiling point of water; for 
example, consequences with respect to the boiling and freezing 
points of other substances. In short, there is no nearby world where 
the laws are just like the laws in our world apart from the fact that 
water boils at ninety degrees Celsius; for there would have to be a 
huge nomological mismatch between our world and the world 
where water boils at ninety degrees Celsius. At this point one is 
rem inded of chaos theory and the much quoted tale about the 
ramifications of butterfly wing flappings. Consequently, Fodor cannot 
legitimately claim that there are laws governing the tokening of 
mental representations that are such that they can be broken without 
there being any further wholesale ramifications; who is to say what 
the consequences would be of breaking the law that cows (on a dark 
night) cause HORSE? Thus, it seems reasonable to doubt that there 
are any laws governing the tokening of mental representations that 
can legitimately be said to depend asymmetrically on any other law 
in the way that the relationship of asymmetric dependence is 
understood by Fodor.
7.6 Some problem cases
In this section I will examine a number of problem cases, cases where 
it would appear that Fodor's theory entails that a representation has a 
content at variance with the one it actually has. The first such case 
has to do with properties that are, in point of nomological necessity, 
coextensive. The properties of being water and having a boiling point 
of one-hundred degrees Celsius are coextensive in this respect.
252
WATER m eans w ater  and not s tu ff that boils at one-hundred 
degrees Celsius. The problem is that Fodor's theory would appear to 
imply that the attribution of the latter content is just as defensible as 
the attribution of the former. For if it is a law that water causes 
WATER and that all nomic connections between non-water and 
WATER asymmetrically depend on this law then it will also be true 
that it is a law that stuff that boils at one hundred degrees Celsius 
causes WATER and that all nomic connections between stuff that 
doesn 't boil at one hundred degrees Celsius and WATER will 
asymmetrically depend on that law. In other words, Fodor is faced 
with a problem of indeterminacy for his theory doesn't have the 
resources to justify the attribution of either one of the competing 
contents water and stu ff that boils at one hundred degrees Celsius in 
preference to the other. Thus his theory falls victim to the same 
problem  that he argued afflicted, and ultim ately sunk, the 
teleological theory.
There are several ways in which Fodor might attempt to respond to 
this problem, (i) An individual cannot think that the stuff before her 
boils at one hundred degrees Celsius unless she has a whole bag of 
concepts, for example the concepts of a boiling point, of the number 
one hundred, and so on. Having these concepts is a matter of having 
in one's idiolect of Mentalese a distinct symbol which expresses each 
of the relevant properties. Now WATER does not mean stu ff that 
boils at one hundred degrees Celsius (or, alternatively, to token the 
Mentalese sentence THAT'S WATER is not to think that what is 
before one is stu ff that boils at one hundred degrees Celsius) because, 
being syntactically primitive, WATER does not have the required 
internal lexico-syntactic structure.
In reply, we might ask why being syntactically primitive debars 
WATER form m eaning s tu ff that boils at one hundred degrees 
Celsius ? The fact that that content can be expressed in English only 
by means of a syntactically complex expression doesn't entail that a 
syntactically simple symbol of some other language could not have 
that content. After all, Fodor attributes the content little ambient 
black thing to the Frog's state S, a representational state that has no 
in ternal lexico-syntactic structure. M oreover, he presum ably 
w ouldn 't want to say that the Frog has the concepts LITTLE, 
AMBIENT, BLACK and THING. It may well be true there is a
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syntactic difference of the kind the objection alludes to between 
ourw ater  thoughts and our stuff that boils at one hundred degree 
thoughts, but Fodor could not legitimately appeal to this fact to 
justify the attribution of the content water to WATER, for to do that 
would be to endorse the holist idea that the content of a symbol is 
partly determined by its relations to other symbols in the language to 
which it belongs.
(ii) A second attem pt to deal with the problem of indeterminacy 
involves appealing to counterfactuals and runs as follows. Its being a 
law that stuff that boils at one-hundred degrees Celsius causes 
WATER is a product of the fact that it is a law that water, and only 
water, has that boiling point, and that it is a law that water causes 
WATER. Were it not the case that water had that boiling point then 
stuff that boils at one-hundred degrees Celsius would not cause 
tokenings of WATER. Thus, it is possible to break the stuff that boils 
at one hundred  degrees Celsius ->WATER connection w ithout 
thereby breaking the water->WATER connection but not vice versa; 
in other words, the former connection asymmetrically depends on 
the latter entailing that, on Fodor's theory, WATER means ivater. 
Similarly, what all this indicates is that it is qua water, rather than 
qua stuff that boils at one hundred degrees Celsius, that water causes 
WATER.
The obvious reply to this is that the possible world where the 
properties of being water, on the one hand, and of being stuff that 
boils at one-hundred degrees Celsius, on the other, are separated is 
hardly going to be a nearby one given that it is no accident that water, 
and only water, has that boiling point in our world. Who is to say 
what would cause WATER in such a distant world? Maybe creatures 
like us couldn't survive in such a world. It is a distinct possibility 
that in every nearby possible world in which that stuff that boils at 
one hundred degrees Celsius doesn't cause WATER, water doesn't 
cause WATER either. This case is quite unlike that of the frog and its 
typically fly-caused internal state S. In the frog's world all LABT's are 
flies (and vice versa); in other words the properties of being a fly and 
that of being an LABT are coextensive. But there are nearby worlds 
w here these properties are separated , for exam ple in the 
psychologist's laboratory where the LABT's are bee-bees. Thus, there 
are some grounds for saying that it is qua LABT, rather than qua fly.
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that flies cause S as, in the laboratory, frogs will snap at bee-bees until 
the cows come home. But there are no parallel grounds for saying 
that it is qua water that water causes WATER.
We now come to the second problem case. Several philosophers 
have argued that Putnam style twin cases pose substantial problems 
for Fodor (for example. Baker (1989) and Boghossian (1991)) and it 
would, perhaps, be surprising if we could complete a discussion of 
the origins of content w ithout mentioning Twin Earth and XYZ at 
some point. Flere is my version of the worry that Fodor can't handle 
twin cases. XYZ does not fall in the extension of our water thoughts. 
However, Fodor's theory would seem to imply that it does. WATER 
also applies to XYZ. XYZ and H 2 O agree in their superficial 
properties, in how they look, taste, smell and feel to the hum an 
visual apparatus. Consequently, given that H2O causes me to token 
WATER via how it looks, tastes, smells and feels to me, XYZ would 
cause me to token WATER were I to interact with any. Therefore, if it 
is a law that H2O causes WATER, then it is also a law that XYZ causes 
WATER. This latter law or connection does not asymmetrically 
depend on the former for it is not true that it can be broken without 
breaking the former. To see this consider the following. XYZ affects 
my twin in the way it does (i.e. in just the same way that H2O affects 
me), because of its microphysical structure, because of the laws that 
hold on Twin Earth (for example, the optical laws), and because of 
the nature of my twins psychology, in particular, his sensory 
apparatus. Consequently, given that the laws of optics etc. are here on 
Earth just as they are on Twin Earth, and given that my sensory 
apparatus is just like that of my twin, it is true that XYZ would cause 
me to token WATER were I to come across any. There are three 
distinct ways of breaking the XYZ connection. The first involves 
altering the microphysical structure of XYZ so that it looked, tasted, 
smelt, and felt to me other than it does, so to speak.; that is, so that it 
affected my sensory apparatus differently than water does. The 
second way involves altering my sensory apparatus in such a way 
that XYZ comes to appear to me differently than H2O does. And the 
third way involves altering the laws of optics, for example, so 
bringing about a change in how XYZ affects me. The crucial point is 
that none of these ways of breaking the XYZ ->WATER connection 
are legitimate; none of the putative possible worlds so generated are
255
relevant to the question of the dependency relations between the 
laws under consideration. The world in which XYZ has a different 
microphysical structure is not a possible world at all given that XYZ's 
microphysical structure is part of its essence. And when breaking 
connections between properties and symbols, there are certain 
features of the subject and its world that have to be held fixed, 
amongst them the basic nature and functioning of the subject's 
sensory apparatus and the laws - such as the laws of optics - that 
underpin all interactions between the subject and the objects that 
inhabit her world. Consequently, there are no nearby possible worlds 
in which H2O causes WATER but XYZ does/w ould not; given the 
nature of XYZ and of my visual apparatus, XYZ cannot but affect my 
sensory apparatus in just the way that H2O does in any world in 
which the laws of optics etc. are as they are in our world. Therefore, 
Fodor's theory would seem to entail that XYZ falls w ithin the 
extension of WATER. But XYZ clearly doesn't fall w ithin the 
extension of WATER.
There are a couple of objections to this argument. Firstly, there is 
nothing in the way that Putnam describes the case that rules out the 
possibility of our coming to be able reliably to distinguish between 
the two kinds of stuff. If the two stuffs are chemically different, so the 
thought continues, then surely it will be nomologically possible for 
us to develop a reliable test (maybe requiring the use of a laboratory 
and sophisticated apparatus) for telling H2O apart from XYZ. This 
generates the argument that in the nearby possible world where we 
developed such a test there will be an H20->WATER connection but 
no XYZ">WATER connection. This world is a legitimate world, 
relevant to determ ining the dependency relations betw een the 
connections in question for in it our sensory apparatus is just as it is 
in the real world the laws of optics are just as they are in the real 
world, etc. .
This reply is unconvincing. In the possible world described, XYZ, in 
direct confrontations w ith me (that is, outside of the laboratory 
setting and without the use of any sophisticated apparatus) will still 
affect or appear to me in just the same way that H2O does. Thus, if it 
is true that H2O would cause me to token WATER in such direct 
interactions then there will still be an XYZ->WATER connection. For 
there to be no such connection we would have to stop applying
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WATER on the basis of direct interactions with liquids. Of course we 
could stop doing this. We could, for example, recognising that 
appearances can be m isleading, decide not to jum p to any 
conclusions as to the nature of the stuff before us when that stuff is a 
colourless, odourless, tasteless liquid; we could decide to make such 
judgements only in the laboratory setting. Making this decision 
w ould have the result of breaking the XYZ->WATER connection 
whilst leaving the H2O connection intact. However, this possibility 
does not vindicate Fodor's position. Water is very important to us 
and we are forever coming to the conclusion that the stuff before us 
is water solely on the basis of a direct perceptual encounter tliat is not 
mediated by the use of any scientific apparatus or the administering 
of any test. Rarely do we employ anything more than our unaided 
senses. Thus the H20->WATER connection is very much unlike the 
acid-> ACID connection as the latter is mediated by the use of such 
things as pieces of litmus paper. Now in the possible world under 
consideration, the H20->WATER connection is unlike the H 20-> 
WATER connection that holds in the real world in that it is 
m ediated by the em ploym ent of scientific apparatus and the 
administering of tests; the inhabitants of that world never think 
THAT'S WATER solely on the basis of a direct perceptual encounter 
with water (if they did it would be true of them that XYZ would cause 
them to token WATER). And this fact entails that their world is not 
nearby, or at least not relevant, for although the H 20->W A TER  
connection is held intact it is not the same H 2 O ->WATER 
connection that holds in the real world; for example, it is not 
implemented by the same lower level laws. Intuitively, what Fodor 
needs is a world where H2O causes WATER in just the way that it 
actually does. In the world under consideration H2O causes WATER 
in a radically different way; to employ Fodor's terminology, all else is 
not equal in that world. In short, so long as the H 20->W A T E R  
connection as it is in the real world is held intact, there will be an 
XYZ->WATER connection.
A second response to the accusation that Fodor's theory cannot deal 
with XYZ is developed by him in 'TOCIT. This response constitutes 
a modification of his theory. Here is how it goes. There is no XYZ 
around here; the property of being XYZ is uninstantiated. For this 
reason XYZ doesn't fall in the extension of WATER, for to so fall in
257
the extension of that symbol, XYZ would have to feature in the local 
environment or in the actual history of tokenings of WATER. Thus 
Fodor amends his theory saying that for a symbol "X" to mean X it 
has to be the case that 'Some "X"s are actually caused by Xs' (p. 121).
Quite apart from worries about the resultant capacity of Fodor's 
theory to deal with symbols that express uninstantiated properties 
(UNICORN, GHOST, etc.), there are major problems associated with 
the addition of this clause. Fodor is echoing Putnam's thought that 
we mean "water" to apply to stuff with the same microphysical 
structure as the local samples of "water". As a consequence of this fact 
about us, thinks Putnam, "water" doesn't apply to XYZ given that 
w hat we norm ally apply "water" to has a quite different 
microphysical structure to XYZ. This is a plausible thought and one 
that Putnam can legitimately hold. But Fodor would be on shaky 
grounds if he made a parallel move with respect to the Mentalese 
symbol WATER. Fodor is assuming that WATER is a kind concept. 
W hat right has he got to make this assumption? Nothing about 
w a t e r ' s  nomic relations to externally instantiated properties 
suggests that it is a kind concept any more than a concept that is 
satisfied by anything that has a certain range of superficial properties; 
why, for example, doesn't WATER mean something like colourless, 
odourless liquid! If WATER had this latter m eaning then XYZ 
would fall in its extension even if it were the case that for a symbol 
to express a particular property instances of that property must have 
caused tokenings of the symbol in question. I have never tokened 
TREE in response to a Giant Redwood as I have never come across a 
member of that species of tree. But Redwoods still fall within the 
extension of TREE as that symbol means tree; and given that trees 
have actually caused me to token TREE, to make that content- 
attribution is not to reject Fodor's additional clause.
In short then, Fodor's additional clause will only help him avoid 
the undesirable conclusion that XYZ falls within the extension of 
WATER if he can justify his assumption that WATER is a kind 
concept. But I don't see how he can do that by appeal to mind-world 
causal laws alone. Of course WATER is a kind concept, but 
presumably that is because of our beliefs, intentions, and the like: for 
example because it is my intention to think such thoughts as 
THAT'S WATER only in response to samples of stuff with the same
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microphysical structure as the stuff that I normally think THAT'S 
WATER in response to; because I believe that everything to which 
WATER applies has the same microphysical structure; because I 
believe that I would be mistaken if I were to think THAT'S WATER 
of any sample of stuff that wasn't H2O; and so on. Therefore, I think 
it is safe to conclude that XYZ poses a real problem for Fodor's theory.
A third problem case takes us back into the realm of representations 
that are manipulated at the subpersonal level by processes that are 
cognitively impenetrable. One objection to Fodor's theory is that it 
entails that the symbols of Mentalese do not express properties that 
are instantiated in the extra mental world but, rather, such properties 
as that of being a certain sort of proximal stimulus. The idea is that, 
for example, because whenever a horse causes a tokening of HORSE 
it does so by causing a token of a certain type of proximal trace, the 
horse ~> HORSE connection asymmetrically depends on that between 
the proximal trace type in question and HORSE.
As we have seen, Fodor's response to this objection is to say, quite 
plausibly, that there is no single, or small range of, proximal trace 
types that mediate the horse->HORSE connection. However, this 
line of response will not work for all mental representations. Recall 
the symbol RED (not that symbol that features in sentences of 
Mentalese that express the contents of our red beliefs, but that 
symbol employed in early visual processing to indicate that a red 
object is impinging upon the subject's visual apparatus). RED 
covaries quite reliably with a certain pattern of retinal stimulation, 
namely that pattern that is standardly caused by red objects. That is, 
red objects typically cause retinal images with a certain intrinsic 
property, and retinal images with that property invariably cause a 
tokening of RED. If this were not the case then the visual system 
w ould not be able to perform  the routine task of extracting 
information concerning the colour of the object(s) before the subject 
from the retinal image. Now of course RED expresses the property of 
being red, but Fodor's theory would seem to suggest that it expresses 
the property of being a retinal image with a certain type of intrinsic 
property. There will be many other symbols manipulated at the sub 
personal level by cognitively impenetrable processes that cause 
similar problems for Fodor's theory; RED is not an isolated case that 
can be brushed under the carpet. It will do no good to try to deal with
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this problem by stipulating that the connections relevant to the 
determ ination of meaning are those between properties that are 
instantiated in the extra cranial world and the symbols in question. 
This is because some such symbols express properties that are 
instantiated in the head. For example, the primal sketch does not 
represent the external world as being a certain way, but rather 
represents certain features of the retinal image from which it was 
generated.
A final problem case is that of states or events that, though they 
satisfy Fodor’s sufficient condition, do not have any meaning or 
content. Such cases would appear to suggest that Fodor's condition is 
not sufficient after all. There are plenty of cases where a law of the 
form "As cause Cs" asymmetrically depends on a law of the form "Bs 
cause Cs" where the Cs in question mean nothing at all. Indeed, if 
Fodor's condition was sufficient, given that causal chains give rise to 
a species of asymmetric dependence and that every event belongs to a 
causal chain, every event would mean something.^^^
In attempting to deal with this problem Fodor amends his theory 
somewhat. He asserts that asymmetric dependence alone is not 
enough for content, stipulating that there must be robustness as well; 
thus it is asymmetric dependence plus robustness that is sufficient for 
meaning. This rules out most Cs from meaning anything as Bs 
always figure in their etiology; they are never caused by non-Bs and 
thus are not robust.
One can see the appeal of this response; it is not just an arbitrary 
stipulation whose only recommendation is that it gets Fodor out of a 
sticky situation. On the contrary, robustness would appear to be 
intimately bound up with meaning, for all the clear cut cases of 
meaningful items (for example, public language utterances and 
thoughts) would appear to be robust. One of the most important and 
valuable features of language and thought is that it enables us to 
represent things (for example, to talk and think about things) in their
Causal chains give rise to a species of asymmetric dependence for this reason: 
Every causal chain leading from A to C will be mediated by an event B. In order to 
cause C, A has to set off a causal chain that leads to B, an event which in turn sets off 
a causal chain that leads to C. Consequently, if B didn't cause C then neither would  
A have, but given that the B->C chain doesn't run through A, B would still cause C 
even if A didn't.
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absence. I don’t have to have Fodor or one of his books impinging on 
me in order to talk or think about him and his writings. However, 
there is a good reason to reject Fodor's addition of the robustness 
clause.
There are symbols that are not robust, yet that are caused only by 
instances of the property that they represent. Transducers are 
m echanism s that play a fundam ental role in m ediating the 
interaction between the mind and the world. There are two basic 
sorts of transducer. The first sort takes physical, non-symbolic events 
as input, and produces symbols as output, symbols which are then 
processed by some cognitive module. The second sort takes mental 
symbols as input and produces physical, nonsymbolic events as 
output (for example, neural firings that subsequently cause muscle 
contractions). My interest is in the first sort of transducer. Such 
transducers are constructed in such a way as to be sensitive only to 
certain of the intrinsic physical properties of their input; for example, 
the transducers that produce the retinal image or grey coding are 
sensitive only to such properties of the light waves hitting the retina 
as their intensity, wavelength, and the like. Consequently, the 
symbolic output produced by a transducer will be wholly determined 
by the intrinsic physical properties of its input, and each of the 
distinct symbols of the transducer's language will covary with a 
specific type of physical input. If, on two distinct occasions, my retina 
is subject to the same stimulation then, all else equal, identical 
retinal images will be produced. Now the crucial point is that the 
symbols produced by such transducers represent or express the very 
properties that they are sensitive to; for example, the symbols 
produced by the retinal transducer represent the light intensity 
values at various points on the retina. Given that transducers 
produce symbols that represent intrinsic physical properties of their 
causes and that they are sensitive only to such properties, a 
transducer will produce that symbol that expresses the property P 
only in response to events which have P. In other words, transducer- 
produced symbols are not robust, and thereby constitute a 
counterexample to Fodor's amended theory. Once again it is symbols 
produced at the sub personal level that cause him problems.
It might be thought that Fodor can save his theory by appealing to 
the phenom enon of m alfunction. In cases of m alfunction.
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transducers sometimes produce a tokening of the symbol S that 
expresses the property P in response to a non-P. It might be thought 
that this entails that S is robust. However, it does not. The laws 
governing the production of transducer symbols are ceteris paribus 
laws, and in cases of malfunction the ceteris paribus clause of such 
laws will have been violated. If it is a ceteris paribus law that 
transducers of type T produce symbols of type S in response to inputs 
with property P then there will be no other laws of the form "Ts 
produce S in response to inputs that have P " (where P' is some 
property other than P). I take it that there would have to be laws of 
this latter form for S to be robust. Therefore S will not be robust, the 
possibility of malfunction notwithstanding.
7.7 Is there more to meaning than reference?
Fodor's theory is a theory of reference in the respect that it accounts 
for, at most, the reference of the primitive nonlogical symbols of 
Mentalese, and consequently of our thoughts. But, one might object, 
there is more to meaning than reference, thus entailing that Fodor's 
theory is at best incomplete. For example, the symbols "water" and 
"H2O" have the same reference but are not equivalent in meaning 
and the thought that I express with the sentence "water is wet" differs 
in content from that that I express with the sentence "H2O is wet"; 
these symbols and thoughts diverge in respect of a second 
component of meaning, namely sense, or the mode of presentation 
of reference. Familiar facts that are widely taken to establish that 
there is this second component of meaning are the following; the 
sentence "water is H2O " is informative whereas "water is water" is 
not; one can rationally adopt different epistemic attitudes with 
respect to thoughts that have the same referential content or truth 
conditions. For example, one can sensibly believe that water is wet 
whilst doubting that H2O is wet.
In response to the charge that his theory ignores sense, and for that 
reason is at best incomplete (in naturalising only one component of 
content) and at worst flat false (in implying that, for example, "water" 
and "H2O " -and their Mentalese analogues - are equivalent in 
meaning) Fodor takes the bull by the horns denying that there is such
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a thing as s e n s e . H e  attempts to deal with the above described 
sense-motivating facts - what he calls the Frege cases - by appealing to 
syntax. In effect, he wheels in syntax to do the job that sense is widely 
invoked to do. This is how his idea goes. Prepositional attitudes are 
individuated not just in terms of their mode and content but also in 
terms of the syntactic properties of their vehicle, so that for you and I 
to share a belief we must each have a sentence in our respective 
belief boxes that agrees in both its semantic and syntactic properties. 
If, for example, the sentence in your belief box is WATER IS WET 
and that in mine is H2O IS WET then our respective beliefs do not 
belong to the same type, despite the fact that they agree in c o n t e n t . ^ 4 0  
Reflecting this fact, sentences that ascribe prepositional attitudes to 
individuals specify not just the mode and content of the attitude, but 
also the syntactic properties of its vehicle, that is, the syntactic 
properties of the sentence of Mentalese that expresses the content of 
the attitude in question. Consequently, an individual can rationally 
believe that water is wet whilst doubting that H2O is wet, for to do 
that is not the same as to believe that w ater is wet and 
simultaneously doubt that water is wet. And the sentence "water is 
H 2O" is informative in a way in which "water is water" is not, for an 
individual who already has the concept WATER can acquire a new
In 'TOCir, in answer to the question 'why doesn't "water" mean the same as 
"H20"?' he says that these two symbols have the same meaning but goes on to argue 
that having the concept WATER is not the same mental state as having the concept 
H 2 O in virtue of the fact that the Mentalese symbol WATER has different syntactic 
properties from the Mentalese symbol H20. His rejection of the notion of sense is most 
explicit in 'Substitution Arguments and the Individuation of Beliefs', a paper that 
opens with the sentence, 'The older I get, the more inclined I am to think that there 
is nothing at all to meaning except denotation; for example, that there is nothing to 
the meaning of a name except its bearer and nothing to the meaning of a predicate 
except the property that it expresses'.
140 'Substitution Arguments and the Individuation of Beliefs' Fodor argues that 
there is a fourth dimension to propositional attitude individuation, namely causal 
role. So, for you and I to share a belief we must each have in our belief box a sentence 
with the same content, the same syntactic properties, and the same causal role. 
However, by The Elm and the Expert Fodor had abandoned this fourth feature of 
propositional attitude individuation.
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belief on being presented with the former sentence but not on being 
presented with the latter.
If this appeal to syntax works then - given that Fodor has no 
problems accounting for how some of our internal states can have 
syntactic properties - so long as Fodor's theory of content works as a 
theory of reference the problems generated by the Frege cases 
evaporate. However, there are several reasons for scepticism.
(i) Fodor would appear to be making a claim about folk psychology, 
namely that it individuates propositional attitudes partly in terms of 
the syntactic properties of mental representations. Moreover, he 
seems to be committing himself to the view that ordinary folk, 
when they ascribe propositional attitudes to their fellows, stick their 
neck out as to the syntactic properties of some mental representation. 
Thus, when I say that Edgar believes that water is wet, I am making 
the claim that he has in his belief box the Mentalese analogue of the 
English sentence "water is wet"; I am doing more than saying that he 
has a belief with the same content as that English sentence. This does 
seem a little implausible as it implies that folk psychology is 
committed to a specific theory concerning the nature of propositional 
attitudes, namely RTM. Surely most folk psychologists have never 
heard of, let alone endorsed, RTM.
Despite the fact that folk psychology does not individuate attitudes 
syntactically, it does distinguish between attitudes that agree in their 
truth conditional or referential content. For example, folk psychology 
does distinguish between believing that water is wet and believing 
that H 20 is wet and most of those who would be happy to ascribe to 
Fang the belief that there is water in his bowl would resist the claim 
that Fang thereby believes that there is H2O in his bowl. This suggests 
that it is a fundamental assumption of folk psychology that there is 
more to a propositional attitude than a mode and a referential 
content and that extra component is not syntax. This makes it very 
tem pting to conclude that folk psychology is committed to the 
existence of something like sense. If this conclusion were correct, 
then Fodor's view, as a claim about folk psychology, would be 
mistaken. Of course it would be open to him to argue that folk 
psychology does employ a notion of sense but that it is mistaken to 
do so. However, one might wonder how appealing such a view
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would be to Fodor given his desire to vindicate folk psychology and 
make a respectable scientific psychology out of it.
(ii) A second problem with Fodor's rejection of sense is that he runs 
the real danger of running together two levels that he stresses are 
distinct, namely the intentional level and the computational level 
that implements it. As we have seen, he holds that intentional laws 
are com putationally  or syntactically im plem ented. That the 
relationship between the intentional and the computational is one 
of phenomena and laws at one level, being implemented by lower 
level phenomena and laws, is appealed to by Fodor in dealing with 
the accusation (most famously levelled by Stich (1983); see also Devitt 
(1991)) that the endorsement of the view that the mind is a syntax- 
driven machine implies that intentional and semantic properties 
have no proper place in psychological explanation. Such a defence of 
intentional psychology - and the associated account of the nature of 
th e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw ee n  the  in te n tio n a l an d  the  
syntactic/computational, and their respective places in the scientific 
hierarchy - would appear to be inconsistent with the idea that 
intentional psychology must individuate partly in terms of syntax; 
for that idea entails that intentional psychology must appeal to the 
syntactic properties of mental representations in framing its laws and 
explanations.
It is clear that intentional psychology needs more than just mode 
and referential content. A psychology that recognised, appealed to, 
and individuated propositional attitudes in terms of just their mode 
and their reference would be descriptively and explanatorally 
inadequate. This is because beliefs can agree in their referential 
content yet diverge in their causal powers; for example water beliefs 
have different causal powers f iom H lO  beliefs. Consequently, if one is 
going successfully to predict an individual's behaviour one needs to 
know more than the referential content of her belief. Similarly, if 
one is going to explain adequately an individual's behaviour one 
will need to specify more than the referential content of the belief 
appealed to.
As a consequence of the above described facts, the laws and 
generalisations em ployed and alluded to in the course of 
constructing intentional explanations and predictions will need to 
appeal to more than the referential content of propositional attitudes.
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If the generalisations of intentional psychology are such that to satisfy 
the antecedent of such a generalisation all that is required of a 
subject is that she has an attitude with a certain mode and a certain 
referential content then they will be at worst flat false, and at best 
useless for the purposes of intentional prediction and explanation.
Hence, intentional psychology must recognise the existence of, 
appeal to, and individuate propositional attitudes in terms of, 
properties other than modes and referential contents. A psychology 
that ignored such differences as that between believing that water is 
wet and believing that H 2O is wet would be descriptively and 
explanatorily inadequate.
(iii) A third problem with Fodor's rejection of sense has to do with 
behaviour. For very familiar reasons behaviour cannot be reduced to 
physical m ovement; type-identical behaviour can involve the 
making of very different physical movements, and identical physical 
movements can constitute divergent behaviour (Pylyshyn (1983)). 
Behaviour has semantic and intentional properties in terms of 
which we describe and individuate it. Some recent behaviour of 
Edgar includes hiding from Fang, ringing the emergency services, 
and asking for directions to the nearest hospital. Behaviour inherits 
its semantic and intentional properties from its mental causes, and 
from features of the wider context in which it takes place. For 
example, whilst riding a cycle Waldo sticks out his left arm and in so 
doing indicates to turn left. His behaviour is that of indicating to turn 
left partly in virtue of its intentional causes, (that is, the beliefs, 
desires, intentions etc. that figure in its etiology), and partly because 
of such facts about the wider context as that it is a convention in our 
society that one indicates to turn left on a cycle by sticking out one's 
left arm.
Now just as sentences that attribute propositional attitudes to an 
ind iv idual are opaque to the substitu tion  of co-referential 
expressions, so are sentences that describe an individual’s behaviour. 
The fact that it is true that an individual is searching for water 
doesn't imply that it is true that she is searching for H2O. There is a 
difference between water behaviour and H2O behaviour, just as there 
is a difference between gold behaviour and stuff with atomic number 
79 behaviour, and so on. Ordinary every day folk recognise and 
honour such differences in describing and individuating the
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behaviour of themselves and their fellows. Waldo is prospecting for 
gold in a respect in which he is not prospecting for stuff with atomic 
number 79; Fang is scratching around for water in a respect in which 
he is not scratching around for H2O; and Edgar is setting a trap to 
catch the thief of his prize delphiniums in a respect in which he is 
not setting a trap to catch Waldo despite the fact that Waldo is the 
culprit.
Thus, in describing and individuating behaviour, folk psychology 
appeals to, and must appeal to, properties of behaviour other than, so 
to speak, referential content. In this respect behaviours are just like 
propositional attitudes. How are we to account for this fact? What is 
the difference between water behaviour and H2O behaviour? It is 
clearly no good to argue that the difference is syntactic, as behaviour 
doesn't have syntactic properties; only certain kinds of symbols have 
syntactic properties. My thought is that the difference is semantic, 
something like a difference in sense. In saying this, the conclusion 
that I am driving at is that in abandoning sense Fodor has no way of 
accounting for such differences in behaviour, for here syntax will not 
do the job that sense is standardly invoked to do. A psychology based 
on the idea that there is nothing more to meaning than reference 
would therefore miss important distinctions between different types 
of behaviour; in other words, its taxonomy of behaviour would be 
far too coarse-grained.
It might be objected to this argument that one can account for the 
difference between water and H2O without invoking some second 
component of meaning or arguing that behaviour has syntactic 
properties. The idea is that we describe and individuate behaviour in 
terms of what the subject has in mind, in terms of how she sees or 
represents to herself that behaviour. This won't do for at least two 
reasons. Firstly, animals often behave without having anything in 
mind or without representing to themselves what they are doing. Is 
it really plausible to say that as a thirsty Fang scratches around for 
water he sees himself as scratching around for water? Secondly, often 
when people do have a conception of what they are doing they are 
mistaken so that the correct description of what they were doing 
w ouldn't be a correct description of what they had in mind in so 
acting. Consider, for example, those lonely folks who go shopping 
everyday in a desperate search for companionship. As far as they are
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concerned what they are doing is going shopping, yet what they are 
really doing is searching for companionship, despite how they 
represent their behaviour to themselves.
Thus, I conclude that Fodor has failed to overcome the need for a 
second component of meaning; his attempt to invoke syntax to do 
the job normally given to sense fails. The upshot of this is that his 
theory of content is at best incomplete, as it naturalises only one 
component of meaning, namely, reference. His theory might tell us 
why, for example, the thought that I express with the English words 
"water is wet" is about water. But it doesn't tell us why it has the 
same content as the English sentence "water is wet" rather than that 
of "H20 is wet".
7.8 Conclusion
In this chapter I have presented a whole battery of objections to 
Fodor's naturalistic theory of content and therefore conclude that 
that theory fails. By way of recapitulation my central claims are as 
follows: (i) Fodor's theory does not apply to the simple non-logical 
symbols of natural language. Consequently, the theory is robbed of 
much of its motivation. Moreover, given the close relationship 
between language and thought, a failure to apply to natural language 
comes very close to implying a failure to apply to Mentalese. (ii) 
Fodor's theory requires that there are nonintentional causal laws 
relating the tokening of symbols to the instantiation of the properties 
that they express. Yet with respect to many of the symbols that 
express the contents of personal level prepositional attitudes, there 
are no such laws; the only laws that govern the tokening of such 
symbols are inherently intentional, (iii) At the subpersonal level 
there are, arguably, symbols whose tokening is governed by the kinds 
of laws that Fodor requires. However, in these cases there is no
It might be thought that one option open to Fodor is that of appealing to narrow ;
content. The idea is that the difference between my water thoughts and my H 20 j
thoughts is a difference in narrow content and that such differences are reflected in 
the syntactic properties of the sentences that we use to ascribe thoughts to ourselves j
and our fellows. However, there is no mileage in this idea as water thoughts have :
the same narrow content as their H 20 thought analogues (as they instantiate the j
same function from contexts to referential contents).
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asymmetric dependence. In general, where there are nonintentional 
laws governing the tokening of a symbol, there are no relationships 
of asymmetric dependence between those laws. And in those cases 
where there is something approaching asymmetric dependence (as in 
the case of the tokening of such natural language symbols as "horse") 
there are no nonintentional laws in operation, (iv) There are a 
number of problem cases; that is, cases where Fodor's theory implies 
that a symbol has a meaning at odds with its actual meaning, (v) 
Fodor's theory is essentially a theory of reference. This is a weakness 
if there is more to the content of our mental states than their 
reference or if scientific psychology needs to appeal to a further 
dimension of mental meaning. Fodor's attempt to invoke syntax to 
play the role of that extra dimension fails.
What are we to do in the light of the failure of Fodor's theory? 
W hat morals should be draw n from my reflections? We should 
certainly not abandon the naturalisation project. But an approach 
somewhat at odds with that adopted by Fodor is needed. Fodor 
attem pted to construct - in one fell swoop and by relatively a 
prioristic means - an all encompassing theory of content. And he 
arrived at his conclusions on the basis of reflection on a small 
num ber of cases that, though familiar and salient from the folk 
psychological perspective, may not be all that typical. Given the 
differences between the various representational states that are 
attributed to us by scientific psychologists, there are good reasons to 
be sceptical of the existence of any general theory of content. In all 
probability, some of our representational states get their intentional 
and semantic properties determined in one way, and others in quite 
another way. Consequently, we should adopt a more piecemeal 
approach, concentrating our attention on only a small range of 
related intentional states at any one time. However, having said that, 
we should not focus our attention on too narrow a range of examples 
or we shall run the risk of making a mistake analogous to that made 
by Fodor as a result of his concentrating too much of his attention on 
thoughts about horses and thoughts about cows. Such a piecemeal 
approach cannot proceed in ignorance of, and indifference to, actual 
empirical research for we need to know what kinds of intentional 
states scientific psychology takes us to have, which specific 
intentional and semantic properties it attributes to those states, and
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what the facts are surrounding their tokening. But there may well be 
an important role for a prioristic reasoning. If we are to have any 
realistic hope of uncovering the nonintentional and nonsemantic 
determ inants of the semantic and intentional properties of a 
particular type of intentional state, we need to have a detailed 
understanding of the nature of the properties in question. In general, 
if one seeks to naturalise a property P, it is a good idea to have a 
detailed understanding of the nature of that property. It is not 
outlandish to say that such an understanding is precisely the sort that 
is arrived  at by the successful construction by trad itional 
philosophical means of a constitutive account of what it is to have 
the p roperty  in question. In other words, both  trad itional 
philosophical analysis and a consideration of actual scientific 
psychological theories and explanations, have an important place in 
any sensible approach to the naturalisation project. One might say 
that the project has a distinctly interdisciplinary air about it. This 
implies a criticism of Fodor's approach on two counts. First, he 
doesn’t make enough of an attempt to understand and shed light on 
the nature of the properties that he seeks to naturalise. For example, 
he launches into a search for the nonsemantic and nonintentional 
determinants of the meaning of the Mentalese symbol that means 
horse w ithout considering what is involved in having that meaning. 
Second, he nowhere considers or appeals to actual scientific 
psychological research and findings. I find this quite ironic given that 
Fodor spent much of his early and middle career telling us that there 
is no fundam ental divide betw een philosophy and scientific 
psychology and that developments in the latter field can shed much 
light upon the traditional concerns of those engaged in the former.
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